Burma’s “reform process” – to the extent it is one – defies easy labels. It certainly isn’t a People Power Revolution like the one that overthrew Marcos – that has not been a serious possibility in Burma since 1988. Nor is it a negotiated transition along the lines of South Africa’s release from apartheid. Importantly, unlike New Order Indonesia, the regime does not face any significant economic or political crises. The atmosphere in Burma perhaps resembles the gradual loosening of political restrictions under Gorbachev’s glasnost – an analogy President Thein Sein would surely abhor.
In the midst of this ambiguity, Burma watchers have debated the sincerity and depth of Burma’s glasnost. Bertil Lintner suggests it’s all to beguile the international community, while Andrew Selth remains cautiously optimistic. Unfortunately, the debate has focused too much on Thein Sein’s reformist credentials, removal of sanctions, or even Than Shwe’s religious beliefs. However, none of these possible motivations sufficiently explains why the government has engaged in these reforms now as opposed to, say, 10 years ago.
With the exception of the late Dr. Nay Win Maung, few have thought through how Burma’s new political institutions have changed the rules of the political game. Indeed, after most transitions to democracy, former authoritarian elites usually retain some power (except, of course, when removed through a revolution). What produces democracy and good governance is not necessarily removing the old elites, but rather giving them an incentive to constrain themselves through democratic institutions. The real question then is not whether Burma’s “reform process” is “genuine” but rather whether the new rules of the game give political elites an incentive to sustain reforms.
While former junta officials fill the cabinet and the military remains powerful, under the 2008 Constitution political elites must now compete for power through the legislature (Hluttaw), the state and region governments, and even the Constitutional Tribunal. The mechanism for presidential elections is particularly important. Under the 2008 Constitution, the Hluttaw nominates and elects the president and vice-presidents, so politicians who seek the presidency must get the Hluttaw’s support. This makes presidential aspirants dependent upon Hluttaw MPs and, if the next elections are free and fair, indirectly upon voters.
Obvously, any analysis of Burma’s political elites depends heavily upon secondhand anecdotes and rumor. Nonetheless, it seems clear that for the two most prominent “reformers” in the government, President Thein Sein and Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, the new institutional structure presents opportunities as well as risks. While outsider observers who have met both men claim they are genuinely interested in reform, in the short term they both have a political incentive to push for reforms: to be elected president in 2015. In fact, many analysts had predicted that Shwe Mann would be tapped for the office last February.
In theory, presidential candidates could just garner support amongst the military and Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) MPs. Under the constitution, the military holds 25% of the seats in each chamber, while the USDP won around 80% of the contested seats in 2010. However, neither option represents a viable path to power for either Thein Sein or Shwe Mann. While insiders claim the army supports the president’s reform agenda, it is not clear whether that implies military MPs will vote for him in 2015. Under the junta, Thein Sein was never known for his fighting experience or following amongst the troops. Even more surprisingly, the military MPs have not always voted as a unified bloc, but rather tend to follow their chamber leader. This means that military MPs in the Amyotha Hluttaw would probably support that chambers nominee over Thein Sein or Shwe Mann.
If, as Lintner maintains, the USDP serves only as “a vehicle for the military’s political interests”, it certainly has not been a very effective one. On several key votes USDP members defected and voted with the opposition, suggesting that legislative leaders could not discipline them. Moreover, neither Thein Sein nor Shwe Mann possesses effective control over the party. Under ┬з 64 of the constitution, Thein Sein must refrain from any party activities, so he is in no position to corral members to support him. As speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw, Shwe Mann has little formal influence over USDP MPs in the Amyotha Hluttaw.
The USDP is also fractured between reformists and hardliners. Unlike parliamentary systems, where the head of government also serves as head of the party, Burma’s presidential institutions have created a leadership gap. Speaker Thura Shwe Mann is still only acting chairman of the party. Some analysts claim this is because hardliners refuse to confirm a permanent appointment – a very public display of factionalism if true. USDP hardliners would probably nominate one of their own, such as Vice-President Tin Aung Myint Oo, for the presidency over either Shwe Mann or Thein Sein. In short, the USDP lacks the leadership and party infrastructure of its counterparts in the Vietnamese Communist Party or Malaysia’s UMNO to act as an effective authoritarian party.
On the other hand, Thein Sein or Shwe Mann might be able to build a support coalition amongst more reformist USDP MPs, parts of the military, and the opposition. Thein Sein’s reform initiatives are well known: legalizing trade unions, relaxing censorship, releasing hundreds of political prisoners, and suspending construction of the unpopular Myitsone Dam. Shwe Mann has been particularly aggressive in courting Pyithu Hluttaw MPs, defending the chamber’s prerogatives against the Constitutional Tribunal, encouraging opposition members to debate bills, and establishing a committee to review corrupt judicial decisions.[1] The Hluttaw has surprised many by evolving beyond a rubberstamp, which should make many MPs grateful to Shwe Mann when 2015 arrives.
