Reply to #53: Because this issue about using real names is so important to you in defending yourself from my criticisms can I ask you one question:
Is the way you write about the monarchy (eg. “…which I take to mean that he [the king] would be happy to be subject to equal treatment in matters of law in his position as an individual, not as an institution…”) by comparison with the way you write about Thaksin and the democratically-elected PPP (“mostrosity”) determined by your fears about lese majeste – since you use your real name – or is it the way you really feel?
Jon, from your latest post, I really hope you see my point with regards to your standards for calling people heroes.
“When soldiers start acting in ways worthy of respect, they are heroes.” — Such a way is by not staging a coup. But if Sonthi had never staged a coup, you would’ve never called him a hero. I stand by my point that you cannot begin calling everyone a hero just for doing their job. They have to do their job in exceptional and treacherous circumstances, display bravery and adherence to their principles for them to be called heroes.
The Generals such as Sonthi or Saprang? No, their job was not to stage a coup or seize power. And no, what they did didn’t help anybody nor was it a display of bravery of courage or lofty principles.
johnfernquest: “That they’ve learned to **not kill** people in certain contexts is noteworthy and praiseworthy.” When they learn not to kill civilians in contexts such as Tak Bai maybe then they deserve some praise. To praise them for – at the moment – not ” hav[ing] thrown a monkey wrench in the works but they didn’t” seems giving them way, way too much credit. Historically, they are unworthy of praise or respect. Presently, one act of (presumed) good judgment hardly constitutes an historical watershed.
Dog Lover #7:’ I’m not sure that “some very useful and productive intellectual exchanges between University of Hawaii and Thai universities, … teaching reading (extensive reading).” is what I had in mind regarding critical scholarship.’ Well, come on, don’t be coy. What did you have in mind? Spell it out.
It seems to me that many of the political bloggers on this site are dedicated to maintaining the state of polarization that is responsible for the history of Thai politics replaying the same old story over & over. Tub thumping about the big issues, instead of worming in at ground-level and gradually effecting genuine change in the society, may be satisfying for those who want to be seen as knights in shining armour, but in terms of reality it’s counter-productive.
This is, and always has been, a cosmetically-engineered society, in which the image is more important than the reality, & the majority of people are quite happy to leave everything to those who are in charge, & go along with their PR. Try discussing the Drug War deaths with Thai people. “They were in the drug trade, they deserved to die,” they’ll say. Where is the evidence that that is true? “Oh, they were on the police blacklists.” Begging the question! (Many bloggers,even ‘academics’, here don’t understand the meaning of ‘begging the question.’ They think it means ‘ raising a further, obvious, question. It doesn’t. Their misunderstanding may come from the fact that they have never studied a critical or extensive reading course.)
It’s a very well-established fact that critical thinking skills are not taught in most of the Thai education system. Education? I don’t think so! Except in a few elite institutions, assessment in undergraduate, & even some post-graduate courses, is done on the basis of multiple-choice exams: the students can go through 4 years of ‘study’ without ever having to write an essay. It doesn’t matter in many departments, anyway, because they’re not allowed to fail. All they have to do is regurgitate what their lecturers have told them are the true facts.
Sneering at “teaching reading (extensive reading)” is tacky and stupid.
“Let me get this right. The military leaders who ran a coup in the name of preserving democracy and protecting the monarchy and thereby overthrew a popularly elected and popular government (albeit one that was flawed in many ways), imposed martial law, fixed a constitution and so on are heroes.”
Yep. May not seem like it now, but give historians some time.
A bloodless coup nowadays makes a hero. Soldiers kill people. That’s their job. That they’ve learned to **not kill** people in certain contexts is noteworthy and praiseworthy.
I remember a lecture by McCoy on torture in the Phillipines at SEASSI at University of Wisconsin in which he described an interview with Gringo Honasan with his aquarium of piranhas and James Bond toys in the background. When soldiers start acting in ways worthy of respect, they are heroes.
If you can see the implicit contradictions and ironies of events over
the last year and a half, maybe you should look a little closer.
“Thaksin’s 2005 Electoral Triumph:Looking Back From the Election in 2007”, published by the Southeast Asia Research Centre at the City University of Hong Kong.
[Comment: This paper ranks right up there with the best of Pasuk and Baker. Once I started reading it, couldn’t put it down. Most notable feature: author strives for balance, which is pretty difficult given the situation. Hopefully, the author will work this into a book. This sort of informative writing is needed because the valuable background information it supplies is usually lacking and like computer programmers always say: garbage in – garbage out.]
Republican’s last post gets to the heart of the matter.
Human Rights
I asked Republican whether people have the right to address questions of human rights if they do not also criticise the monarchy. Here is his response:
“Of course they have the “right”. What a patronizing question. But if they do not also criticize the monarchy’s human rights violations then they are hypocrites. And because of the politicization of human rights in Thailand now, effectively their criticisms are partisan; they are effectively supporting network monarchy’s attack on Thaksin and TRT-PPP and the democratic wishes of the Thai electorate using human rights as a political weapon. What do human rights mean if you are partisan?”
My response to this would be that anyone working on human rights in the South, during the war on drugs and so on are inevitably pushing at both the Thaksin regime and those forces connected to the CNS and the palace, by virtue of the wide-spread arms of the state that are implicated in those issues. As an example, I noted in another post CNS PM Sarayud was on the Committee related to the War on Drugs. This is just one example of how the forces cross over. To fight on the War on Drugs will see the underbelly of the Thai state revealed, and I suspect it will implicate all sides.
If Republican will allow PM Samak the right to think strategically in regard to how he relates to royalism and its power in Thailand, he might also allow people who work on human rights in Thailand ( with so much less power than Samak) to also work their way through the difficult questions that face them without calling them hypocrites. He is asking something of them that he won’t do in his own name.
Effectively, the Republican position shields any government from criticism because it asks the politically near-impossible under the guise of radicalism, and therefore leaves areas that can be worked on untouched.
Thaksin
Republican #45
“In fact, it seems that Connors is not in the “song mai ao” camp after all; the camp that Connors belongs to based on his own arguments is that of the CNS and the royalists.”
Somsak and Republican have repeated demanded that Thaksin-critics criticise the monarchy in the same manner that they criticise Thaksin. Of course Somsak and Thaksin do not criticise Thaksin in the manner that they demand others criticise the monarchy, because for them Thaksin had/has an electoral mandate – legitimacy. I have argued that in my opinion Thaksin forfeited democratic legitimacy when he moved outside the rules of the game when his regime launched the war on drugs, when his regime endorsed Tak Bai, when his regime moved against the checks and balances of the political system and so on. Now for most people Thaksin remained the legitimate leader for reasons related to leadership and decisiveness and the fact that they got concrete benefits from the regime, and of course because his government was popularly elected. These things I accept. In arguing that I think the regime was illegitimate based on my understanding of democracy I am one person making an argument in a crowd of arguments, and I reserve my right to do so. I also think people had a right to call for Thaksin’s resignation. If making an argument means putting yourself above other people, then we should all be silent. Indeed, if all commentary ceased when people voted (as is the implication of Republican’s position), I don’t know what the meaning of politics would be. To argue against a majority opinion, to disagree and advance different arguments is key to democracy. It is as if Somsak and Republican had imbibed Thaksin’s “I have 19 million votes” mantra and therefore brook no dissent.
However, illegitimate I think Thaksin was (can a person not have that opinion and express it, or must I toe the majority line) I also think the coup and the CNS were wrong (illegitimate); the use of Article 7 by the PAD was politically opportunist and weakened their commitment to democracy and so on…all these things I have previously said.
