Sometimes, I am amused seeing those anti-Thaksin guys get hot seat whenever Thaksin phones in.
As I listened to his conversations, it’s just a conversation that he talks with his fans. That’s all. He talked about himself, he talked about how he’s been. He talked about pitying the poor and he expressed his concerns over the Thai economics. He even offered some help to the government. He asked for reunite. etc.
Some may say it is his tactic. But I see nothing wrong with the phone-ins. Those people, they are just too panic.
They are afraid of Thaksin for being loved by so many Thais.
and they can’t stand with that.
Even the Q. secretary cried out yesterday at the opening ceremony for Royal Projects Promotions via website. She claimed why the royal is being attacked.
On the evolution of the level of taxation/support of agriculture in Thailand and in major SEA countries, have a look at the “distortions to agricultural incentives” reports published by the World Bank. They’re not perfect, but they give you a good idea of the radical shifts that took place in most SEA countries during the last 25 years or so (i.e. a shift from net taxation to net support of agriculture and towards a reduction of the “bias” against agriculture and in favor of of non-agricultural sectors) .
ref: Anderson K. & Martin W. (2008) Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in China and Southeast Asia. Washington: World Bank.
Warr P. G. & Kohpaiboon A. (2007) Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Thailand Washington: World Bank.
Warr P. G. (2008) Trade Policy and the Structure of Incentives in Thai Agriculture. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 25(3): 249-270.
On the political implications of the agrarian transition (or structural change in the composition of the economy), I’ve found Hayami’s report very interesting as well, especially given the current political conflict in Thailand. Basically, he says Thailand and similar emerging countries are now faced with a double problem : 1st) pursuing industrialisation and fighting (urban) poverty, which requires low food prices, and 2) controlling and reducing the growing income gap between agriculture and non-agriculture sectors (which was typically done in current development countries by greater financial support of agricultural households by the state ). Failing to resolve any of these problems can lead to serious political agitation and economic troubles.
Ref: Hayami Y. (2007) An Emerging Agricultural Problem in High-Performing Asian Economies. Washington: World Bank.
Brilliant. Convinced me to buy the book and read it. On the bus this morning listened to an MP3 rendition for language learners of the “uthorized hill tribe myth”in “Thai for Advanced Readers” (Becker, 2000) which actually induced nausea after reading this. There is a real need for political realism in advanced Thai language learning materials.
Very interested in the historical sources used to write this history of exploitation. Doubt if it was carried as investigative journalism in the newspapers of the time. Perhaps similar events in more the more recent history of tribal groups will see the light of day in history in a similar fashion. Great work.
reg: “The man was and is a rabid xenophobe.” He might be but recall the criticisms of his policies and actions (in no particular order and recognizing that there were also “nationalist” policies, especially where crony capitalism rubbed up against “neo-liberal” policies etc.):
Sold Shin Corp to the Singaporean govt’s holding company (he was accused of selling out the “national interest”)
Brought the rich guys from the Middle East to “buy” Thai rice land
Opposed the monarchy (so central to Thai nationalism)
Developed FTAs with a range of countries
Negotiated the major non-NATO ally status for Thailand with Bush.
Worked closely with the US on the “war on terror”
Policies on privatisation were (in part) attacked as “selling the nation”
Advanced the export promotion of healthcare services with a “medical hub project” to lure rich foreign patients to Thailand for medical treatment, that was criticized as undermining the national health system
So if Thaksin is a “xenophobe” it is difficult to know what his critics were “uber-xenophobes”?
Thaksin used nationalism for personal benefits but also saw a strong economic nationalism as part of a strong national capitalism. His policies were riven by contradictions, but just a “xenophobe” seems too simplistic.
