To Khun Patiwat: TAOs and PAOs already existed before the 1997 constitutuion. But it openened the way for introducing direct elections of executives, and the transfer of powers via the Decentralization Act and the Decentralization Plan. Also, the previous sukhapiban had to be changed into thesaban tambon as a result of the constitution. The CEO governors have nothing to do with the constitution, but represent Thaksin’s attempt at centralizing policy-implementation power and establishing some degree of horizontal integration at the provincial level (suan phumiphak), which is highly fragemented. This sort of governor could rather be seen as contradicting the constitution’s push for democracy, especially if you consider Article 78.
I hate Thai funerals, whether held in Bangkok or upcountry. I hate the part where I have to suffer the long sermon by the presiding monk about what the dead had left behind (usually measurable in Baht terms) and the living should be giving more.
But for status conscious Thais, funerals are very like much like weddings, and many (of the dead) planned their funerals and the amount to be spent on them (with specific instructions to their kids) long before they coughed out their last breath.
I hate to be morbid but I get this feeling that the funeral of one Thaksin Shinawatra would be very festive, rather than mournful, for Thailand. And many are impatient to line up to give a dead Thaksin some unprintable compliments (similar to the millions of NO VOTES on ballots defaced by poetic obscenities directed at Thaksin Shinawatra)!
When one speaks about De-Thaksinization, one will also have to ask what will be put in place instead. And this is a good question to direct at the current constitution-drafting process. One might say that well, yes, the people’s political roles will be increased. However, this does not seem to be the case. The headline of Matichon’s Sunday edition (February 11) reads “The new constitution presages the weakening of the political sector and the restoration of bureaucratic power.” Thaksin is, so to speak, taken as an excuse by the monarchist and bureaucratic forces to wrest powers from the politicians and the people and return it where it was under pre-1997 conditions–the bureaucracy. Thus, weak coalition governments with parties riddled by factional infighting, so Matichon, is needed in order to put the “civil service party” back to where they used to be.
On this way, important political rights of the people will have to be sacrificed. This concerns both the election of party-list MPs and of senators. The party list is of particular concern, because, for the first time, it enabled voters to translate their national political preferences into votes, thereby substantially increasing the citizens’ representational participation. This established an electoral link between voters and national-level politicians that was previously absent. This link, then, was an important element in decreasing the power of the bureaucracy. For this reason, it has to go.
It remains to be seen, whether the CDC’s decision to abolish the party-list system will be resisted in the public hearings and surveys, and finally put back into the constititution.
The drafting of the constitution warrants close observation. Equally important will be how the referendum will be conducted. There are some signs that an open debate and moves to push for a no-vote might be prohibited. This would seriously impact on the legitimacy of the referendum, and perhaps its outcome.
In sum, there is more to the issue of “De-Thaksinization” than initially meets the eye.
Thank you Erik for that wonderful mini ethnography.
“If the family feels the need to celebrate the death in public fashion, the cost will be higher”
This seems like a key point. The cheapest funeral is very cheap indeed. My peaceful little neighborhood in Chiang Rai has a lot of elderly people who die of old-age related illnesses quite frequently. They have very small informal and inexpensive funerals.
When I lived in Mae Sai, a place where there are many rich Chinese merchant familes, some of the funerals where quite extravagant, with fireworks even, and a big party. I have to admit, I find the whole thing depressing and don’t actively partcipate (which probably means I wouldn’t have many people coming to my funeral, if I died suddenly and unexpectedly). My family though fastidiously carries out their obligation to attend these funerals. IMHO this creates bonds of friendship between neighbors and makes a neighborhood more secure. Our neighborhood is very safe because neighbors look out for each other. (other neighborhoods are plagued by youth gangs and drugs) As a contrast, when I lived in Yangon you always had to have someone at home with bars on windows and doors. The one time an aunt left her house in Taung Okalapa unattended to go to a house warming over on Pyi St. a burglar ransacked the house and stole all the family heirlooms, i.e. funerals are part of “neighborhood security and solidarity”
Counting, collecting stats probably give a more objective picture, but one might perhaps look like a foreign spy (Thaksin’s observation that NGOs implied a loss of sovereignty) thus IMHO the need for collaboration with Thai researchers. The UC Berkeley Demography Department was doing some work in northern Thailand, but I don’t whether their data are detailed enough.
