I thank Somsak for his comments and his suggestion that I review my stance over the last two years. Oddly, I feel sufficiently comfortable with my politics, and even more so as the monstrosity of the new government becomes apparent.
I want to draw attention to several points that Somsak has consistently made against those who use the words of Bhumiphol in their writings (actually me, but there may be others). I have often used the king’s speech as a kind of foil to Thaksin, also as a kind of narrative setting for the reader. But there is enough in my work to indicate what I think about monarchy and its role. I do not feel the need to hold my red flag all the time.
In his post above Somsak questions my lack of anger regarding the coup (actually I said I was not especially angry) as though anger is a socialist virtue (my anger was spent on Tak Bai and the War on Drugs, among other things). He also notes that I claimed that Thaksin was worse than the military that launched the coup. Well, yes, I did, and here is what I actually said:
“The monarchy in Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with special powers; anyone who imagines that Walter Bagehot has said all there is to say about its functioning (“the right to be consulted, the right to advise, and the right to warn”) is missing the extraordinary conventional powers that have accrued to the institution, a product of both design and historical evolution. Neither the design nor the evolution would have occurred without a particular constellation of forces, including the demobilisation of radical forces in the 1970s, in which the monarchy played a key role, and the continuing elevation of the institution into the metaphoric soul of the nation.
To recognise and analyse the role of the monarchy in Thai politics is not to endorse that role. It is, however, to appreciate how the balance of forces in Thailand are constituted beyond normative appeals to ‘democracy.’ The monarchy and the military are enduring historical institutions in Thailand. Deeply rooted in various networks, ideologically and culturally embedded, and organizationally present. These are powerful institutions, as former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra learned. While some are now trying to script Thaksin as a bourgeois revolutionary he was always too poorly equipped and lacking in vision to play that role. Thaksin played an insider’s game and lost. Many supporters want to paint him as a democratic martyr; his actions suggest a terrible authoritarian in the making. Any legitimacy he may have had as a consequence of being selected prime minister by elected representatives was negated by his actions in that position.
Does Thaksin’s authoritarianism justify a more insidious authoritarianism in the form of the military coup? No. Other channels were available to restrain or fell Thaksin: further popular protest, the weakening of his parliamentary dominance, the use of legal measures. The military intervened, pre-empting these possibilities, to remind all that behind the flow of contested politics a ‘state of exception’ always lurks. The instrument of that state of exception, the military, bluntly and arrogantly inserted its own solution, showing up the fiction that lies behind people-sovereignty.
Somsak Jeamteerasakul has noted that some who would normally be identified as progressive activists or democrats feel indifferent to Thaksin’s fall and feel no outrage at the military’s actions. I was against the coup, but I can not claim to have felt especially angry. At that time my opinion was that Thaksin was worse than the military – a coup d’etat, the construction of national security complexes and human rights abuses are to be expected from a military steeped in the kind of history the Thai military has. The military was living its soul. And of course it continues to do so , pressing for national security laws and the continued imposition of martial law, thereby illustrating that some of its claimed reasons for the coup to have been excuses or self-delusional. Certainly, the military, at least sections of it, as the instrument of force for national unity was concerned about disunity and apparent slights on the monarchy; but its stated concerns for the health of Thailand’s democracy and the level of corruption have purchase only if we suspend good judgement. The military did in 2006, and does now, what the military can be expected to do.
Thaksin was worse because one might have expected better from the first prime minister elected under the reform constitution. As an elected politician Thaksin de-institutionalised the political system (protected by his hegemonically constructed majoritarianism), aggrandised wealth and power, engaged in intimidation of those against him, and recklessly and with fatal consequences abandoned the rule of law in the war on drugs, thus negating the social compromise effected in the 1997 constitution – however flawed that constitution was. To those who scoff the rule of law as a bourgeois abstraction, consider it from the perspective of those who never had a chance to plead “not guilty” during the wave of extra judicial killings in 2003.
What is implied, but never stated, by those who see a direct line of causality between the anti-Thaksin camp and the coup is that progressive forces should have endured the Thaksin era because it was a popularly elected regime. This is a retrospective argument, made in the light of the coup. So too is the argument that organizing opposition against Thaksin laid the basis for a conservative military backlash. This is a retro-subjectivist view of history, putting hindsight at the steering wheel. It is to say that history is made by will, intent and prudent choices. In part maybe, but not wholly.