In the face of a series of quotations in post 50 that demonstrate that I am indeed critical of both sides Republican moves the issue to my use of adjectives for both sides. As Republican refuses to put his name to his own arguments he is not really in a position to quibble about the colour of my adjectives.
Reply to #50: The sarcastic tone you take in #50 is a bit tiresome. I didn’t call you a “monarchist” or a “royalist”, I said that your position that Thaksin had no legitimacy despite his electoral victories and great popularity with the electorate is the SAME as that of the CNS and the royalists. It is demonstrably the same and you should not deny it.
There’s no need to drag up any earlier pieces to prove your anti-monarchy credentials or that you were ahead of the “fashion”. My comments were directed at the Asia Sentinel article and your responses to my criticisms of it on this thread.
By using the terms “wankery”, “pretentiousness”, “hypocrisy” I wasn’t trying to discredit you. It was an accurate summary of your argument.
Re. your 3 questions:
Your whole discourse of “people who care about human rights” is distasteful, because the insinuation is that I don’t. Connors as the “khon di”.
a) No, I won’t endorse your statements for all the reasons I gave in #51. I find it perverse in the first place that you should be asking me to put my name to your work, even if I agreed with it.
b) Another example of your moral self-righteousness. You ask me whether I think human rights violators of “various forms of legitimacy” should face “due process”. Why on earth would I not agree that those who have violated human rights should face due process? (“even an elected politician” – how patronizing). But what a na├пve question this is from someone who should know better. Do you actually think the courts in Thailand today are free from political interference? and especially on issues of human rights violations with political significance? You and others can trumpet your morally self-righteous demands for human rights violators to face justice and “due process” but these things hardly exist in Thailand for such politically significant violations. So what do you gain from these calls for justice? Your own sense of moral self-satisfaction.
c) Of course they have the “right”. What a patronizing question. But if they do not also criticize the monarchy’s human rights violations then they are hypocrites. And because of the politicization of human rights in Thailand now, effectively their criticisms are partisan; they are effectively supporting network monarchy’s attack on Thaksin and TRT-PPP and the democratic wishes of the Thai electorate using human rights as a political weapon. What do human rights mean if you are partisan?
“…Please Republican, explain why people who care about human rights have to condemn the monarchy, while those who may well be implicated in the abuse of human rights are allowed to protect the monarchy …”
Well, if you are going to use the discourse of “human rights” the monarchy should be criticized because of its daily abuse of the human rights of the Thai people, starting with Article 1 of the UDHR, before listing the many other specific abuses.
I don’t understand what you mean by the second part of your sentence.
Re. my comments about Samak’s statements about 6 October: you joined the moral cheerleaders who condemned Samak – as though what he said was something new. It provided another moral issue for the “khon di” to bash TRT-PPP, while they remained silent on the king’s role in October 6 – and all this coming after the September 19 coup and 17 months of a royalist dictatorship. My post was merely a speculation about the political reasons for Samak’s statements. If one wants to try to understand how politics works (instead of merely displaying what a morally right-thinking academic one is) one might take the time to actually judge politicians’ words on their intended political effect. If that effect is to strengthen a democratically-elected government over the royalist opposition forces, then one might not be so quick to press the moral outrage button.
Thaksin kissed the ground at Suvarnabhumi airport to thank the run way for not collapsing under the weight of his plane.
News junkies will recall that Suvarnabhumi was a disastrous construction project with connections to Thaksin’s corrupt cronies…but hey most western presses really BELIEVE it when Chakrapop Penkair says “Democracy has returned to Thailand”
don’t you mean “Thaksin’s brand of democracy?”
Reply to #48: Well, you just said in #38 that that was your last post on this matter because of alleged “abuse”. What is that if not running away? – the second time: you did it earlier in #1 after complaining that I was a blunt axe wielder… then there was that bit about the “show trial” and the “firing squad”. Sounds a bit like “abuse” to me. I thought you said you prefer to disagree without name-calling?
You say you want to cut through the personal abuse, but there hasn’t been ANY “personal” abuse; any criticisms have been of arguments, not personal matters. And I don’t call criticizing an argument “abuse”. This is an important point, because you are setting up a false man instead of defending your arguments.
There’s no need to repaste what you seem to feel are some choice parts of your posts about the monarchy and ask for my endorsement. In these postings you merely emphasize Somsak’s point: the language you use for the monarchy is entirely of a different order to the language you use to criticize Thaksin and TRT-PPP.
In any case, I wouldn’t put my name to another person’s work. And there is no way I would put my name to such a bland posting as “the monarchy is illegitimate from a political perspective that is based on equality of human beings”. I would have a far longer list of objections. I and many others have talked enough about these things on this blog. If I and they do not use real names the reason should be bleeding obvious.
By your challenge to me to use a real name you IMPLY that the way you write about the monarchy is out of your concern for lese majeste; ie. Republican (and others on this and other blogs) do not use their real names so they have no right to challenge others who do to write more critically about the monarchy.
OK. So you don’t want to run foul of lese majeste. Of course, that is understandable. But at the same time, as a political scientist aren’t you then admitting to hypocrisy? You’re happy to put your name to criticisms of a democratically-elected government precisely at a time it is engaged in a profoundly unfair struggle with “network monarchy” (unfair because the king’s manipulations can not be publicly criticized whereas Thaksin and TRT are abused by all on a daily basis), but you resist criticizing the monarchy in the same terms (Samak’s democratically-elected government a “monstrosity”) because it might cause you problems in your career? Is that what you’re saying?
I am not a political scientist, I don’t publish comments on politics in the mass media and I don’t have any desire to. But for those who do, because of (i) the difficulties in which a democratic government operates in a political game whose rules are largely set by the ratchakan state; and (ii) with constant undemocratic political interventions by the king, both obvious and behind the scenes, that can not be criticized by the government because of lese majeste, I would wish that academic commentators temper their comments to reflect this unfair situation.
The issue is not about stopping people from criticizing democratically-elected governments, or forcing them to publicly commit lese majeste. The issue is about pointing out the hypocrisy and moral self-righteousness of those that criticize the one but are soft or silent on the other. In 2006 it was not just hypocrisy; the demonization of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai by the academics and “phak prachachon” was a critical factor in softening up the Bangkok middle class to accept a coup. And now they are at it again.
I’ve just noticed your post #50. Will reply in another post to anything that was not addressed in this one.
I don’t really believe he has any emotion worth a damn . Everything I’ve seen indicates that he’s just a remorseless and almost robotic power and attention-grabber. He has to be the center of attention or he gets bored. I used to watch him sitting through no-confidence debates when he was a junior whippersnapper and he looked terminally-bored with everything around him. I don’t really think he owes any great loyalty to anything other than himself.
jonfernquest : Let me get this right. The military leaders who ran a coup in the name of preserving democracy and protecting the monarchy and thereby overthrew a popularly elected and popular government (albeit one that was flawed in many ways), imposed martial law, fixed a constitution and so on are heroes. They are heroes because they did not do worse than this. They they broke the law and scrapped a constitution and then passed laws to protect themselves makes them somehow unpunishable. Yeh, right.
jonfernquest: So sucking up to royals is the best way to do academic work in Thailand…. Like Teth, I hope you see the problem in this. I also suggest that you look more carefully at the ways in which the EWC Honolulu constructs its academic agenda in support of US foreign policy objectives. Of course, this is its mission:
“The East-West Center is an education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, and just Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and the governments of the region.”
