LSS: Thanks for the additional information; I look forward to reading your paper.
“Every culture has it’s own culturally appropriate student/teacher expectations and student/teacher interactional style. ‘Problems’ only occur in a cross-cultural setting, such as going to study abroad.” >> I am not sure about this point. Merle Wallace, in 2003, saw the Thai teachers’ “cultural dilemma” as having to be both “moral parents and critical thinkers” in dealing with their students. It seems to me that it is not only the ministry that wants to see moral education. Parents also put pressure on the schools hoping that teachers would compensate their own educational deficiencies as well as the increasingly uncontrolled peer-group pressure.
Moreover, both mass schooling and universities in fact are genuinly cross-cultural settings, if we look at their origins. The sociological institutionalists around Meyer et al have looked into the effects this might have on “national” educational cultures. But whether there really is (developing) a “world culture of schooling”, and what it actually entails, remains a controversial issue (see Anderson-Levitt 2003, and the chapter on Thailand therein by Junck/Boonreang).
So, in the Thai context, there is the potential for critical thinking. Can we also hope for cognitive dynamics concerning curiositas? After all, little seem to have changed since Mulder wrote, “[Academics] are curiously incurious, uninquiring, do little if any research, and tend to shy away from discussion.” He related this to the “traditional idea of knowledge [.] exemplified by the three-tiered nagtham courses that constitute the curriculum for formal Buddhist learning.” Is this the same what you mean by “classical Theravadian views of epistemology and pedagogy”?
Thanks for adding aditional clarification and nuance. As you point out, authoritarian (nationalist) populist parties / leaders are, like a politicized military, common threats to the emergence and consolidation of a liberal consitutional democratic order during transition periods. And clearly Thaksin is a good example of the former. Thailand’s democratic transition is even more complicated than many other regimes’ transitions precisely because in its case there is also a third obstacle that most other polities don’t have – a viable, popular, influential (and absurdly rich) royal institution (and network). Neutralizing all three obstacles simultaneously is a serious challenge.
I would be interested if anyone has a comparative sense of comparable situations regarding other countries’ democratic transitions. Is there any historical examples of a polity successfully navigating these three obstacles without (at least temporarily) relying on any one of them at early moments in the transitions to push back against the other institutional obstructions? Which is to say, should one temporarily concede the necessity of authoritarian, nationalist populism to weaken the military and the palace, only to later push strenously for the deepening democratization and rule of law that will lower the potential for authoritarian populism?
It seems to me that many critics who have argued for a third option between Thaksin and the coup are in many ways implicitly arguing for that staged process of democratization I outlined above. Better to let the democratic political party system and rule of law slowly, eventually corral and undermine authoritarian populism (i.e. Thaksin) – suffering corruption, injustice and administrative dysfunction in the short term – than to reset the whole political system by appealing to extra-legal, extra-parliamentary actors to “solve” the problem. Because the latter option deeply undemines the long-term viability of the whole political project of democratization itself.
Good job Andrew. I realize how difficult it is to get a message across in the media that is not too complicated in just a few sound bytes. I don’t know how much of the interview was edited, but you can probably already guess my criticism: “elite”, “generals” , their “backers”, “certain people in the elite” … Why no mention of the “king”, the “monarchy”, or at least the “Palace”, the “privy council” and especially the “royalists”? This is the discourse that I think needs to be used more, so people understand that this whole crisis of the last 2 years is about the monarchy, and that it is the monarchy that is standing in the way of Thailand’s democratization.
………in the United States, the Supreme Court was allowed to decide a close election in a pretty non-rational and opaque manner and it did not turn out well…………….
…….all the bruhaha is not really ab0ut who did and who did not follow whatever capricious and arbitrarily enforced set of rules, nor is it about whatever ruling a shakey and opaque Supreme Court issues according to their subjective and mystical definition of the Rule of Law, nor is it about which set of Thai politicians is more pristine and virtuous……….
……….it is really about which of Thailand’s citizens, no matter how small their numbers might be, feel it is their inheritance and right to control and dominate the rest of Thailand’s citizens, based on education level, income level, family history and ethnic persuasion………….
