interesting to discover what Chatham House Rules means and I can see a place for it
however in this case I think the Thai government is desperate to get its point of view into any international fora so I doubt if they will close out any opportunities as a result of this breach
as we have noted the royal/military/government oriented participants generally expressed what we expected in terms of the standard lines and we did not see them taking advantage of the “frank personal” exchanges that we might reasonably expect if someone asked for the proceedings to be under these rules
so, we can reasonably complain about their apparent lack of candour and the participants, if they paid to attend, should ask for their money back
My number one comment on Professor Bongboonkarn is in reply to this remark that the coup, PAD protests, etc. has “led to peoples ultimately questioning democratic principles”.
In LAO Isaarn it has led to people questioning whether they remain part of “Thailand”.
“He stated that Thai culture does not want this kind of debate, ‘public debate is out, and it’s against public interest’ (…yes he actually said this!)”
I guess it’s because Patra assumes he knows better than Suchit what public interest is in Thailand. There are obviously very different opinions on this, I can only guess why Suchit thinks some things better not to be brought out in the open, but if the free discussion leads to reducing the value of some important institutions, negative effects need to be considered first.
Also I feel that people came with their own questions and didn’t really listen to panelists presentations. “When will coup makers will be brought to justice” seems to completely ignore Layland’s views on constitutionality, for example.
Though recognising the need to cover these discussions, particularly given the dearth of space available for free speech in Thailand’s own media, I do have reservations about the flagrant breach of the Chatham House Rule in coverage of this event.
“When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed”.
To ‘expose’ the speakers in this event surely does more damage to New Mandala’s means to solicit and receive important insight into Thailand’s political situation.
Too late now, but given that this is perhaps one of the first talks on the political environment in Thailand – sponsored by the Government – this coverage may have blown any chances of other events in the same vein out of the water.
Ethnic Burmese population is almost exploding in Burma, much more than the population growth of ethnic Kachins in last two decades. That population pressure and also the army-backed relocation of lowland Burmese into the highland areas like the Hu-gaung Valley are dramatically changing the racial mix of Kachin land.
If the past trend of over 20 years of development since the ceasefire with KIA continues at the current breakneck speed the Army will eventually sideline the Kachins, cooperate with China, and open the Pan Asian Highway as their promise to India just last year.
If speaking or writing in English is politically safer, better tell both Ji Ungpakorn and Harry Nicolaides who wrote in English and it was those English pieces that were cited as lese majeste.
In that case, this whole India-Burma-China & Asian highways are on shaky ground, especially in North Burma. Unless the people of Burma/Kachins genuinely benefit, the Junta might have a tough job managing these highways IMO. That may be the very reason we still don’t have the roads or the $60 billion(and growing) annual trade between India and China would have well been flowing through Burma.
India is developing at a blistering pace, that said being a large country the economic fate of the North-eastern states hinge on how Burma emerges especially politically. I read about the Chinese pushing hard there and if they have built highways up to Hukwang valley they must be in a real hurry. Btw was not too surprised to check into a Chinese hotel in Tamu bordering Manipur, on a visit last year.
Ralph Kramden: The argument is the same, but I spent several days working on the prose in advance of the manuscript going to print. I think it’s safe to say that the book is a much better piece of writing than the version that was posted on the web about a month ago.
my simple minded observation is that Prem and the privy council and their mates in business (royals, CP, bankers, generals) set the agenda followed by the military with mercenaries like the PAD and the judges
their agenda is to maintain the traditional conservative wealth and power
the Prince (or some people around him, privy councillors?) seems to be stirring, eg. police appointment, which must be scaring a lot of people. I think the King is on the hospital to protect himself from the Prince
the ordinary huge majority are now awake to the possibility of change for their better, inspired by Thaksin but starting to recognise democracy and voting for their benefit. some are explicit redshirts but most will support if called.
decentralised democracy is the solution, voting at all levels (which Thaksin progressed towards).
the authority of the vote will eventually suppress the royals, privy council and the military
The Kachin are the main player in the region, and it’s crucial to get them on board if we are to make any significant progress in development or trilateral trade and commerce. The ‘Asian Highway’ is what the junta will rely on, and it’s likely to concentrate its efforts on securing and policing it rather than on seeking genuine national reconciliation with the KIO/KIA that must include fiscal and revenue policy issues, not just the BGF (Border Guard Force) issue currently causing considerable tension. The current time-honoured strategy of co-opting or buying off a handful of corrupt ethnic leaders will not give us lasting and encompassing benefits though such divide and rule policies may prolong the state of inequity for some time.