I’m not sure that “some very useful and productive intellectual exchanges between University of Hawaii and Thai universities, … teaching reading (extensive reading).” is what I had in mind regarding critical scholarship.
Jon, I know what you mean, but I had hoped your standards were higher. To call them “heroes” is WAYYY over the top, first, because they seriously undermined the country for their own greed (not only for money but for power). Secondly, they knew they could not have stayed on with the current state of civil politics which is why they tried underhand tactics like the NLA law machine or the new security bill. So they were pretty much forced to do what they’ve done.
Heroes? No. All they deserve is no revenge since they actually kept their promise.
Words from a monarchist …and words from a republican
Below are some more “monarchist” comments I have made in published pieces under my own name, including suggestions of a personality cult, terrorizing popular movements, brute force and so on. Republican (in his own name) may or may not wish to endorse them as he may also do so regarding my earlier post (48 in this topic). There are few criticisms of elected politicians in this post and post 48 (except an observation that Thaksin did little to undermine royalist ideology), so Republican should feel reasonably comfortable in endorsing at least some of them in his own name. He demands that others speak critically of the monarchy, I’d like him to take the step also in his own name.
I do not expect many Thais being able to say these things (quotations below) in public; they face certain sanction, especially those not in the relatively protected university sector. And before I am misunderstood as taking a snipe at Somsak because I say the university sector is relatively protected, I think his statements on this blog and elsewhere are extraordinarily challenging and brave in the Thai context. While I disagree with his analysis, I think he is pushing (in his own name) the boundaries more than anyone.
Many Thais and outsiders won’t say critical things about the monarchy or say word for word what Somsak and Republican require them to say, simply because they are likely to disagree with this analysis of the monarchy or they don’t like being told what to say word for word; even those who are critical of it will see it differently, and say it differently. Just because they do not say anti-monarchist things does not mean they forfeit the right to raise questions of human rights abuses during the Thaksin regime. I keep replying in this post-thread, because I find it difficult to accept the argument made by Somsak and Republican that no one has a right to say anything about elected politicians unless they are also willing to touch the monarchy.
I do not think it is hard for western academics to say these things (if they want to, and in their own words, please). The relative openness for western academics may change as the new PPP government may wish to start proving its royalist credentials (something we should understand according to Republican) as the government needs to time to establish itself. See Republican Post 28 (and reproduced below) at: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2008/02/13/samaks-disgrace/
Here then, below, are a few “monarchist” statements I have made in the past, before it became the fashion to criticise the monarchy, and some made after the coup. It may seem self-indulgent to defend myself against the various charges of being in support of monarchy and dictatorship and to provide textual ‘evidence’; I only do so because I want to see if someone does this as requested by Republican and Somsak, whether in response Somsak and Republican will also agree that crimes may have been committed under Thaksin’s rule and these should be examined. Also, I’d like them to consider whether a popular mandate means that a person can walk away from potential responsibility for those crimes (it may be the case that a different kind of popular support has allowed the palace to so far be immune)? I don’t think either electoral legitimacy or ‘traditional legitimacy ’ or ‘constitutional legitimacy’ should provide any one with immunity, be they king, politician, army general and so on. Now before this question is avoided by stating I do not demand the same of the Thai monarchy, please refer to previous posts where I have stated that I have no problem with any body, including the monarchy, being subject to investigations in regard to such crimes.
And now, words from a monarchist, who supports royalist dictatorship, from my book the ultra-royalist grovelfest, Democracy and National Identity in Thailand:
1.
“Liberal elite forces reached their pinnacle of influence in the open period of politics of 1973–76, but only under the shadow of an increasingly aggressive and brutal right-wing backlash. Precisely because of the polarization in these years, the period is often seen as a lost opportunity; the elite pact of ‘first round’ democratization is seen as being undermined by a number of factors, including the mobilization of the masses internally, and the ‘communist’ victories in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. These developments led to a conservative reaction among sections of Thai establishment, including the palace, and the mobilization of mass right-wing organizations to terrorize the popular movement. Ultimately, such forces crushed the pro-democracy movement in the bloody events of 6 October 1976, at Thammasat University, when armed thugs, with the backing of the police and paramilitary elements, shot, battered, mutilated and hanged unarmed students. Using the events at Thammasat as a pretext, a coalition of military, bureaucratic, palace and capitalist forces backed a military coup, once again halting the emergence of progressive forces, as they had done in the late fifties.”
2.
“Most cited [in terms of the king as a pro-democratic force] is his intervention in the May 1992 events. On prime time television Bhumiphol lectured protagonists of the May events, Prime Minister Suchinda and Chamlong Srimuang, who lay semi-prostrate before him. However, a critical reading of that event shows Bhumiphol publicly sympathizing with Suchinda. Bhumiphol expressed frustration that his advice to ‘promulgate now, amend later’ (regarding the military backed 1991 Constitution) had been ignored by those pushing for immediate amendments.”
3
“After the tumultuous events of 1973–76, the monarchy became the focus of a new round of ultra-nationalist drum-beating and identity-seeking. The right wing had monopolized the official ideology of nation, religion and monarchy during the polarized political struggles of the 1970s. Many thus associated the triad with the appalling violence of the ultra-right. To counteract this, an aggressive restoration of the monarchy was pursued, in terms encompassing the progressive themes of democracy and social development and remoralization of the state around the figure of the monarch. The position of the monarchy was promoted by extensive media manipulation, effectively creating a cult of personality around Bhumiphol.”
4
“ The sum effect of this historical image making is that the present king is seen as a mediating power between hostile social forces, despite his family’s position as leading capitalists and landowners with a personal stake in the wellbeing of Thai capitalism. The palace’s unique position as a public exemplar of conservative traditions and its existence as a network of capital have proved an invaluable resource for Thailand’s elite democratic development. With the aura of traditional authority, built up since the 1950s, the monarchy is able to strategically intervene in favour of order.”
5
“The historical processes of the construction of the royal myth cannot be ignored in any attempt to ‘progressively’ appropriate this institution; it has never been a neutral national symbol. It has, rather, been an active political force …the monarchy ideologically disciplines the rural population through the discourse of thrift, self-reliance, national security and moral selfhood.”
…
“A key ideological resource and active agent of power bloc, the palace has succeeded in partly mobilizing resources for its own ends, but it has also been mobilized by social forces to assume a position at the helm of national ideology.”
6
”As an exponent of conservative forms of capitalism, the palace has vested interests in the propagation of ideology. As Chairat Charoensin-O-Larn notes, with the fragmentation and competition in and between the state and the bourgeoisie, the monarchy remained a key force for integration. Thus the constancy of the monarchy’s political position, its abiding regard for security and productive labour, reflects the concerns of a reflexive capitalist agent empowered by the prestige of royalty, and which has subsequently succeeded in positioning itself at the head of an ensemble of bureaucratic and capitalist forces. Given the glaring disparity between the rich and the poor, the monarchy’s dual position, as an agent of political and economic interests, and as a symbol transfigured as the soul and destiny of the nation, requires an iron regime of controlled imagery.”
7.
“The existence of lèse-majesté should not be seen as a minor blotch on an otherwise clean slate of political opening-up. In the 1980s liberalization was a limited affair, opening a political space for elite conflict and expression, bounded by the triad of nation, religion and monarchy. In villages, newspapers and in relations with the bureaucracy and capitalists, ordinary Thais faced the brute rule of superior power and the strictures of national identity and culture propagated by state ideologues and the palace. The stage-managed role of the monarch, the compulsory respect
shown to the institution, and the pressure of social conformity left many people with a taste of bitterness which few felt confident to express.”