And, of course, the academic sphere itself, i.e. universities, is just as disfunctional as the political arena is. But while academics are ready to criticize politics, they reject seeing their own substantial faults. Speaking of hypocrisy…
Chulalongkorn University yesterday denied it has banned the Sept 19 Coup d’etat, a 460-page book containing articles criticising the putsch, from sale in the university’s book store. The allegation surfaced on Thursday when the book’s editor and publisher Thanapol Eawsakul, of the Fa Diew Kan printing house, complained to the media that the publication was banned from the CU Book Centre.
”It is a pity the students and clients of the CU book shop cannot buy the book,” he said.
CU book store is a major book supplier for domestic and overseas libraries. The ban means a number of intellectuals and students would be impeded from learning the views of Thailand’s top thinkers on the current political situation, he said.
But the CU Book Centre manager Uraiwan Kornwitysinn yesterday denied the book ban and said that readers could still buy it from the book store or order it through http://www.chulabook.com.
”There is no reason to ban the book. We have 500 copies of the Sept 19 Coup d’etat in our stock at the moment,” she claimed.
”I think the publisher is using this tactic to promote the book,” said the book shop manager.
She admitted the book store began the sale of the controversial publication much later than other stores because the book had only just arrived at the university two days ago.
Mr Thanapol dismissed the book shop’s claim, saying that the distributor had delivered the publication to all book stores within a week after the book was launched on Jan 19.
The root cause of the crisis was the 1997 Constitution, a constitution that assured that Thailand would get a strong and stable government, able to develop and execute radical long-term plans without falling apart every few months like the governments of the past – although some called that a parliamentary dictatorship. That’s why a 2/5’s vote of the House was needed for a no confidence vote.
We didn’t want our MPs to be whores that defected to whatever party paid them the most money – even though some claimed that MPs should be able to defect whenever they wanted. That’s why the 90-day-before-elections party registration limit was put in place and Snoh was so unwilling to just leave the TRT.
By design, the constitution created a strong executive branch with a firmer division between the executive and legislative branches – even though some called this the first step to a presidential system. That’s why MPs were forced to resign from the House in order to become Cabinet ministers. That’s why we adopted the party-list system.
The constitution assumed that the electorate could provide better checks and balances for the government than the bureaucracy could – even though some people claimed that the people are too dumb to care about their own rights. That’s why we had an elected Senate and an Ombudsman.
The constitution strongly advocated decentralization of power – even though some people said that rural politicians were even more corrupt than national politicians. But that’s why we had TAOs, PAOs, and later the CEO-governor model.
The de-Thaksinization of Thailand isn’t just about exiling Thaksin. It also requires a dismantling of the key innovations of the 1997 Constitution.
To use a medical metaphor, the ‘conventional wisdom’ is that what has been ailing Thai society is a ‘pathogenic’ agent, reads Thaksin, and his minions of corrupted politicians and bureaucrats. According to this view, if you get rid of the ‘pathogen’, all will be fine and dandy. The ‘De-Thaksinizing’ coup is thus like an antibiotics or an antivirals. Disease cured. End of story. Life goes on as it has always been, or so they thought.
But while the above diagnosis may appeal to many, in part, because it absolves most people of their guilt, it may well be too simplistic.
