The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era

Policy Briefing – SEARBO

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Front cover image: Protestors utilise public infrastructure to amplify English-language messages intended to generate overseas support
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Introduction

Emerging as the first act of defiance after the military coup on 1 February 2021, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is a general strike mobilisation spearheaded by hundreds of thousands of civil servants. The CDM has become the centre of focus for all parties involved in the post-coup era in Myanmar. To those opposing the coup and the military, the CDM is not only an anti-coup campaign but also a foundation from which to replace the military-controlled administrations. For the military and its supporters, the CDM was a surprise, and represents a threat to maintaining coercive and central power in the post-coup era—a threat that needs to be dealt with through the strongest measures available.

This report explains the CDM in three different phases—emergence, growth, and consolidation—by highlighting the significant developments, campaigns, and relationships among key political actors and organisations involved; it will also explain the measures taken against the CDM by the military to consolidate its grip. Like in many other authoritarian countries, the civil disobedience campaign in Myanmar comprises a wide range of forms including banging pots and pans, street protests, refusal to pay bills, and boycotting state-sponsored lottery and military-affiliated businesses. However, this paper mainly focuses on the actions and roles of CDM civil servants, locally known as the CDMers, as the civil disobedience campaign is widely referred to the act of civil servants pledging not to work under the military.

The movement began with healthcare workers refusing to go to work on the day after the coup. The movement has rapidly become the country’s largest social movement since 1988 uprising, crippling all major government functions and the country’s economy. The movement grew exponentially, with some CDMers becoming leaders of the National Unity Government (NUG), an alternative government to the State Administration Council (SAC) formed by the military. Protesters have resorted to both persuasive and coercive tactics, including a controversial “social punishment” campaign, to strengthen the movement. Having the highest volumes of CDM participants, the health and education sectors have become the NUG’s strongest alternative administrative mechanisms delivering services to the people. However, when the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic struck the country in mid-June, the effects of the CDM and the military’s crackdown against the CDM backfired, creating what may be the country’s worst humanitarian crisis to date. Despite a reduction in pace over the seven months since the coup, recent events have shown that the CDM still possesses popular support at home and afar, indicating the rivalry centred around the CDM will continue to intensify.
The Military Coup

After allegations of irregularities and poll fraud in the November 8 general election in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won more than 80 percent of the total votes, the military (Tatmadaw), led by the commander-in-chief senior general Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup d’état on 1 February, the same day that the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) was set to confirm and certify the results of the election.

The military arrested State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint, and many other NLD leaders — along with prominent NLD supporters — in pre-dawn raids. The former general and military-appointed Vice President U Myint Swe declared a one-year state of emergency and transferred power to the military, despite this process having no constitutional basis.

The coup was almost universally unpopular, sparking mass protests and boycotts against military-affiliated businesses, but also creating renewed fighting with several ethnic armed organisations, including signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).

As of 27 August 2021, over 1000 protesters and bystanders, including more than 70 children, have been killed and nearly 8,000 people have been arrested by the military. A total of 65 people has been sentenced to death, including two under the age of 18. Due to renewed fighting and violence across the country, about 22,000 people have fled to the neighbouring countries and 206,000 people have been forcibly displaced within the country since 1 February.

The Emergence of the Civil Disobedience Movement

The first week of the coup was critical for the emergence of the CDM. In his first interview with the local media on 1 February, U Win Htein, a patron of the NLD, urged the public to create a non-violent movement to protest against the coup, referring to the civil disobedience movement of India led by Mahatma Gandhi. On 2 February, Min Ko Naing, a protest leader of the 1988 uprising, used social media to call for the launch of a “no recognition and no participation” campaign.

A prominent physician from the Myitkyina General Hospital, Kachin State, is believed to be the first civil servant and healthcare professional to refuse to go to work.

Subsequently, a group of medical doctors from Mandalay hospital and other hospitals created a network and launched the online campaign by circulating a statement condemning the military coup.

Minister of Health and Sports Dr Myint Htwe, appointed by the NLD government, was one of the first high-ranking officials to resign without being arrested in pre-dawn raids. His trip to Yangon from Naypyidaw on the morning of 3 February, after announcing his resignation, attracted nationwide attention. A day after the coup, healthcare workers from about forty hospitals, medical institutes, and COVID-19 testing centres announced their decision to join the movement and stop work indefinitely.
The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era

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Figure (1) Numbers of Public Offices, Hospitals, and Schools involved in the CDM Campaign in Five Days after the Coup

![Civil Disobedience Movement Map]

Source: Civil Disobedience Movement Facebook Page

The Growing Popularity of the Civil Disobedience Movement

The movement gained momentum with the onset of street protests. As street protests intensified across the country—following the protest led by Dr. Tayzar San in Mandalay and the one led by Ei Thin Zar Maung and Esther Ze Naw Bamvo in Yangon—so did the calls for CDM and participation in the movement. Along with other slogans such as “release all detained leaders,” “say no to military coup,” and “federal democracy,” the “CDM” and “Don’t go to office, break away” became some of the most popular slogans of the anti-coup demonstrations across the country. The call for the CDM became an integral part of protesters’ speeches, writings, and visual communications. While some portrayed the CDM as the best bulwark in defence against the military-rule, some further described the CDM as a silver bullet that could entirely end the military’s dominance in politics.
The online campaigns of some healthcare workers attracted thousands of views and reactions. The Civil Disobedience Movement Facebook page, which was launched on the afternoon of 2 February, attracted more than 100,000 followers in a few hours. Two days after the coup, more than 110 public hospitals and health departments in 50 townships joined the campaign. Some local news sources estimated that 90% of the total number of healthcare workers joined the CDM in the first month.

