LANDSLIDE: There’s no other way to put it really when you look at the results. The National League for Democracy wiped the floor with the Union Solidarity and Development Party in Myanmar’s April 1 by-elections, not to mention the 15 other parties and handful of independent candidates that contested the vote.
The size of the NLD’s win is likely to have a significant impact on the political landscape over and above the 43 seats the party picked up. It sets the scene for an important showdown in 2015 and puts pressure on the USDP – and to a lesser extent ethnic political parties – to respond and shore up its support.
While anecdotal reports had indicated that the NLD had won its 43 seats convincingly, full results published in Myanmar-language state media earlier this month show just how one-sided the April 1 vote was.
The NLD received 2.686 million, or about 65.6 percent, of the 4.092 million eligible votes cast, while the USDP received 1.123 million, or 27.5 percent. That’s a huge gap, and it only gets wider when you take out the Amyotha Hluttaw constituency that the NLD didn’t contest.
I was particularly surprised that the by-elections turnout was only 68.19 percent – significantly lower than in 2010 – despite what I perceived to be relatively high awareness and interest in the vote. This raises some questions: What proportion of non-voters made a conscious decision not to vote in 2012? What would their reasons for not voting have been? To what extent, if at all, was the 2010 turnout of about 77.6 percent skewed by fraudulent advance votes?
Advance votes made up only 3.31 percent of all votes in the by-elections and this is likely to have been a factor in the lower turnout. (While I can’t find the precise figure for 2010, I believe it was above 10 percent.) In many constituencies the NLD got about the same or only slightly fewer advance votes than the USDP and there were reports of the election rejecting applications to vote in advance. This contrasts sharply with 2010, when many government-friendly companies, state-owned enterprises and government departments voted in advance en masse. This process took place with little oversight and overwhelmingly benefited the USDP.
Problems with the electoral rolls were much more pronounced during the by-elections and would have affected turnout to some degree. Only a small fraction of cases are likely to have been documented so it’s impossible know how many of those eligible were unable to cast a vote but based on what I have heard – of whole villages, and thousands of residents of a single ward, being left off the roll – it could have been several hundred thousand.
Another possibility floated by the NLD representative for Mayangone is that some who voted for the USDP in 2010 – presumably public servants – chose not to vote in the by-elections. While they felt unable to vote for the NLD, they did not want to harm the party’s chances of winning, she said. While this seems unlikely to have been a major factor, it would also help explain the dramatic drop in the USDP vote, which fell by more than half on average. (In 2010, the party received about 58 percent of all votes.)
Since the by-elections I have pondered where the NLD votes came from, and where the USDP votes went. I find it hard to believe that it can be simply be put down to many of those who voted for the USDP in 2010 switching to the NLD in 2012. If they were closet NLD supporters – or at least Daw Aung San Suu Kyi supporters – are they really likely to have voted for the pro-military party? Wouldn’t they instead have backed one of the many alternatives, such as the National Democratic Force? If they were ideologically opposed to voting for the NLD breakaway group, I doubt they would have voted USDP instead; more likely, they would not have voted at all.
Certainly, though, a significant number of voters must have made this switch. I heard this was common among those who felt unable to vote against the USDP in 2010, such as family members of civil servants, and I imagine those coerced into voting USDP – through the provision of low-interest loans, for example – will have felt little compunction not backing the USDP again.
But I think there were other factors at play here. It was clear that the NLD picked up a large number of votes from the USDP’s main opponents in 2010; almost all other candidates struggled, collectively attracting just 7 percent of the overall vote. In Mandalay’s Maha Aung Myay, for example, there were eight candidates but U Ohn Kyaing from the NLD got almost 90 percent of votes.
Another question to ponder is what proportion of the approximately 23 percent who did not vote in 2010 voted in 2012? Given the absence of exit polling, we’ll never know for sure but based on anecdotal evidence I would say it was a large number and they almost exclusively voted NLD.
This would create another voting bloc – those who voted in 2010, probably for the USDP, but not in 2012 – and one that seems to support the Mayangone NLD representative’s argument to an extent. How this group votes in 2015 – assuming they do – could have a significant impact on the result of that election. It’s not hard to imagine them being persuaded to vote for the USDP again if needed.
The result also shows up a misperception about 2010 that applies to the NLD’s win in 1990 as well. The USDP, while dominant, received about 50 percent
There’s been much discussion in the media about the significance (or not) of the by-elections and the result. One correspondent for a British television network proclaimed, almost in the same sentence, that the result was a blow for the government but that the NLD would be able to do little until the next general election in 2015. I’m sure that the government as a whole would not have been displeased with the election result and, more specifically, the glowing international response it garnered. The fact that the by-elections were unofficially postponed from October/November 2011 until after the NLD had decided whether to contest is indicative of the fact the government wanted the party, and in particular Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, in the political arena, rather than on the sidelines.