Perhaps Thailand can better be described as suffering from a different kind of disease though. If Thailand can be compared to a human being, one must say that she is not one known for virtues or moderation, despite her constant proclamation to the contrary. Her fortune in life is derived largely from resources that has been passed on to her from earlier generations, and perhaps from her agreeable personality, and from being a good cook possibly, but her relatively lapse personal discipline is a handicap that hinder her from realizing her full potential. She would also be someone who didn’t pay much attention to school in her youth, prone to vanity and luxuries, fairly excitable, drinks and party excessively, and of easy morals. So, just as someone who leads an easy life like this is not likely to age gracefully, perhaps Thailand is going through the same phase as well? Thus, what is ailing Thailand may better be compared to some kind of social ‘degenerative’ disease, a la various neurodegernative diseases–alzheimer’s, dementia, and the like, for example, for which Thaksin and the ensuing conflicts are but one of many symptoms. And what constitute to the conditions is the way every Thais go about their lives, for better or for worse. Thaksin, the juntas, the elites, as much as everyone else is part of the problem.
This view is much less comforting, admittedly, since like their medical analogies, there isn’t much one can do yet to reverse aging or cure degenerative diseases.
The problems were not Thaksin. The problems were and are still institutional.
But, of course, no serious Thai academic will ever challenge or go after the institutional structures that perpetuate dysfunctions in Thai politics, which is why the same problems keep repeating themselves time and time again.
Thai academics are part of the problem, and like political cronies of powerful figures, they will never bite the hand that feeds them.
Chulalongkorn University Book Centre has banned a new anthology critical of the coup, due to fears of possible political repercussions.
The book entitled: “The September 19th coup: a coup for a democratic regime under the constitutional monarchy” is an anthology written by leading academics and intellectuals, including Nidhi Eoseewong, Sulak Sivaraksa, Chaiwat Satha-anand and Thongchai Winichakul.
Chula Book Centre yesterday informed the book’s distributor that the centre’s literary-approval group opposed selling the book at the university’s bookstores.
“They just said that they dare not to sell the book,” said Tichakorn Chatanan of Kledthai, the book’s distributor. The book was published by Samesky Publishing House.
An official at Chula Book Centre told The Nation that the group feared political repercussions from selling the book.
“We are in educational institution, so we decided to be neutral,” said the official who asked not to be named.
The official declined to say whether the group was pressured to ban the book.
“Please do not ask, I feel uneasy about answering,” the official said.
“It’s up to the puyai [superiors] whether they will reconsider the ban,” the official said.
Pitch Pongsawat, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn, said: “This is one among various forms of self-censorship that is taking place in Thailand, especially after the coup.
“In this particular case, it reflects the reality of how the university operates, which seems to be against the idea of ensuring academic freedom and the freedom of speech, which are important for Thailand in this particular time of political tension.”
Pitch wrote an essay for the book called: “The September 19 Coup turned citizens into vassal serfs”.
The book is selling well at other bookstores, including Amarin Bookstore’s Nai-in, Se-Ed Books and Thammasat University Bookstore.
“We have already ordered more copies because many customers have asked for the book,” said Pracharakamol Ampunsaeng at Amarin Bookstore’s purchasing department. The book is displayed on the “Social and Political Issue” shelf at the store.
The book’s contents include: “Historical status of the September 19th Coup” by historian Suthachai Yimprasert; and “The September 19th Coup in the eyes of foreign media” by Pakavadi Virapaspong. Other contributors include political scientist Thanet Wongyannava, historian Somsak Jeamtheerasakul, philosophy lecturer Kasem Penpinan, Somchai Preecha-silpakul of Chiang Mai University and University of Hawaii PhD candidate Sirote Klampaiboon.
to high civilize people!!!!!! I’m one of those who love our majesty and our kingdom. our country have many beautiful culture that you never have it. so,this book is all Lie!! and look down our country our king please looking back to your country and think again before you post your stupid idea.
A recent issue of the Asian Studies Journal has an article written by two Japanese researchers on the results of interviewing a number of people in the Khon Kaen [spelling?] area on the 30 baht scheme. Conclusion-respondents thought it was a good scheme.
I must warn one or two posters that the researchers did not sample thousands of people distributed over all provinces,nor did they make any mention of the respondents being supporters of Mr.T..