………..not all that different from what is playing out in Kenya at the moment between the traditional rulers, the Kikuyu group, and the rest of Kenya’s citizens who have been recently disenfranchised by also having their votes and their right to elect representatives and a government of their choosing denied……….
Colonel: Bags of money from HK? Are these the bags that the police and military agreed were not for election expenses? Or have you seen another set of bags? Or are you just assuming?
As usual, you haven’t answered the question and you ignore the points made, except where you want to get all frothy at the mouth. Was it that you made up the bit about bags of money? Or was it a throwaway line? And you ignore vote-buying by other parties? Or is it that the sizeable but reduced vote for TRT/PPP just scared the pants off you?
What an odd article. This is the same author who claimed that the coup was “apolitical.” Now if that wasn’t a partisan and just plain silly statement, I’ve never seen one.
By Mr. Klein’s logic, the Democrats didn’t win either, so no government could be formed in Thailand! The usual practice – and even the awful Mr. Samak made this point – is that the party with the largest number of seats has the opportunity to form a government.
That the remarkably opaque Electoral Commission is perhaps rigging the result surely deserves the attention of a legal eagle like Mr. Klein?
Srithanonchai might like to look more closely at the Asia Foundation. It has lost considerable credibility since being made into a Republican-dominated think-tank. I agree that Mr. Klein is showing considerable partisanship, but that is the way American political commentators work these days. Manipulate information, shout it very loudly, and ignore contrary views, analysis and facts. In other words, Mr. Klein has descended to the same level as Fox News commentators.
Perhaps not so many years from now, we will all look back at Mahidon family royalism and the way that it long stunted Thai society and politics with utter incredulity. How hard it will be to explain these times to younger people, people familiar only with a more open, less constrained Thailand than the one that we all know?
One among many sobering aspects of the story will be Mahidon success in turning so many foreigners and foreign institutions into its willing servants. James Klein and, alas, the Asia Foundation’s Bangkok office are a case in point. A year and a half ago, Klein did in fact endorse the royalists’ anti-Thaksin coup. In the face of the coup’s manifest failure, he now puts pen to paper to try to explain that it did not fail at all.
The resultant article is, of course, just plain silly. As Klein fully knows, in electoral democracies people do not vote *against* parties. They vote for them. And, hard as this is for him to accept, more Thais voted for the PPP than for any other party that contested the 23 December polls.
Klein and his office were committed backers of the 1997 constitution. It is thus no surprise that he so privileges party-list votes as “a decisive factor in [determining] who should form the next government”. For, lest we forget, the party list was originally conceived as nothing less than a device to dilute the electoral power of less educated, provincial voters of the sort whose will Klein and his friends in the Network clearly find so hard to abide.
Now, the fact that the Democrats did win a higher percentage of party-list seats than constituence seats is worth noting. While less extreme at that time, the same effect was apparent in 2001. It speaks to the greater institutionalization of the Democrat Party, to its six-decade-long history. It thus underlines the promise of an institutionalized party system for Thailand. And it highlight just how damaging, in retarding the development of such a system , repeated coups by royalists and soldiers have been.
Such characters also coined the appalling phrase, “parliamentary dictatorship”, as least as far back as 1991, in order to justify the coup that toppled Chatchai Chunhawan. That Klein now uses the phrase with a straight face, with no apparent irony, puts him in pretty choice company. What he needs to know is that, in his own country, what he calls “parliamentary dictatorship” is known as “a congressional majority” and that it reflects–guess what?–the collective will of the voters under a constitutionally enshrined system of government.
One more mystery. Klein labels Chat Thai “a spoiler” in Bangkok races that PPP won. But how can he be so certain that, in two-party contests between the Democrats and the PPP, Chat Thai voters in the constituencies involved would have supported the former party? Perhaps he could explain.
After, that is, he has finished explaining to his boss in San Francisco why he serves as a flack for coup-makers and hereditary monarchs. During his years in the United States Congress, current Asia Foundation president Douglas Bereuter became known as a man with relatively enlightened views of Asia. One wonders how he can countenance what has become of the Foundation’s Bangkok office. One assumes that the Mahidons are not paying pay the Foundation for this backing, directly or indirectly. But they sure are enjoying service better than money could, in any case, buy.