Now the NLD is very much in and there’s a fair chance that, provided they are pragmatic in how they attempt to implement their political agenda, the party’s victorious candidates will be able to work together with other parliamentarians, whether they are from “opposition” groups like the National Democratic Force, ethnic parties, the USDP or even the military. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues are likely to find quite a lot of common ground, particularly on their short-term priorities, such as improving provision of health and education services. The key will be to first pursue those goals that more closely align with the government’s: For example, participating in peace negotiations rather than immediately pushing for amendments to the constitution to get the military out of parliament. This will not only generate results but also reduce the risk of the NLD being seen as a danger to national stability and all the potential consequences that entails. However, the refusal to take their seats in parliament until the oath is amended indicates the NLD may not yet have adopted pragmatism over principle as much as it needs to.
A few days after the by-elections, English-language weekly The Myanmar Times published a photo on its front page of a pickup bus in Kawhmu township laden with about 50 NLD supporters and the headline, “On the road to 2015”. It might seem a little premature to be talking about an election that’s still more than three years away, particularly given the changes of the past 12 months. But while the by-elections were held to fill seats vacated shortly after the 2010 election, they are more of a prologue to 2015 than an epilogue to November 2010. I say this primarily because, with the NLD involved, these by-elections will share many more similarities with and the next general election than the previous one.
The importance of 2015 for Myanmar’s future cannot be overstated; it will shape the country’s direction far more than 2010, which was essentially a military exercise to bring about a transfer of power to a non-threatening but mostly civilian government. Post-2015, Myanmar could be looking at a radically different political environment, with so-called democratic and ethnic parties holding a majority in the national legislature.
A major question now is which of the different groups with a shot at victory can best position themselves for success. Can the USDP rebuild its support base (assuming it ever really had one)? Will ethnic parties be able to compete with the NLD?
An NLD win is certainly not assured. In fact, I’d be surprised if we saw a landslide on the scale of the by-elections in ethnic Burmese areas, let alone ethnic minority regions. An element of the party’s success on April 1 was simply voters enjoying the opportunity to vote for a person and a party that had been, until recently, on the sidelines of the political process. The campaign was also based around the personality of the party’s Nobel Prize-winning leader; many NLD candidates campaigned with the slogan that a vote for them was a vote for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Given she will be 70 in November 2015, it’s not clear how long she can remain at the helm of the party. Much has also been made of the fact Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is attempting to make the potentially tricky transition from icon to politician. Similarly, the party as a whole is shifting from an extremely polarised political environment, in which the two sides were very easy to delineate, to a much more complex scenario where success will depend on cooperation as much as confrontation.
Should Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the party’s representatives struggle to make inroads in the parliament – another feature of the campaign was the NLD’s lofty, perhaps unattainable goals – the election in 2015 may not be as straightforward as the by-elections. Conversely, given its minority status, anything the party achieves through the parliament can equally be claimed by the USDP.
Yet the USDP at the moment seems almost a toxic brand. Rebuilding its support to anything approaching 2010 levels will require either a great deal of coercion or a complete overhaul of the party’s image, culture and operations. I suspect this may be beyond the capabilities of its current leaders. At the same time, it has failed to recruit or attract talented younger members to take over from some of the geriatrics in Nay Pyi Taw; on one political “capacity-building” trip to Japan for members of political parties, the USDP stayed true to form by mostly sending the children of senior party officials.
“At a personal level they [conservatives in the USDP] know if we don’t reform ourselves, then we will hand the NLD or others a sweeping victory in 2015,” one government adviser told Financial Times last week.
Expect to see a significant degree of tension within the USDP over the next three years – and not only at the top. Many of its more able parliamentarians simply ran on the USDP ticket because they realised it would guarantee a seat in the hluttaw. Will they stick around if the party fails to rebuild by 2015 and defeat looms on the horizon? Perhaps not. I don’t foresee a major split, however; most members would be all too aware of the possible consequences should the military perceive that the USDP is falling apart.
