Simon, I think we’re in furious agreement there.
The point I am making is not that the political woes are caused by poor urban planning but that political inequality creates spatial inequality which in turn makes political instability and inequality more likely. There is a vicious cycle between the spatial and social distribution of power.
Alongside decentralising the power base of Bangkok there needs to be a reassessment of the ‘patronage’ system which is manifested in not only the capitals’ corrupt dealings but across the vast majority of business, educational and governing institutions outside of Bangkok.
Decentralising power from the capital through provincal social projects still fails to address the social construct of the client and patron. The construct is at the epi-centre of much of the corrupt dealings that are not only accepted widely but have existed for many decades.
The pocasts have been great.
It would be great to hear an expat Thai’s perspective on the historical context of the political and social problems in the kingdom.
Also ‘the centralising of power in Bangkok’ as written in a previous article would also create an interesting sub-topic in perspective to how crisises of this nature in Thailand seems to continually perpetuate.
#4 “It’s hard to imagine a more ruthless and greedy collection of people than those who make up the Thai governing class. Thaksin… Abhisit… makes no difference. Their center of gravity is not in Thailand and they no the value of absolutely nothing.”
Exactly. That’s why not everyone here is inclined to follow the first loud-mouth who comes along. Show us a mainstream political activist (I include those who control the various color-coded goon squads) and it will inevitably be someone who is doing it for the sake of his/her power and prestige within that grouping. I even spot quite a few of them on this forum – beavering away for all they’re worth at getting a lifestyle. Others of us can only ever hope to survive their hyperactive greed, as they try to monopolize everything under the sun.
Linking Thailand’s political woes to poor urban planning is a bit of a stretch. Both are merely symptoms of a far more serious disease: Poor governance and its inevitable consequence, corruption.
Until governance improves, Thailand will remain locked in a cycle of despots => coup => despot.
When politicians start going to jail for breaking the law – then perhaps we’ll start to see some improvements. Meanwhile, don’t hold your breath.
We are delighted that you are enjoying the vodcast and podcast series.
Moreover, if anybody out there has a question or sub-topic that they would like to see Andrew deal with in this week’s episode of “Thailand in Crisis” then please let us know. He has promised another graph — but I’m sure he’d appreciate any suggestions from readers/viewers.
Throughout most of history, governments and capital cities have evolved as centres of exploitation in a dog-eat-dog society. It is only since the European/American Enlightenment that some governments have changed from ruthless abusers of the population, to organisations that do deals with them via the ballot box. They still appropriate wealth from the people, but they allow the people to choose the group that gives them the best deal for that wealth.
The situation in Thailand/Bangkok in the present reign is that of a pre-Enlightenment government pretending to be an enlightened one. Only the stooges of the pre-Enlightenment core of Thailand are permitted to hold office unmolested in the ostensibly elected Parliament. All means, fair or foul– street mobs, corrupt judges, murder by the army– are permitted to ensure that government remains controlled by the rotten core of Thailand.
The Thaksin phenomenon involved the nucleation of a Chiang-Mai based alternative core, in may ways just as rotten or potentially more rotten than the existing Bangkok one, but one that offered the people a deal via the ballot box. For the first time, Thai people were offered an alternative to the yoke they had borne since their nation’s birth. Time would have allowed the people to judge which was the heavier one, but that was not permitted. Events have shown Thai democracy to be a fake.
#32 Your last point suggests you believe Thailand has been a democratic country at some point. In 2 decades ( and in examining several other decades of history), I have never experienced Thailand as anything other than a non-democratic country. Indeed, it is as much of a myth as most of the monarchy propaganda
(are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)
Just answering David, no. But are you going to go through all the threads and pick out anyone who isn’t following the party line and ask them the same question?
It’s a bit silly as of course I could do the same by asking if people are on Thaksin’s payroll or maybe asking if they belong to the same party as Giles.