8.
“Expectations of reduced policing of lèse-majesté in the near future are sanguine to say the least. Thai elites are well aware of how the free press has led to public mockery of the British monarchy, and they are fearful of what would happen were the Thai royal family open to scrutiny. The existence of the law does not suggest that the royalty is despised and needs protection, although there are elements of this – but who dares speak with universal sanction and prison waiting? The laws have a more general application in that they point to the monarchy as central to the entire modern ideological complex; around the figure of a righteous king, democracy may be defined in a traditionalistic and disciplinary manner.”
Postscript of Dem/National Identity (post coup)
8.
“If under Thaksin the rule of law had been in the intensive care unit, the CDR has taken it to the mortuary table. They annulled the constitution, banned political gatherings, censored the press, and declared their decrees to have the status of law. News soon followed that King Bhumiphol had met with the coup group, bestowing legitimacy on them.”
“The coup group did not move against Thaksin because of corruption, human rights abuses, or erosion of democratic freedoms– a feature of the early years of the Thaksin regime – but because it was clear that Thaksin was fundamentally challenging the power of the palace and the interests that have formed around it. When the coup group say they launched the coup for the sake of democracy, they mean Thai ‘constitutional monarchy’.”
9
“Thaksin’s fatal weakness was that while in power he did nothing to challenge royal ideology at an ideological level. He did not create a space for new ideological forms to take root. An ex-policeman and businessman, he placed too much faith in sheer force, money and capitalist-inspired empowerment of the poor. Ideology in the form of nationness, Thainess and moral order remain central in strategies of enduring political domination in Thailand. Those elements in the ‘people sector’ who played the royalist card – by joining the establishment opposition to Thaksin – understood the monarchy’s great ideological power, but at the cost of a deeper commitment to self-organization and democratic politics.”
10.
From Article of Faith: The Failure of Royal Liberalism
“Bhumibol’s declaration that he would not use Article 7 requires interpretation. Paradoxically, Bhumibol relied on his un-codified power (that which the anti- Thaksin movement had sought to deploy) to effectively compel a judicial solution to the crisis. The king would not be dictated to by street forces and instead relied on the power of his speech (see Thongchai, 2008) to impact on the outcome of political events. This course of action, it may be assumed, ensures the continuing myth of royal distance from politics and secures the reserve powers codified in Article 7 which the king refused to publicly exercise. Public use of those powers, compelled by protests on the street, may well have been judged imprudent in the face of a popular prime minister.”
11.
“…in the Thai context political liberals, believing Thailand to be bereft of a strong nationwide middle class that supposedly grounds liberalism, have entrusted the mission of establishing liberal democracy in the ideologies and institutions simultaneously derived from and legitimated by a mythic social contract embodied in the monarchy. Political liberalism in Thailand is unlikely to find a sure footing based on such exclusive terrain, especially when that base necessarily, because of its own role as the head of a power bloc in the national Thai capitalist formation (Connors, 2007: 131), fails to address the gross economic and social inequalities that led many to support Thaksin.”
“In the longer term, progressive social liberal forces, perhaps now disabused of the notion that the monarchy may be utilised for progressive purposes, may well be the political beneficiaries. The wide debates on the role of the monarchy, partly refracted through debates on the role of Privy Councillor Prem (see Prachathat, 16-22 July, 2007: 11) in the events of 2006, has greatly affected its standing, especially among supporters of Thaksin’s social and economic policies. This has the potential to erode the ideological compact that has taken shape since the 1970s and offers the possibility of the emergence of a more widespread egalitarian sentiment to challenge the hierarchical and deferential sentiment that surrounds the monarchy.”
WORDS FROM A REPUBLICAN
And now, words from Republican who labels me royalist and then allows Thai PM Samak the right to be ‘strategically monarchist’ in order to survive (not Republican’s words, but what I think he means, please tell me if I am wrong).
Posted on New MANDALA FEB 17 by REPUBLICAN
1.
“Given the current circumstances, on this issue [Samak’s comments that one person died during in the October 1976 events] maybe we need to separate moral outrage and political necessity. Those who want to see the neutralization of the royalist-military forces after the debacle of the last 17 months should be hoping for a strong PPP-led government. In this respect what Samak said in the CNN interview could actually work well for Samak himself and the PPP (including the former student activists)
….
(ii) Samak re-emphasizes his credentials (at least in terms of rhetoric) as an unreconstructed rightist-royalist. This helps him gain some confidence from the royalists, smarting from their big defeat following the formation of the PPP government.”
********************************************
Now, please Republican, explain why people who care about human rights have to condemn the monarchy, while those who may well be implicated in the abuse of human rights are allowed to protect the monarchy. And please don’t try and discredit me by simply referring to my wankery, pretentiousness, hypocrisy (I am happy to let you win that point if it helps), just please respond to the following questions:
a) Can you endorse statements (in quotation marks above) that I have made about the monarchy in your own name? Or, if you find something terribly monarchist about my statements quoted above, perhaps you can endorse Somsak’s statements that appear in this post-thread in your own name? Just as you require of others.
b) Will you allow that people with various forms of legitimacy (political, king, general etc) should face due process if there is sufficient evidence of complicity in a state or political crime (even an elected politician)?
c) Do you believe that no one has the right to speak about human rights in Thailand unless they also criticise the monarchy?
Anyone else who thinks I’ve been too precious and circumspect are welcome to endorse the above statements in their own name and address the three questions.
Greetings.
Having been run through the grinder here in Thailand a couple of times myself, a former Thailand Peace Corps volunteer and long-married to a wonderful Thai lady (39 years), bot of us were accused of being foreigners damaging the nation, the religion and the monarchy, I had a charge of lese majesty against me filed with the national police, and we have been in court for criminal and civil (defamation) claims and counter-claims.Yet, no one would proceed with human rights-related investigations of what happened at Watpa Salawan that 12 February 2005.
I am working on a book on the topic, tentatively titled Five Octobers, because events at Watpa were precipitated by an October 2004 incident and the other four Octobers, in Thailand, relate to the infamous massacres and southern violence. I have spent some nine years with the local media – something foreigners are not supposed to be doing – and have a personal in-depth grasp of what the media are faced with, as well as how academics, government and private sector individuals and groups act, etc.
In short, I would like Mr. Handley’s email address, and would appreciate anyone else’s comments who cares to contribute something to this new book.
Thank you all.
Sincerely,
Frank G Anderson
Teth wrote: “…if you were to praise somebody every time they do something they’re supposed to, you’ll be out of breath really soon.”
The historical pattern is political involvement of military followed by less political involvement, from coup maker rent seeker to narrowly focused professional soldier.
This pattern holds true almost everywhere I look.
South Korea used to be ruled by a brutal military regime.
The military has made the transition to professional army.
Same in Chile. In the Phillipines coups don’t seem to be as
effective as they used to and non-military PMs are the norm.
I would start with the historical pattern, then go to what should be the case. What should be the case should have a reasonable relation to what can be the case.
If you look at this way, Sonthi and the rest of the coup makers are heroes for not pressing it further and the forces that be in Thai society will recognise this and at least not punish them for this. It could have been a lot worse.
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The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
Reply to #53: Because this issue about using real names is so important to you in defending yourself from my criticisms can I ask you one question:
Is the way you write about the monarchy (eg. “…which I take to mean that he [the king] would be happy to be subject to equal treatment in matters of law in his position as an individual, not as an institution…”) by comparison with the way you write about Thaksin and the democratically-elected PPP (“mostrosity”) determined by your fears about lese majeste – since you use your real name – or is it the way you really feel?
