With the new Thai king crowned and his Privy Councillors appointed, Pavin Chachavalpongpun argues that cooperation between the monarchy and military will be closer than ever, in a blow for hopes of pro-democratic reform.
Vajiralongkorn was officially crowned early this month, assuming the title of King Rama X of the Chakri Dynasty. Prior to his enthronement, many analysts, myself included, predicted that Vajiralongkorn would appoint his own trusted men to sit on the powerful Privy Council. But as it turned out, the list of the newly appointed Privy Councillors contains a mix of conservative royalists who are allies of both General Prem Tinsulanonda and the current military government under the premiership of General Prayuth Chan-ocha.
Prem is a former army chief (1978-1982), a former prime minister (1980-1988), and has been president of the Privy Council since 1988. The new king decided to rely on his nemesis, Prem, to continue to serve in that capacity. Together, they nominated royalists, ex-generals and enemies of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, as Privy Councillors. The revelation of the new members of the Privy Council confirms that the political structure dominated by the network monarchy may not change significantly, even when the legitimacy and popularity of the new king are still in doubt.
In 2012, I contributed a short article on the role of the Privy Council to Time’s Arrow and the Burden of the Past: A Primer on the Thai Un-State’—a project led by Professor Craig J Reynolds. In the piece, I asserted that, by its nature, the Thai Privy Council is an advisory and implemental body serving the king. At a deeper level, however, it exercises a dominant power function in politics, as can be seen since its establishment in 1874 during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. The king set up the Privy Council, whose members were recruited from the Council of State, also founded in the same year, to break the power of the then regent, Chaophraya Si Suriyawongse. Hence, traditionally, the Privy Council has been assigned a quintessentially political role; the significance of which increased notably during King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s reign (1946-2016).
Undoubtedly, the Privy Council is an integral part of the monarchy. As King Bhumibol embarked on a life-long project to transform a near-extinct monarchy into the country’s most powerful institution, the Privy Council’s position was also elevated. As Paul Handley, author of The King Never Smiles argued, “The Privy Council in the modern era is more of a Royal Interests Section, which not only collects information for the King, but also works actively to defend the monarchy and propagate its message.”
With the king’s blessing, the Privy Council emerged as an authoritative entity, working outside the constitutional framework to compete with other elite groups for administrative and political power. Quite often it fiercely protected its own interests in the name of safeguarding the monarchy, thereby highlighting the co-dependent nature of the relationship. The lèse-majesté law is a weapon used to undermine the enemies of the throne and those of the Privy Council.
But it is important to recognise that the Privy Council is not monolithic. There are factions within the Privy Council that construct different kinds of relationships with other power nodes outside their own networks. Successive coups have, over the years, strengthened the partnership between the Privy Council and the military. The Privy Council played its part in endorsing past coups, including the most recent ones in 2006 and 2014.
Prem has been referred to as the “chief operator” of the network monarchy. The fact that Prem is an ex-general allowed him to establish a direct link with the military. With him at the head of the Privy Council, its interests and those of the military are, for once, aligned in the protection of royal power and prerogative. Prem, in particular, constructed a complex web of relationships, as part of sanctifying royal power above other institutions within the un-state. In his overt intervention in politics, Prem placed his trusted subordinates in key positions in the bureaucracy and the army; he controlled the defence budget, and dominated national security and foreign policy, and thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Privy Council under Prem also had its members seated on boards in major conglomerates including the Bangkok Bank, Charoen Phokphand, the Boonrawd group and the Charoen Siriwatanapakdi business group. For the Privy Council, reaching out to these power nodes is as crucial as allowing them to reach in, thus consolidating a network of interdependence. The Privy Council’s strong ties with the bureaucracy, the military and businesses effectively circumscribe the power and authority of the government of the day. When political leaders, such as Chatichai Choonhavan and Thaksin, wanted to break free from this extra-constitutional network, a coup was staged to counter their perceived defiance.
In the new set of the Privy Council, attention must be paid to certain personalities. General Paiboon Koomchaya, former Justice Minister in the Prayuth government, has been behind the operation to hunt down those living overseas who are alleged to have violated Article 112 (the lèse-majesté law). Paiboon, last year, had a meeting with the Japanese Ambassador to Bangkok to complain about my case while requesting that Japan considers sending me back to Thailand. Paiboon also put pressure on certain governments not to allow lèse-majesté offenders to use their territories as a launching pad against the Thai monarchy.