There are some Chinese as well as a lot of Shan and Palaung in the region apart from the Burman. You know the Naga straddle the border with India and some Kachin also live in India (Singpho) just as in China (Jingpo). Historians believe that the Kachin were latecomers who ruthlessly pushed the Shan, Ahom and Naga out of the headwaters of the Irrawaddy. You ignore them at your peril.
RLP: “What is your net worth now outside Thailand?”
TS: “Outside Thailand it’s only a hundred million, or couple of hundred million US dollars. A hundred million US dollars, actually.”
RLP: “A couple of hundred or a hundred?”
TS: “It used to be a couple but I spent some on my house, this and that. I have about a hundred left.”
Good to know that there are presses that get things done quickly and efficiently. Given that it was reviewed at the press, how different is the published version from that which was ever so briefly available for download?
The coup against Thaksin can be viewed as an action of enforcing “conformity with the rules”. The coup wasn’t against the constitution, it was against abusing the poor 1997 charter.
In “Thai Thai Thaksin” entry in my own blog I argue that at that time the opposition couldn’t find ANY rules Thaksin was willing to subject himself to, so when everything else failed, including 1997 carter, PAD had brought up the King and the morals, and the army brought out their most powerful argument – the guns.
It dovetails nicely with Leyland’s idea that it’s conformity to the rules that makes a constitution, not the mere existence of those rules on paper. The generals were very clear on that distinction.
Is the appeal for justice in English media by those who feel that wrongdoing has occurred indicative of the righteousness of the cause? Do the current elites embroiled in power simply not respond in kind through English because they are aware of how unjustifiable and ridiculous their positions have become? Is there evidence of a PAD member linking English language media to treason? I wouldn’t be surprised.
That there are these pressure release valve realms is a complete authoritarian political failure. One cannot maintain an old style authoritarian system in the
‘information age’ (especially with the level of technology use Thailand has) without returning to unpopular measures like purges, which there have been. Yet these limited purges have not really been successful and have only fuelled dissent in English and subsequently amongst those along the Thai feedback chain. Surely the current ‘regime’ (I think I can call it a regime) realises this.
Ironic that it is a systemic failure that those with little political will are in power and that their lack of political acumen secures the systems downfall.
I wonder what you’ll make of Thaksin’s Richard Lloyd Parry interview in one of the following entries…
Much as Giles may feel that present government is against the pro-poor populist changes that Thaksin made, I haven’t noticed any real attempt by them to turn the clock back and rescind any of these changes.
That’s the thing about populist politics, the policies can be, well, quite popular.
Thank you, StanG. Your words of encouragement are very much appreciated.
As for your comment, my problem was less with the coup than with the people who staged/organized it and the agenda they have been pursuing for at least the last half-century. This is a debatable point, of course, but whereas I have no idealized notion of how democracy works in Thailand I would submit that the people who have routinely subverted democratic institutions have done more damage to the country than elected politicians ever have. One of the main ideas I put forth in the book, moreover, is that the constant interference of these “unelected institutions” has a lot to do with the fact that Thailand’s democracy has never developed into a functioning democracy (indeed, I think that the constant interference is also what made Thaksin’s rise possible). Again, reasonable people may disagree on both these interpretations, but in a nutshell this is the reason why I take this kind of approach in the book. As you noted, it’s certainly not out of any love for Thaksin and his crew.
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SOAS Thai politics event
Flatman
interesting to discover what Chatham House Rules means and I can see a place for it
however in this case I think the Thai government is desperate to get its point of view into any international fora so I doubt if they will close out any opportunities as a result of this breach
as we have noted the royal/military/government oriented participants generally expressed what we expected in terms of the standard lines and we did not see them taking advantage of the “frank personal” exchanges that we might reasonably expect if someone asked for the proceedings to be under these rules
so, we can reasonably complain about their apparent lack of candour and the participants, if they paid to attend, should ask for their money back
Report on SOAS event, part I
StanG – are you an academic ?