The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
Maybe, New Mandala should establish a separate running thread called “Republican/Somsak versus Michael Connors”…
The return of the king
Jon, from your latest post, I really hope you see my point with regards to your standards for calling people heroes.
“When soldiers start acting in ways worthy of respect, they are heroes.” — Such a way is by not staging a coup. But if Sonthi had never staged a coup, you would’ve never called him a hero. I stand by my point that you cannot begin calling everyone a hero just for doing their job. They have to do their job in exceptional and treacherous circumstances, display bravery and adherence to their principles for them to be called heroes.
The Generals such as Sonthi or Saprang? No, their job was not to stage a coup or seize power. And no, what they did didn’t help anybody nor was it a display of bravery of courage or lofty principles.
The return of the king
johnfernquest: “That they’ve learned to **not kill** people in certain contexts is noteworthy and praiseworthy.” When they learn not to kill civilians in contexts such as Tak Bai maybe then they deserve some praise. To praise them for – at the moment – not ” hav[ing] thrown a monkey wrench in the works but they didn’t” seems giving them way, way too much credit. Historically, they are unworthy of praise or respect. Presently, one act of (presumed) good judgment hardly constitutes an historical watershed.
In very good company
Spot on!!!
East-West Center to host Thai royal visit
Dog Lover #7:’ I’m not sure that “some very useful and productive intellectual exchanges between University of Hawaii and Thai universities, … teaching reading (extensive reading).” is what I had in mind regarding critical scholarship.’ Well, come on, don’t be coy. What did you have in mind? Spell it out.
It seems to me that many of the political bloggers on this site are dedicated to maintaining the state of polarization that is responsible for the history of Thai politics replaying the same old story over & over. Tub thumping about the big issues, instead of worming in at ground-level and gradually effecting genuine change in the society, may be satisfying for those who want to be seen as knights in shining armour, but in terms of reality it’s counter-productive.
This is, and always has been, a cosmetically-engineered society, in which the image is more important than the reality, & the majority of people are quite happy to leave everything to those who are in charge, & go along with their PR. Try discussing the Drug War deaths with Thai people. “They were in the drug trade, they deserved to die,” they’ll say. Where is the evidence that that is true? “Oh, they were on the police blacklists.” Begging the question! (Many bloggers,even ‘academics’, here don’t understand the meaning of ‘begging the question.’ They think it means ‘ raising a further, obvious, question. It doesn’t. Their misunderstanding may come from the fact that they have never studied a critical or extensive reading course.)
It’s a very well-established fact that critical thinking skills are not taught in most of the Thai education system. Education? I don’t think so! Except in a few elite institutions, assessment in undergraduate, & even some post-graduate courses, is done on the basis of multiple-choice exams: the students can go through 4 years of ‘study’ without ever having to write an essay. It doesn’t matter in many departments, anyway, because they’re not allowed to fail. All they have to do is regurgitate what their lecturers have told them are the true facts.
Sneering at “teaching reading (extensive reading)” is tacky and stupid.
The return of the king
“Let me get this right. The military leaders who ran a coup in the name of preserving democracy and protecting the monarchy and thereby overthrew a popularly elected and popular government (albeit one that was flawed in many ways), imposed martial law, fixed a constitution and so on are heroes.”
Yep. May not seem like it now, but give historians some time.
A bloodless coup nowadays makes a hero. Soldiers kill people. That’s their job. That they’ve learned to **not kill** people in certain contexts is noteworthy and praiseworthy.
I remember a lecture by McCoy on torture in the Phillipines at SEASSI at University of Wisconsin in which he described an interview with Gringo Honasan with his aquarium of piranhas and James Bond toys in the background. When soldiers start acting in ways worthy of respect, they are heroes.
If you can see the implicit contradictions and ironies of events over
the last year and a half, maybe you should look a little closer.
New Thai politics papers from Michael H. Nelson
“Thaksin’s 2005 Electoral Triumph:Looking Back From the Election in 2007”, published by the Southeast Asia Research Centre at the City University of Hong Kong.
[Comment: This paper ranks right up there with the best of Pasuk and Baker. Once I started reading it, couldn’t put it down. Most notable feature: author strives for balance, which is pretty difficult given the situation. Hopefully, the author will work this into a book. This sort of informative writing is needed because the valuable background information it supplies is usually lacking and like computer programmers always say: garbage in – garbage out.]
The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
Republican’s last post gets to the heart of the matter.
Human Rights
I asked Republican whether people have the right to address questions of human rights if they do not also criticise the monarchy. Here is his response:
“Of course they have the “right”. What a patronizing question. But if they do not also criticize the monarchy’s human rights violations then they are hypocrites. And because of the politicization of human rights in Thailand now, effectively their criticisms are partisan; they are effectively supporting network monarchy’s attack on Thaksin and TRT-PPP and the democratic wishes of the Thai electorate using human rights as a political weapon. What do human rights mean if you are partisan?”
My response to this would be that anyone working on human rights in the South, during the war on drugs and so on are inevitably pushing at both the Thaksin regime and those forces connected to the CNS and the palace, by virtue of the wide-spread arms of the state that are implicated in those issues. As an example, I noted in another post CNS PM Sarayud was on the Committee related to the War on Drugs. This is just one example of how the forces cross over. To fight on the War on Drugs will see the underbelly of the Thai state revealed, and I suspect it will implicate all sides.
If Republican will allow PM Samak the right to think strategically in regard to how he relates to royalism and its power in Thailand, he might also allow people who work on human rights in Thailand ( with so much less power than Samak) to also work their way through the difficult questions that face them without calling them hypocrites. He is asking something of them that he won’t do in his own name.
Effectively, the Republican position shields any government from criticism because it asks the politically near-impossible under the guise of radicalism, and therefore leaves areas that can be worked on untouched.
Thaksin
Republican #45
“In fact, it seems that Connors is not in the “song mai ao” camp after all; the camp that Connors belongs to based on his own arguments is that of the CNS and the royalists.”
Somsak and Republican have repeated demanded that Thaksin-critics criticise the monarchy in the same manner that they criticise Thaksin. Of course Somsak and Thaksin do not criticise Thaksin in the manner that they demand others criticise the monarchy, because for them Thaksin had/has an electoral mandate – legitimacy. I have argued that in my opinion Thaksin forfeited democratic legitimacy when he moved outside the rules of the game when his regime launched the war on drugs, when his regime endorsed Tak Bai, when his regime moved against the checks and balances of the political system and so on. Now for most people Thaksin remained the legitimate leader for reasons related to leadership and decisiveness and the fact that they got concrete benefits from the regime, and of course because his government was popularly elected. These things I accept. In arguing that I think the regime was illegitimate based on my understanding of democracy I am one person making an argument in a crowd of arguments, and I reserve my right to do so. I also think people had a right to call for Thaksin’s resignation. If making an argument means putting yourself above other people, then we should all be silent. Indeed, if all commentary ceased when people voted (as is the implication of Republican’s position), I don’t know what the meaning of politics would be. To argue against a majority opinion, to disagree and advance different arguments is key to democracy. It is as if Somsak and Republican had imbibed Thaksin’s “I have 19 million votes” mantra and therefore brook no dissent.
However, illegitimate I think Thaksin was (can a person not have that opinion and express it, or must I toe the majority line) I also think the coup and the CNS were wrong (illegitimate); the use of Article 7 by the PAD was politically opportunist and weakened their commitment to democracy and so on…all these things I have previously said.