The anti-Thaksin movement was a legitimate movement, and like all movements it attracted attention from forces with other agendas and interests who sought to manipulate it for other purposes. By the time that movement was demobilised as a consequence of its misconceived and politically opportunist dependence on Article 7 in April 2006, the game moved to the elite sphere. Social forces on the ground were not sufficiently organized to determine the political outcome. In that context the “no to the two camps” position makes sense. It opposes the coup and forces arrayed behind it and it equally opposes the deepening authoritarianism represented by Thaksin.
I happen to believe that wellbeing and social justice, democratic socialism, are secured by deepening both the democratic and liberal gains of historical struggle – something neither Thaksin, the monarchy nor the military have intended to do.”
The ridiculous picture that Somsak and others have of “the song mai ow” camp can only be sustained by silly and it would seem deliberate misrepresentations.
Being against the coup, does not have to mean that one must support Thaksin. Why people such as Somsak continue to require that people support the legitimacy of figures such as Thaksin I have no idea. I can not imagine such figures as Dr Weng appearing at rallies in Chaing Rai declaring that he misses Thaksin, it is as if some fine tuned abstraction mattered more than the terrible crimes that were committed during the Thaksin era.
More over, to equate the struggle between Thaksin and the CNS and the monarchy as that between fascism and democracy during the 2nd World War, as Somsak implies above, doesn’t cut it.
As pro-Thaksin supporters confront the reality of the thuggish government that has been elected all sorts of mendacious positions will be expressed. The absurd alliance of capitalists, globalizers and ex-communists that has taken shape in the Hi-Thaksin camp reflects the absurdity of historical objectivism when measured against concrete justice.
re. #48 You give no attribution. Surang Saitip, where does this information come from? Is ‘ “spend at his pleasure” ‘ a quote? Who said it?
Your post doesn’t have any credibility if you don’t give a reference that can be checked.
Actually, as I understand it, the phrase “spend at his pleasure” is one of the two standard phrases used nowsaday when someone presents money to HM the King. The phrase is a translation of “р╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╕Чр╕гр╕Зр╣Гр╕Кр╣Йр╕кр╕нр╕вр╕Хр╕▓р╕бр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕нр╕▒р╕Шр╕вр╕▓р╕ир╕▒р╕в” (hai-song-chai-soy-tam-phra-rat-cha-at-tha-ya-sai) literally “for His Majesty to use in any which way he wants” but “spend at his pleasure” is perfectly acceptable.
The other phrase, more “specified”, is “р╣Вр╕Фр╕вр╣Ар╕кр╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕╕р╕ир╕ер╕Хр╕▓р╕бр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕нр╕▒р╕Шр╕вр╕▓р╕ир╕▒р╕в” (doei-sa-det-phra-rat-cha-ku-sol-tam-phra-rat-cha-at-tha-ya-sai) or literally “for HM’s charity work whichever one HM wants”.
It is a little bit too fast for someone who is not Thai and comment on Thai issue. Populist list policies is one of the most needed policies in Thailand at the moment.
The one thing that no one has mentioned in any of the reviews quoted, or in any of the replies to this, is that since the movie came out the Thai authorities are keeping closer tabs on westerners in the Mae Sot area and border region.
Before the movie came out I spoke to an American who regularly travels to that area on humanitarian missions. I had told him of my plans to go there (Mae Sot area), and he replied that I should do so before the Rambo movie was released, as it would be sure to generate quite a bit of attention from Walter Mitty types and the press, which in turn would attract the attention of the Thai authorities.
Lastly, my thoughts on the criticisms leveled at Sylvester Stallone: anything that he might do to shine a light on the genocide perpetrated by the Burmese government has to be a good thing.
From people I’ve spoken with, Stallone actually moderated some of the violence – unlike the Burmese generals.
I was listening to him talk about his new movie on the Savage show.
He said that he asked about the least known fighting in the world and went there and asked the natives of the country and took the story from things he was told by them. The one victims was to play a victim but asked if he could play the ‘dictator’ that is doing this to them.
He said they will go after his family but he needed to do it.
It would be interesting to have Stallone post a comment on here 😀
I just finished Gordon Young’s beautiful book entitled Tracks of an Intruder. I’ve read all the classical books of this genre relating to Asia – from Jim Corbett and Kenneth Anderson to other lesser known experts from the 19th Century. Gordon’s accounts from comparitivley modern times are accurate, poignant essays which capture a quickly vanishing life unique to the region. I suppose I can relate to the book based on my own similar experiences in the hills of northern India, jungles of Burma and even some limited experience in the hills of northern Thailand. This is a book I want my own grown son to read and absorb for the life lessons it contains.