Thanks to Andrew for the Chatterjee article, and also for resurrecting the “rice premium” as a matter of which we ought to be aware in our understanding of where Thailand has been and where it is headed. Dan Usher, if he is still alive, will be very pleased to see this posting, as might also be–albeit from his grave–Prince Sitthiphon. We need in this discussion to follow Andrew’s lead in talking specifics, rather than the exceedingly general points raised by Srthanonchai. Among such specifics, and dating from fully a decade before the end of the “rice premium”, the policies of Khuekrit and Bunchu in 1975/76 merit attention. While some were one-off payments at a time of–economic, social, and political–crisis, others addressed resource flows more systematically. These latter include measures relating to commercial banks and to the BAAC, about which I plan to have a chapter in a book now in progress ….
The 90% land story is written by Neo nationalists in a classic finger pointing away from the real (economic shambles) problem exercise. A ‘blame the Ferangs’ attempt at dodging the responsibility of making a total mess of the economy. It is a dangerous departure, because foreigners will lose even more confidence (if that is possible). there is a naive school of thinking, that because Thailand was so ‘export’ oriented over the last decade, they don’t need the ‘Ferangs’. Exports are down 40% now. In a way the right wing want to punish the poor for supporting Thaksin by putting them under pressure to survive, they might worry about eating and not politics!
The next coup will be interesting.It might not be lead by the yellow shirts
They’re probably Thaksin fans anyway. Most policemen are. Don’t bother to ask them why though! There’s no logic about it. The senior leads, the freshies follow like sheep. And like most local freshies week activities, it ends in disaster.
Without having read the article yet, though I might have certain expectations given the author, one might note, first, that, over the past four decades, people working in Thailand’s agricultural sector have been reduced from 80 percent to about 40 percent. Thus, the target groups for policy-making, and the policy areas, are a lot more varied than they used to be. Second, the constitutions of 1997 and 2007 contain entire policy agendas, in their sections on fundemental state policies, spanning all social groups. Third, this latter belongs to a welfare-state discourse that has been around for some time in establishment circles. Fourth, since the electoral and representational mechanisms are too weak to produce regularized and reliable welfare-policy directions, we have this “problem” of constitutional policy-making by illigetimate establishment groups, bureaucratic policy-making, and, a recent functional equivalent, Thaksin’s populism.
This debate needs to be spread out to a wider audience. As a layman developing an interest in the situation facing the hilltribes in Thailand I was blown away by the following quote from the review:
“Jonsson’s critique is not just about Thailand. It is the spearhead of his investigations which harshly expose the appallingly stubborn refusal by Yao Studies ever to have taken any initiative or responsibility for the theorisation of racism or the possibility of genocide under Thailand’s ruling elite whose iconically but deceptive serenity, charming but fabricated sophistry and obfuscatingly dazzling smiles have stereotypically characterised the presentation of itself to the rest of the world since beginning of modern history and can probably presume it can do so forever more. As this book signals, a sea change of highly innovatory conceptualisations will be necessary if research of quality concerning the Yao of the Kingdom will ever manage to rectify itself.”
“So Nganadeeleg and Tettyan was it really a principled jump to the red-shirts? There was nothing to stop Giles and his party going up to the north-east and putting forward their policies in opposition to the local political dinosaurs”
I’ll let Tettyan & Giles speak for themselves – for myself I am still ‘song mai ow’, but I can understand why Thaksin looks attractive compared to what has been dealt up to the masses by others -and I dont support taking away peoples votes.
“With so much of the population being migrants from other parts of the country you get a fair mix of regions and classes. So far the red-shirt movement has found little support there except for the taxi drivers”
Vested interest plays a part, but I still think you might be surpised at the support they have in Bangkok, especially if they ever field a proper candidate.
Overall I share your distaste for Thaksin, but why denigrate a whole movement because of one man?
Do you do the same to the yellows?
(who IMO could also do with some ‘decoupling’)
From personal experience, after the TRT’s election victory I certainly felt that there was a rise in anti-foreigner feeling in the civil service, probably on the back of Thaksin’s anti-IMF election campaign. At this time I wasn’t against Thaksin and hoped that maybe he could clean up the endemic corruption.