In the face of a series of quotations in post 50 that demonstrate that I am indeed critical of both sides Republican moves the issue to my use of adjectives for both sides. As Republican refuses to put his name to his own arguments he is not really in a position to quibble about the colour of my adjectives.
The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
Reply to #50: The sarcastic tone you take in #50 is a bit tiresome. I didn’t call you a “monarchist” or a “royalist”, I said that your position that Thaksin had no legitimacy despite his electoral victories and great popularity with the electorate is the SAME as that of the CNS and the royalists. It is demonstrably the same and you should not deny it.
There’s no need to drag up any earlier pieces to prove your anti-monarchy credentials or that you were ahead of the “fashion”. My comments were directed at the Asia Sentinel article and your responses to my criticisms of it on this thread.
By using the terms “wankery”, “pretentiousness”, “hypocrisy” I wasn’t trying to discredit you. It was an accurate summary of your argument.
Re. your 3 questions:
Your whole discourse of “people who care about human rights” is distasteful, because the insinuation is that I don’t. Connors as the “khon di”.
a) No, I won’t endorse your statements for all the reasons I gave in #51. I find it perverse in the first place that you should be asking me to put my name to your work, even if I agreed with it.
b) Another example of your moral self-righteousness. You ask me whether I think human rights violators of “various forms of legitimacy” should face “due process”. Why on earth would I not agree that those who have violated human rights should face due process? (“even an elected politician” – how patronizing). But what a na├пve question this is from someone who should know better. Do you actually think the courts in Thailand today are free from political interference? and especially on issues of human rights violations with political significance? You and others can trumpet your morally self-righteous demands for human rights violators to face justice and “due process” but these things hardly exist in Thailand for such politically significant violations. So what do you gain from these calls for justice? Your own sense of moral self-satisfaction.
c) Of course they have the “right”. What a patronizing question. But if they do not also criticize the monarchy’s human rights violations then they are hypocrites. And because of the politicization of human rights in Thailand now, effectively their criticisms are partisan; they are effectively supporting network monarchy’s attack on Thaksin and TRT-PPP and the democratic wishes of the Thai electorate using human rights as a political weapon. What do human rights mean if you are partisan?
“…Please Republican, explain why people who care about human rights have to condemn the monarchy, while those who may well be implicated in the abuse of human rights are allowed to protect the monarchy …”
Well, if you are going to use the discourse of “human rights” the monarchy should be criticized because of its daily abuse of the human rights of the Thai people, starting with Article 1 of the UDHR, before listing the many other specific abuses.
I don’t understand what you mean by the second part of your sentence.
Re. my comments about Samak’s statements about 6 October: you joined the moral cheerleaders who condemned Samak – as though what he said was something new. It provided another moral issue for the “khon di” to bash TRT-PPP, while they remained silent on the king’s role in October 6 – and all this coming after the September 19 coup and 17 months of a royalist dictatorship. My post was merely a speculation about the political reasons for Samak’s statements. If one wants to try to understand how politics works (instead of merely displaying what a morally right-thinking academic one is) one might take the time to actually judge politicians’ words on their intended political effect. If that effect is to strengthen a democratically-elected government over the royalist opposition forces, then one might not be so quick to press the moral outrage button.
In very good company
Thaksin kissed the ground at Suvarnabhumi airport to thank the run way for not collapsing under the weight of his plane.
News junkies will recall that Suvarnabhumi was a disastrous construction project with connections to Thaksin’s corrupt cronies…but hey most western presses really BELIEVE it when Chakrapop Penkair says “Democracy has returned to Thailand”
don’t you mean “Thaksin’s brand of democracy?”
The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
Reply to #48: Well, you just said in #38 that that was your last post on this matter because of alleged “abuse”. What is that if not running away? – the second time: you did it earlier in #1 after complaining that I was a blunt axe wielder… then there was that bit about the “show trial” and the “firing squad”. Sounds a bit like “abuse” to me. I thought you said you prefer to disagree without name-calling?
You say you want to cut through the personal abuse, but there hasn’t been ANY “personal” abuse; any criticisms have been of arguments, not personal matters. And I don’t call criticizing an argument “abuse”. This is an important point, because you are setting up a false man instead of defending your arguments.
There’s no need to repaste what you seem to feel are some choice parts of your posts about the monarchy and ask for my endorsement. In these postings you merely emphasize Somsak’s point: the language you use for the monarchy is entirely of a different order to the language you use to criticize Thaksin and TRT-PPP.
In any case, I wouldn’t put my name to another person’s work. And there is no way I would put my name to such a bland posting as “the monarchy is illegitimate from a political perspective that is based on equality of human beings”. I would have a far longer list of objections. I and many others have talked enough about these things on this blog. If I and they do not use real names the reason should be bleeding obvious.
By your challenge to me to use a real name you IMPLY that the way you write about the monarchy is out of your concern for lese majeste; ie. Republican (and others on this and other blogs) do not use their real names so they have no right to challenge others who do to write more critically about the monarchy.
OK. So you don’t want to run foul of lese majeste. Of course, that is understandable. But at the same time, as a political scientist aren’t you then admitting to hypocrisy? You’re happy to put your name to criticisms of a democratically-elected government precisely at a time it is engaged in a profoundly unfair struggle with “network monarchy” (unfair because the king’s manipulations can not be publicly criticized whereas Thaksin and TRT are abused by all on a daily basis), but you resist criticizing the monarchy in the same terms (Samak’s democratically-elected government a “monstrosity”) because it might cause you problems in your career? Is that what you’re saying?
I am not a political scientist, I don’t publish comments on politics in the mass media and I don’t have any desire to. But for those who do, because of (i) the difficulties in which a democratic government operates in a political game whose rules are largely set by the ratchakan state; and (ii) with constant undemocratic political interventions by the king, both obvious and behind the scenes, that can not be criticized by the government because of lese majeste, I would wish that academic commentators temper their comments to reflect this unfair situation.
The issue is not about stopping people from criticizing democratically-elected governments, or forcing them to publicly commit lese majeste. The issue is about pointing out the hypocrisy and moral self-righteousness of those that criticize the one but are soft or silent on the other. In 2006 it was not just hypocrisy; the demonization of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai by the academics and “phak prachachon” was a critical factor in softening up the Bangkok middle class to accept a coup. And now they are at it again.
I’ve just noticed your post #50. Will reply in another post to anything that was not addressed in this one.
In very good company
I don’t really believe he has any emotion worth a damn . Everything I’ve seen indicates that he’s just a remorseless and almost robotic power and attention-grabber. He has to be the center of attention or he gets bored. I used to watch him sitting through no-confidence debates when he was a junior whippersnapper and he looked terminally-bored with everything around him. I don’t really think he owes any great loyalty to anything other than himself.
In very good company
Thaksin is anything you want him to be if you are prepared to pay his price.
The return of the king
jonfernquest : Let me get this right. The military leaders who ran a coup in the name of preserving democracy and protecting the monarchy and thereby overthrew a popularly elected and popular government (albeit one that was flawed in many ways), imposed martial law, fixed a constitution and so on are heroes. They are heroes because they did not do worse than this. They they broke the law and scrapped a constitution and then passed laws to protect themselves makes them somehow unpunishable. Yeh, right.
East-West Center to host Thai royal visit
jonfernquest: So sucking up to royals is the best way to do academic work in Thailand…. Like Teth, I hope you see the problem in this. I also suggest that you look more carefully at the ways in which the EWC Honolulu constructs its academic agenda in support of US foreign policy objectives. Of course, this is its mission:
“The East-West Center is an education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, and just Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and the governments of the region.”
