cb #27 : There you go again with your theory re. Esan wanting to secede from Thailand. Despite having been asked by various posters on NM to show us some evidence that there may be a movement along these lines, you continue to be silent. Your assertion seems most unlikely, silly even.
The opposite would appear to be the fact: Esan people want to be included to a greater extent in the rights & privileges of Thai nationality. They are sick of being excluded. I haven’t met a single person from the area near Laos who has expressed any interest in joining that country.
Given the post, the court seems to have opened itself up to a number of doubts as to its understanding of economic and policy issues. In essence, the court seems to say that Thaksin should not have devised and implemented any telecom policy while in office (or never entered office, in the first place), and that TOT, as a state enterprise, is a holy cow that nobody much ever touch. The judges also seem to be rather liberal in their use of the term “abuse of power.” Anyway, I hope that somebody will perform a thorough analysis of the verdict, and make it public. So far, there are more questions than answers. For example, “Thaksin noted that many deals were struck in the negotiations, and that 16 other companies also benefited from the EXIM Bankโs loans. The judges ruled that the loans gave preferential treatment to Thaksin, and hence were an abuse of power.” Is there really only this much in the verdict on this point? What did the judges say about the other beneficiaries; did they argue that, in fact, Thaksin’s company was the only beneficiary?
Thank for for the summary. However, I have a couple of comments to Patiwat’s comments:
1. The legal charge was not “policy corruption” (which indeed has no legal precedent), but “abnormal gains” which has been defined since 1999 in the law (see http://www.pub-law.net/library/org_pcp.html, in Thai only though).
Since “abnormal wealth” in this case pertains to SHIN shares, which the court ruled that belonged to Thaksin and his wife all along, the court therefore had to decide how such wealth grew “abnormally,” and therefore they had to consider various “policy corruptions.”
2. Since the charge is “abnormal gains” not “policy corruption,” I therefore disagree with Patiwat’s comment that this verdict “set a very low bar for what constitutes policy corruption.”
To use Abhisit’s father example: the prosecutor would have to prove that Abhisit himself owned controlling stake in CP Foods, and that CP Foods unfairly benefits from policy corruption(s), before the court can rule in a manner that is similar to Thaksin’s case.
[…] would you want a review of your book to conclude on this note? Correspondingly, editing seems to have played almost no role in the production of this book. […]
It’s seems hard to argue that a prime minister should be so much more wealthy after being in power than before, although obviously people like Tony Blair did do this. Still, it will take quite a bit of verbal gymnastics for the pro-Thaksin camp to say that this court ruling was grossly unfair to Thaksin. Again looking at the share holdings one would have to be very innocent to think that Thaksin wasn’t hiding his controlling stake through family members.
The only argument really left is about double-standards, but then again we were all taught the two wrongs don’t make a right, weren’t we?
[…] Water, Poverty, Commons in Southeast Asia In sounding on February 26, 2010 at 3:01 pm A great review of a new book on Water Wars in Southeast Asia over at New Mandala came across the wires, serendipitously enough, at the same time as this […]
[…] by chapter 11 Are you kidding me? February 21, 2010 by Federico Ferrara ัโะงัโโกัโฃะัโะฑัโโ โ New Mandala ัโฃะัโะซัโะตัโฃะัโะตัโโัโฃะัโะณัโโกัโะฒัโะชัโฃะัโะณัโโกัโะฒัโะ โ ัโฃะัโะัโะฎัโฃะัโะฅัโะฝัโะณัโฃะ […]
Stephen,
You actually believe what politicians say? Just kidding. Unfortunately, I’m here in the USA and have been following the unedifying health care debacle, so I’m rather jaded. Change you can believe in that looks pretty much like the previous administration.
Back to the topic at hand. The ceasefire groups, or at least the KIO, seem to be in a box. As you note, the gains from going back to war are negligible However, do you think there is a higher probability of gain from the BGF and election route?
Hi Siammiddlepath.
Thank you for an interesting post. I would however like you to remind your farang French friend of the well known quotation “Let them eat cake”. If the meaning is lost on you, he will certainly know what I mean.