As with many foreigners my dealings are mainly with the immigration department and the Ministry of Labour. The anti-foreigner sentiment didn’t improve much during the TRT reign except for very rich investors. It should also be noted that there was no improvement under either the coup leaders or the post-coup governments up until this one. At the moment both Malaysia and the Philippines are trying to encourage foreigners to buy second homes in their countries, so Thailand misses out on that inward investment.
Now we some lessening of it in the likes of the Ministry of Labour, but no improvement in those departments under the police. I wonder why? The nationalist rhetoric does tend to be used by both sides to the harm of Thailand’s wellbeing and discourages anyone being brave enough to go against it.
Nationalist policies died out as the Thaksin admin settled in, Ralph. The man was and is a rabid xenophobe. So much so that he really doesn’t feel at all happy when cut off from his easy ride back home.
Ralph, of course you are correct about the Democrat sinecures. I was going to say crooks north of Bangkok, but that would have complicated the point I was making. Certainly the previous Democrat government had a bad smell about it towards its end. Anyway the very best of the most corrupt are still there in Pheu Thai including their charming leader and his sons. And yes, again you are correct, the Democrat Party hasn’t always been a favourite of the palace.
Of course there are major issues in the north-east. The exploitation of the farmers is extreme by both local middle-men, provincial bosses and the giant agri-industrial companies. And yes there is ethnic discrimination against Esarn people by both the old aristocracy and the businessmen and descendents of the Chinese tax farmers. On Giles and his party, the options might have narrowed, but going into the pro-Thaksin camp couldn’t have been the only answer. So Nganadeeleg and Tettyan was it really a principled jump to the red-shirts? There was nothing to stop Giles and his party going up to the north-east and putting forward their policies in opposition to the local political dinosaurs.
It’s always interesting to see how Bangkok’s population reacts as it is the one place where the political machines are at their weakest. We have seen it swing in all directions in the past having had both Chamlong and Samak elected governor. With so much of the population being migrants from other parts of the country you get a fair mix of regions and classes. So far the red-shirt movement has found little support there except for the taxi drivers.
out of grade school says: “Beating the nationalist drum and fanning anti foreigner sentiment started in the 2000 election.” That’s hardly accurate. Nationalism has been strong in Thailand for many decades (remember Vajiravudh? Luang Wichit?).
But if we assume OOGS means the economic nationalism in recent times, then 2000 is wrong. The recent rise in ant-foreign sentiment came with the economic crisis of 1997-98. Recall, amongst others, Narong Petprasert’s call for a neo-nationalist movement that was racist in orientation. The king added to the nationalist fervor of that time with his “back to the farm” entreaties. The economic crisis brought nationalists together from the extreme right to the left in Thailand. When TRT were elected, worried foreign commentators referred to “nationalist policies,” but those concerns soon faded.
Les Abbey says: “The problem with the red shirt movement is not only can it not “decouple” from Thaksin, it also finds it very difficult to “decouple” from the same old political families that have ruled in the provinces for so long. They almost had the full set of crooks until Newin left.”
That’s not entirely true. They are decoupled (for now) from the Silpa-Archa family, from the families that rule for the Democrats in Rayong, and from the Democrat Party clans that run much of the south.
LA also says: “The affiliation to this movement by left-wing groups smells of opportunism and adventurism to me.” It may be, but which left-wing groups? It seems like there are as many (self-identified) leftists in the yellow camp as on the red side.
On so-called opportunism, recall that it was Ji Ungpakorn who opposed Thaksin and was considered to be rejecting both sides. He was criticized for this. His political options narrowed considerably. For him, opportunism and adventurism are probably not the motivations.
Les Abbey: We can all get caught up in things (obsession/hatred) to such an extent that we cannot see the wood for the trees.
You concentrated on what Tettyan said about the reds decoupling from Thaksin, but you seemed to have missed the more important part of his comment:
“The larger point is that there are much bigger underlying grievances that drive many of these people to support Thaksin. It’s more than just mindless worship of the man (whom I also consider to be a crook), its also a sense of political, economic and social disenfranchisement. If the powers that be quit wasting their time on demonizing Thaksin (and their laughable propaganda campaigns that really put the Thaksin government’s propaganda campaigns to shame) and actually addressed these grievances, I believe support for Thaksin will evaporate over time. Thaksin is merely a symptom of Thailand’s problems – attacking him will do nothing to address the root cause of Thailand’s problems”.