Also from the Prayuth administration, General Dapong Ratanasuwan, former Minister of Education, and now appointed as a Privy Councillor, had a part in the brutal crackdowns on the red shirts on the streets of Bangkok in 2010. And Wirat Chinwinijkul, former Secretary of the Supreme Court Office, played an important role in the judicial coup as early as 2006 against the Thaksin government. These names reaffirm that Vajiralongkorn is not interested in working with pro-democracy forces but finds his comfort in the old structure crafted by his father, the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej.
In many ways, Vajiralongkorn is obliged to lean on Bhumibol’s legitimacy in order to firm up his political power, despite the fact that he seriously lacks the moral authority and charisma his father enjoyed. For now, Vajiralongkorn is more interested in cooperating with the old conservatives and the power holders in the junta, to ensure the smooth transition of the royal succession. This cooperation between the monarchy and the military seems to suggest that the repression of critics of the monarchy will intensify and lead to an increased use of the lèse-majesté law in the future. At this point, reform of the royal institution appears to be unrealistic. At the same time, eliminating critics of the monarchy could also be counter-productive; it may escalate an anti-monarchical sentiment among some Thais.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
Given the new governor’s bad reputation amongst the inmates, it seems doubtful that the prison will run smoothly for long.
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A good analysis. To maintain internal cohesion among the different elite groups (big business, military, bureaucracy) and factions within these groups a position of moderator in conflict situations is required. Acceptance is based on an assumed moral status and neutrality among the different factions. Obviously, for this the privy council plays an important role. The question is in how far the new king is up to the demands and can provide both legitimacy of the elite and legitimacy of his position by the elite.
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You can not keep the lid on a pot of boiling water .
It remains to be seen as to how long the pot can be kept off the boil …………
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“Legitimacy of the new king is in doubt” writes Pavin. His popularity, perhaps. But Vajiralongkorn’s legitimacy not at all. It is his winning vice-like grip.
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Good point Chris,
In all honesty it appears that even his popularity may not really be that much in doubt. Is he as popular as his father? I don’t really know, but we’ve so far seen no sign of the collapse that has so long been predicted as a certainty after the demise of Rama IX.
Rama X first visit outside the capital to the provinces was to Krabi where he was greeted by tens of thousands chanting “long live the King” while holding up old photos of him from his days as Crown prince.
This is hardly the type of greeting that one would expect for a man who, if we are to believe his detractors, is a “vile” “evil” ” stupid” “unpopular” “unloved” “hated” (and my personal favorites)
“Caligula-like” and “Megalomaniacal tyrant”.
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good grief man , do you not understand article 112 ?
any display other than what was witnessed would have earned the participant a certain jail sentence .
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Really… how would one go about charging someone who chose not to show up to cheer the king?
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The message is passed down the chain of command and the local Poo Yal Barn has the responsibility of ensuring that the required number of loyal subjects represent the Amphur .
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“Prior to ____, many analysts, myself included, predicted that ____. But as it turned out ____.” This sounds like a perfect template for future articles by almost all New Mandala’s Thailand experts.
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This is a website for political and cultural analysis, not for soothsayers with extraordinary powers of foretelling the future. Of course, nobody is right all the time about the future. How petty for somebody to snipe about that when you are not even willing to give your real name. If you are looking for a website that tells you exactly what the future holds, you clearly don’t have a very sophisticated understanding….
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Call it prediction or analysis, I know of no other field where being completely wrong all the time has no consequences. Crown Prince’s blood disease? Watermelon soldier mutiny? Red village uprising? Secession of Isaan and Lanna? Contested succession? Privy council favoring Princess over CP? Bhumipol abdicating before referendum? Thai population rejecting proposed constitution? Bhumipol abdicating on August (what was the date? I forget?). CP humiliating Prem?
It’s an alternative universe in which absolutely nothing that has actually happened in Thailand has actually happened in Thailand.
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You need to give it time. Thai people are doing what is expected of them right now. In 4-12 months, let’s see how much love there is for the new king. Let’s see how well he controls himself. Let’s see how long it will take for 1/2 the country to say “Enough is enough!”
I’ve always expected things to run smoothly for a few months after the king died. After that, let’s roll the bones and see where we end up.
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And a great many bones there would be!
This is certainly within the realm of possibility.