However, if, as I suspect, Thein Sein and Shwe Mann are courting the same constituency, there is a risk that they might begin to compete against each other. The two men have already found themselves on opposite sides of key debates. The biggest threat to the “reform process” would be infighting amongst these two, either with one turning to side with the hardliners or the military using the rift as pretext for a coup. As the 2015 presidential election nears, Thein Sein and Shwe Mann will either have to come to a power-sharing agreement or risk competing directly.
We also need to consider Aung San Suu Kyi’s incentives to engage with the “reform process.” Despite Lintner’s claim that she has simply caved in to foreign diplomats,[2] Aung San Suu Kyi is joining the political process because she now has leverage. Even after 20 years of censorship, she remains the most popular political figure inside Burma. When the NLD boycotted the 2010 elections, she denied the government legitimacy, both domestically and abroad. This was a raw demonstration of her political authority and it worked – the government realizes it needs her inside the tent in order to achieve its goals. The same foreign governments that had disparaged the political process back in November 2010 are now hinting at removing sanctions, largely based on Suu Kyi’s expressed wishes.
Right now, it is in Daw Suu’s interests to support the “reform process” and use her leverage to advance gradual reforms whilst she has the opportunity. However, once in the Hluttaw she will be forced to make tough decisions, some of which might alienate activists, others that frustrate the government. Internationally, as the E.U. and U.S. build deeper relations with Burmese officials they will depend less on her to guide their foreign policy. I suspect that, like Nelson Mandela or Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi will never go out of style, but it will be interesting to see how she manages these competing tensions.
Finally, time and tide wait for no man, even dictators. While only Than Shwe’s astrologers know how much longer he will live, many Burmese assume his departure would free the government and allow democratization to quicken. However, religious beliefs aside, Than Shwe’s relationship with the new government is not entirely clear. Is he the trump card hardliners play when they want to dampen the pace of reform? Or is he the only individual capable of reining hardliners in?
Ironically, Than Shwe might have an interest in seeing democratization through, if only to prevent the rise of another strongman who could disrupt his retirement (the ghosts of Saw Maung and Ne Win still haunt him). Some Burma watchers believe that Than Shwe ended the infighting that erupted last summer by telling Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo to stop obstructing Thein Sein’s administration. On the other hand, he is said to dislike Aung San Suu Kyi and probably abhors the thought of an NLD government. The question then is whether Burma’s political institutions will develop quickly enough before his departure shakes the political scene.
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[1] I predict Shwe Mann will become noticeably less enthusiastic about legislative power if he becomes president in 2015.
[2] I find it hard to believe a woman who endured decades of house arrest and refused to even leave the country to visit her dying husband would be intimidated by the U.S. Foreign Service.
All they have to do is make it look enough like ‘reform’ for the Western MSM to ‘cautiously’ bill it as such… then the desperate, greedy Western corporations will give themselves dispensation… rather order their client ‘democratic’ Western governments to give them dispensation to deal with the ‘new! now with democracy added!’ reform government… and the gold rush will be on.
The generals woke up one day and realized they were at the mercy of the Chinese plutocrats and this is the result.
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If that was the case, wouldn’t Western governments have rushed to Burma 20 years ago along with the rest of the world?
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Taking the ideologies of the political elite serious, they see themselves as the only able guarantors of national unity and sovereignty. They certainly noticed two important current shifts. Firstly, the rise of China and India as new global economic and political players. Myanmar is located just in between both. To maintain political and economic independence vis a vis these two neighbours requires support from others like ASEAN and may be even Europe and the US. Secondly, they noticed what happened around the Mediterranean. To avoid revolution gradual reform is the only way to maintain power. This is, in turn, is regarded as crucial to keep unity and sovereignty. Consequently, a policy of careful reform is most appropriate. (It seems that the elite in Thailand has not yet learned this lesson). As external observer, the task is to support this process and not to challenge it with utopian demands for “good governance” etc.
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HRK, thanks for your comments. While the Arab Spring might have had something to do with it, again there’s the question of why now. Why not after the 2005 color revolutions? Or the collapse of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s/early 1990s? Moreover, when the momentum for the Arab Spring has stopped last spring, why did the reforms accelerate these past few months? It’s tough to tease all these different pieces apart, but I’ve always been a bit skeptical of placing too much weight on international factors.