Thanks, Tettyan for putting things into proper perspective.
Les, to use a football term:
You are playing the man, not the ball!
(that’s an Aussie Rules football term, but I presume you have a similar saying for the round ball game:)
C42. Of course it is opportunism by the left who joined the reds. Bolsheviks did something similar.
Its always interesting to pose the drug war conundrum to those on the left who took this route. That is squirm time for them. Without the hideous human rights record of Thaksin the alliance or coattailing to his movement makes more sense.
It would be great to see the left and true democracy advocates split from Thaksin but it wont happen. Ideals always come second to politcal expedience and short cuts to power.
I would just like to point out that I am not NOBODY (in caps) as I post here from time to time as nobody 😉
It looks like an official I cannot/will not take sides and please work together announcement. In a constitutional democracy that is what would be expected from a monarch.
The problem with the red shirt movement is not only can it not “decouple” from Thaksin, it also finds it very difficult to “decouple” from the same old political families that have ruled in the provinces for so long. They almost had the full set of crooks until Newin left.
The affiliation to this movement by left-wing groups smells of opportunism and adventurism to me. A more principled approach in 2006 would be with “a curse on both your houses” when splitting from the anti-Thaksin movement. Thaksin isn’t another Peron, and certainly not a Chavez. Another Berlusconi possibly, but I wouldn’t expect to see the Italian left fighting on that man’s behalf.
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Security forces prepare for next Thaksin phone-in
Sometimes, I am amused seeing those anti-Thaksin guys get hot seat whenever Thaksin phones in.
As I listened to his conversations, it’s just a conversation that he talks with his fans. That’s all. He talked about himself, he talked about how he’s been. He talked about pitying the poor and he expressed his concerns over the Thai economics. He even offered some help to the government. He asked for reunite. etc.
Some may say it is his tactic. But I see nothing wrong with the phone-ins. Those people, they are just too panic.
They are afraid of Thaksin for being loved by so many Thais.
and they can’t stand with that.
Even the Q. secretary cried out yesterday at the opening ceremony for Royal Projects Promotions via website. She claimed why the royal is being attacked.
Some thoughts on rural taxation and “political society”
On the evolution of the level of taxation/support of agriculture in Thailand and in major SEA countries, have a look at the “distortions to agricultural incentives” reports published by the World Bank. They’re not perfect, but they give you a good idea of the radical shifts that took place in most SEA countries during the last 25 years or so (i.e. a shift from net taxation to net support of agriculture and towards a reduction of the “bias” against agriculture and in favor of of non-agricultural sectors) .
ref: Anderson K. & Martin W. (2008) Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in China and Southeast Asia. Washington: World Bank.
Warr P. G. & Kohpaiboon A. (2007) Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Thailand Washington: World Bank.
Warr P. G. (2008) Trade Policy and the Structure of Incentives in Thai Agriculture. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 25(3): 249-270.
On the political implications of the agrarian transition (or structural change in the composition of the economy), I’ve found Hayami’s report very interesting as well, especially given the current political conflict in Thailand. Basically, he says Thailand and similar emerging countries are now faced with a double problem : 1st) pursuing industrialisation and fighting (urban) poverty, which requires low food prices, and 2) controlling and reducing the growing income gap between agriculture and non-agriculture sectors (which was typically done in current development countries by greater financial support of agricultural households by the state ). Failing to resolve any of these problems can lead to serious political agitation and economic troubles.
Ref: Hayami Y. (2007) An Emerging Agricultural Problem in High-Performing Asian Economies. Washington: World Bank.
Review of Jonsson’s Mien Relations
Brilliant. Convinced me to buy the book and read it. On the bus this morning listened to an MP3 rendition for language learners of the “uthorized hill tribe myth”in “Thai for Advanced Readers” (Becker, 2000) which actually induced nausea after reading this. There is a real need for political realism in advanced Thai language learning materials.