тАв New duty free shop operator at Suvarnabhumi Bangkok Airport could be delayed
тАв King Power denies its contracts abused law
тАв Airports of Thailand may run own commercial area after terminating King Power contracts
тАв King Power Duty Free back at Suvarnabhumi Airport
тАв Airports of Thailand terminated King Power Duty Free’s contracts
тАв King Power files 68 Billion Baht suit against Airports of Thailand
тАв New Bangkok Airport contracts to be re-examined by Gen Saprang
тАв Airports of Thailand to revoke permanent passes of all King Power staff
тАв King Power given 30 day deadline to remove parts of duty free outlets at Suvarnabhumi Airport
Updating Srithanonchai’s #37 (in what I see as the move toward’s PMThaksin grand return):
Sunai Manomai-udom, head of the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), was removed from his position yesterday. The big moves are starting as PMSamak and Chalerm self-combusts. Before the whole PPP house burns down, the urgent task left is to free the 111 banned politicians and manipulate PMThaksin and co’s corruption cases. PMThaksin could return to head the resurrected TRT and sweep to an easy election victory, distancing himself from his director’s role of the PPP demise (PMThaksin knows both the strong and weak points of his pawns and his oppositions – ask PMSurayud and watch how PMSamak is quickly being dragged down into the gutters in the media). If his gamble plays out rightly, he’ll come back very strong (but probably significantly less than at the peak of his powers in 2005 – but who knows what else he is capable of).
At that time, how will Thai democracy be re-defined by PMThaksin (or do we really think he will be inclusive?)? How will Thai democracy including key events of 1932, 1973, 197 6 , 1992, 1997, 2004-2006* be re-written, re-framed under a ‘reformed’ (or vengeful) PMThaksin?
(*Here I include PMThaksin’s War on Drugs, Krue-sae and Takbai as some of the darkest days of Thai democracy comparable to 1973 and 1976. It could be a generation gap here as I ‘lived’ through those events while I was only a child in 1973 and 1976)
On the other hand, the gamble could go terribly wrong. At this point it will depend on how the relationship between the man-in-power and the power-behind-the screens pan out. PMThaksin will not want PMSamak as his enemy while Samak heads the government… I suspect if he (PMSamak) is to go down, he will try to bring PMThaksin down with him. Just by dissolving parliament without lifting the ban means PMThaksin will have to piece together another very expensive nominee government.
Interesting comments – and I agree with your thrust here.
What is important to note, but certainly not suprising given their numerical advantage, is the way that Kachin from the Kachin State (whether they still live there or not) play a significant role in the creation of various ideas about Singpho-ness in India. They are part of a wider conversation, for sure, but through education, political feeling, resources, etc, they have forged a real presence – especially at an event like this recent Manau in Arunachal Pradesh. In southwestern China I have found that the same is often true. Even when the local religious and political tradition is quite different some of Burma’s Kachin (and, especially, Jinghpaw from all the hotspots) find a place for themselves. I guess this is not that surprising – but it leads to an interesting dynamic, nonetheless.
I’m not sure that the gumsa/gumlao distinction held up that well even when Leach proposed it. However, based on having absolutely no direct personal experience in NE India, I’d suspect that a more “gumsa”, duwa based attitude, would be retained in India as opposed to Burma. In part, this would be due to the political influence of the KIO, which despite the rather duwa background of many of its leaders, always promoted a gumlao ideology and theory, if not practice. Furthermore, the Kachin Baptist tradition isn’t just Baptist, but American Baptist, which again in theory would be more democratic, brash approach. One might argue how democratic the Baptist tradition is in practice, but I think the brash is pretty self evident. I’d suspect the more “chiefly” manau in India would be more restrained, if only by default.
The interesting question is how does the Chinese manua tradition fit in to this? My impression is that the Chinese Jinghpo are influenced in terms of cultural expression by the Burmese Kachins.
Excellent. I suspected Wikipedia had it wrong, I was just having trouble finding a source for the real death date. Armed with your new info, I found it: 18 August 1997, and I corrected Thai Wikipedia accordingly. Thanks!