‘One big political thorn’: There is an even bigger ‘thorn’ lurking out there for Thais to deal with someday, but no one knows when that day will come, or how things will unfold at that crucial time…
While I think itโs pretty fair to say that the KIO/KIA has been the most pragmatic, astute and far sighted of the armed ethnic groups in their dealings with the state, it does seem that (at least for the Border Guard Force (BGF) issue) thereโs not really much room for negotiations. The directive seems pretty firm from the SPDC leadership and (as I understand it) Ye Myint has not been given any power to negotiate. While heโs the head of Military Affairs Security (MAS), he does not wear a second hat as PM (as did his predecessor Khin Nyunt, as head of Military Intelligence Service (of which MAS is a reconstruction)). So, he seems to be just a messenger. Whether a given armed group accepts or rejects the BGF transformation, he just relates the response back to his superior(s), who then reiterate(s) the initial directive.
Given such restrictions on bargaining over the BGF (and negligible gains at high cost from any return to war), Dr. Tu Jaโs resignation seems quite sensible. And while Aiontay has questioned โhow amicable the break away isโ, Dr. Tu Ja explained to Mizzima that: โthe KIO central body accepted the resignations in consultation with all to tread the way paved by the military regime and to stand with the people. They did not object to our decision but encouraged us to do so. There is no rift among us. We got permission from the central body on September 3 to resign from our posts.โ
Sorry for the grief I’ve caused you. I have to apologize you again.
I dug up my old diaries and rediscovered that you were right about the location. It wasn’t your house. It was your mother’s house in Campsie. I think you were then working and living in Canberra. But I remember seeing your family back in Campsie so many times.
I might have confused you with one of your brothers. At my age of almost 55 the memories are getting blurred. Especially recalling the ones from almost 20 years ago. I hope you understand me.
The reason I still remember that occasion of meeting Gen Tint Swe there was the fact that he was the most powerful retired general out of all Ne Win’s lieutenants and we all knew him very well as the head of The Economic Reform Commission or some powerful commission formed after the 1988 coup.
Also his adopted son was none other than General Khin Nyunt and he was the one who recommended to appoint his protege Khin Nyunit as the powerful chief of MIS to Ne Win after MI chief Tin Oo was removed in 1983.
You know all the Burmese here always look up to you as a freedom fighter and the important leader of CRDB actively struggling for the restoration of democracy in our Burma.
I was really shocked to see him comfortably sitting on the couch at your mother’s house with your brothers so I wrote it down that occasion in my diary that night.
I was already shocked to see the Burmese ambassador’s Mercedes at the front. You and many Burmese used to stand and yelled slogans for many hours in front of Burmese embassy in Canberra during many protests then.
So I happily retract my throw-away statement that you met him. Please forgive me for that. Sorry!
Shock revelation in today’s Dim Light: Than Shwe is a “great gardener”!
Who would have thought? Ok, it was a metaphor, the headline for an article about the development of Pakkoku read: “Garden of a great gardener”.
And it was mostly referring to the Tatmadaw but there was this quote in reference to Than Shwe: “Development of Pakkoku started just after it was put into the list of 24 special development regions in Magway Division under the guidance of the Head of State. Railways and motorways appeared overnight and communication systems have developed to make the town modern.”
It appears he has some magic fertiliser, unlike any of the country’s farmers.
I believe the order to print Dim Light space fillers that read, “The best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago. The second best time is now,” also came directly from the top….
Having someone on both sides in the conflict isn’t a particularly new strategy for the Kachins. It is pretty much the norm in any civil conflict. I’m not entirely clear how amicable the break away is, but I’ll have to admit I have some rather limited sources these days Also, while it is true the ceasefire has not broken down yet, and while it would be a disaster for Kachin civilans if it did, I’m not sure that the KIO has a whole lot of choice. I simply don’t see how they can retain any political power by agreeing to the border guard program.
It seems to me that I have seen some river flow data as related to the virtual disappearance of the pla beuk in the BHS/Xg Kong area…but can not find it now. Anyone?
Debbie: Pls say hello to your father for me. We worked together in
BHS and I remember the conversations we used to have in the evening and all I learned from him. Are you the daughter who was at UCSC while I was there?
I do not understand why you have “to be afraid” ‘siammiddlepath’?
In an imperfect world (or an imperfect Thailand), chipping out the thorny flaws help reduce life’s irritations. And surely a judicial resolution of the Thaksin asset case (it won’t be a perfect solution, but what is?) would dull one big political thorn and stabilize matters a bit.
One would argue that some ‘political accommodation’ of sort would have been the ideal solution. Oh yeah? (Remember we are talking of a megalomaniac named Thaksin who believes he is above the law.)