Very interested in the historical sources used to write this history of exploitation. Doubt if it was carried as investigative journalism in the newspapers of the time. Perhaps similar events in more the more recent history of tribal groups will see the light of day in history in a similar fashion. Great work.
King Bhumibol expresses his worries
reg: “The man was and is a rabid xenophobe.” He might be but recall the criticisms of his policies and actions (in no particular order and recognizing that there were also “nationalist” policies, especially where crony capitalism rubbed up against “neo-liberal” policies etc.):
Sold Shin Corp to the Singaporean govt’s holding company (he was accused of selling out the “national interest”)
Brought the rich guys from the Middle East to “buy” Thai rice land
Opposed the monarchy (so central to Thai nationalism)
Developed FTAs with a range of countries
Negotiated the major non-NATO ally status for Thailand with Bush.
Worked closely with the US on the “war on terror”
Policies on privatisation were (in part) attacked as “selling the nation”
Advanced the export promotion of healthcare services with a “medical hub project” to lure rich foreign patients to Thailand for medical treatment, that was criticized as undermining the national health system
So if Thaksin is a “xenophobe” it is difficult to know what his critics were “uber-xenophobes”?
Thaksin used nationalism for personal benefits but also saw a strong economic nationalism as part of a strong national capitalism. His policies were riven by contradictions, but just a “xenophobe” seems too simplistic.
Some thoughts on rural taxation and “political society”
Thanks to Andrew for the Chatterjee article, and also for resurrecting the “rice premium” as a matter of which we ought to be aware in our understanding of where Thailand has been and where it is headed. Dan Usher, if he is still alive, will be very pleased to see this posting, as might also be–albeit from his grave–Prince Sitthiphon. We need in this discussion to follow Andrew’s lead in talking specifics, rather than the exceedingly general points raised by Srthanonchai. Among such specifics, and dating from fully a decade before the end of the “rice premium”, the policies of Khuekrit and Bunchu in 1975/76 merit attention. While some were one-off payments at a time of–economic, social, and political–crisis, others addressed resource flows more systematically. These latter include measures relating to commercial banks and to the BAAC, about which I plan to have a chapter in a book now in progress ….
King Bhumibol expresses his worries
The 90% land story is written by Neo nationalists in a classic finger pointing away from the real (economic shambles) problem exercise. A ‘blame the Ferangs’ attempt at dodging the responsibility of making a total mess of the economy. It is a dangerous departure, because foreigners will lose even more confidence (if that is possible). there is a naive school of thinking, that because Thailand was so ‘export’ oriented over the last decade, they don’t need the ‘Ferangs’. Exports are down 40% now. In a way the right wing want to punish the poor for supporting Thaksin by putting them under pressure to survive, they might worry about eating and not politics!
The next coup will be interesting.It might not be lead by the yellow shirts
Security forces prepare for next Thaksin phone-in
They’re probably Thaksin fans anyway. Most policemen are. Don’t bother to ask them why though! There’s no logic about it. The senior leads, the freshies follow like sheep. And like most local freshies week activities, it ends in disaster.
Review of Jonsson’s Mien Relations
My gosh — such a jargon…
Some thoughts on rural taxation and “political society”
Without having read the article yet, though I might have certain expectations given the author, one might note, first, that, over the past four decades, people working in Thailand’s agricultural sector have been reduced from 80 percent to about 40 percent. Thus, the target groups for policy-making, and the policy areas, are a lot more varied than they used to be. Second, the constitutions of 1997 and 2007 contain entire policy agendas, in their sections on fundemental state policies, spanning all social groups. Third, this latter belongs to a welfare-state discourse that has been around for some time in establishment circles. Fourth, since the electoral and representational mechanisms are too weak to produce regularized and reliable welfare-policy directions, we have this “problem” of constitutional policy-making by illigetimate establishment groups, bureaucratic policy-making, and, a recent functional equivalent, Thaksin’s populism.