Ajarn Pacapol: Just two brief remarks. First, I would not refer (De-)Thaksinization to Thailand. That was a vast exaggeration already in the title of McCargo/Ukrist’s book. If anything, Thaksin had an impact on politics, while the other societal sub-systems remained largely unaffected. Teachers did not change their instruction methods because of Thaksin, neither did doctors, artists, lecturers, lawyers, or mass-media people change their modes of operation because of Thaksin.
Second, even in politics one needs to be rather careful. Did Thaksin push through new socio-political structures or did he rather merely maximised existing structures to his own benefit? I would opt for the second option. Patronage networks at the national level, or phuak structures in the provinces existed before Thaksin, and they will exist after him. Look at the NLA, the CDA, and the CDC: Do they consist of individuals or of members of socio-political networks? Rather the latter.
Thaksin is not pricipally different at all from Chartchai, Chavalit, Banharn, Suwat, Somsak, or Banharn. What distinguishes him from them is his great energy and determination, his unsurpassed egocentrism, his visionary and modern approach to political marketing, and, of course, his immense personal wealth, which has made him basically independent from financiers. Simply speaking, where Banharn or Kamnan Poh could “buy” Suphanburi and Chonburi, respectively, Thaksin could aim for the entire country.
With the departure of Thaksin, Thai politics is de-Thaksinized already. However, the structures that enabled him to do what he did are general Thai socio-political structures that continue to exist.
Many in this forum seem to believe that Thaksin Shinawatra, despite his anomalous rule, would have survived and flourished still . . . had Thailand without its HMK. But is that presumption valid?
Southeast Asia had even more powerful ‘democracy-defending’ monsters like Marcos, and later on Joseph Estrada (whom many Filipinos claim was even more popular to the majority Philippine rurals and poor). And Thailand’s Suharto too was another powerful corrupt and was too deposed extra-constitutionally. And the Philippines and Indonesia we know had never had Kings.
‘De-Thaksinisation’ is no more different to ‘De-Marcosation’ or ‘De-Suhartosation’. All were popular people protests to oust shameless corrupt leaders they can no longer accept nor tolerate. And once begun the ouster of these leaders could no longer be stopped, with violence or without.
Personally I believe HMK’s presence helped prevent bloodshed from the Thaksin issue upheaval (and in the case of the Suchinda upheaval, stop more blood being shed). Thailand’s HMK could NOT ‘prevent’ or ‘encourage’ the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra . . . because once the Thai people made up their minds, every one else, including HMK, can only go with the flow.
Re: Tobacco: “Over the past two or three years tobacco has greatly increased in popularity. It is grown under contract (albeit an informal, verbal one) and one of the main attractions is that the company, not the farmer, pays for the seedlings and the fertiliser.”
One farmer, due west of Chiang Rai just when you start going up in the foothills, told me that there was an agricultural extension program for higher quality tobacco being funded by a foreign tobacco company, I believe American. Corn for pig feed was all the rage a couple of years ago too.
[I had the opportunity to talk to farmers when Alliance Francaise Photography Club in Chiang Rai put on an exhibit at Chiang Saen museum a couple of years ago. Nineteenth century photos of the Lamet, a Cambodian hill tribe were also included. The French have lot of real down home and nice things in Thailand, like their recent macrophotography seminar in Chiang Rai.]
Facebook 
Twitter 
Soundcloud 
Youtube 
Rss
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
PS: sorry — “push for decentralization”, not “push for democracy”.
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
To Khun Patiwat: TAOs and PAOs already existed before the 1997 constitutuion. But it openened the way for introducing direct elections of executives, and the transfer of powers via the Decentralization Act and the Decentralization Plan. Also, the previous sukhapiban had to be changed into thesaban tambon as a result of the constitution. The CEO governors have nothing to do with the constitution, but represent Thaksin’s attempt at centralizing policy-implementation power and establishing some degree of horizontal integration at the provincial level (suan phumiphak), which is highly fragemented. This sort of governor could rather be seen as contradicting the constitution’s push for democracy, especially if you consider Article 78.