Prapass died in 1997(2540). He was royally cremated in January the following year. (He had an audience with KMK and/or MHQ shortly before he died. I used to have a photo but can’t find it now.) His return to Thailand in August 1976 sparked off a protest rally at Thammasat in which a protester died from bomb thrown by right-wing thugs on August 21. (Prapas left the next day.) Looking back, I believe this was a “test-run” of the final assualt of the right-wing forces, culminating in Thanom’s return and the 6 Tula events. Prapas’s memoirs – fak wai hai luk lan (roughly translated: what I leave behind for my children and grand-children) were serialized in Matichon weekly and later published as book by the same publisher in 1991.
Thanom passed away just a couple of years ago, i.e. in 2007 or ten years after Prapas. He was also royally cremated presided over by the Queen; the photos of the cremation ceremony have again been distributed on the net just last week, perhaps by pro-Thaksin activists, to counter the attack on Samak over the 6 Tula interview.
I’m not sure if there is a major difference in the relatively urban(e), literate “preacher’s voice” between Catholics and Protestants (or Anglicans, or Assemblies of God, for that matter), although there might well be. It is a really good question, and something I would like to know more about.
As for the chiefly families, yes, they were out in force. The annual Manau held in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh appears to have always been closely aligned with the various chiefly families: the patriarchs, some of whom play substantial economic roles, do carry the “Duwa” title. I get the impression that the retention of Buddhism all plays a part in maintaining this system. That said, I’m not sure if the old gumlao, gumsa, Shan typology will stand up to much contemporary, critical scrutiny in Singpho areas. The dynamic is quite different – although I am not certain I yet understand what it is! Notably, the histories of migration from various parts of the Kachin State to the western side of the Patkai Range are not always so “aristocratic”. Again this is an issue about which it would be good to know much more.
Thanks for raising these interesting points for discussion.
Definitely, the Thai Wikipedia page had it wrong (hopefully someone would correct it soon). Both Generals Prapas and Thanom lived long after the Oct 6 ’76 event. As I recall, Prapas even became Matichon columnist for a year or so.
Is the Nation mixing up 14 October 1973 and 6 October 1976?
According to his Thai Wikipedia page, Field Marshal Prapass died in 22 August 1976. I can’t seem to find any other web page that will corroborate that death date. However, it’s known that he fled to Taipei after the events of October 1973, and sites like this one, with day-by-day accounts of the events leading up to October 6, mention his coming back to Thailand during August for medical treatment for glaucoma (р╣Вр╕гр╕Др╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕лр╕┤р╕Щ) and what I think means enlarged heart (р╣Вр╕гр╕Др╕лр╕▒р╕зр╣Гр╕Ир╣Вр╕Х). Students protested en masse, and the last it mentions of him on any web page I can find is that he fled Thailand again amidst the protests, on 22 August 1976, the day Wikipedia reports as the day of his death.
Is there a difference between Baptist “preacher’s voice” and Catholic in Burma and did it show up at the manau in Myitkyina? I did notice a bit of difference, stylistically at least between the Kachin Catholics and Baptists in Burma, but I haven’t had any experience with the Singhpo, except second hand through Burmese Kachins.
You mentioned the chiefly families. My understanding is that the Singhpo have retained a bit more of the duwa system than they more gumlao (in theory) Kachins in Burma, I wonder if this might have any influence on the retention of Buddhism, given that it may help legitimize the chiefly families. It might also have influenced the tone, since it may be the event in India was a more “aristocratic” affair.
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The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
I thank Somsak for his comments and his suggestion that I review my stance over the last two years. Oddly, I feel sufficiently comfortable with my politics, and even more so as the monstrosity of the new government becomes apparent.
I want to draw attention to several points that Somsak has consistently made against those who use the words of Bhumiphol in their writings (actually me, but there may be others). I have often used the king’s speech as a kind of foil to Thaksin, also as a kind of narrative setting for the reader. But there is enough in my work to indicate what I think about monarchy and its role. I do not feel the need to hold my red flag all the time.
In his post above Somsak questions my lack of anger regarding the coup (actually I said I was not especially angry) as though anger is a socialist virtue (my anger was spent on Tak Bai and the War on Drugs, among other things). He also notes that I claimed that Thaksin was worse than the military that launched the coup. Well, yes, I did, and here is what I actually said:
“The monarchy in Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with special powers; anyone who imagines that Walter Bagehot has said all there is to say about its functioning (“the right to be consulted, the right to advise, and the right to warn”) is missing the extraordinary conventional powers that have accrued to the institution, a product of both design and historical evolution. Neither the design nor the evolution would have occurred without a particular constellation of forces, including the demobilisation of radical forces in the 1970s, in which the monarchy played a key role, and the continuing elevation of the institution into the metaphoric soul of the nation.