Shame you didn’t query the quotes in comment #90 as to whether Thaksin had given the order for extra-judicial killings. Still you are correct to say that many people involved in, or supporters of Thaksin’s war on drugs, but not supporters of Thaksin now, could be embarrassed by an inquiry. Mind you that doesn’t absolve the main architect, Thaksin, and ‘just following’ orders is not an acceptable excuse for the policemen involved in either the killings or the line of command.
Now what should bring up David is the killing of Seh Daeng which was obviously an extra-judicial killing. I wonder who gave that order and whether anyone will own up to it. Are we looking at the military or the government, or both. So off you go David, see if you can get to the bottom of that one instead of trying to defend Thaksin from his accusers, because they are not going to go away.
Moving the capital from Bangkok like primate city Rangoon to jungle city Nay Pyi Daw might be one of the very rare decisions rightly made by the Burmese generals?
Whilst I would welcome a trip down Soi 4, I wonder whether the old guard would see it as a concession for reconciliation, a major victory, or a trap?
Losing expendable Abhisit would be a small loss, but surely they realize the need to keep Thaksin as the bogeymen, lest the dissenters become more united?
Interesting. Eye opening.
That Bangkok is a “primate” city, and the vulnerability implied by that is not new, of course. But the details! the details! I suspect that there may have been less directly intentional planning and more haphasard piling up and extention of the basic structure than the essay may imply, but the effects (and motivations, by and large) remain the same. At one point, I thought: but he’s describing Thaksin. Up here in Isan it was the same thing, with building roads & canals & the land being bought up by the, mostly Chinese, wealthy classes, aided by the million THB / village loans which served to create a steady stream of income for the money lenders who come around every time payments on the Thaksin loans come due–making even more land available since the farmers can’t possibly keep up the payments indeffinately–escalating because of the loan sharks. Meanwhile the farmers (most not all) have no concept of money/capitalism etc. and dream of the day that Thaksin will come back and clear all loans out of his own pocket.
I’ve often wondered why theses aspects of Thaksin’s corruption have gotten so little press–maybe because investigating that aspect would open the door on similar crimes of the other, older, elites.
Stephen [email protected]
sites.google.com/site/accesstoacademicpapers
I agree with Suzie Wong (8) that this crisis is more political in nature than economics. I like Andrew’s earlier analysis explaining the red shirts’ protests being about political inclusion than this one on education and rural de-industrialization. While I think Andrew’s explanation on lower education opportunities among the poor was valid to explain the income and wealth disparity between the rich and the poor, I don’t think it is the cause behind the red shirt movement–at least the direct cause. Nor was the rural de-industrialization. Many rural people have opportunities through rural industrialization e.g. food processing, garment industries, handy craft industries–and most rural villages depend on non-farm, rural industrial occupation with the people earning as much as a third of their income from these sources. An important policy under Thaksin was the OTOP (one tambon, one product) policy to promote skills and marketing of the rural industrial product. It was gaining grounds in 2004-2006 but was much slowed down after the 2006 coup due to policy uncertainly and change.
While education, rural industrialization and income equality are important long term policies, to think that tackle these policies in Thailand at this time are not hitting at the heart of the problem. That is why Abhisit’s reconciliation policies are missing the points. The immediate problem is political inclusion. To tackle this problem, one should focus on good governance. The justice system must be seen as “just”. The atmosphere of reconciliation should be one of forgiveness, listening and understanding rather than one of shows of power, toughness of the laws and social condemnation.
I wish Abhisit’s government will not use the word “reconciliation” because what they are doing is far from it.
Stan G #13
(are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)
Fred Korat #30
in a working democracy:
a. regular elections allow the voting citizens to pick and choose their representatives
b. the only other critical element is that the people of the country must accept the result of elections and permit the elected representatives to resolve their differences in the parliament
while a working judiciary is useful, and corruption-free MPs, etc, etc are highly desirable it is the democratic processes a. and b. above that eventually weed out the objectionable elements
in Thailand’s case, as we all know and shown in this article and the comments, it is the unwillingness of the Military/amart to accept the democratic process and resort to force that maintains peoples cynicism and desire for “stability” in lieu of human and political rights
Thailand is in a bad and declining state right no, the only options I see are:
a. the royal family to scrape together whatever reputation and influence it still has, repudiate their links with the military (Border Patrol Police, Village Scouts, etc) and declare support for democratic elections under the 1997 Constitution
b. the ordinary majority of Thais, under redshirt or some other leadership, to rise up and demand the military generals withdraw from all involvement in politics, legal and illegal businesses, any operations within Thailand including in the south, with refugees and border operations except as explicitly authorised from time to time by the elected government.