Wearing red ribbons as a gesture of defiance, thousands of teachers and administrative staff from educational institutions and ministries echoed calls to walk away from their work. As of the first week of May, the Myanmar Teachers’ Federation (MTF) estimated 60 percent of of 35,000 tertiary education staff and 27 percent of a total of 450,000 workers in primary and secondary education joined the CDM.

Declaring themselves “CDM universities”, hundreds of universities and colleges, which had been closed for a year due to the pandemic, refused a military order to reopen. Among the twenty-five ministries, the Ministry of Education has one of the highest proportions of CDM participation in all states and regions. In Chin, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), and Sagaing, 50 to 65 percent of teaching staff joined the movement. Student and teacher unions also campaigned against reopening schools in June, claiming the military was using the education system as propaganda to show the country is back to normal regardless of the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. As a result, about 90 percent of 9 million primary and high students did not enrol for the new intake.
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Healthcare Workers Protesting with Three Finger Salute in Front of a Private Hospital in Yangon. Photo Credit: Maung Sun on Wikimedia (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Volunteers from Covid quarantine centres protesting the military coup. Photo Credit: Kummari (New Mandala)
A large number of civil servants from Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Electricity and Energy, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Planning and Finance, and private and public bank employees actively took part in the CDM campaign, leading to closure of the railway network, international airports, border trade, and the banking system. Most CDM civil servants are at junior levels, but hundreds of gazetted officials, such as deputy directors, assistant directors, and staff officers joined the movement as well. The protest of local administrators under the General Administration Department (GAD), which is mostly made up of retired army personnel, has attracted much public attention. Many ward and village tract administrators closed their offices and hung posters with “CDM office.” In some townships in Yangon and Mandalay, CDM participation among ward offices is as high as 100%, leaving the military completely in the dark.

Despite the strict control, there were police participating in the CDM as early as 2 February. Two brothers serving in the police force in Kyangin Township, Ayeyarwady Region, are known as the first “CDM police”. Out of 84,000 police officers nationwide, about 60 police officers in Kayah State, 45 in Chin State, and more than 100 in Nay Pyi Taw, Mandalay, and Pago regions were participating in the CDM within a month of the coup. By the first week of March, over 880 police had defected across the country, including 173 from Kayah (Karenni) State. However, many of them were from State and Regional Police forces, not from the Combat Police Battalions, locally known as “Lon Htein,” responsible for cracking down on protests. One of the first army officers to defect, Captain Lin Htet Aung, estimated that around 1500 soldiers had defected by mid-August and that between 50 and 60 soldiers a day ask for his help to join the CDM. Like the police force, many of the CDM soldiers are not from army battalions, but from the Navy, the Air Force, artillery units, as well as support units and arms factories. As of July, all of them are low-ranking, with the highest ranks being the acting Police Colonel Tin Min Tun from Yangon’s Special Intelligence Department (Special Branch) and a few Army Majors, including Major Nyunt Naing from the Kalaw-based No. (7) Infantry Battalion. According to a press conference given by the NUG’s Union Minister of Planning and Finance, U Tin Tun Naing, on 24 August, more than 410,000 of about one million civil servants have participated in the CDM since the coup.

The popularity of the CDM movement has extended beyond the country. U Kyaw Moe Tun, the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations, made a shocking speech at the UN General Assembly on 26 February, urging the international community to use “any means necessary” against the military, and to restore democracy. His action seemed to pave the way for diplomats and staffers at Myanmar’s embassies around the world to join the CDM. By 7 March, a total of 30 embassy staffers from seven countries including the United States, Switzerland, Germany, Israel and Japan, had denounced the coup and joined the CDM. In addition, six academics at the University of Oslo in Norway nominated the CDM for
the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize on 22 March, reinforcing public confidence in the impact of the CDM. The nomination stated: “the Civil Disobedience Movement strives to create a united stand against the military’s divide and rule tactics and for federal democracy. If successful, this holds the potential of ending Myanmar’s long legacy of direct and indirect military rule and intrastate armed conflicts.”

Consolidating the Civil Disobedience Movement

Having witnessed the crackdown on the protests and impact of the CDM over the military’s administrative capability, protesters have resorted to various methods to increase and sustain the CDM movement. Not only did they patiently persuade civil servants and reward the CDM participants, but they also employed coercive and ethically controversial approaches, such as social punishment campaigns, threats, and intimidation against those who refused to join the CDM. Moreover, supporting the CDM has become a priority for all groups opposing the military coup: especially for the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the NUG, the CDM is perceived as the most important pillar to boost its domestic support.