This is one of my soap box topics from sitting on the banks of the Mekong for only a short six years – as with farmers in the desert people only have a memory of the exceptional years.
By pure recollection, unfortunately not by scientific record, in at least 50% of the previous years large boat traffic between Chiang Saen and Jing Hong has been halted by low water at some point – the huge new Chiang Saen port is seemingly being built with only the memory of the year round transportation in mind.
It is undoubtedly early this year (even though, thanks to a 23mm storm in January Chiang Saen is sitting on the wettest year in the six that I’ve been recording – our local reservoirs would be full if year round crop irrigation for an increasing amount of cleared land wasn’t also nowdays considered as normal as year round large boat transportation) and I’ve not known slow boat transport to Luang Prabang be stopped before (though I was in Tha Souang the other day – after the ‘banning’ and was offered slow boat transportation both to Huay Xai and to Luang Prabang so some boats are still running, how safely and reliably I wouldn’t care to guess).
Though I’m sure damming must have some effect on rivers and on water supplies I have long been convinced (http://bit.ly/9I8uFi – written last year when the situation was, admittedly, better; the graph in that piece is from the below link and so points to todays situation) that yearly cries of drought and flood are more to do with land use and irrigation changes – not to mention access to disaster relief grants – indeed was relieved to see the same scientifically set out in FD, FD.
A resource that I’m sure you all know about is the Mekong River Commission’s Resource website (http://bit.ly/aWELGD) currently showing that in Chiang Saen we are still on a par with the ’93 dry season.
Clicking onto the Luang Prabang data shows an interesting difference in patterns between the two stations – not least, in the old Royal capital ’04 seems to have been dryer than ’93, vice versa in Chiang Saen.
Over to scientists for explanation – I’ve got to get off my soap box and look after some elephants.
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Making sense of the verdict
Srithanonchai What did the judges say about the other beneficiaries; did they argue that, in fact, Thaksinโs company was the only beneficiary?
Does it really matter how many other companies benefited? The fact that Thaksin’s companies did benefit suggests corruption, doesn’t it?
Are you kidding me?
cb #27 : There you go again with your theory re. Esan wanting to secede from Thailand. Despite having been asked by various posters on NM to show us some evidence that there may be a movement along these lines, you continue to be silent. Your assertion seems most unlikely, silly even.
The opposite would appear to be the fact: Esan people want to be included to a greater extent in the rights & privileges of Thai nationality. They are sick of being excluded. I haven’t met a single person from the area near Laos who has expressed any interest in joining that country.
Making sense of the verdict
Given the post, the court seems to have opened itself up to a number of doubts as to its understanding of economic and policy issues. In essence, the court seems to say that Thaksin should not have devised and implemented any telecom policy while in office (or never entered office, in the first place), and that TOT, as a state enterprise, is a holy cow that nobody much ever touch. The judges also seem to be rather liberal in their use of the term “abuse of power.” Anyway, I hope that somebody will perform a thorough analysis of the verdict, and make it public. So far, there are more questions than answers. For example, “Thaksin noted that many deals were struck in the negotiations, and that 16 other companies also benefited from the EXIM Bankโs loans. The judges ruled that the loans gave preferential treatment to Thaksin, and hence were an abuse of power.” Is there really only this much in the verdict on this point? What did the judges say about the other beneficiaries; did they argue that, in fact, Thaksin’s company was the only beneficiary?
Making sense of the verdict
Thank for for the summary. However, I have a couple of comments to Patiwat’s comments:
1. The legal charge was not “policy corruption” (which indeed has no legal precedent), but “abnormal gains” which has been defined since 1999 in the law (see http://www.pub-law.net/library/org_pcp.html, in Thai only though).
Since “abnormal wealth” in this case pertains to SHIN shares, which the court ruled that belonged to Thaksin and his wife all along, the court therefore had to decide how such wealth grew “abnormally,” and therefore they had to consider various “policy corruptions.”
2. Since the charge is “abnormal gains” not “policy corruption,” I therefore disagree with Patiwat’s comment that this verdict “set a very low bar for what constitutes policy corruption.”
To use Abhisit’s father example: the prosecutor would have to prove that Abhisit himself owned controlling stake in CP Foods, and that CP Foods unfairly benefits from policy corruption(s), before the court can rule in a manner that is similar to Thaksin’s case.