SOAS Thai politics event
My number one comment on Professor Bongboonkarn is in reply to this remark that the coup, PAD protests, etc. has “led to peoples ultimately questioning democratic principles”.
In LAO Isaarn it has led to people questioning whether they remain part of “Thailand”.
SOAS Thai politics event
“He stated that Thai culture does not want this kind of debate, ‘public debate is out, and it’s against public interest’ (…yes he actually said this!)”
I guess it’s because Patra assumes he knows better than Suchit what public interest is in Thailand. There are obviously very different opinions on this, I can only guess why Suchit thinks some things better not to be brought out in the open, but if the free discussion leads to reducing the value of some important institutions, negative effects need to be considered first.
Also I feel that people came with their own questions and didn’t really listen to panelists presentations. “When will coup makers will be brought to justice” seems to completely ignore Layland’s views on constitutionality, for example.
SOAS Thai politics event
Though recognising the need to cover these discussions, particularly given the dearth of space available for free speech in Thailand’s own media, I do have reservations about the flagrant breach of the Chatham House Rule in coverage of this event.
“When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed”.
To ‘expose’ the speakers in this event surely does more damage to New Mandala’s means to solicit and receive important insight into Thailand’s political situation.
Too late now, but given that this is perhaps one of the first talks on the political environment in Thailand – sponsored by the Government – this coverage may have blown any chances of other events in the same vein out of the water.
China and the Wa
Ethnic Burmese population is almost exploding in Burma, much more than the population growth of ethnic Kachins in last two decades. That population pressure and also the army-backed relocation of lowland Burmese into the highland areas like the Hu-gaung Valley are dramatically changing the racial mix of Kachin land.
If the past trend of over 20 years of development since the ceasefire with KIA continues at the current breakneck speed the Army will eventually sideline the Kachins, cooperate with China, and open the Pan Asian Highway as their promise to India just last year.
Elephants in the room: Part 1
If speaking or writing in English is politically safer, better tell both Ji Ungpakorn and Harry Nicolaides who wrote in English and it was those English pieces that were cited as lese majeste.
China and the Wa
Moe Aung
In that case, this whole India-Burma-China & Asian highways are on shaky ground, especially in North Burma. Unless the people of Burma/Kachins genuinely benefit, the Junta might have a tough job managing these highways IMO. That may be the very reason we still don’t have the roads or the $60 billion(and growing) annual trade between India and China would have well been flowing through Burma.
India is developing at a blistering pace, that said being a large country the economic fate of the North-eastern states hinge on how Burma emerges especially politically. I read about the Chinese pushing hard there and if they have built highways up to Hukwang valley they must be in a real hurry. Btw was not too surprised to check into a Chinese hotel in Tamu bordering Manipur, on a visit last year.
Ferrara on Thai politics
Ralph Kramden: The argument is the same, but I spent several days working on the prose in advance of the manuscript going to print. I think it’s safe to say that the book is a much better piece of writing than the version that was posted on the web about a month ago.
SOAS Thai politics event
thanks for sharing the Q&As…
my simple minded observation is that Prem and the privy council and their mates in business (royals, CP, bankers, generals) set the agenda followed by the military with mercenaries like the PAD and the judges
their agenda is to maintain the traditional conservative wealth and power
the Prince (or some people around him, privy councillors?) seems to be stirring, eg. police appointment, which must be scaring a lot of people. I think the King is on the hospital to protect himself from the Prince
the ordinary huge majority are now awake to the possibility of change for their better, inspired by Thaksin but starting to recognise democracy and voting for their benefit. some are explicit redshirts but most will support if called.
decentralised democracy is the solution, voting at all levels (which Thaksin progressed towards).
the authority of the vote will eventually suppress the royals, privy council and the military
China and the Wa
sangos,
The Kachin are the main player in the region, and it’s crucial to get them on board if we are to make any significant progress in development or trilateral trade and commerce. The ‘Asian Highway’ is what the junta will rely on, and it’s likely to concentrate its efforts on securing and policing it rather than on seeking genuine national reconciliation with the KIO/KIA that must include fiscal and revenue policy issues, not just the BGF (Border Guard Force) issue currently causing considerable tension. The current time-honoured strategy of co-opting or buying off a handful of corrupt ethnic leaders will not give us lasting and encompassing benefits though such divide and rule policies may prolong the state of inequity for some time.