From the archives: funding funerals
I hate Thai funerals, whether held in Bangkok or upcountry. I hate the part where I have to suffer the long sermon by the presiding monk about what the dead had left behind (usually measurable in Baht terms) and the living should be giving more.
But for status conscious Thais, funerals are very like much like weddings, and many (of the dead) planned their funerals and the amount to be spent on them (with specific instructions to their kids) long before they coughed out their last breath.
I hate to be morbid but I get this feeling that the funeral of one Thaksin Shinawatra would be very festive, rather than mournful, for Thailand. And many are impatient to line up to give a dead Thaksin some unprintable compliments (similar to the millions of NO VOTES on ballots defaced by poetic obscenities directed at Thaksin Shinawatra)!
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
When one speaks about De-Thaksinization, one will also have to ask what will be put in place instead. And this is a good question to direct at the current constitution-drafting process. One might say that well, yes, the people’s political roles will be increased. However, this does not seem to be the case. The headline of Matichon’s Sunday edition (February 11) reads “The new constitution presages the weakening of the political sector and the restoration of bureaucratic power.” Thaksin is, so to speak, taken as an excuse by the monarchist and bureaucratic forces to wrest powers from the politicians and the people and return it where it was under pre-1997 conditions–the bureaucracy. Thus, weak coalition governments with parties riddled by factional infighting, so Matichon, is needed in order to put the “civil service party” back to where they used to be.
On this way, important political rights of the people will have to be sacrificed. This concerns both the election of party-list MPs and of senators. The party list is of particular concern, because, for the first time, it enabled voters to translate their national political preferences into votes, thereby substantially increasing the citizens’ representational participation. This established an electoral link between voters and national-level politicians that was previously absent. This link, then, was an important element in decreasing the power of the bureaucracy. For this reason, it has to go.
It remains to be seen, whether the CDC’s decision to abolish the party-list system will be resisted in the public hearings and surveys, and finally put back into the constititution.
The drafting of the constitution warrants close observation. Equally important will be how the referendum will be conducted. There are some signs that an open debate and moves to push for a no-vote might be prohibited. This would seriously impact on the legitimacy of the referendum, and perhaps its outcome.
In sum, there is more to the issue of “De-Thaksinization” than initially meets the eye.
From the archives: funding funerals
Thank you Erik for that wonderful mini ethnography.
“If the family feels the need to celebrate the death in public fashion, the cost will be higher”
This seems like a key point. The cheapest funeral is very cheap indeed. My peaceful little neighborhood in Chiang Rai has a lot of elderly people who die of old-age related illnesses quite frequently. They have very small informal and inexpensive funerals.
When I lived in Mae Sai, a place where there are many rich Chinese merchant familes, some of the funerals where quite extravagant, with fireworks even, and a big party. I have to admit, I find the whole thing depressing and don’t actively partcipate (which probably means I wouldn’t have many people coming to my funeral, if I died suddenly and unexpectedly). My family though fastidiously carries out their obligation to attend these funerals. IMHO this creates bonds of friendship between neighbors and makes a neighborhood more secure. Our neighborhood is very safe because neighbors look out for each other. (other neighborhoods are plagued by youth gangs and drugs) As a contrast, when I lived in Yangon you always had to have someone at home with bars on windows and doors. The one time an aunt left her house in Taung Okalapa unattended to go to a house warming over on Pyi St. a burglar ransacked the house and stole all the family heirlooms, i.e. funerals are part of “neighborhood security and solidarity”
Counting, collecting stats probably give a more objective picture, but one might perhaps look like a foreign spy (Thaksin’s observation that NGOs implied a loss of sovereignty) thus IMHO the need for collaboration with Thai researchers. The UC Berkeley Demography Department was doing some work in northern Thailand, but I don’t whether their data are detailed enough.
