



(Soonthornpasuch himself was simultaneously employed at the US military's Advanced Research Projects Agency). In this way, we can begin to see how maps were used as a technique of power during the Cold War.

As I dug deeper into maps, I began to wonder: how were communities that lived at the peripheries of state power arranged before the Series L708 maps? According to the field notes of Lucien Hanks, the “villages” he surveyed every five years in 1964, 1969 and 1974 progressively could not be found, since most were nomadic and moved continuously. These “villages” apparently did not have leaders, headmen or permanent governance structures, but lived fluidly. I began to muse on another question: when did the Thai state penetrate the lives of those living at its borders? When did these nomadic groups begin to settle permanently, hold identity cards—when did they even begin to call themselves “Thai”?

A survey conducted by the Tribal Research Centre across the decade of 1970–80 found that prior to 1970, many people in the tribal regions did not have identity cards, did not have permanent residences and were not interested in whether they were Thai or not. But when we near the end of the 1970s, and step into the 1980s, ‘villages’ characterised by permanent residences, and identity cards that list addresses and nationality, were becoming a nation-wide phenomenon. In the context of the Cold War, all these sources of surveillance and identification were exploited by the Thai state to build allegiance and counter communism.

In retrospect, we might conclude that ‘Thainess’ only truly laid down its roots at the end of the 1970s. While the Siamese state surely yearned to exercise control over its territory and peoples since ancient times, it lacked the necessary mechanisms to penetrate lives and territories at its peripheries. Even the absolutist state of Rama V, who oversaw the state’s modernisation, lacked the required technologies and knowledge of the peoples inhabiting the kingdom’s borders, and could only hope to fully extend its power.

What defined the Thai state from the Cold War era was that it could construct *visual knowledge* of what it governed. In contrast to the past—when the rural regions were conceptualised solely through description and imagination—technologies of aerial photography, mapping and anthropological surveying allowed the Thai state to ‘discover’ villages and devise methods to invest them with ‘Thainess’.

Perhaps I will conclude by picking an argument with Thongchai Winichakul’s *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. Thongchai drew the critical conclusion that maps drawn during Rama V gave birth to the nation as we know it—this is the conclusion my book seeks to shatter. The drawing of maps was one way by which Rama V constructed the boundaries of the absolutist Thai state. But these maps were without substance: they did not have details that could speak to the people and ways of living at the edges of the state. The maps of the Rama V era were as such ‘maps of the state’, but not ‘maps of the nation’. They did not give rise to a consciousness of ‘Thainess’ in the hearts of that era’s people.