Review of Jonsson’s Mien Relations
This debate needs to be spread out to a wider audience. As a layman developing an interest in the situation facing the hilltribes in Thailand I was blown away by the following quote from the review:
“Jonsson’s critique is not just about Thailand. It is the spearhead of his investigations which harshly expose the appallingly stubborn refusal by Yao Studies ever to have taken any initiative or responsibility for the theorisation of racism or the possibility of genocide under Thailand’s ruling elite whose iconically but deceptive serenity, charming but fabricated sophistry and obfuscatingly dazzling smiles have stereotypically characterised the presentation of itself to the rest of the world since beginning of modern history and can probably presume it can do so forever more. As this book signals, a sea change of highly innovatory conceptualisations will be necessary if research of quality concerning the Yao of the Kingdom will ever manage to rectify itself.”
Montesano on Thailand in April 2009
“So Nganadeeleg and Tettyan was it really a principled jump to the red-shirts? There was nothing to stop Giles and his party going up to the north-east and putting forward their policies in opposition to the local political dinosaurs”
I’ll let Tettyan & Giles speak for themselves – for myself I am still ‘song mai ow’, but I can understand why Thaksin looks attractive compared to what has been dealt up to the masses by others -and I dont support taking away peoples votes.
“With so much of the population being migrants from other parts of the country you get a fair mix of regions and classes. So far the red-shirt movement has found little support there except for the taxi drivers”
Vested interest plays a part, but I still think you might be surpised at the support they have in Bangkok, especially if they ever field a proper candidate.
Overall I share your distaste for Thaksin, but why denigrate a whole movement because of one man?
Do you do the same to the yellows?
(who IMO could also do with some ‘decoupling’)
King Bhumibol expresses his worries
From personal experience, after the TRT’s election victory I certainly felt that there was a rise in anti-foreigner feeling in the civil service, probably on the back of Thaksin’s anti-IMF election campaign. At this time I wasn’t against Thaksin and hoped that maybe he could clean up the endemic corruption.
As with many foreigners my dealings are mainly with the immigration department and the Ministry of Labour. The anti-foreigner sentiment didn’t improve much during the TRT reign except for very rich investors. It should also be noted that there was no improvement under either the coup leaders or the post-coup governments up until this one. At the moment both Malaysia and the Philippines are trying to encourage foreigners to buy second homes in their countries, so Thailand misses out on that inward investment.
Now we some lessening of it in the likes of the Ministry of Labour, but no improvement in those departments under the police. I wonder why? The nationalist rhetoric does tend to be used by both sides to the harm of Thailand’s wellbeing and discourages anyone being brave enough to go against it.
King Bhumibol expresses his worries
Nationalist policies died out as the Thaksin admin settled in, Ralph. The man was and is a rabid xenophobe. So much so that he really doesn’t feel at all happy when cut off from his easy ride back home.
Montesano on Thailand in April 2009
Ralph, of course you are correct about the Democrat sinecures. I was going to say crooks north of Bangkok, but that would have complicated the point I was making. Certainly the previous Democrat government had a bad smell about it towards its end. Anyway the very best of the most corrupt are still there in Pheu Thai including their charming leader and his sons. And yes, again you are correct, the Democrat Party hasn’t always been a favourite of the palace.
Of course there are major issues in the north-east. The exploitation of the farmers is extreme by both local middle-men, provincial bosses and the giant agri-industrial companies. And yes there is ethnic discrimination against Esarn people by both the old aristocracy and the businessmen and descendents of the Chinese tax farmers. On Giles and his party, the options might have narrowed, but going into the pro-Thaksin camp couldn’t have been the only answer. So Nganadeeleg and Tettyan was it really a principled jump to the red-shirts? There was nothing to stop Giles and his party going up to the north-east and putting forward their policies in opposition to the local political dinosaurs.
It’s always interesting to see how Bangkok’s population reacts as it is the one place where the political machines are at their weakest. We have seen it swing in all directions in the past having had both Chamlong and Samak elected governor. With so much of the population being migrants from other parts of the country you get a fair mix of regions and classes. So far the red-shirt movement has found little support there except for the taxi drivers.