Neither of these seem probable now but we need to live in hope.
Adding on to what Tarrin has said, Thaksin was the catalyst for this turmoil. He certainly was not the cause of it. The underlying issues such as “double standards”, income disparity, and corruption existed way before Thaksin was in politics. The so called “elites” have had years to benefit from these issues. When Thaksin got elected he came up with policies to benefit him as well as the rural people. Due to his increasing popularity with the rural he was seen as a threat to the elites. Hence the coup to depose him. IMO Thaksin was the better of a bad bunch.
There are probably two directions Thailand could head to.
1. Elites accept the fact that majority rules
2. Thailand becomes a non-democratic country like Burma/Iran/N. Korea
Les Abbey #97
(are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)
and Somsak #98
As I recall, the Border Patrol Police, see my comment #92, were involved in many of the killings reported in the War on drugs
If so, is it really clear that the agencies most responsible for the killings were under a command that was controllable by the PM? or in fact perhaps were agents of “higher authorities”?
Perhaps the monarchies apparent approval of the War on Drugs could be relevant to at least some of the unfortunate results?
If this is so then any investigation mounted in Thailand would be unable to arrive at any definitive and fully satisfactory result due to legal restrictions on their scope of enquiry and ability to publish relevant evidence?
Such consideration might explain why the government refuses to permit international assistance to any enquiries because it is aware that almost any investigation results published in Thailand would necessarily be so limited.
In addition, the government might need to formally advise the international investigators they might find it necessary to produce minority reports that could only be published outside Thailand and the individuals involved might not be able to visit the country again.
A Realistic Alternative Road-map for Reconciliation
1) Universal political representation, free of coups, royal, judicial, constitutional or military.
Everything else, the corruption, the terrible leaders, the inequality, anti-Isaan bigotry, the fake investigations, the double standards, the Thaksin duped red shirts and the reactionary yellow shirts, indeed the whole laundry list of problems listed above doesn’t matter if there is representation. Thais will eventually work out all the other problems to their own satisfaction if they can have a say.
The great irony in Thailand is that it has representation already, and it previously had middle class support. But what is happening is an attempt to roll it back and put in place a more authoritarian system. A softer Authoritarianism that maintains the social status-quo without constantly having to make corrections through coups. This is something that appeals to not only the elite but the middle class too.
Abhisit’s reconciliation is nothing of the sort – it is capitulation followed by authoritarian patronizing rule by the existing power structure.
It has to be said that this sort of authoritarianism has worked well in other SE Asian countries and has deep roots in the cultures. It also relied on an implicit compact that all boats would benefit from the rising sea and all would eventually become middle class.
The question is what happens to such countries when the growth slows and the vast bulk of the population are still poor. Thailand is not Singapore the problems are very much larger because the population is much larger. I think the record shows that it eventually leads to repression and the locking in of economic stagnation.
The poor in Thailand are not just a burden they are also represent a huge economic opportunity. A Thailand where the poor have become middle class would be be immensely richer for all its citizens and their is several decades of organic economic growth possible. It would be a pity to see Thais throw it away.
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The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military
FredKorat’s comment about living under god-king sound so ironic to me….
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
Simon, I think we’re in furious agreement there.
The point I am making is not that the political woes are caused by poor urban planning but that political inequality creates spatial inequality which in turn makes political instability and inequality more likely. There is a vicious cycle between the spatial and social distribution of power.