When the street protests escalated, the facades of government offices turned into regular gathering places for protesters. While some protesters begged staff not to come to the office, others built barriers to block the offices’ entrances and embarrassed those attending work on social media. Led by the CDM civil servants and the tech-savvy youth known as Generation Z, a “Social Punishment” online campaign was launched and grew exponentially since the third week of February. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Tiktok have been used to identify and shame those who refuse to join the CDM, supporters and relatives of military officers, and those who have not condemned the coup. More than 160 people are listed on a website called “Social Punishment” as traitors. Lists collected by universities’ alumni and students number in the hundreds. Protesters also carried pictures of non-CDM civil servants and posted them in public spaces. Despite debate over whether these coercive approaches were ethical and in line with principles of non-violence, many campaigners considered such actions effective and justifiable in response to military violence.

The “social punishment” campaign poses a great threat to non-CDM civil servants, those close to the military, and military-affiliated businesses. There have been a number of instances demonstrating the impacts of the social punishment campaign, ranging from the deactivation of target’s social media accounts, to running away from their residences, to the permanent closure of their businesses and even (in some cases) death threats and murders. Moreover, some civil servants, including high-ranking healthcare workers, announced their participation in the CDM after their names were added to the lists. Although street protests and CDM participation have been significantly reduced due to the deadly crackdowns, many people are still actively engaging in the campaign, reaching more than two hundred thousand posts using hashtag #socialpunishment on Facebook alone as of the end of July.

The CRPH has identified the CDM movement as one of its primary missions since its
formation on 5 February. Even though there was criticism over the CRPH’s political ambiguity and over-reliance on the NLD party, the CRPH has been recognised for its quick response to the CDM. In order to boost the CDM participation, the CRPH has designated “the CDM Week” since the second week of February and began collecting donations from the public via a website called “We Pledge CDM Myanmar”. Two days after launching the website, the CRPH announced that the CDM civil servants would be supported monthly and formed the CRPH-CDM Supporting Team to compile a list of CDM participants. The CRPH-CDM Supporting Team social media page states that each participant receives a regular payment of 50,000 to 100,000 Kyat (AUD 50 to 100) per month and on some days, a total payment sent to the participants amounted to more than 200 million Kyat (AUD 200,000). Although the exact number of civil servants receiving the CRPH’s support has never been disclosed, it is estimated that the CRPH is supporting more than five thousand people regularly. According to statements of the CRPH, majority of the financial support comes from Myanmar diaspora communities in foreign countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Australia. On 26 April, the CRPH introduced the CRPH – Official Fundraising Program, providing official fundraiser certificates to organisations and individuals outside of the country. As of the second week of August, 163 organisations and individuals from 22 countries have been certified as regular fundraisers on behalf of the CRPH.

Figure (2) Webpage of the CRPH Fundraising
Apart from the CRPH-led CDM support activities, there are several community-led CDM supporting programs that have emerged since early February. Many of these fundraising activities are led by existing charity groups and civil society organisations, including religious organisations. One-to-One CDM campaign and Wine Gyi Chote (WGC) Campaign are two of the most well-known and resilient campaigns aiming to support the CDM. In the One-to-One CDM campaign, individuals or groups make one off or regular donations to the fundraisers. Organisers of this campaign announced that 1786 CDM civil servants have been receiving a monthly allowance since February, but the funding incoming to the One-to-One has gradually decreased starting from May. In the WGC program, one CDM civil servant is being supported directly by five to ten people in his/her vicinity with the facilitation of the fundraising groups. In the first few days after its formation, more than 1200 million kyats were raised and about 9700 CDM civil servants were supported, members of the WGC announced on 8 March. A variety of methods are being used to send support for the CDM. Declining confidence in the banking system and the military’s restrictions on remittances, as well as strict surveillance, have led expatriates to revive the once popular “hundi” or “hawala” system, an informal remittance system operated by unlicensed financial brokers.

For sending cash domestically, mobile financial services such as Wave Money and KBZPay are widely used in the country, even though the service charges up to 10% per transaction.

Figure (3) CRPH’s online registration form for CDM Civil Servants
However, there are criticisms of CRPH's approaches and capability to support the CDM. It has been criticised for undermining community-led CDM supporting groups, accused of monopolising CDM supporting activities without proper consultation with civil society, and over-reliance on the NLD's network. Activists claimed that many community-led activities have been discontinued as local and foreign donors are less interested in them and become more reliant on the CRPH-led program. Moreover, despite the large percentage of the CDM participation rate, the CRPH has been criticised for being unable to provide regular support in ethnic areas.