Evaluating the 30 baht health care program
Here is another piece on the 30-baht programme.
http://www.tdri.or.th/library/quarterly/text/s05_2.pdf
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
And, of course, the academic sphere itself, i.e. universities, is just as disfunctional as the political arena is. But while academics are ready to criticize politics, they reject seeing their own substantial faults. Speaking of hypocrisy…
Saprang on the three pillars
Anti-coup book ‘not banned’
KULTIDA SAMABUDDHI
Chulalongkorn University yesterday denied it has banned the Sept 19 Coup d’etat, a 460-page book containing articles criticising the putsch, from sale in the university’s book store. The allegation surfaced on Thursday when the book’s editor and publisher Thanapol Eawsakul, of the Fa Diew Kan printing house, complained to the media that the publication was banned from the CU Book Centre.
”It is a pity the students and clients of the CU book shop cannot buy the book,” he said.
CU book store is a major book supplier for domestic and overseas libraries. The ban means a number of intellectuals and students would be impeded from learning the views of Thailand’s top thinkers on the current political situation, he said.
But the CU Book Centre manager Uraiwan Kornwitysinn yesterday denied the book ban and said that readers could still buy it from the book store or order it through http://www.chulabook.com.
”There is no reason to ban the book. We have 500 copies of the Sept 19 Coup d’etat in our stock at the moment,” she claimed.
”I think the publisher is using this tactic to promote the book,” said the book shop manager.
She admitted the book store began the sale of the controversial publication much later than other stores because the book had only just arrived at the university two days ago.
Mr Thanapol dismissed the book shop’s claim, saying that the distributor had delivered the publication to all book stores within a week after the book was launched on Jan 19.
Bangkok Post, 10 February 2007
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
De-Thaksinisation do rhyme with detoxification.
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
Thaksin wasn’t the disease – he was the symptom.
The root cause of the crisis was the 1997 Constitution, a constitution that assured that Thailand would get a strong and stable government, able to develop and execute radical long-term plans without falling apart every few months like the governments of the past – although some called that a parliamentary dictatorship. That’s why a 2/5’s vote of the House was needed for a no confidence vote.
We didn’t want our MPs to be whores that defected to whatever party paid them the most money – even though some claimed that MPs should be able to defect whenever they wanted. That’s why the 90-day-before-elections party registration limit was put in place and Snoh was so unwilling to just leave the TRT.
By design, the constitution created a strong executive branch with a firmer division between the executive and legislative branches – even though some called this the first step to a presidential system. That’s why MPs were forced to resign from the House in order to become Cabinet ministers. That’s why we adopted the party-list system.
The constitution assumed that the electorate could provide better checks and balances for the government than the bureaucracy could – even though some people claimed that the people are too dumb to care about their own rights. That’s why we had an elected Senate and an Ombudsman.
The constitution strongly advocated decentralization of power – even though some people said that rural politicians were even more corrupt than national politicians. But that’s why we had TAOs, PAOs, and later the CEO-governor model.
The de-Thaksinization of Thailand isn’t just about exiling Thaksin. It also requires a dismantling of the key innovations of the 1997 Constitution.
The poor stay poor, the rich stay rich
Any word that come out of the mouth of this cunning old man is ambiguity, don’t waste your time think about it, can cause brain damage.
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
To use a medical metaphor, the ‘conventional wisdom’ is that what has been ailing Thai society is a ‘pathogenic’ agent, reads Thaksin, and his minions of corrupted politicians and bureaucrats. According to this view, if you get rid of the ‘pathogen’, all will be fine and dandy. The ‘De-Thaksinizing’ coup is thus like an antibiotics or an antivirals. Disease cured. End of story. Life goes on as it has always been, or so they thought.
But while the above diagnosis may appeal to many, in part, because it absolves most people of their guilt, it may well be too simplistic.