King Bhumibol expresses his worries
out of grade school says: “Beating the nationalist drum and fanning anti foreigner sentiment started in the 2000 election.” That’s hardly accurate. Nationalism has been strong in Thailand for many decades (remember Vajiravudh? Luang Wichit?).
But if we assume OOGS means the economic nationalism in recent times, then 2000 is wrong. The recent rise in ant-foreign sentiment came with the economic crisis of 1997-98. Recall, amongst others, Narong Petprasert’s call for a neo-nationalist movement that was racist in orientation. The king added to the nationalist fervor of that time with his “back to the farm” entreaties. The economic crisis brought nationalists together from the extreme right to the left in Thailand. When TRT were elected, worried foreign commentators referred to “nationalist policies,” but those concerns soon faded.
Montesano on Thailand in April 2009
Les Abbey says: “The problem with the red shirt movement is not only can it not “decouple” from Thaksin, it also finds it very difficult to “decouple” from the same old political families that have ruled in the provinces for so long. They almost had the full set of crooks until Newin left.”
That’s not entirely true. They are decoupled (for now) from the Silpa-Archa family, from the families that rule for the Democrats in Rayong, and from the Democrat Party clans that run much of the south.
LA also says: “The affiliation to this movement by left-wing groups smells of opportunism and adventurism to me.” It may be, but which left-wing groups? It seems like there are as many (self-identified) leftists in the yellow camp as on the red side.
On so-called opportunism, recall that it was Ji Ungpakorn who opposed Thaksin and was considered to be rejecting both sides. He was criticized for this. His political options narrowed considerably. For him, opportunism and adventurism are probably not the motivations.
Montesano on Thailand in April 2009
Les Abbey: We can all get caught up in things (obsession/hatred) to such an extent that we cannot see the wood for the trees.
You concentrated on what Tettyan said about the reds decoupling from Thaksin, but you seemed to have missed the more important part of his comment:
“The larger point is that there are much bigger underlying grievances that drive many of these people to support Thaksin. It’s more than just mindless worship of the man (whom I also consider to be a crook), its also a sense of political, economic and social disenfranchisement. If the powers that be quit wasting their time on demonizing Thaksin (and their laughable propaganda campaigns that really put the Thaksin government’s propaganda campaigns to shame) and actually addressed these grievances, I believe support for Thaksin will evaporate over time. Thaksin is merely a symptom of Thailand’s problems – attacking him will do nothing to address the root cause of Thailand’s problems”.
Thanks, Tettyan for putting things into proper perspective.
Les, to use a football term:
You are playing the man, not the ball!
(that’s an Aussie Rules football term, but I presume you have a similar saying for the round ball game:)
Montesano on Thailand in April 2009
C42. Of course it is opportunism by the left who joined the reds. Bolsheviks did something similar.
Its always interesting to pose the drug war conundrum to those on the left who took this route. That is squirm time for them. Without the hideous human rights record of Thaksin the alliance or coattailing to his movement makes more sense.
It would be great to see the left and true democracy advocates split from Thaksin but it wont happen. Ideals always come second to politcal expedience and short cuts to power.
King Bhumibol expresses his worries
I would just like to point out that I am not NOBODY (in caps) as I post here from time to time as nobody 😉
It looks like an official I cannot/will not take sides and please work together announcement. In a constitutional democracy that is what would be expected from a monarch.
Montesano on Thailand in April 2009
The problem with the red shirt movement is not only can it not “decouple” from Thaksin, it also finds it very difficult to “decouple” from the same old political families that have ruled in the provinces for so long. They almost had the full set of crooks until Newin left.
The affiliation to this movement by left-wing groups smells of opportunism and adventurism to me. A more principled approach in 2006 would be with “a curse on both your houses” when splitting from the anti-Thaksin movement. Thaksin isn’t another Peron, and certainly not a Chavez. Another Berlusconi possibly, but I wouldn’t expect to see the Italian left fighting on that man’s behalf.