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
Alongside decentralising the power base of Bangkok there needs to be a reassessment of the ‘patronage’ system which is manifested in not only the capitals’ corrupt dealings but across the vast majority of business, educational and governing institutions outside of Bangkok.
Decentralising power from the capital through provincal social projects still fails to address the social construct of the client and patron. The construct is at the epi-centre of much of the corrupt dealings that are not only accepted widely but have existed for many decades.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 3
The pocasts have been great.
It would be great to hear an expat Thai’s perspective on the historical context of the political and social problems in the kingdom.
Also ‘the centralising of power in Bangkok’ as written in a previous article would also create an interesting sub-topic in perspective to how crisises of this nature in Thailand seems to continually perpetuate.
The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military
#31 Live in hope, yes. Live in abbeyance to the god-king of chiangmai and his sychophants, no.
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
#4 “It’s hard to imagine a more ruthless and greedy collection of people than those who make up the Thai governing class. Thaksin… Abhisit… makes no difference. Their center of gravity is not in Thailand and they no the value of absolutely nothing.”
Exactly. That’s why not everyone here is inclined to follow the first loud-mouth who comes along. Show us a mainstream political activist (I include those who control the various color-coded goon squads) and it will inevitably be someone who is doing it for the sake of his/her power and prestige within that grouping. I even spot quite a few of them on this forum – beavering away for all they’re worth at getting a lifestyle. Others of us can only ever hope to survive their hyperactive greed, as they try to monopolize everything under the sun.
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
Linking Thailand’s political woes to poor urban planning is a bit of a stretch. Both are merely symptoms of a far more serious disease: Poor governance and its inevitable consequence, corruption.
Until governance improves, Thailand will remain locked in a cycle of despots => coup => despot.
When politicians start going to jail for breaking the law – then perhaps we’ll start to see some improvements. Meanwhile, don’t hold your breath.
Thailand in crisis – Episode 3
Thanks for all of these comments:
We are delighted that you are enjoying the vodcast and podcast series.
Moreover, if anybody out there has a question or sub-topic that they would like to see Andrew deal with in this week’s episode of “Thailand in Crisis” then please let us know. He has promised another graph — but I’m sure he’d appreciate any suggestions from readers/viewers.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
Throughout most of history, governments and capital cities have evolved as centres of exploitation in a dog-eat-dog society. It is only since the European/American Enlightenment that some governments have changed from ruthless abusers of the population, to organisations that do deals with them via the ballot box. They still appropriate wealth from the people, but they allow the people to choose the group that gives them the best deal for that wealth.
The situation in Thailand/Bangkok in the present reign is that of a pre-Enlightenment government pretending to be an enlightened one. Only the stooges of the pre-Enlightenment core of Thailand are permitted to hold office unmolested in the ostensibly elected Parliament. All means, fair or foul– street mobs, corrupt judges, murder by the army– are permitted to ensure that government remains controlled by the rotten core of Thailand.
The Thaksin phenomenon involved the nucleation of a Chiang-Mai based alternative core, in may ways just as rotten or potentially more rotten than the existing Bangkok one, but one that offered the people a deal via the ballot box. For the first time, Thai people were offered an alternative to the yoke they had borne since their nation’s birth. Time would have allowed the people to judge which was the heavier one, but that was not permitted. Events have shown Thai democracy to be a fake.
Reconciliation: climbing the mountain
#32 Your last point suggests you believe Thailand has been a democratic country at some point. In 2 decades ( and in examining several other decades of history), I have never experienced Thailand as anything other than a non-democratic country. Indeed, it is as much of a myth as most of the monarchy propaganda
Reconciliation: climbing the mountain
#28 So we agree on something. We just don’t agree on anything else.
#32 Slightly better of a really crap bunch just isn’t good enough.
Violating human rights? Yes, indeed!
David Brown – 102
(are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)
Just answering David, no. But are you going to go through all the threads and pick out anyone who isn’t following the party line and ask them the same question?
It’s a bit silly as of course I could do the same by asking if people are on Thaksin’s payroll or maybe asking if they belong to the same party as Giles.