Review of Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War
[…] would you want a review of your book to conclude on this note? Correspondingly, editing seems to have played almost no role in the production of this book. […]
Making sense of the verdict
It’s seems hard to argue that a prime minister should be so much more wealthy after being in power than before, although obviously people like Tony Blair did do this. Still, it will take quite a bit of verbal gymnastics for the pro-Thaksin camp to say that this court ruling was grossly unfair to Thaksin. Again looking at the share holdings one would have to be very innocent to think that Thaksin wasn’t hiding his controlling stake through family members.
The only argument really left is about double-standards, but then again we were all taught the two wrongs don’t make a right, weren’t we?
Review of Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region
[…] Water, Poverty, Commons in Southeast Asia In sounding on February 26, 2010 at 3:01 pm A great review of a new book on Water Wars in Southeast Asia over at New Mandala came across the wires, serendipitously enough, at the same time as this […]
Thitinan on the looming verdict
Ahhh — der blinde Seher ist auch wieder da… ๐
Are you kidding me?
[…] by chapter 11 Are you kidding me? February 21, 2010 by Federico Ferrara ัโะงัโโกัโฃะัโะฑัโโ โ New Mandala ัโฃะัโะซัโะตัโฃะัโะตัโโัโฃะัโะณัโโกัโะฒัโะชัโฃะัโะณัโโกัโะฒัโะ โ ัโฃะัโะัโะฎัโฃะัโะฅัโะฝัโะณัโฃะ […]
The KIA digging in
Stephen,
You actually believe what politicians say? Just kidding. Unfortunately, I’m here in the USA and have been following the unedifying health care debacle, so I’m rather jaded. Change you can believe in that looks pretty much like the previous administration.
Back to the topic at hand. The ceasefire groups, or at least the KIO, seem to be in a box. As you note, the gains from going back to war are negligible However, do you think there is a higher probability of gain from the BGF and election route?
Thitinan on the looming verdict
Hi Siammiddlepath.
Thank you for an interesting post. I would however like you to remind your farang French friend of the well known quotation “Let them eat cake”. If the meaning is lost on you, he will certainly know what I mean.
Thitinan on the looming verdict
‘One big political thorn’: There is an even bigger ‘thorn’ lurking out there for Thais to deal with someday, but no one knows when that day will come, or how things will unfold at that crucial time…
The KIA digging in
While I think itโs pretty fair to say that the KIO/KIA has been the most pragmatic, astute and far sighted of the armed ethnic groups in their dealings with the state, it does seem that (at least for the Border Guard Force (BGF) issue) thereโs not really much room for negotiations. The directive seems pretty firm from the SPDC leadership and (as I understand it) Ye Myint has not been given any power to negotiate. While heโs the head of Military Affairs Security (MAS), he does not wear a second hat as PM (as did his predecessor Khin Nyunt, as head of Military Intelligence Service (of which MAS is a reconstruction)). So, he seems to be just a messenger. Whether a given armed group accepts or rejects the BGF transformation, he just relates the response back to his superior(s), who then reiterate(s) the initial directive.
Given such restrictions on bargaining over the BGF (and negligible gains at high cost from any return to war), Dr. Tu Jaโs resignation seems quite sensible. And while Aiontay has questioned โhow amicable the break away isโ, Dr. Tu Ja explained to Mizzima that: โthe KIO central body accepted the resignations in consultation with all to tread the way paved by the military regime and to stand with the people. They did not object to our decision but encouraged us to do so. There is no rift among us. We got permission from the central body on September 3 to resign from our posts.โ
Burma sanctions: limited, Western, symbolic
Dear Dr. Tint Way,
Sorry for the grief I’ve caused you. I have to apologize you again.
I dug up my old diaries and rediscovered that you were right about the location. It wasn’t your house. It was your mother’s house in Campsie. I think you were then working and living in Canberra. But I remember seeing your family back in Campsie so many times.
I might have confused you with one of your brothers. At my age of almost 55 the memories are getting blurred. Especially recalling the ones from almost 20 years ago. I hope you understand me.
The reason I still remember that occasion of meeting Gen Tint Swe there was the fact that he was the most powerful retired general out of all Ne Win’s lieutenants and we all knew him very well as the head of The Economic Reform Commission or some powerful commission formed after the 1988 coup.
Also his adopted son was none other than General Khin Nyunt and he was the one who recommended to appoint his protege Khin Nyunit as the powerful chief of MIS to Ne Win after MI chief Tin Oo was removed in 1983.
You know all the Burmese here always look up to you as a freedom fighter and the important leader of CRDB actively struggling for the restoration of democracy in our Burma.