In addition to providing support to CDM civil servants, there have been efforts to develop alternative administrative mechanisms to challenge the military’s rule, with the assistance of CDM civil servants. When the NUG was formed, some prominent CDM civil servants were appointed to senior positions. Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, the Rector of the University of Medicine 1, was assigned Union Minister for the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health, and Dr. Sai Khaing Myo Tun, a professor at Yangon University, was appointed Deputy Minister of Education. The NUG’s alternative administrative mechanisms are strongest in the health and education sectors, not only because the ministers themselves are influential CDM civil servants but also because these sectors have the highest level of CDM participation. The NUG’s Ministry of Education announced its Interim Academic Program and appointed teaching staff and volunteers for program implementation. Online courses have been delivered regularly in collaboration with local and international scholars, academic networks, and universities. According to the statement of the NUG Ministry of Education, a total of 145 Interim University Administrative University Councils or Interim Councils, which are made up of teachers’ unions and students’ unions, have signed up to work with the NUG and 18 universities have been designated as universities operating under the NUG’s Ministry of Education as of end of June.

Like education, the health sector is one of the NUG’s strongest alternative administrative mechanisms. The NUG is able to implement a wide range of health services and in particular, since the third wave of COVID struck in June, the NUG’s Ministry of Health has expanded its operations, conducting online lectures and training, opening call centres, and providing mobile clinics and home-based health care services. The “Tele-clinic program” was launched with about 500 healthcare workers in June, providing free online counselling and treatment for COVID-19 patients. The NUG’s Ministry of Health also stated that volunteers are working with charities and the NLD network on the ground to provide oxygen, food and medicine. According to the NUG’s announcement on 22 July, a COVID-19 Task Force (CTF) has been formed in collaboration with ethnic health organisations. Led by Dr. Cynthia Maung, chair of the Ethnic Health Committee and founder of the Mae Tao Clinic on the Thai-Myanmar border, this task force aims to procure COVID-19 vaccines and other medical support and equipment from the international community. However, there is also criticism of the NUG for inadequately supporting displaced civilians and those helping them in conflict areas. In these areas individual CDM healthcare workers, with the support of local communities
The security sector is another noticeable area of collaboration between the NUG and the CDM participants. Defected soldiers and police are known for conducting training for the People's Defence Forces under the guidance of the NUG, liaising with those keen to defect, and leaking information about military affairs to the press and the NUG. In collaboration with the People's Embrace, which is said to be made up of CDM soldiers, the NUG's Ministry of Defence announced on 29 July that it will issue CDM code numbers (service numbers) for both CDM security forces and those who have not yet been able to join CDM for various reasons. As of the first week of August, 719 security forces had registered as CDM participants via its Telegram channel. Moreover, military strategies and policies for the People's Defense Forces (PDF), including the Soldier's Rules, have been reportedly developed as part of their collaboration.

Responses of the Military
Surprised by the impact and popularity of the CDM, the military has used all the tools at its disposal to weaken and co-opt the movement. In the early days of the coup, the military did not take strong action against those involved in the CDM, but only asserted authority through intimidation and warnings via their subordinates. The CDM civil servants were also persuaded that they could return to the office and that no action would be taken against them. Promotions and benefits were given to those did not participate in the CDM. However, the military's use of soft approaches did not last long, and forceful tactics on CDM participants and their supporters began even before the violent crackdown on street protests in early March. To intimidate the CDM participants and their supporters, soldiers and police have carried out lethal and extra-lethal violence such as dragging dead bodies on the streets, posting footages of torture and killings, and mutilating dead bodies before sending them to family members. The military-controlled ministries set deadlines for CDM participants to return to office and also ordered them to repay the two months' advance salary that was provided as COVID-19 assistance under the NLD administration. Thousands of CDM civil servants across the country, including about 1,000 railway workers and their families, have been evicted from the public housing.

While the NUG and the protesters compiled and published social punishment lists, the military and its subordinate ministries also announced the dismissal of CDM civil servants on a daily basis. Many were suspended under the Civil Service Law due to unauthorised absences and negligence. As of 22 May, 19,500 of the 35,000 teaching staff at the tertiary level and 125,900 of 450,000 teaching staff at the primary and secondary level were suspended, according to the Teachers' Federation.
Hundreds of CDM civil servants, including at least 600 healthcare workers, as well as individuals and groups assisting them, have been charged under Section 505 (a) of the Penal Code, which carries a maximum sentence of three years in prison.

Although a few activists and CDM civil servants were released on 2 August, more than 150 people, including 48 doctors, were still in custody in connection with the CDM in the second week of August.

The military also announced that the medical licences of CDM doctors would be revoked, and instructed private hospital and clinics not to employ CDM healthcare workers. Between 1 February and 31 July, there were at least 252 attacks against healthcare workers and medical facilities, resulting in 25 deaths.

According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 76 family members, including those of CDM civil servants, were taken hostage by the military.