Perhaps Thailand can better be described as suffering from a different kind of disease though. If Thailand can be compared to a human being, one must say that she is not one known for virtues or moderation, despite her constant proclamation to the contrary. Her fortune in life is derived largely from resources that has been passed on to her from earlier generations, and perhaps from her agreeable personality, and from being a good cook possibly, but her relatively lapse personal discipline is a handicap that hinder her from realizing her full potential. She would also be someone who didn’t pay much attention to school in her youth, prone to vanity and luxuries, fairly excitable, drinks and party excessively, and of easy morals. So, just as someone who leads an easy life like this is not likely to age gracefully, perhaps Thailand is going through the same phase as well? Thus, what is ailing Thailand may better be compared to some kind of social ‘degenerative’ disease, a la various neurodegernative diseases–alzheimer’s, dementia, and the like, for example, for which Thaksin and the ensuing conflicts are but one of many symptoms. And what constitute to the conditions is the way every Thais go about their lives, for better or for worse. Thaksin, the juntas, the elites, as much as everyone else is part of the problem.
This view is much less comforting, admittedly, since like their medical analogies, there isn’t much one can do yet to reverse aging or cure degenerative diseases.
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
What does De-Thaksinization mean?
Same as De-Nazification?
De-Baathicifation?
Was there a Thaksinology in the Thaksinocracy?
The problems were not Thaksin. The problems were and are still institutional.
But, of course, no serious Thai academic will ever challenge or go after the institutional structures that perpetuate dysfunctions in Thai politics, which is why the same problems keep repeating themselves time and time again.
Thai academics are part of the problem, and like political cronies of powerful figures, they will never bite the hand that feeds them.
Saprang on the three pillars
Chula bans book critical of coup
Chulalongkorn University Book Centre has banned a new anthology critical of the coup, due to fears of possible political repercussions.
The book entitled: “The September 19th coup: a coup for a democratic regime under the constitutional monarchy” is an anthology written by leading academics and intellectuals, including Nidhi Eoseewong, Sulak Sivaraksa, Chaiwat Satha-anand and Thongchai Winichakul.
Chula Book Centre yesterday informed the book’s distributor that the centre’s literary-approval group opposed selling the book at the university’s bookstores.
“They just said that they dare not to sell the book,” said Tichakorn Chatanan of Kledthai, the book’s distributor. The book was published by Samesky Publishing House.
An official at Chula Book Centre told The Nation that the group feared political repercussions from selling the book.
“We are in educational institution, so we decided to be neutral,” said the official who asked not to be named.
The official declined to say whether the group was pressured to ban the book.
“Please do not ask, I feel uneasy about answering,” the official said.
“It’s up to the puyai [superiors] whether they will reconsider the ban,” the official said.
Pitch Pongsawat, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn, said: “This is one among various forms of self-censorship that is taking place in Thailand, especially after the coup.
“In this particular case, it reflects the reality of how the university operates, which seems to be against the idea of ensuring academic freedom and the freedom of speech, which are important for Thailand in this particular time of political tension.”
Pitch wrote an essay for the book called: “The September 19 Coup turned citizens into vassal serfs”.
The book is selling well at other bookstores, including Amarin Bookstore’s Nai-in, Se-Ed Books and Thammasat University Bookstore.
“We have already ordered more copies because many customers have asked for the book,” said Pracharakamol Ampunsaeng at Amarin Bookstore’s purchasing department. The book is displayed on the “Social and Political Issue” shelf at the store.
The book’s contents include: “Historical status of the September 19th Coup” by historian Suthachai Yimprasert; and “The September 19th Coup in the eyes of foreign media” by Pakavadi Virapaspong. Other contributors include political scientist Thanet Wongyannava, historian Somsak Jeamtheerasakul, philosophy lecturer Kasem Penpinan, Somchai Preecha-silpakul of Chiang Mai University and University of Hawaii PhD candidate Sirote Klampaiboon.
Subhatra Bhumiprabhas
The Nation 9 February 2007
More debate on The King Never Smiles
to high civilize people!!!!!! I’m one of those who love our majesty and our kingdom. our country have many beautiful culture that you never have it. so,this book is all Lie!! and look down our country our king please looking back to your country and think again before you post your stupid idea.