Finally, the by-elections gave little indication of how ethnic parties will fare in 2015, other than that they can expect a strong challenge from the NLD. Three “ethnic” constituencies were contested, with the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party winning an upper house seat in northern Shan State that included Lashio township, and the NLD taking Kalaw and Mawlamyine. The first of these merits closer attention. Of the five townships in the constituency, the NLD easily won Lashio, which is mostly urban, the USDP won Kunlong, a military town, and the SNDP was victorious in three more rural constituencies. Ethnic parties it seems will remain strong in ethnically homogenous rural areas, while the NLD and USDP will lead the way in urban constituencies. Results could also vary depending on the state; the NLD can expect tougher opposition in Kachin State (provided there is a strong ethnic Kachin party involved), Rakhine State and much of Shan State.
Independent analyst Richard Horsey said the result could usher in “a more polarised political space in the lead-up to 2015, and possibly for more confrontational politics, as key sectors of Myanmar society – the conservative political elite, ethnic parties, and non-NLD democrats – see the risk of marginalisation”.
For the USDP, the size of the loss “raises serious questions about what core group of supporters the USDP can rely on, and about its electability in the next general elections due in 2015”, he said.
“How the USDP will position itself going forward will depend in part on which of the various factions in the party will gain the ascendency following its poor showing in the polls. If the hardliners (who also have considerable financial muscle) do so, the party may start to position itself more aggressively – perhaps with the kind of corrupt populism adopted by some other parties in the region. Alternatively, a more moderate faction may use the by-election results to push for a fundamental reorganisation and reorientation of the party. If the USDP is unable to formulate a credible plan for success in 2015, many of its strongest candidates may leave the party.”
As with everything in Myanmar, it’s difficult to speculate with any sense of conviction. There is a real risk of a coup. If there is one thing the election showed, it is that politics remains dangerously personalised; too much is reliant on the understanding between President U Thein Sein and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as Pyithu Hluttaw Thura U Shwe Mann.
If this relationship wavers — and, as we’ve seen in recent days, obstacles can appear in relatively unlikely places — Myanmar’s political future will be more opaque than ever.
Kyaw Kyaw is a Yangon-based writer.
I was expecting a deeper conspiracy as I thought the author was on the verge of discovering Myanmar president H.E. U Thein Sein’s master stroke in killing three proverbial birds with one stone; 1) orchestrating a landslide victory of NLD thus securing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s trust that consequently resulted in various sanctions being either suspended or lifted 2) securing the complete trust of Snr. General Than Shwe who is still widely believed to be in control of the state affairs 3) securing his place in the new era as a respectable leader. Unsurprisingly at the end comes an anticlimax when the author bluntly stated that “There is a real risk of a coup”(sic). I found it strangely amusing as there are active-duty high ranking military officers in the Myanmar parliament because of the “25%” clause in the current constitution and the majority USDP is mainly comprised of ex-military commanders. There may be some political maneuvering among the chairman of the parliament, Thura U Shwe Mann, the president and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi but it is highly unlikely to affect the view of the majority of the voters either now or in 2015. Thura U Shwe Mann is rumoured to be a middleman between the president and Snr. general Than Shwe. It seems to be that he will play the same role for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should the occasion arises.
In a nut shell I found the article slightly passed its used-by date but at any rate a good read. It’s so much better than some dramatic monologues that I find totally unfounded.
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A very perceptive analysis and good article. The “advance votes” and- -let’s not mince the words- the fraud in the 2010 elections, in my view, was even more endemic than the author infers.
As for the “real risk of a coup” I do not know whether the risk is real or not but of course it can by no means be dismissed. The 2008 Constitution (in so many or so few words) virtually and in advance allows a ‘constitutional coup’ – one of very few Constitutions in the world that allows such actions (and different from declarations of emergency). I suppose that apart from the 25% military appointees Aung San Suuu Kyi and NLD wants to change that provision: good luck to them.
The previous two open coups in 1962 and 1988 were extra constitutional in that they were in violations of the Charters during those years: even with the ‘constituional coup” which is allowed or empowered in the 2008 Constitution an ‘extra-constitutional coup’ (not formally authorized by the National Defence and Security Council) can also take place though one suppose and hope that this is not that likely. So there is a ‘risk’ of constiutional or extra constituional coup though -again- one hopes that the risk though not minimal is not that solid.
Another concern or possible issue is that the government could ‘revert back’ to its 2010 (almost fraudulemt) election mode in 2015 (supposing there would not be a coup, constiutional or other wise in the interim) rather than the 2012 by-election ‘mode’ (of conducting it). Since the government ‘craves’ international legitimacy the by-elections of April 2012 (unlike 2010) were non-fraudulent .
And true to or pehaps even more than their expectations international and also domestic legitimacy and in very large dollops indeed! The government also wanted to co-opt Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. This, to a certain perhaps large extent, they have succeded.