Moreover, NLD party members believed to be linked to the CDM movement have also been arrested and tortured to death during interrogation. By the first week of August 324 NLD party members, including 98 members of parliament, had been arrested and at least three died in custody.
Four Cs – Coup, CDM, COVID, Crisis

The continuing military oppression and the resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on the tempo of the CDM movement. In the face of imminent threats and financial hardships, some participants decided to return to their previous work. Some have returned due to offers of dropping charges against them. When the third wave of COVID-19 struck, some public hospitals and Covid quarantine centres in cities reopened as healthcare workers returned to their workplaces. Unlike before the third wave, there was no strong public backlash to the reopening of some health services. Taking advantage of the outbreak, the military has been accused of attempting to revive its local administration by shutting down medical facilities run by CDMers, controlling oxygen supply plants, and forcing the public to seek the approval of the military-appointed local authorities to fill their oxygen tanks.

Both the structural damage caused by the CDM and the military’s actions against the CDMers backfired and hurt everyone as the country plunged into devastating COVID-19 third wave, leading toward the country’s worst humanitarian crisis in modern times. The country’s public health care system has collapsed with the rise of the CDM movement. The military announced that the system could be restored with military doctors and nurses but was unable to deliver on this promise. While the military-controlled media, citing military-controlled government sources, announced around 300 COVID-19-caused deaths per day in July, independent local media assessed information from voluntary funeral service operators and reported that at least 600 people died from the virus each day in Yangon alone. It is estimated that about half of Myanmar’s 54 million people could be infected with COVID-19 and 6.2 million people could also be facing hunger within months.

There is also growing concern that Myanmar could become a new COVID hub in the region. Moreover, COVID outbreaks in prisons and shelters accommodating more than 220,000 newly-displaced people across the country are truly alarming, and exacerbating their existing troubles. Sexual and reproductive health services and maternal and child health services, led by international organisations and civil society organisations, have almost come to a standstill. About 250 pregnant women are estimated to die each month due to lack of access to emergency obstetric care. However, thousands of CDM civil servants, especially healthcare workers, are still reluctant to return to military-controlled workplaces. Footage of healthcare workers and emergency responders being beaten and threatened at gun point, the arrest of prominent doctors and professors from medical schools, and the death of imprisoned surgeons due to COVID-19 infections have prevented the majority of young and middle-aged CDM healthcare workers from reversing their decisions.

There is little or no room for dialogue, or neutrality, in post-coup Myanmar. The military, which sees the CDM as a major obstacle to maintaining its political power and coercive and centralised rule, will continue to take the strongest possible measures against the movement and its supporters. The targeting of healthcare workers and medical facilities associated with the CDM, even during the pandemic, is evident. The recent
assassination attempt against U Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations, and intimidation of CDM diplomats and civil servants studying abroad are a clear indication of how far the military will go to maintain its coercive power.

Recent activities indicate that popular consent for the CDM has not yet diminished. The public perception of CDM civil servants as champions sacrificing their livelihoods for the many have changed little. When the NUG created a social media page to promote online lottery tickets raising funds for the CDM civil servants, more than four hundred thousand people liked the page within hours. When tickets went on sale on 15 August, more than 50,000 tickets worth a hundred million kyats (AUD 100,000) were sold in one hour, and the same thing happened on the second day. In addition, the rate of CDM participation in security forces has increased by about 50 percent in the last two months. As of June, there were just over 1,000 CDM soldiers and police participating in CDM, but by the end of August, the number increased to about 2,500, according to those assisting CDM soldiers and police. Moreover, in August in Kayah (Karenni) State, which has the largest number of CDM police, groups opposing the coup formed a state police force comprised of 300 CDM police as part of an alternative governing force. As of 2 September, there are over 52,000 CDM civil servants in the ethnic states: Chin, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen, Mon, and Shan. Chin State has the highest number of CDM participants, accounting for 72 percent of the total civil servants.

Despite the deadly outbreak and deepening crises, tensions between the military and CDM civil servants and their supporters are unlikely to ease. The health and education sectors in particular are more severely affected by the adverse effects of this competition. With the escalation of the civil war following the NUG’s call for defensive war against the military, the humanitarian and socio-economic situations are likely to worsen. High-need areas have been expanding quickly. Not only war-torn ethnic areas, but areas predominantly Burman or Bamar, and urban cities, are increasingly suffering from the collapse of the economy and the health system. People are reportedly trying to sell kidneys, an uncommon phenomenon in the country before the coup. In July alone, more than twenty people from various regions, including Yangon, Magway, Ayeyarwady, and Naypyidaw, advertised their willingness to sell their kidneys on social media.

Conclusion
This paper describes the Myanmar Civil Disobedience Movement that emerged after the military coup in three stages—emergence of the movement, its growing public support, and struggles to consolidate the movement—as well as action taken by the military to weaken the movement. With the belief that the CDM can eventually end the military dictatorship, the CDM movement, which was initiated the day after the coup by healthcare workers, has grown exponentially overnight, crippling all major government functions and the economy. Led by civil servants and tech-savvy youths, the movement has unified across ethnicities, religions, gender and generations, involving more than 400,000 out of one million civil servants in one of the largest popular movements since
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With the highest volumes of participants, the Health and Education Sectors have become the most resilient alternative governing mechanisms for the NUG. Strong cooperation between the NUG and CDM security forces also poses a major threat to the military. However, the pace of the movement reduced as many returned to work because of the military’s extreme measures, a lack of financial support, and the devastating COVID third wave that began in mid-June. Thousands of CDM civil servants are either in hiding or detained in prisons. Along with NLD loyalists, strike leaders, the NUG/CRPH and PDF members, CDM civil servants will continually be the primary targets of the military. The military, which sees the CDM as a significant threat to its coercive and centralised power, has and will continue to use all the tools at its disposal to crackdown the movement.