I was really shocked to see him comfortably sitting on the couch at your mother’s house with your brothers so I wrote it down that occasion in my diary that night.
I was already shocked to see the Burmese ambassador’s Mercedes at the front. You and many Burmese used to stand and yelled slogans for many hours in front of Burmese embassy in Canberra during many protests then.
So I happily retract my throw-away statement that you met him. Please forgive me for that. Sorry!
Than Shwe all alone?
Shock revelation in today’s Dim Light: Than Shwe is a “great gardener”!
Who would have thought? Ok, it was a metaphor, the headline for an article about the development of Pakkoku read: “Garden of a great gardener”.
And it was mostly referring to the Tatmadaw but there was this quote in reference to Than Shwe: “Development of Pakkoku started just after it was put into the list of 24 special development regions in Magway Division under the guidance of the Head of State. Railways and motorways appeared overnight and communication systems have developed to make the town modern.”
It appears he has some magic fertiliser, unlike any of the country’s farmers.
I believe the order to print Dim Light space fillers that read, “The best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago. The second best time is now,” also came directly from the top….
The KIA digging in
Having someone on both sides in the conflict isn’t a particularly new strategy for the Kachins. It is pretty much the norm in any civil conflict. I’m not entirely clear how amicable the break away is, but I’ll have to admit I have some rather limited sources these days Also, while it is true the ceasefire has not broken down yet, and while it would be a disaster for Kachin civilans if it did, I’m not sure that the KIO has a whole lot of choice. I simply don’t see how they can retain any political power by agreeing to the border guard program.
Damned Chinese: mighty Mekong a memory
It seems to me that I have seen some river flow data as related to the virtual disappearance of the pla beuk in the BHS/Xg Kong area…but can not find it now. Anyone?
From the archives: Gordon Young
Debbie: Pls say hello to your father for me. We worked together in
BHS and I remember the conversations we used to have in the evening and all I learned from him. Are you the daughter who was at UCSC while I was there?
Sok Dee Yu Dee Mi Hang
Thitinan on the looming verdict
I do not understand why you have “to be afraid” ‘siammiddlepath’?
In an imperfect world (or an imperfect Thailand), chipping out the thorny flaws help reduce life’s irritations. And surely a judicial resolution of the Thaksin asset case (it won’t be a perfect solution, but what is?) would dull one big political thorn and stabilize matters a bit.
One would argue that some ‘political accommodation’ of sort would have been the ideal solution. Oh yeah? (Remember we are talking of a megalomaniac named Thaksin who believes he is above the law.)
Damned Chinese: mighty Mekong a memory
Dear All
This is one of my soap box topics from sitting on the banks of the Mekong for only a short six years – as with farmers in the desert people only have a memory of the exceptional years.
By pure recollection, unfortunately not by scientific record, in at least 50% of the previous years large boat traffic between Chiang Saen and Jing Hong has been halted by low water at some point – the huge new Chiang Saen port is seemingly being built with only the memory of the year round transportation in mind.
It is undoubtedly early this year (even though, thanks to a 23mm storm in January Chiang Saen is sitting on the wettest year in the six that I’ve been recording – our local reservoirs would be full if year round crop irrigation for an increasing amount of cleared land wasn’t also nowdays considered as normal as year round large boat transportation) and I’ve not known slow boat transport to Luang Prabang be stopped before (though I was in Tha Souang the other day – after the ‘banning’ and was offered slow boat transportation both to Huay Xai and to Luang Prabang so some boats are still running, how safely and reliably I wouldn’t care to guess).
Though I’m sure damming must have some effect on rivers and on water supplies I have long been convinced (http://bit.ly/9I8uFi – written last year when the situation was, admittedly, better; the graph in that piece is from the below link and so points to todays situation) that yearly cries of drought and flood are more to do with land use and irrigation changes – not to mention access to disaster relief grants – indeed was relieved to see the same scientifically set out in FD, FD.
A resource that I’m sure you all know about is the Mekong River Commission’s Resource website (http://bit.ly/aWELGD) currently showing that in Chiang Saen we are still on a par with the ’93 dry season.
Clicking onto the Luang Prabang data shows an interesting difference in patterns between the two stations – not least, in the old Royal capital ’04 seems to have been dryer than ’93, vice versa in Chiang Saen.
Over to scientists for explanation – I’ve got to get off my soap box and look after some elephants.
Thanks
John