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Thanks for this illuminating discussion. I’m curious why you predict ‘Shwe Mann will become noticeably less enthusiastic about legislative power if he becomes president in 2015’, though. I don’t have any reason to counter your prediction, I’m just interested in greater elaboration.
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Thanks for the thought-provoking article. I find it interesting that Thein Sein and crew thought it worthwhile coaxing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi into the political process, despite the likely damage it would do to the USDP. I’m sure that not all in the party, particularly those who are no longer in real positions of power, such as Htay Oo, would have welcomed her return to the formal political process. It will be fascinating to see where the USDP is at in four years time.
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Colum, thanks for the comments. Obviously, we can’t be sure, and some people I’ve talked to think Shwe Mann is sincerely interested in enhancing the legislature’s capacity. However, I suspect that this interest stems at least in part from his desire to become president in 2015. Once he becomes president, a strong legislature might be seen as an impediment. Unlike parliamentary systems, a president can’t directly control or discipline MPs who oppose his agenda. After all, no president wants an oversight committee looking over his shoulders.
This is a classic twist in presidential systems. Even in America, politicians who criticize the imperial presidency often become ardent supporters once they become president. Just ask President Obama (he’s been quite willing to employ unilateral force without asking for congressional authorization).
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Nice intro to the brave new world of Burmese (or Myanmarese?) parliamentary politics . Future news reports promise to have real & interesting developments rather than the stock summaries of decades-long political deadlock of the past. Will be interesting to see how the economic opening up proceeds along with the political, because wouldn’t that seem to be the major motivation for political events? How the slow transition from outright isolation for decades to balancing of outside economic powers & interests (China, India, Russia, US, Europe) Great Game style proceeds with the legacy of British law lurking in the background will be interesting. Land tenure and development of local politics will be particularly interesting, on a comparative basis between other Southeast Asian states, too. Just discovered your Southeast Asian critical legal studies blog (an area i am very interested in & really can’t find much interesting work done in, looking forward to learning more). Thanks.
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Jon, thanks for your comments. I actually intentionally left out the economic side of things because Myanmar Network circulated an excellent brief last month about the top 15 tycoons and the prospects for economic reform. Definitely worth reading.
Regarding law and SEA, I might have a piece on Burma’s/Myanmar’s constitution up somewhere (if I can find the time to finish it).
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Dom: “Regarding law and SEA, I might have a piece on Burma’s / Myanmar’s constitution up somewhere (if I can find the time to finish it).
That would be great to read. I just remember the never-ending preliminaries, all the meetings year after year with nothing really happening. Would be interesting to see what happened in the end. I think the defining moment for me (while i lived there for 2 years around 2001) that proved how removed politics was from the people was when a helicopter carrying essentially the whole cabinet crashed into a river killing them all and it wasn’t even on the evening news and funerals were held shortly thereafter without there being one public announcement. Some patriotic people showed up based on what they heard through the grapevine. I only found out because my next door neighbor neighbor was a son of an ambassador during the Nei Win era and therefore was hooked into the grapevine.
I am really interested in how the law works in practice. To give an example, there are the reforms in criminal justice procedure in the 1997 Thai “People’s Constitution” the great promise of which was discussed in the 2005 JSD thesis at Cornell of the King’s granddaughter (“Towards Equal Justice: Protection fo the Rights of the Accused in the Thai Criminal Justice Process – A Comparison with France and the United States by Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol” from Chula Library, a good read). Then there is what I have been able to read on the penal system, which is not much, and seems to be a taboo subject to even talk about among many. And then finally, there is the death penalty in Asia as discussed in The Next Frontier: national Development, Political Change, and the Death Penalty in Asia, David T. Johnson and Franklin E. Zimring (actually got to talk to the author) which clearly describes what could be likened to a royal intervention over the years that prevented people from being executed. Contrast that with Chalerm who now wants to fully book the execution chamber for the foreseeable future. In fact, effective abolition of the death penalty in most cases has taken place against the will of the democratic majority. Then there is land tenure at the local level which seems to be correlated with the colonial legal tradition, civil law traditions tending to have a legacy of weaker property rights. Anyway, there are many interesting issues and little analysis that I have seen 🙂
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Dear Dom/Jon,
Could one or the other pls share the link to your “Southeast Asian critical legal studies blog”?
Cheers,
R.
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Roberto: Could one or the other pls share the link to your “Southeast Asian critical legal studies blog
Rule by Hukum: Law in Southeast Asia [Great blog]
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Jon, thanks for beating me to the punch in posting that. “Southeast Asian critical legal studies blog” is a big grandiose, but I try to keep track of legal developments in SEA, particularly Burma, Indonesia, and Philippines.
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