However, the popularity of the CDM is unlikely to decline as long as it is accepted as a struggle that can actually overthrow the dictatorship. Regardless of their differences and disagreements, all actors opposing the military will continue to support the CDM and sympathise with CDM participants. Moreover, tens of thousands of CDM participants will remain steadfast in their decision as long as the military is in power, leaving little or no room for neutrality or political solutions.

The damage caused by the coup and the pandemic are unprecedented. There is an urgent need for the international community to mitigate this multitude of crises. Responding to escalating hunger and medical assistance should be prioritised, but the issues of mental health and educational support should not be overlooked for much longer. However, it is crucial for the international community and agencies operating in the country to have a clear understanding of public perceptions of the CDM and the CDMers. Any attempt to carry out humanitarian work without the recognition of the CDM or prioritising localisation will provoke public distrust and rejection, as admiration of the CDM is deeply ingrained in the post-coup Myanmar society.
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Burmese Translation

ရှေးအခြေခံနိုင်ငံရေး အလုပ်မှု (Civil Disobedience Movement) လူ့ ရှေးအခြေခံကျင်းပချက်အပေါ် အကြမ်းမဖက်အာဏာ (Burmese Translation)

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စစ်တပ်အာဏာ (NLD) ကို (၈) ဃိုင်းတွင်ပြုပြင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာစာအုပ်တစ်ချက်တစ်ချက်အားဖြင့် NLD မှစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ အသွေးအမှတ်မှာ အာက်ထွန်းသောလူမျိုး၏ အာန်တွင် (၇) ဃိုင်းတွင်ပြုပြင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြောက်ပိုင်းမှာ အာက်ထွန်းသောလူမျိုးစားသူဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုအချိန်အနေဖြင့် (၁) ဃိုင်းတွင် NLD မှစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြောက်ပိုင်းမှာ အာလူမျိုးစားသူဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုအချိန်အနေဖြင့် (၈) ဃိုင်းတွင် NLD မှစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြောက်ပိုင်းမှာ အာလူမျိုးစားသူဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုအချိန်အနေဖြင့် (၈) ဃိုင်းတွင် NLD မှစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြောက်ပိုင်းမှာ အာလူမျိုးစားသူဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုအချိန်အနေဖြင့် (၈) ဃိုင်းတွင် NLD မှစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ မြောက်ပိုင်းမှာ အာလူမျိုးစားသူဖြစ်သည်။
The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era

Civil Disobedience Movement

As of February 5, 2021

100
Government Hospitals

States and Regions

22 Universities, Colleges and Schools

16 Government Departments

218
Statements

- Ministry of Health and Sports,
- Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Transport and Communications

Civil Disobedience Movement Facebook Page

The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era
ကြက်သိည်း်။ လူဒါ်အာနောန်မြဖင်် ူလူတန််နိုင််အာထုက််တန််သိာ (၉) သိန်် (၉၀) ာချုင််နိုန််ချန်သိည်းမြန််လူည်း်နောက်ျာင််သိာ က်ုဗစ်က််နောဂါါရှားုနောန်လူင််က်စာ ၎င််လူက််နောအာက််တွင််တု်မြည်း်သိည်း် ံ��န််အာနောန်အာထုုုမြဖစ်ရှားုနောန်နောမြဖစ်နောကြက်ပြီးစစ်တ�်သိည်း် လူက််ရှားုမြဖစ်ွာစစ်တ�်သိည်း်လူက််ရှားုမြဖစ်ချ��သိည်း်။ နောက်ျာင််သိာသိ�ဂါု�ျာ�နိုင်��် ဆ�ာသိ�ဂါု�ျာ�က်လူည်း်အာမြင််ဆံ��မြဖစ်ချ��သိည်း်။ ချျင််၊ က်ချျင််၊ က်ယ်ာ (က်င််န်း) နိုင်��် စစ်က်ုင််တု��တွင််သိင််ကြက်ာနော�၀န််ထု�် (၅၀) ဝန််ကြိုးက်းဌာာန် (၂၅) ချ�အာန်က််ည်းာနော�၀န််ကြိုးက်းဌာာန်သိည်း်မြ�ည်း်န်ယ််နိုင်�်တု��နောဒါသိကြိုးက်းအာာ�လူံ�၌ CDM တွင်် �ါဝင််ချ��ကြက်သိည်း်။ နောက်ျာင််သိာသိ�ဂါု�ျာ�အာဖွ��ချျု�်၏အာဆု�အာ�လူ�ထု�အာ�တ်အာထုု အာဆင်မြင် �ည်းာနော�၀န််ထု�်စ�စ�နော�ါင််�ဝန််ထု�်�တူလူ��်င်န်န်�ချွင််�ာထုွက််ချွာ�န််တုက််တွန််နိုု�နောဆာ်ကြက်သိည်း်။ မြ�ည်း်တွင််သိတင််�အာချျုု�၏ချန်�်��န််��ာထုွက််ချွာ�န််သိည်း်။ အာာဏာာသိ�်�ုက်ု�ဆန်�်က်ျင််သိည်း်�အာနောန်မြဖင််�အာန်းနော�ာင််ဖကြိုးက်ုု�၀တ်ဆင််ပြီး ည်းာနောတ�်အာဖွ��အာစည်း်�ျာ�နိုင်�် ဝန််ထု�်�စ�စ�နော�ါင််�၏၉၀% ချန်�်သိည်း် အာာဏာာသို�်�အာပြီး�း�ထု�လူတွင်် CDM တွင်် �ါဝင််ချ��ကြက်သိည်း်။ မြ�ည်း်တွင််သိတင််�အာချျုု�၏ချန်�်��န််��ာထုွက််ချွာ�န််သိည်း်။ အာာဏာာသိ�်�ပြီး�း�(၂) က််အာကြက်ာတွင််ပြီး�ုု�န်ယ််(၅၀)ရှားန်ယ်�တူလူူထု�အာကြက်ာ�အာလူှင််BY-SA 4.0)
The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era