I’m not sure that “some very useful and productive intellectual exchanges between University of Hawaii and Thai universities, … teaching reading (extensive reading).” is what I had in mind regarding critical scholarship.
The return of the king
Jon, I know what you mean, but I had hoped your standards were higher. To call them “heroes” is WAYYY over the top, first, because they seriously undermined the country for their own greed (not only for money but for power). Secondly, they knew they could not have stayed on with the current state of civil politics which is why they tried underhand tactics like the NLA law machine or the new security bill. So they were pretty much forced to do what they’ve done.
Heroes? No. All they deserve is no revenge since they actually kept their promise.
The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
Words from a monarchist …and words from a republican
Below are some more “monarchist” comments I have made in published pieces under my own name, including suggestions of a personality cult, terrorizing popular movements, brute force and so on. Republican (in his own name) may or may not wish to endorse them as he may also do so regarding my earlier post (48 in this topic). There are few criticisms of elected politicians in this post and post 48 (except an observation that Thaksin did little to undermine royalist ideology), so Republican should feel reasonably comfortable in endorsing at least some of them in his own name. He demands that others speak critically of the monarchy, I’d like him to take the step also in his own name.
I do not expect many Thais being able to say these things (quotations below) in public; they face certain sanction, especially those not in the relatively protected university sector. And before I am misunderstood as taking a snipe at Somsak because I say the university sector is relatively protected, I think his statements on this blog and elsewhere are extraordinarily challenging and brave in the Thai context. While I disagree with his analysis, I think he is pushing (in his own name) the boundaries more than anyone.
Many Thais and outsiders won’t say critical things about the monarchy or say word for word what Somsak and Republican require them to say, simply because they are likely to disagree with this analysis of the monarchy or they don’t like being told what to say word for word; even those who are critical of it will see it differently, and say it differently. Just because they do not say anti-monarchist things does not mean they forfeit the right to raise questions of human rights abuses during the Thaksin regime. I keep replying in this post-thread, because I find it difficult to accept the argument made by Somsak and Republican that no one has a right to say anything about elected politicians unless they are also willing to touch the monarchy.
I do not think it is hard for western academics to say these things (if they want to, and in their own words, please). The relative openness for western academics may change as the new PPP government may wish to start proving its royalist credentials (something we should understand according to Republican) as the government needs to time to establish itself. See Republican Post 28 (and reproduced below) at: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2008/02/13/samaks-disgrace/
Here then, below, are a few “monarchist” statements I have made in the past, before it became the fashion to criticise the monarchy, and some made after the coup. It may seem self-indulgent to defend myself against the various charges of being in support of monarchy and dictatorship and to provide textual ‘evidence’; I only do so because I want to see if someone does this as requested by Republican and Somsak, whether in response Somsak and Republican will also agree that crimes may have been committed under Thaksin’s rule and these should be examined. Also, I’d like them to consider whether a popular mandate means that a person can walk away from potential responsibility for those crimes (it may be the case that a different kind of popular support has allowed the palace to so far be immune)? I don’t think either electoral legitimacy or ‘traditional legitimacy ’ or ‘constitutional legitimacy’ should provide any one with immunity, be they king, politician, army general and so on. Now before this question is avoided by stating I do not demand the same of the Thai monarchy, please refer to previous posts where I have stated that I have no problem with any body, including the monarchy, being subject to investigations in regard to such crimes.
And now, words from a monarchist, who supports royalist dictatorship, from my book the ultra-royalist grovelfest, Democracy and National Identity in Thailand:
1.
“Liberal elite forces reached their pinnacle of influence in the open period of politics of 1973–76, but only under the shadow of an increasingly aggressive and brutal right-wing backlash. Precisely because of the polarization in these years, the period is often seen as a lost opportunity; the elite pact of ‘first round’ democratization is seen as being undermined by a number of factors, including the mobilization of the masses internally, and the ‘communist’ victories in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. These developments led to a conservative reaction among sections of Thai establishment, including the palace, and the mobilization of mass right-wing organizations to terrorize the popular movement. Ultimately, such forces crushed the pro-democracy movement in the bloody events of 6 October 1976, at Thammasat University, when armed thugs, with the backing of the police and paramilitary elements, shot, battered, mutilated and hanged unarmed students. Using the events at Thammasat as a pretext, a coalition of military, bureaucratic, palace and capitalist forces backed a military coup, once again halting the emergence of progressive forces, as they had done in the late fifties.”
2.
“Most cited [in terms of the king as a pro-democratic force] is his intervention in the May 1992 events. On prime time television Bhumiphol lectured protagonists of the May events, Prime Minister Suchinda and Chamlong Srimuang, who lay semi-prostrate before him. However, a critical reading of that event shows Bhumiphol publicly sympathizing with Suchinda. Bhumiphol expressed frustration that his advice to ‘promulgate now, amend later’ (regarding the military backed 1991 Constitution) had been ignored by those pushing for immediate amendments.”
3
“After the tumultuous events of 1973–76, the monarchy became the focus of a new round of ultra-nationalist drum-beating and identity-seeking. The right wing had monopolized the official ideology of nation, religion and monarchy during the polarized political struggles of the 1970s. Many thus associated the triad with the appalling violence of the ultra-right. To counteract this, an aggressive restoration of the monarchy was pursued, in terms encompassing the progressive themes of democracy and social development and remoralization of the state around the figure of the monarch. The position of the monarchy was promoted by extensive media manipulation, effectively creating a cult of personality around Bhumiphol.”
4
“ The sum effect of this historical image making is that the present king is seen as a mediating power between hostile social forces, despite his family’s position as leading capitalists and landowners with a personal stake in the wellbeing of Thai capitalism. The palace’s unique position as a public exemplar of conservative traditions and its existence as a network of capital have proved an invaluable resource for Thailand’s elite democratic development. With the aura of traditional authority, built up since the 1950s, the monarchy is able to strategically intervene in favour of order.”
5
“The historical processes of the construction of the royal myth cannot be ignored in any attempt to ‘progressively’ appropriate this institution; it has never been a neutral national symbol. It has, rather, been an active political force …the monarchy ideologically disciplines the rural population through the discourse of thrift, self-reliance, national security and moral selfhood.”
…
“A key ideological resource and active agent of power bloc, the palace has succeeded in partly mobilizing resources for its own ends, but it has also been mobilized by social forces to assume a position at the helm of national ideology.”
6
”As an exponent of conservative forms of capitalism, the palace has vested interests in the propagation of ideology. As Chairat Charoensin-O-Larn notes, with the fragmentation and competition in and between the state and the bourgeoisie, the monarchy remained a key force for integration. Thus the constancy of the monarchy’s political position, its abiding regard for security and productive labour, reflects the concerns of a reflexive capitalist agent empowered by the prestige of royalty, and which has subsequently succeeded in positioning itself at the head of an ensemble of bureaucratic and capitalist forces. Given the glaring disparity between the rich and the poor, the monarchy’s dual position, as an agent of political and economic interests, and as a symbol transfigured as the soul and destiny of the nation, requires an iron regime of controlled imagery.”
7.