To recognise and analyse the role of the monarchy in Thai politics is not to endorse that role. It is, however, to appreciate how the balance of forces in Thailand are constituted beyond normative appeals to ‘democracy.’ The monarchy and the military are enduring historical institutions in Thailand. Deeply rooted in various networks, ideologically and culturally embedded, and organizationally present. These are powerful institutions, as former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra learned. While some are now trying to script Thaksin as a bourgeois revolutionary he was always too poorly equipped and lacking in vision to play that role. Thaksin played an insider’s game and lost. Many supporters want to paint him as a democratic martyr; his actions suggest a terrible authoritarian in the making. Any legitimacy he may have had as a consequence of being selected prime minister by elected representatives was negated by his actions in that position.
Does Thaksin’s authoritarianism justify a more insidious authoritarianism in the form of the military coup? No. Other channels were available to restrain or fell Thaksin: further popular protest, the weakening of his parliamentary dominance, the use of legal measures. The military intervened, pre-empting these possibilities, to remind all that behind the flow of contested politics a ‘state of exception’ always lurks. The instrument of that state of exception, the military, bluntly and arrogantly inserted its own solution, showing up the fiction that lies behind people-sovereignty.
Somsak Jeamteerasakul has noted that some who would normally be identified as progressive activists or democrats feel indifferent to Thaksin’s fall and feel no outrage at the military’s actions. I was against the coup, but I can not claim to have felt especially angry. At that time my opinion was that Thaksin was worse than the military – a coup d’etat, the construction of national security complexes and human rights abuses are to be expected from a military steeped in the kind of history the Thai military has. The military was living its soul. And of course it continues to do so , pressing for national security laws and the continued imposition of martial law, thereby illustrating that some of its claimed reasons for the coup to have been excuses or self-delusional. Certainly, the military, at least sections of it, as the instrument of force for national unity was concerned about disunity and apparent slights on the monarchy; but its stated concerns for the health of Thailand’s democracy and the level of corruption have purchase only if we suspend good judgement. The military did in 2006, and does now, what the military can be expected to do.
Thaksin was worse because one might have expected better from the first prime minister elected under the reform constitution. As an elected politician Thaksin de-institutionalised the political system (protected by his hegemonically constructed majoritarianism), aggrandised wealth and power, engaged in intimidation of those against him, and recklessly and with fatal consequences abandoned the rule of law in the war on drugs, thus negating the social compromise effected in the 1997 constitution – however flawed that constitution was. To those who scoff the rule of law as a bourgeois abstraction, consider it from the perspective of those who never had a chance to plead “not guilty” during the wave of extra judicial killings in 2003.
What is implied, but never stated, by those who see a direct line of causality between the anti-Thaksin camp and the coup is that progressive forces should have endured the Thaksin era because it was a popularly elected regime. This is a retrospective argument, made in the light of the coup. So too is the argument that organizing opposition against Thaksin laid the basis for a conservative military backlash. This is a retro-subjectivist view of history, putting hindsight at the steering wheel. It is to say that history is made by will, intent and prudent choices. In part maybe, but not wholly.
The anti-Thaksin movement was a legitimate movement, and like all movements it attracted attention from forces with other agendas and interests who sought to manipulate it for other purposes. By the time that movement was demobilised as a consequence of its misconceived and politically opportunist dependence on Article 7 in April 2006, the game moved to the elite sphere. Social forces on the ground were not sufficiently organized to determine the political outcome. In that context the “no to the two camps” position makes sense. It opposes the coup and forces arrayed behind it and it equally opposes the deepening authoritarianism represented by Thaksin.
I happen to believe that wellbeing and social justice, democratic socialism, are secured by deepening both the democratic and liberal gains of historical struggle – something neither Thaksin, the monarchy nor the military have intended to do.”
The ridiculous picture that Somsak and others have of “the song mai ow” camp can only be sustained by silly and it would seem deliberate misrepresentations.
Being against the coup, does not have to mean that one must support Thaksin. Why people such as Somsak continue to require that people support the legitimacy of figures such as Thaksin I have no idea. I can not imagine such figures as Dr Weng appearing at rallies in Chaing Rai declaring that he misses Thaksin, it is as if some fine tuned abstraction mattered more than the terrible crimes that were committed during the Thaksin era.