Credit: Kummari (New Mandala)
Policy Briefing – SEARBO
The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era

CRPH စတင်ဖွစ်စည်းသိည်းနောဖာ်ဝါးလူ (၅)က််နောန် စစ်တက်တည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတprendendးတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်းတည်း dagen}
(AUD 200,000) ကျင်ားပေးမှုကျန်ရှိသည်ကို ပြင်သိမ်းပေးသော အဓိကလုပ်ငန်းမှာ ဖြဲ႕ောက်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ CRPH မှ ပြင်သိမ်းပေးထားသော အဓိကလုပ်ငန်းမှာ ဖြဲ႕ောက်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ CRPH မှ ပြင်သိမ်းပေးထားသော အဓိကလုပ်ငန်းမှာ ဖြဲ႕ောက်မှု ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

CRPH မှ One-to-One CDM ကျန်းပွဲများသည် CDM သို့မဟာများသို့ အပြန်အပြေးများသို့ စစ်ဆေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖျင်ရှေ့ရေးပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ CDM သို့မဟာများသို့ စစ်ဆေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖျင်ရှေ့ရေးပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

CRPH သည် တစ်ဦးသို့မဟုတ် တစ်ဦးသို့ စစ်ဆေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖျင်ရှေ့ရေးပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ CDM သို့မဟာများသို့ စစ်ဆေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖျင်ရှေ့ရေးပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

CRPH သည် တစ်ဦးသို့မဟုတ် တစ်ဦးသို့ စစ်ဆေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖျင်ရှေ့ရေးပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ CDM သို့မဟာများသို့ စစ်ဆေးခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဖျင်ရှေ့ရေးပြုလုပ်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။
The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar's Post-Coup Era
မြန်မာစိတ်ကျောင်းသားတစ်ခွေထိုးသူကျောင်းသားများနှင့် လူထုအတွက် ကြိုးစားပြောင်းလဲမှုနှင့်တက်ရောက်စွာ လူဒေသများနှင့် စစ်သိုင်းများ ဖော်ပြခြင်း ဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ပြည်သူကြီးများ တွေ့ရှိအောင် မိတ်ဆွေးနှိပ်ပါမည်။

In the context of the NUG and CDM operations, the NUG has been consistent in its efforts to ensure that the people's rights are respected and protected. The NUG, through its CDM, has been highly active in providing essential services and support to the people. This includes health care services, education, and livelihood assistance. The NUG has also been actively engaging with the CDM, to ensure that the people's voices are heard and that their needs are addressed.

However, despite these efforts, the NUG and CDM have faced challenges in implementing their operations effectively. One of the major challenges has been the lack of access to essential resources, such as medical supplies, food, and fuel. The NUG and CDM have had to work closely with other organizations to overcome these challenges.

In conclusion, the NUG and CDM have been working tirelessly to provide support and assistance to the people, and their efforts are commendable. However, more needs to be done to ensure that the people's rights are protected and that they have access to essential services and support.
The Centrality of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in Myanmar’s Post-Coup Era

Files opened against health staff who participated in CDM acts to deteriorate peace and stability of the State

The following nurses have been charged under Section 595-A of the Penal Code for inciting State service personnel and health staff to participate in CDM activities, themselves participating in it, supporting CDM activities and CRPH unlawful association with the aim of deteriorating the State administrative machinery.