There are some Chinese as well as a lot of Shan and Palaung in the region apart from the Burman. You know the Naga straddle the border with India and some Kachin also live in India (Singpho) just as in China (Jingpo). Historians believe that the Kachin were latecomers who ruthlessly pushed the Shan, Ahom and Naga out of the headwaters of the Irrawaddy. You ignore them at your peril.
Malaysia’s “killer king”
Incidentally, the same thing happens for the article on King Lee in Greg’s second comment.
A writer’s view of recent history
Hla Oo,
Hear, hear!
Ferrara on Thai politics
Re Thaksin’s finances –
RLP: “What is your net worth now outside Thailand?”
TS: “Outside Thailand it’s only a hundred million, or couple of hundred million US dollars. A hundred million US dollars, actually.”
RLP: “A couple of hundred or a hundred?”
TS: “It used to be a couple but I spent some on my house, this and that. I have about a hundred left.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6909258.ece?token=null&offset=96&page=9
Ferrara on Thai politics
Good to know that there are presses that get things done quickly and efficiently. Given that it was reviewed at the press, how different is the published version from that which was ever so briefly available for download?
Report on SOAS event, part II
The coup against Thaksin can be viewed as an action of enforcing “conformity with the rules”. The coup wasn’t against the constitution, it was against abusing the poor 1997 charter.
In “Thai Thai Thaksin” entry in my own blog I argue that at that time the opposition couldn’t find ANY rules Thaksin was willing to subject himself to, so when everything else failed, including 1997 carter, PAD had brought up the King and the morals, and the army brought out their most powerful argument – the guns.
It dovetails nicely with Leyland’s idea that it’s conformity to the rules that makes a constitution, not the mere existence of those rules on paper. The generals were very clear on that distinction.
Report on SOAS event, part I
A couple of years ago NM was promoted as an “academic” blog.
Now it’s chasing away and ridiculing academics like Young, and now it’s MacCargo’s turn. Thai academics don’t stand a chance.
Elephants in the room: Part 1
Thanks Thomas. Good entry.
Is the appeal for justice in English media by those who feel that wrongdoing has occurred indicative of the righteousness of the cause? Do the current elites embroiled in power simply not respond in kind through English because they are aware of how unjustifiable and ridiculous their positions have become? Is there evidence of a PAD member linking English language media to treason? I wouldn’t be surprised.
That there are these pressure release valve realms is a complete authoritarian political failure. One cannot maintain an old style authoritarian system in the
‘information age’ (especially with the level of technology use Thailand has) without returning to unpopular measures like purges, which there have been. Yet these limited purges have not really been successful and have only fuelled dissent in English and subsequently amongst those along the Thai feedback chain. Surely the current ‘regime’ (I think I can call it a regime) realises this.
Ironic that it is a systemic failure that those with little political will are in power and that their lack of political acumen secures the systems downfall.
I wonder what you’ll make of Thaksin’s Richard Lloyd Parry interview in one of the following entries…
Report on SOAS event, part I
Much as Giles may feel that present government is against the pro-poor populist changes that Thaksin made, I haven’t noticed any real attempt by them to turn the clock back and rescind any of these changes.
That’s the thing about populist politics, the policies can be, well, quite popular.
Ferrara on Thai politics
Thank you, StanG. Your words of encouragement are very much appreciated.
As for your comment, my problem was less with the coup than with the people who staged/organized it and the agenda they have been pursuing for at least the last half-century. This is a debatable point, of course, but whereas I have no idealized notion of how democracy works in Thailand I would submit that the people who have routinely subverted democratic institutions have done more damage to the country than elected politicians ever have. One of the main ideas I put forth in the book, moreover, is that the constant interference of these “unelected institutions” has a lot to do with the fact that Thailand’s democracy has never developed into a functioning democracy (indeed, I think that the constant interference is also what made Thaksin’s rise possible). Again, reasonable people may disagree on both these interpretations, but in a nutshell this is the reason why I take this kind of approach in the book. As you noted, it’s certainly not out of any love for Thaksin and his crew.