More over, to equate the struggle between Thaksin and the CNS and the monarchy as that between fascism and democracy during the 2nd World War, as Somsak implies above, doesn’t cut it.
As pro-Thaksin supporters confront the reality of the thuggish government that has been elected all sorts of mendacious positions will be expressed. The absurd alliance of capitalists, globalizers and ex-communists that has taken shape in the Hi-Thaksin camp reflects the absurdity of historical objectivism when measured against concrete justice.
Royalist propaganda and policy nonsense
re. #48 You give no attribution. Surang Saitip, where does this information come from? Is ‘ “spend at his pleasure” ‘ a quote? Who said it?
Your post doesn’t have any credibility if you don’t give a reference that can be checked.
Actually, as I understand it, the phrase “spend at his pleasure” is one of the two standard phrases used nowsaday when someone presents money to HM the King. The phrase is a translation of “р╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╕Чр╕гр╕Зр╣Гр╕Кр╣Йр╕кр╕нр╕вр╕Хр╕▓р╕бр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕нр╕▒р╕Шр╕вр╕▓р╕ир╕▒р╕в” (hai-song-chai-soy-tam-phra-rat-cha-at-tha-ya-sai) literally “for His Majesty to use in any which way he wants” but “spend at his pleasure” is perfectly acceptable.
The other phrase, more “specified”, is “р╣Вр╕Фр╕вр╣Ар╕кр╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕╕р╕ир╕ер╕Хр╕▓р╕бр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕нр╕▒р╕Шр╕вр╕▓р╕ир╕▒р╕в” (doei-sa-det-phra-rat-cha-ku-sol-tam-phra-rat-cha-at-tha-ya-sai) or literally “for HM’s charity work whichever one HM wants”.
A new look at “populist” policies
It is a little bit too fast for someone who is not Thai and comment on Thai issue. Populist list policies is one of the most needed policies in Thailand at the moment.
Reviews of Rambo’s war in Burma
The one thing that no one has mentioned in any of the reviews quoted, or in any of the replies to this, is that since the movie came out the Thai authorities are keeping closer tabs on westerners in the Mae Sot area and border region.
Before the movie came out I spoke to an American who regularly travels to that area on humanitarian missions. I had told him of my plans to go there (Mae Sot area), and he replied that I should do so before the Rambo movie was released, as it would be sure to generate quite a bit of attention from Walter Mitty types and the press, which in turn would attract the attention of the Thai authorities.
Lastly, my thoughts on the criticisms leveled at Sylvester Stallone: anything that he might do to shine a light on the genocide perpetrated by the Burmese government has to be a good thing.
From people I’ve spoken with, Stallone actually moderated some of the violence – unlike the Burmese generals.
Reviews of Rambo’s war in Burma
I was listening to him talk about his new movie on the Savage show.
He said that he asked about the least known fighting in the world and went there and asked the natives of the country and took the story from things he was told by them. The one victims was to play a victim but asked if he could play the ‘dictator’ that is doing this to them.
He said they will go after his family but he needed to do it.
It would be interesting to have Stallone post a comment on here 😀
From the archives: Gordon Young
I just finished Gordon Young’s beautiful book entitled Tracks of an Intruder. I’ve read all the classical books of this genre relating to Asia – from Jim Corbett and Kenneth Anderson to other lesser known experts from the 19th Century. Gordon’s accounts from comparitivley modern times are accurate, poignant essays which capture a quickly vanishing life unique to the region. I suppose I can relate to the book based on my own similar experiences in the hills of northern India, jungles of Burma and even some limited experience in the hills of northern Thailand. This is a book I want my own grown son to read and absorb for the life lessons it contains.
Where is Gordon now?
Royalist propaganda and policy nonsense
re. #48 You give no attribution. Surang Saitip, where does this information come from? Is ‘ “spend at his pleasure” ‘ a quote? Who said it?
Your post doesn’t have any credibility if you don’t give a reference that can be checked.
Samak’s disgrace
More revised figures & interesting logic from PM Samak:
“He said he was informed that there were only 59 drug suspects killed by the police and others had been killed by those in the same drug gangs.
Had they been innocent, they would not have been killed, he said.