“The existence of lèse-majesté should not be seen as a minor blotch on an otherwise clean slate of political opening-up. In the 1980s liberalization was a limited affair, opening a political space for elite conflict and expression, bounded by the triad of nation, religion and monarchy. In villages, newspapers and in relations with the bureaucracy and capitalists, ordinary Thais faced the brute rule of superior power and the strictures of national identity and culture propagated by state ideologues and the palace. The stage-managed role of the monarch, the compulsory respect
shown to the institution, and the pressure of social conformity left many people with a taste of bitterness which few felt confident to express.”
8.
“Expectations of reduced policing of lèse-majesté in the near future are sanguine to say the least. Thai elites are well aware of how the free press has led to public mockery of the British monarchy, and they are fearful of what would happen were the Thai royal family open to scrutiny. The existence of the law does not suggest that the royalty is despised and needs protection, although there are elements of this – but who dares speak with universal sanction and prison waiting? The laws have a more general application in that they point to the monarchy as central to the entire modern ideological complex; around the figure of a righteous king, democracy may be defined in a traditionalistic and disciplinary manner.”
Postscript of Dem/National Identity (post coup)
8.
“If under Thaksin the rule of law had been in the intensive care unit, the CDR has taken it to the mortuary table. They annulled the constitution, banned political gatherings, censored the press, and declared their decrees to have the status of law. News soon followed that King Bhumiphol had met with the coup group, bestowing legitimacy on them.”
“The coup group did not move against Thaksin because of corruption, human rights abuses, or erosion of democratic freedoms– a feature of the early years of the Thaksin regime – but because it was clear that Thaksin was fundamentally challenging the power of the palace and the interests that have formed around it. When the coup group say they launched the coup for the sake of democracy, they mean Thai ‘constitutional monarchy’.”
9
“Thaksin’s fatal weakness was that while in power he did nothing to challenge royal ideology at an ideological level. He did not create a space for new ideological forms to take root. An ex-policeman and businessman, he placed too much faith in sheer force, money and capitalist-inspired empowerment of the poor. Ideology in the form of nationness, Thainess and moral order remain central in strategies of enduring political domination in Thailand. Those elements in the ‘people sector’ who played the royalist card – by joining the establishment opposition to Thaksin – understood the monarchy’s great ideological power, but at the cost of a deeper commitment to self-organization and democratic politics.”
10.
From Article of Faith: The Failure of Royal Liberalism
“Bhumibol’s declaration that he would not use Article 7 requires interpretation. Paradoxically, Bhumibol relied on his un-codified power (that which the anti- Thaksin movement had sought to deploy) to effectively compel a judicial solution to the crisis. The king would not be dictated to by street forces and instead relied on the power of his speech (see Thongchai, 2008) to impact on the outcome of political events. This course of action, it may be assumed, ensures the continuing myth of royal distance from politics and secures the reserve powers codified in Article 7 which the king refused to publicly exercise. Public use of those powers, compelled by protests on the street, may well have been judged imprudent in the face of a popular prime minister.”
11.
“…in the Thai context political liberals, believing Thailand to be bereft of a strong nationwide middle class that supposedly grounds liberalism, have entrusted the mission of establishing liberal democracy in the ideologies and institutions simultaneously derived from and legitimated by a mythic social contract embodied in the monarchy. Political liberalism in Thailand is unlikely to find a sure footing based on such exclusive terrain, especially when that base necessarily, because of its own role as the head of a power bloc in the national Thai capitalist formation (Connors, 2007: 131), fails to address the gross economic and social inequalities that led many to support Thaksin.”
“In the longer term, progressive social liberal forces, perhaps now disabused of the notion that the monarchy may be utilised for progressive purposes, may well be the political beneficiaries. The wide debates on the role of the monarchy, partly refracted through debates on the role of Privy Councillor Prem (see Prachathat, 16-22 July, 2007: 11) in the events of 2006, has greatly affected its standing, especially among supporters of Thaksin’s social and economic policies. This has the potential to erode the ideological compact that has taken shape since the 1970s and offers the possibility of the emergence of a more widespread egalitarian sentiment to challenge the hierarchical and deferential sentiment that surrounds the monarchy.”
WORDS FROM A REPUBLICAN
And now, words from Republican who labels me royalist and then allows Thai PM Samak the right to be ‘strategically monarchist’ in order to survive (not Republican’s words, but what I think he means, please tell me if I am wrong).
Posted on New MANDALA FEB 17 by REPUBLICAN
1.
“Given the current circumstances, on this issue [Samak’s comments that one person died during in the October 1976 events] maybe we need to separate moral outrage and political necessity. Those who want to see the neutralization of the royalist-military forces after the debacle of the last 17 months should be hoping for a strong PPP-led government. In this respect what Samak said in the CNN interview could actually work well for Samak himself and the PPP (including the former student activists)
….
(ii) Samak re-emphasizes his credentials (at least in terms of rhetoric) as an unreconstructed rightist-royalist. This helps him gain some confidence from the royalists, smarting from their big defeat following the formation of the PPP government.”
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Now, please Republican, explain why people who care about human rights have to condemn the monarchy, while those who may well be implicated in the abuse of human rights are allowed to protect the monarchy. And please don’t try and discredit me by simply referring to my wankery, pretentiousness, hypocrisy (I am happy to let you win that point if it helps), just please respond to the following questions:
a) Can you endorse statements (in quotation marks above) that I have made about the monarchy in your own name? Or, if you find something terribly monarchist about my statements quoted above, perhaps you can endorse Somsak’s statements that appear in this post-thread in your own name? Just as you require of others.
b) Will you allow that people with various forms of legitimacy (political, king, general etc) should face due process if there is sufficient evidence of complicity in a state or political crime (even an elected politician)?
c) Do you believe that no one has the right to speak about human rights in Thailand unless they also criticise the monarchy?
Anyone else who thinks I’ve been too precious and circumspect are welcome to endorse the above statements in their own name and address the three questions.
And yes, I’ve learned never say “last post”.
Paul Handley replies to comments
1 March 2008
Greetings.
Having been run through the grinder here in Thailand a couple of times myself, a former Thailand Peace Corps volunteer and long-married to a wonderful Thai lady (39 years), bot of us were accused of being foreigners damaging the nation, the religion and the monarchy, I had a charge of lese majesty against me filed with the national police, and we have been in court for criminal and civil (defamation) claims and counter-claims.Yet, no one would proceed with human rights-related investigations of what happened at Watpa Salawan that 12 February 2005.
I am working on a book on the topic, tentatively titled Five Octobers, because events at Watpa were precipitated by an October 2004 incident and the other four Octobers, in Thailand, relate to the infamous massacres and southern violence. I have spent some nine years with the local media – something foreigners are not supposed to be doing – and have a personal in-depth grasp of what the media are faced with, as well as how academics, government and private sector individuals and groups act, etc.
In short, I would like Mr. Handley’s email address, and would appreciate anyone else’s comments who cares to contribute something to this new book.
Thank you all.
Sincerely,
Frank G Anderson
The return of the king
Teth wrote: “…if you were to praise somebody every time they do something they’re supposed to, you’ll be out of breath really soon.”
The historical pattern is political involvement of military followed by less political involvement, from coup maker rent seeker to narrowly focused professional soldier.
This pattern holds true almost everywhere I look.
South Korea used to be ruled by a brutal military regime.
The military has made the transition to professional army.
Same in Chile. In the Phillipines coups don’t seem to be as
effective as they used to and non-military PMs are the norm.
I would start with the historical pattern, then go to what should be the case. What should be the case should have a reasonable relation to what can be the case.
If you look at this way, Sonthi and the rest of the coup makers are heroes for not pressing it further and the forces that be in Thai society will recognise this and at least not punish them for this. It could have been a lot worse.