The situation you describe would result in a tragedy of truly epic proportion’s. Civil War, Thai murdering Thai by the hundreds of thousands . There would be rivers of blood in every city and village of Thailand. What’s worse there would be no way of knowing which side would win. The new king would have just as great a chance of victory as his opponents.
I hope, with all of my heart, that the people of Thailand will not choose this route; that the king ,his people and government will find a peaceful solutions to Thailand’s problems. We only need look next-door at Cambodia to see what happens when a nation turns inward and destroys itself. Thailand does not deserve the genocide of the killing fields.
What good would come from this? How would the “Victor” feel standing atop a mountain of corpses as they look down upon horror of their triumph?
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Mark, do you think the Khmer deserved the genocide of the killing fields? Admittedly, LM laws and KR strictures are just one of the many tools used in the arsenal of silence by any oppressive power or regime. The KR regime and taking Cambodia back to “year zero” caused the brutal death of 1.5-3 million innocent Cambodians-“To spare you is no profit, to destroy you is no loss.”
A strange cultural marker of genocide is the need to return back to some imaginary/mythical past. As well as dehumanization on a mass scale. I might be misinformed or naive but I have not seen this in Thailand.
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JohnF’s caustic observation has more truth than most NM readers would like to acknowledge. When I first began working in Thailand, I was struck by how easily intelligent and self-confident people can be transformed into obsequious cowards in the face of superior status. This feudal notion of status as bestowed rather than earned goes a long way in explaining these frustrating turns that JohnF mentions. People who despised the CP were magically transformed into adoring supporters simply from his being crowned, and 112 does not explain why they did not just vote with their feet (or, in the case of Bike for Dad, their wheels).
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Good insight from the author.
On the other hand, I do believe that an agreement must surely have been reached with Pa Prem and the new King of Thailand, prior to his succession. They must have surely reached a deal whereby Prem and his cronies in the Privy Council, and Prayuth and his cronies, will run the show and the CP gets to succeed his father on the throne. They must have reached a deal and clipped his wings and will likely control him in a way that does not threaten the status quo, while he gets to live the immoral and decadent lifestyle that he has lived for decades, as long as he does not do anything drastic that blows the lid on this show. The “old boys network” want to keep this network monarchy and the “gravy train,” that they have so painstakingly built up over the past several decades, going on as long as they can.
Yet, nothing lasts forever and the “truth” cannot be hidden for long. In this day and age, the majority of Thais, know what is going on and will rise up and take back their country from these self serving, immoral, and ruthless network. But it won’t be before they have been suppressed, threatened, intimidated, and coerced like never before, using all means at their disposal esp. Article 44 and 112.
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Rama X has just appointed two new members to the privy Council, both seem to be civilians. It would appear the generals are no longer in the majority
They are Virat Chinvinijkul and Jaranthada Karnasuta
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Mark Dunn – re. your Thai civil war horror scenario : that is EXACTLY WHY I suggest Thailand adopts some local variant of Australian / Canadian federalism, UNDER THE MONARCHY, as we are.
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I can see this as a possible solution in the long term. Although getting there will be quite the feat for a country like Thailand that has such a long history of highly centralized government.
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indeed , civil war is the likely outcome should the current one sided repression be continued .
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Re-RNAP God no! No people deserve that. It was not my intention to imply otherwise. The point I was trying to make was that “those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it”. I was shocked by, what seemed to me, the almost hopeful tone struck by “Eddie Munster” in the post I was replying to. My intention was simply to state that one half of the Thai people turning on the other could have no happy ending.
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Well taken Mark. It was a rhetorical question not an attack. It is interesting that I deleted a quote from Mark Twain in the original response. “History does not repeat itself but it often rhymes.” So we are in accord. I close with another quote from The Unforgiven-“Deserving’s got nothin to do with it!”
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Gen Kampanat Ruddit, a former assistant army chief, has been appointed a new member of the Privy Council to advise His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn Bodindradebayavarangkun.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/1167520/gen-kampanat-joins-privy-council
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Not a comment on the article per se , rather a heads up on a gift from the author Pavin Chachavalpongpun .
A New Publication — The Blooming Years
This collection of articles from the Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia (KRSEA) is published with the financial support of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University. We have compiled all the English articles from Issue 13 (March 2013), to Issue 20 (September 2016). This period marked a turning point for KRSEA with the re-launch of the website in March 2013 and the new online archive of earlier issues. That was when I was assigned as the chief editor of the KRSEA.
https://kyotoreview.org/the-blooming-years/
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