Mr Samak suggested that those who had lost their relatives during the anti-drug campaign lodge complaints with police so wrongdoers could be taken to court.”
http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories/topstories.php?id=126099
and
“Speaking to Interior Mini-stry executives, provincial governors and district chiefs, Chalerm said it would be natural if more than 2,700 people were killed during the upcoming crackdown. “
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/02/23/headlines/headlines_30066235.php
Royalist propaganda and policy nonsense
Recent background on King Power:
http://www.airportsuvarnabhumi.com/transport-minister-need-more-info-on-king-power-duty-frees-contract-termination
and
тАв New duty free shop operator at Suvarnabhumi Bangkok Airport could be delayed
тАв King Power denies its contracts abused law
тАв Airports of Thailand may run own commercial area after terminating King Power contracts
тАв King Power Duty Free back at Suvarnabhumi Airport
тАв Airports of Thailand terminated King Power Duty Free’s contracts
тАв King Power files 68 Billion Baht suit against Airports of Thailand
тАв New Bangkok Airport contracts to be re-examined by Gen Saprang
тАв Airports of Thailand to revoke permanent passes of all King Power staff
тАв King Power given 30 day deadline to remove parts of duty free outlets at Suvarnabhumi Airport
Samak’s disgrace
Updating Srithanonchai’s #37 (in what I see as the move toward’s PMThaksin grand return):
Sunai Manomai-udom, head of the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), was removed from his position yesterday. The big moves are starting as PMSamak and Chalerm self-combusts. Before the whole PPP house burns down, the urgent task left is to free the 111 banned politicians and manipulate PMThaksin and co’s corruption cases. PMThaksin could return to head the resurrected TRT and sweep to an easy election victory, distancing himself from his director’s role of the PPP demise (PMThaksin knows both the strong and weak points of his pawns and his oppositions – ask PMSurayud and watch how PMSamak is quickly being dragged down into the gutters in the media). If his gamble plays out rightly, he’ll come back very strong (but probably significantly less than at the peak of his powers in 2005 – but who knows what else he is capable of).
At that time, how will Thai democracy be re-defined by PMThaksin (or do we really think he will be inclusive?)? How will Thai democracy including key events of 1932, 1973, 197 6 , 1992, 1997, 2004-2006* be re-written, re-framed under a ‘reformed’ (or vengeful) PMThaksin?
(*Here I include PMThaksin’s War on Drugs, Krue-sae and Takbai as some of the darkest days of Thai democracy comparable to 1973 and 1976. It could be a generation gap here as I ‘lived’ through those events while I was only a child in 1973 and 1976)
On the other hand, the gamble could go terribly wrong. At this point it will depend on how the relationship between the man-in-power and the power-behind-the screens pan out. PMThaksin will not want PMSamak as his enemy while Samak heads the government… I suspect if he (PMSamak) is to go down, he will try to bring PMThaksin down with him. Just by dissolving parliament without lifting the ban means PMThaksin will have to piece together another very expensive nominee government.
The Senate, 6th October, the south and Thai democracy
“I know that the State and the business class control the media”
It’s a lot more complicated than that.
As the paper presented by Streckfuss and the law professor
from Chiang Mai University **empirically** shows.
This article triggers my itchy footnoting finger.
I want to try to insert a footnote to back every assertion up
and it might be impossible.
It does give an overall impression of outright chaos
and hints that everyone’s hands might be dirty.
Solution: California group hug. Kiss and make up.
Manau in Arunachal Pradesh
Thanks Aiontay,
Interesting comments – and I agree with your thrust here.
What is important to note, but certainly not suprising given their numerical advantage, is the way that Kachin from the Kachin State (whether they still live there or not) play a significant role in the creation of various ideas about Singpho-ness in India. They are part of a wider conversation, for sure, but through education, political feeling, resources, etc, they have forged a real presence – especially at an event like this recent Manau in Arunachal Pradesh. In southwestern China I have found that the same is often true. Even when the local religious and political tradition is quite different some of Burma’s Kachin (and, especially, Jinghpaw from all the hotspots) find a place for themselves. I guess this is not that surprising – but it leads to an interesting dynamic, nonetheless.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Manau in Arunachal Pradesh
I’m not sure that the gumsa/gumlao distinction held up that well even when Leach proposed it. However, based on having absolutely no direct personal experience in NE India, I’d suspect that a more “gumsa”, duwa based attitude, would be retained in India as opposed to Burma. In part, this would be due to the political influence of the KIO, which despite the rather duwa background of many of its leaders, always promoted a gumlao ideology and theory, if not practice. Furthermore, the Kachin Baptist tradition isn’t just Baptist, but American Baptist, which again in theory would be more democratic, brash approach. One might argue how democratic the Baptist tradition is in practice, but I think the brash is pretty self evident. I’d suspect the more “chiefly” manau in India would be more restrained, if only by default.