As tasks are being carried out to arrest these education staff charged, people are urged to inform nearby police stations about those education staff, action will be taken against the persons under the law for admitting those education staff. —MNA.
ကြိုးက်ုချစ်သည် (၅၀၀) ဦးများနှင့် CDM တွင်မှတ်တမ်းထားပေးချက်များကို စုစုပေါင်းပေးခဲ့သည်။ အာန်ည်း်ဆံ����ပြီး အာန်ည်း်ဆံ�မှု (၃၂၄) ဦးဖွံ့ဖြိုး�ချစ်သည်။ ကြိုးက်ုံး (၂၅၂) ကြိုးက်ုချစ်သည်။ နောဖနောဖာ်ဝါ�း (၁) ဦးကျင့်ဝါလ် (၃၁) ကျင်တွင် ကြိုးက်ုံး (၆၀၀) ချန််းအာ�ါအာ၀င်် CDM ၀န််ထု�်�ာနော�ါင််��ျာ�စွာနို�င်် ၎င််�တု��အာာ�က်ူည်းးနော��နောန်

252 REPORTED INCIDENTS
190 HEALTH WORKERS ARRESTED²
86 RAIDS ON HOSPITALS³
55 MILITARY OCCUPATIONS OF HOSPITALS³
37 HEALTH WORKERS INJURED⁴
25 HEALTH WORKERS KILLED⁵
17 INCIDENTS IMPACTING COVID-19 RESPONSE MEASURES

Source: 01 February – 31 July 2021 Violence Against Health Care in Myanmar Data

အသုံးပြုနိုင်သော CDMကို အဆင့်မြင့်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ကြိုးက်ုံးများကို အာန်ည်း်ဆံ��နောထုာင််ဒါဏာ်သိံ��နိုု�င််သိည်း်​ာဇွသိတ်ကြိုးက်းဘဲက််ဆုင််ာ အာနောဆာက််အာအာ ံ��ျာ တု�က််ချု�က််ချံ��ု အာန်ည်း်�ဆံ�� (၂၅) ဦးနောသိဆံ��ချ��သိည်း ်။ နောဖနောဖာ်ဝါ�း (၁) ဦးကျင့်ဝါလ် (၃၁) ကျင်တွင် ကြိုးက်ုံး (၆၀၀) ချန််းအာ�ါအာ၀င်် CDM ၀န််ထု�်�ာနော�ါင််��ျာ�စွာနို�င်် ၎င််�တု��အာာ�က်ူည်းးနော��နောန်

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စာရင်းအသစ်များကို NUG ကို CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်တွင် နောက်ထိုင်ခြင်းအတွက် အပြန်အလမ်း အသုံးပြုပြီးနေစဉ်တွင် သိကြေညာသည်။ တောင်ကျင်မြေပြင် CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်အတွင်း စိုးရိမ်မှုကို အပြင်အဆင်များကို သိကြည့်ပေးပါသည်။ ထို့သို့ NUG နှင်း CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်တွင် အပြင်မှုအရ မြန်မာ့ောက်မြန်မာ့အတွက် အဆင်များကို ပြောဆိုပါသည်။ CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်တွင် လူလျင် မြို့တွင် ကြသိပ်တို့အတွက် စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်အတွင်း အခြေခံပါသည်။

အထူးသဖြင့် စာရင်းအသစ်များကို NUG ကို CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်အတွင်း စိုးရိမ်မှုကို သိကြည့်ပေးမည်။ တောင်ကျင်မြေပြင် CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်တွင် စိုးရိမ်မှုကို အပြင်အဆင်များကို သိကြည့်ပေးပါသည်။ NUG နှင်း CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်တွင် အပြင်မှုအရ မြန်မာ့ောက်မြန်မာ့အတွက် အဆင်များကို ပြောဆိုပါသည်။ CDM စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်တွင် လူလျင် မြို့တွင် ကြသိပ်တို့အတွက် စစ်ဆေးနေစဉ်အတွင်း အခြေခံပါသည်။
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မြန်မာ၏ အပြောင်အဆင်းသော ကျင်ငွေ့ (CDM) ရောဂါစည်းပေါင်း တွင်းအာဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ အလိုအလျောက် လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များ အကြား အကြားခြောက်ရောက်ခဲ့ပြီး ကမ္ဘာ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းကို အကြားခြောက်ရောက် ထွေးခွင်းနေရာများ လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်း ရှိသည်။ ဤနိုင်ငံများ အတွက်များ ကြက်တင်ခဲ့ရလိုသည်။

ယုံကြည်စွာ အကြားခြောက်ရောက် ချက်များ အကြားခြောက်ရောက် မြန်မာတွင်း ကမ္ဘာ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွင်းအာဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ အဆင်းသက်ရောက်ချက်များ လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်း ရှိသည်။

ယခုအခါမှာ အကြားခြောက်ရောက်ချက်များ အကြားခြောက်ရောက် မြန်မာတွင်း ကမ္ဘာ့အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွင်းအာဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ အဆင်းသက်ရောက်ချက်များ လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်း ရှိသည်။
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