These comments are not to take the wind out of the sails of the NLD’s victory but the ‘clean’ by-elections of April 2012 perhaps at least slightly benefits the government more rather than the NLD and the other ‘opposition parties ‘ notwithstanding the fact that President Thein Sein apparently said there are no ‘opposition’ parties!
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#2
not sure how the by-election results could be understood to (dis) advantage equally the NLD and the “other opposition parties”. The latter were filleted.
as for the 2015 electoral “mode” not following the 2012 mode – let’s hope so in at least some respects. As someone wrote somewhere “Free & fair? Aung San Suu Kyi was courted by the president, the parliamentary speaker and also foreign government leaders as well as television channels – this pushed her to the top of the game but crippled other parties. Should this repeat during the 2015 [polls] ……………”
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We might be ushering in an era of the triumvirate, TS/ASSK/TSM, running the country if what you see is what you get in the way of ‘power sharing’ as manufactured by yet another cunning plan. But that would normally require a coalition govt with no decisive winner in the elections where smaller parties can become kingmakers with a lot of horsetrading going on before they settle down to an acceptable agreement.
A coup is a coup by any other name, and we have seen that with Ne Win’s first successful venture in 1958 which gave him a taste of untrammelled power. It’s been a long road to its eventual enshrinement in the constitution. They wouldn’t have included this crucial provision if they were absolutely certain that the 25% in uniform plus a ‘landslide victory’ in 2010 for the USDP ensuring practically unchallenged domination of both Houses was enough. Nothing less than fail safe for our generals.
Regardless of 2015, ASSK’s best chance remains winning over a good majority of parliamentarians and the Tatmadaw unless she has not planned for a real fighting chance to win the ‘second struggle for independence’ carrying all of us with her.
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It seems this parliament thing is not just for the romantics and the opportunists, then? Than Shwe would be shaking in the nappy now!
It is though very expensive, right? Estimated about three generations just to pay back the Chinese. And full of funny clothed people trying to look important against the odds.
Name one that parliament has done in the last 365 days?
By the way, commiserations to the people’s champion, for wise moves, both.
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I have no qualms in giving the author the benefit of the doubt for his ‘coup’ scenario loosely in the end of his assertion, However, author’s conclusion unfortunately made this whole article a ‘non-sequitur’. While I cannot say the author’s approach (including methodology) in his analysis overly complicated and old-fashioned, I have to admit that it reminds me of some Asian food served in restaurants in the Western countries, including Australia; with slight modifications to suit the targeted audience.
Going back to the commentaries on polling stats, vote swings, vote buying, election frauds and voter sentiments etcs., I would like offer a few pointers;
1) In Burma, people hardly care about government or party policies and agendas; majority follows a person or a party that they can closely identify with them. Before, it was the late Gen. Aung San as usually a ballot box with his picture would secure most votes in the good old days. It is Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at present. The point here is, majority of Myanmar population’s take on politics is a KISS.
2) Most of the voters in and around Mandalay where anti-Chinese sentiment is paramount will definitely vote for NLD every time, anytime and all the time. Mandaly is currently swamped by Kokant’s and Wa’s who are mostly China-borns, living and running businesses in the country; legal, shady or otherwise, under the umbrella of the said ethnic groups.
3) Ethnic parties will be securing their dominance in the ethnic states, where the majority of the population are ethnic, if they are allowed to operate and campaign freely and safely. And with the extremist groups like KIA diminishing soon, these activities will be seen nationwide. Both USDP and NLD are fully aware of importance of ethnic parties. They will be working hard to win the hearts and minds of the leaders of these parties, and at the same time will undoubtedly campaign for their own candidates.
4) Everyone in Burma knows the current constitution is a misnomer unless for a few who are willfully blind to the facts. The majority however wants it works for the time being as the country suffered from sanctions tremendously (Please note that some sanctions were in place since U Nu government because of his and his elected government’s socialist stands and religious views. U Nu gov used bartering system at that time), more under subsequent military rules. Unlike pre-1988 uprising years, most of the people of Myanmar, including ethnic population, now have exposure to outside world like no other times by means of oversea travels, oversea employments as engineers, health professionals, labourers, machinists, domestic assistants or ‘miscellaneous!’. And they are all very much aware of the fact that the whole world has changed pretty much and every neighbouring countries are doing ways much better. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi understands this fact and people’s will. It was one of the main reasons why she did a gigantic back flip in front of the world’s media instead of taking her stand and fight for the cause to the oblivion. And by her joining the parliament, no one can deny that it helped U Thein Sein and group achieved their immediate goal; making the constitution legitimate on the world’s stage but it is a win-win for people of Myanmar at any rate.