The interesting question is how does the Chinese manua tradition fit in to this? My impression is that the Chinese Jinghpo are influenced in terms of cultural expression by the Burmese Kachins.
Samak’s disgrace
Excellent. I suspected Wikipedia had it wrong, I was just having trouble finding a source for the real death date. Armed with your new info, I found it: 18 August 1997, and I corrected Thai Wikipedia accordingly. Thanks!
Samak’s disgrace
SORRY. The year of Thanom passing should read 2004 (2547 – the conversion to Farang calender confused me!). Or just seven years after Prapas.
Samak’s disgrace
Prapass died in 1997(2540). He was royally cremated in January the following year. (He had an audience with KMK and/or MHQ shortly before he died. I used to have a photo but can’t find it now.) His return to Thailand in August 1976 sparked off a protest rally at Thammasat in which a protester died from bomb thrown by right-wing thugs on August 21. (Prapas left the next day.) Looking back, I believe this was a “test-run” of the final assualt of the right-wing forces, culminating in Thanom’s return and the 6 Tula events. Prapas’s memoirs – fak wai hai luk lan (roughly translated: what I leave behind for my children and grand-children) were serialized in Matichon weekly and later published as book by the same publisher in 1991.
Thanom passed away just a couple of years ago, i.e. in 2007 or ten years after Prapas. He was also royally cremated presided over by the Queen; the photos of the cremation ceremony have again been distributed on the net just last week, perhaps by pro-Thaksin activists, to counter the attack on Samak over the 6 Tula interview.
Manau in Arunachal Pradesh
Thanks Aiontay,
I’m not sure if there is a major difference in the relatively urban(e), literate “preacher’s voice” between Catholics and Protestants (or Anglicans, or Assemblies of God, for that matter), although there might well be. It is a really good question, and something I would like to know more about.
As for the chiefly families, yes, they were out in force. The annual Manau held in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh appears to have always been closely aligned with the various chiefly families: the patriarchs, some of whom play substantial economic roles, do carry the “Duwa” title. I get the impression that the retention of Buddhism all plays a part in maintaining this system. That said, I’m not sure if the old gumlao, gumsa, Shan typology will stand up to much contemporary, critical scrutiny in Singpho areas. The dynamic is quite different – although I am not certain I yet understand what it is! Notably, the histories of migration from various parts of the Kachin State to the western side of the Patkai Range are not always so “aristocratic”. Again this is an issue about which it would be good to know much more.
Thanks for raising these interesting points for discussion.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Samak’s disgrace
Definitely, the Thai Wikipedia page had it wrong (hopefully someone would correct it soon). Both Generals Prapas and Thanom lived long after the Oct 6 ’76 event. As I recall, Prapas even became Matichon columnist for a year or so.
Samak’s disgrace
Is the Nation mixing up 14 October 1973 and 6 October 1976?
According to his Thai Wikipedia page, Field Marshal Prapass died in 22 August 1976. I can’t seem to find any other web page that will corroborate that death date. However, it’s known that he fled to Taipei after the events of October 1973, and sites like this one, with day-by-day accounts of the events leading up to October 6, mention his coming back to Thailand during August for medical treatment for glaucoma (р╣Вр╕гр╕Др╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕лр╕┤р╕Щ) and what I think means enlarged heart (р╣Вр╕гр╕Др╕лр╕▒р╕зр╣Гр╕Ир╣Вр╕Х). Students protested en masse, and the last it mentions of him on any web page I can find is that he fled Thailand again amidst the protests, on 22 August 1976, the day Wikipedia reports as the day of his death.
Can anyone else help sort out?
Manau in Arunachal Pradesh
Is there a difference between Baptist “preacher’s voice” and Catholic in Burma and did it show up at the manau in Myitkyina? I did notice a bit of difference, stylistically at least between the Kachin Catholics and Baptists in Burma, but I haven’t had any experience with the Singhpo, except second hand through Burmese Kachins.
You mentioned the chiefly families. My understanding is that the Singhpo have retained a bit more of the duwa system than they more gumlao (in theory) Kachins in Burma, I wonder if this might have any influence on the retention of Buddhism, given that it may help legitimize the chiefly families. It might also have influenced the tone, since it may be the event in India was a more “aristocratic” affair.