Shame you didn’t query the quotes in comment #90 as to whether Thaksin had given the order for extra-judicial killings. Still you are correct to say that many people involved in, or supporters of Thaksin’s war on drugs, but not supporters of Thaksin now, could be embarrassed by an inquiry. Mind you that doesn’t absolve the main architect, Thaksin, and ‘just following’ orders is not an acceptable excuse for the policemen involved in either the killings or the line of command.
Now what should bring up David is the killing of Seh Daeng which was obviously an extra-judicial killing. I wonder who gave that order and whether anyone will own up to it. Are we looking at the military or the government, or both. So off you go David, see if you can get to the bottom of that one instead of trying to defend Thaksin from his accusers, because they are not going to go away.
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
Moving the capital from Bangkok like primate city Rangoon to jungle city Nay Pyi Daw might be one of the very rare decisions rightly made by the Burmese generals?
Reconciliation: climbing the mountain
Whilst I would welcome a trip down Soi 4, I wonder whether the old guard would see it as a concession for reconciliation, a major victory, or a trap?
Losing expendable Abhisit would be a small loss, but surely they realize the need to keep Thaksin as the bogeymen, lest the dissenters become more united?
Here lies a toppled god – Bangkok
Interesting. Eye opening.
That Bangkok is a “primate” city, and the vulnerability implied by that is not new, of course. But the details! the details! I suspect that there may have been less directly intentional planning and more haphasard piling up and extention of the basic structure than the essay may imply, but the effects (and motivations, by and large) remain the same. At one point, I thought: but he’s describing Thaksin. Up here in Isan it was the same thing, with building roads & canals & the land being bought up by the, mostly Chinese, wealthy classes, aided by the million THB / village loans which served to create a steady stream of income for the money lenders who come around every time payments on the Thaksin loans come due–making even more land available since the farmers can’t possibly keep up the payments indeffinately–escalating because of the loan sharks. Meanwhile the farmers (most not all) have no concept of money/capitalism etc. and dream of the day that Thaksin will come back and clear all loans out of his own pocket.
I’ve often wondered why theses aspects of Thaksin’s corruption have gotten so little press–maybe because investigating that aspect would open the door on similar crimes of the other, older, elites.
Stephen
[email protected]
sites.google.com/site/accesstoacademicpapers
Thailand in crisis – Episode 3
I agree with Suzie Wong (8) that this crisis is more political in nature than economics. I like Andrew’s earlier analysis explaining the red shirts’ protests being about political inclusion than this one on education and rural de-industrialization. While I think Andrew’s explanation on lower education opportunities among the poor was valid to explain the income and wealth disparity between the rich and the poor, I don’t think it is the cause behind the red shirt movement–at least the direct cause. Nor was the rural de-industrialization. Many rural people have opportunities through rural industrialization e.g. food processing, garment industries, handy craft industries–and most rural villages depend on non-farm, rural industrial occupation with the people earning as much as a third of their income from these sources. An important policy under Thaksin was the OTOP (one tambon, one product) policy to promote skills and marketing of the rural industrial product. It was gaining grounds in 2004-2006 but was much slowed down after the 2006 coup due to policy uncertainly and change.
While education, rural industrialization and income equality are important long term policies, to think that tackle these policies in Thailand at this time are not hitting at the heart of the problem. That is why Abhisit’s reconciliation policies are missing the points. The immediate problem is political inclusion. To tackle this problem, one should focus on good governance. The justice system must be seen as “just”. The atmosphere of reconciliation should be one of forgiveness, listening and understanding rather than one of shows of power, toughness of the laws and social condemnation.
I wish Abhisit’s government will not use the word “reconciliation” because what they are doing is far from it.