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
Who precisely are “the Thai people who made up their minds”, those in BKK, or those up-country, and what were their relative strategic advantages?
Evaluating the 30 baht health care program
A recent issue of the Asian Studies Journal has an article written by two Japanese researchers on the results of interviewing a number of people in the Khon Kaen [spelling?] area on the 30 baht scheme. Conclusion-respondents thought it was a good scheme.
I must warn one or two posters that the researchers did not sample thousands of people distributed over all provinces,nor did they make any mention of the respondents being supporters of Mr.T..
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
Ajarn Pacapol: Just two brief remarks. First, I would not refer (De-)Thaksinization to Thailand. That was a vast exaggeration already in the title of McCargo/Ukrist’s book. If anything, Thaksin had an impact on politics, while the other societal sub-systems remained largely unaffected. Teachers did not change their instruction methods because of Thaksin, neither did doctors, artists, lecturers, lawyers, or mass-media people change their modes of operation because of Thaksin.
Second, even in politics one needs to be rather careful. Did Thaksin push through new socio-political structures or did he rather merely maximised existing structures to his own benefit? I would opt for the second option. Patronage networks at the national level, or phuak structures in the provinces existed before Thaksin, and they will exist after him. Look at the NLA, the CDA, and the CDC: Do they consist of individuals or of members of socio-political networks? Rather the latter.
Thaksin is not pricipally different at all from Chartchai, Chavalit, Banharn, Suwat, Somsak, or Banharn. What distinguishes him from them is his great energy and determination, his unsurpassed egocentrism, his visionary and modern approach to political marketing, and, of course, his immense personal wealth, which has made him basically independent from financiers. Simply speaking, where Banharn or Kamnan Poh could “buy” Suphanburi and Chonburi, respectively, Thaksin could aim for the entire country.
With the departure of Thaksin, Thai politics is de-Thaksinized already. However, the structures that enabled him to do what he did are general Thai socio-political structures that continue to exist.
The “De-Thaksinization” of Thailand
Many in this forum seem to believe that Thaksin Shinawatra, despite his anomalous rule, would have survived and flourished still . . . had Thailand without its HMK. But is that presumption valid?
Southeast Asia had even more powerful ‘democracy-defending’ monsters like Marcos, and later on Joseph Estrada (whom many Filipinos claim was even more popular to the majority Philippine rurals and poor). And Thailand’s Suharto too was another powerful corrupt and was too deposed extra-constitutionally. And the Philippines and Indonesia we know had never had Kings.
‘De-Thaksinisation’ is no more different to ‘De-Marcosation’ or ‘De-Suhartosation’. All were popular people protests to oust shameless corrupt leaders they can no longer accept nor tolerate. And once begun the ouster of these leaders could no longer be stopped, with violence or without.
Personally I believe HMK’s presence helped prevent bloodshed from the Thaksin issue upheaval (and in the case of the Suchinda upheaval, stop more blood being shed). Thailand’s HMK could NOT ‘prevent’ or ‘encourage’ the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra . . . because once the Thai people made up their minds, every one else, including HMK, can only go with the flow.
Playing the market in rice
Re: Tobacco: “Over the past two or three years tobacco has greatly increased in popularity. It is grown under contract (albeit an informal, verbal one) and one of the main attractions is that the company, not the farmer, pays for the seedlings and the fertiliser.”
One farmer, due west of Chiang Rai just when you start going up in the foothills, told me that there was an agricultural extension program for higher quality tobacco being funded by a foreign tobacco company, I believe American. Corn for pig feed was all the rage a couple of years ago too.
[I had the opportunity to talk to farmers when Alliance Francaise Photography Club in Chiang Rai put on an exhibit at Chiang Saen museum a couple of years ago. Nineteenth century photos of the Lamet, a Cambodian hill tribe were also included. The French have lot of real down home and nice things in Thailand, like their recent macrophotography seminar in Chiang Rai.]