5) Both NLD and USDP should be working hard for rural vote in 2015 because there is a possibility that as the country develops, become stable and prospers, local issues will take priority over national interest. Both parties are well aware of the fact thus
6) The topic of 25% ‘self’-appointees in both parliaments will be a sticking point in oncoming political tug of wars. And the same can be said about the Chinese vested MyitSone Dam project. Even if these appointees remain in the parliaments on pretext national sovereignty, it will be interesting to see whether they can demonstrate the impartiality on both sides, currently being USDP and NLD and how they will sell this idea to the people of Myanmar. If, by any odd chance, they managed to achieve this goal then Myanmar Arm Forces, or Tattmadaw will be on the right track to regain its credibility as these appointee are symbolic representation of the Arm Forces.
7) Recent by-election cannot be said totally free and fair. There were independent reports of electoral irregularities, vote frauds and intimidation. But they all seemed to have little or no impact on voters and their conscious choie.
8) Come 2015, if both USDP and NLD succeed in bringing in young generation leaders it is not unlikely that there is a possibility of hang parliament. The role of the ‘self’ appointee will be the order of the day. Whether they will play the role of ‘Savior of Myanmar’ and tilt towards NLD should the occasion arises, only time will tell.
So here’s my two cents’ worth. It is not exactly a “there you go again’ but it offers an alternative to the doomsday scenarios. Why? And in ‘2012’ especially?
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Thanks for all the great comments. I’m really pleased to see this level of discussion.
The ending may not fit with the rest of the piece but I suppose I was explaining my concerns about Myanmar’s political future and making predictions. Whether the risk of a coup is real (constitutional or extra-constitutional) and how much depends on the relationships between those three figures both merit an article in themselves.
In terms of the comments by “independent thinker” on 2010, a cursory glance at the full results of the election shows that advance votes tipped the balance in favour of the USDP in only a relatively small number of constituencies – perhaps 30 across the country in both national and regional constituencies. However, there were obviously a lot of other dynamics going on in that election that could be defined as “fraud” and the effect of these is impossible to quantify…
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Thank you Ko Aung #8
A well deserved compliment to Ko Kyaw Kyaw for his western style analysis of voter turn, yet not mentioning within the context on the ground reality that were mentioned.
1) The area of Mandalay is a tinder box of ugly racist bomb looking for any reason to explode.
2) The etiology of #1 is the direct result of SPDC saving it own skin during the initial West useless careless policy.
Not until these root etiology are repeated this another “sky is falling’
assertion will be our cross to bear in order to high light the plight of the citizenry.
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nani gigantum humeris insidentes indeed, plan B.
And thank you U Kyaw Kyaw for your kind response.
Now I am wondering what happened to an article I came across this morning by Dr. Farrelly about exPats returning to Myanmar. I hope it will find its way back to Mandala soon.
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Almost everybody in Burma now knows that Daw Suu will become the president in 2015 as she and Thein Sein have since agreed with a handshake back in August 2011 for a gradual power-transfer deal, unless something really unexpected happens (to her or U Thein Sein) before that date in 2015.
That UNLESS is a huge unless and what General Min Aung Hliang’s army will do between now and that power-transfer date immediately after the 2015 general elections, where the NLD will surely win again with another landslide, will be closely watched not only by the Burmese elite but also by the Americans and the Chinese.
http://pwvb.blogspot.com/2012/05/myanmars-leader-may-step-aside-after.html
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Aung Moe,
Pretty obvious that’s what the govt wants us to believe , and an awful lot of us have swallowed it hook, line and sinker.
Surely ASSK will become the president in 2015. Who actually made such a momentous (we must have missed the moment) remark about handing over, ASSK? Thein Sein? A joint communique? Or just rumour and speculation as usual? If Thein Sein is going to be 70 in 2015 so is ASSK, and they are both likely to outlive Than Shwe but not Shwe Mann or Shit Lone.
IF free and fair elections take place in 2015. IF they honour the results. IF the army stays away from politics. Well, the army has promised unequivocally to the contrary, from Than Shwe to Min Aung Hlaing. They lost their way home to the barracks a long time ago.
The one honest truth Ko Ko Hlaing uttered was, “The future is unpredictable”. The rest is spin and hogwash. More of the same to come for the benefit of both domestic and international audiences. The show must go on.
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[…] of Myanmar’s NLD landslide May 11, 2012 By Kyaw Kyaw, New Mandala Leave a […]
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Here is a new article in elections and civil society in Burma.
Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and Elections in Myanmar 2010–2012
Michael Lidauer
Free download at http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa
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