The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military
Stan G #13
(are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)
Fred Korat #30
in a working democracy:
a. regular elections allow the voting citizens to pick and choose their representatives
b. the only other critical element is that the people of the country must accept the result of elections and permit the elected representatives to resolve their differences in the parliament
while a working judiciary is useful, and corruption-free MPs, etc, etc are highly desirable it is the democratic processes a. and b. above that eventually weed out the objectionable elements
in Thailand’s case, as we all know and shown in this article and the comments, it is the unwillingness of the Military/amart to accept the democratic process and resort to force that maintains peoples cynicism and desire for “stability” in lieu of human and political rights
Thailand is in a bad and declining state right no, the only options I see are:
a. the royal family to scrape together whatever reputation and influence it still has, repudiate their links with the military (Border Patrol Police, Village Scouts, etc) and declare support for democratic elections under the 1997 Constitution
b. the ordinary majority of Thais, under redshirt or some other leadership, to rise up and demand the military generals withdraw from all involvement in politics, legal and illegal businesses, any operations within Thailand including in the south, with refugees and border operations except as explicitly authorised from time to time by the elected government.
Neither of these seem probable now but we need to live in hope.
Reconciliation: climbing the mountain
Adding on to what Tarrin has said, Thaksin was the catalyst for this turmoil. He certainly was not the cause of it. The underlying issues such as “double standards”, income disparity, and corruption existed way before Thaksin was in politics. The so called “elites” have had years to benefit from these issues. When Thaksin got elected he came up with policies to benefit him as well as the rural people. Due to his increasing popularity with the rural he was seen as a threat to the elites. Hence the coup to depose him. IMO Thaksin was the better of a bad bunch.
There are probably two directions Thailand could head to.
1. Elites accept the fact that majority rules
2. Thailand becomes a non-democratic country like Burma/Iran/N. Korea
Violating human rights? Yes, indeed!
Les Abbey #97
(are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)
and Somsak #98
As I recall, the Border Patrol Police, see my comment #92, were involved in many of the killings reported in the War on drugs
If so, is it really clear that the agencies most responsible for the killings were under a command that was controllable by the PM? or in fact perhaps were agents of “higher authorities”?
Perhaps the monarchies apparent approval of the War on Drugs could be relevant to at least some of the unfortunate results?
If this is so then any investigation mounted in Thailand would be unable to arrive at any definitive and fully satisfactory result due to legal restrictions on their scope of enquiry and ability to publish relevant evidence?
Such consideration might explain why the government refuses to permit international assistance to any enquiries because it is aware that almost any investigation results published in Thailand would necessarily be so limited.
In addition, the government might need to formally advise the international investigators they might find it necessary to produce minority reports that could only be published outside Thailand and the individuals involved might not be able to visit the country again.
Reconciliation: climbing the mountain
A Realistic Alternative Road-map for Reconciliation
1) Universal political representation, free of coups, royal, judicial, constitutional or military.
Everything else, the corruption, the terrible leaders, the inequality, anti-Isaan bigotry, the fake investigations, the double standards, the Thaksin duped red shirts and the reactionary yellow shirts, indeed the whole laundry list of problems listed above doesn’t matter if there is representation. Thais will eventually work out all the other problems to their own satisfaction if they can have a say.
The great irony in Thailand is that it has representation already, and it previously had middle class support. But what is happening is an attempt to roll it back and put in place a more authoritarian system. A softer Authoritarianism that maintains the social status-quo without constantly having to make corrections through coups. This is something that appeals to not only the elite but the middle class too.
Abhisit’s reconciliation is nothing of the sort – it is capitulation followed by authoritarian patronizing rule by the existing power structure.
It has to be said that this sort of authoritarianism has worked well in other SE Asian countries and has deep roots in the cultures. It also relied on an implicit compact that all boats would benefit from the rising sea and all would eventually become middle class.
The question is what happens to such countries when the growth slows and the vast bulk of the population are still poor. Thailand is not Singapore the problems are very much larger because the population is much larger. I think the record shows that it eventually leads to repression and the locking in of economic stagnation.
The poor in Thailand are not just a burden they are also represent a huge economic opportunity. A Thailand where the poor have become middle class would be be immensely richer for all its citizens and their is several decades of organic economic growth possible. It would be a pity to see Thais throw it away.