“The truth is that we must rely on increased globalization and the economic enfranchisement of the rural poor as the best method of bringing democracy.”
I would add to that significant improvements in education standards. Social change does come through economic enfranchisement, but needs an educated poor to ensure it’s direction is fair.
Thaksin, as we know, wasn’t interested in debate, just power, both economic and political.
Siam #246,
Unfortunately this debate is about life and death, and the fact that the contributors are passionate about the future of Thailand does not make them any less passionate about other issues in world politics.
everyone recalls the photos of people in military fatigues and carrying war weaponsin and around Thammasat. There’s no reason why not to call these guys “soldiers” even if they weren’t in the army. Indeed, the border patrol police and special police units were trained not as law enforcers but as soldiers.
It’s important, if one wants to really understand recent Thai political history and the role of key factions within the rulling class, to understnad exactly what the difference between the Border Patrol Police as a politcial force and the army.
The BPP, especially its most letal unit, the Parashut, that went into Thammasat on the morning of October 6, originally was set up by Phao in the 1950s as a political instrument to compete with his great rival, Sarit who controled the army (apparently with the backing of the CIA, as against the backing of the Pentagon of Sarit).
After the 1958 coup Sarit dismantled the unit, but later Thanom resurrected it. The king came into contact with the unit in the 1960s as part of his activity of fighting communsit insurgency. The most important and visible fruit of their “union” was, of course, the Village Scout, set up under the supervision of the BPP and the King’s patronage.
In political terms, the BPP and its civilian arms, the Village Scouts, had become, in effect, the King’s private army.
Now, in the 1970s, the Thai rulling elite were EXTREMELY fractionalised and this fractionalism had a great bearing on the struggle between the elite and the emergence left-wing urban movement led by the students, as well as on their own internal struggle for power
In both the October 14 and the October 6, the fractionalisation of the ruling elite played a vital role in deciding the outcome (I had no time to go into details here). Also important is the ideological propagation about the events afterward (the king was the savior of 14 October, the “Three Tyrants” were the culprits in the crash in the early morning near Jitladda Palace, and so on).
Now, to argue, as Taxi Driver does, that the role of “soldiers” in the Thammasat massacre is evendence in support of his naive view that the military was more important than the monarhcy is just plain wrong. Because there was no soldiers in the massacre which means that the army factions were not the one reposible for the killing at Thammasat that morning.And in direct contradiction to his argument, this fact about the role of the BPP in the killing means that the Palace played far more important role in the events of October 6 (as Khun Teth originally argued). Hence the important to understand who exactly entered Thammasat and did the killing that morning.
P.S. I’m not arguing that, since the Palace was the dominant player in the October 6 events, it is also the dominant player in all the other events before and after (Oct 14, May 92, Sep 19). But as regard its role in the latest coup, I agree with Republican that it’s the more dominant factor than the military. Without the palace, there would be no Prem to plot and direct the coup in the first place. (Not that Prem can be viewed as “military” in any meaningful sense either.)
P.S.(2) It’s true that “everyone recalls the photos of people in military fatigues …” . In other word, there is a widespread MIS-understanding of the fact about the role of the miliatary and more importantly, the palace in the events that morning. This happened among the Thai activists of this generation too. In fact, there was such widespread confusion at the time of the 20th anniversary of the events on precisely this point, that one of the reasons I wrote an article titled “Who’s who in the 6 October events” was to correct this confusion. I’d say that since then there has been general acceptance among the activists of this fact (that there’s NO soldiers doing the killing, but “someone else’s” armed power base) .
‘Republicans’ should really be disappointed in Thaksin, because even if the monarchy was out to get him, it was only made possible by Thaksin’s winner take all greed and arrogance.
(unless of course they think it was all part of his master plan, lose a battle to win the war, and they are just crying crocodile tears over ‘democracy’ as another part of the battle strategy)
Good points Teth, and I might add that although a Thaksin is not covered by lese majeste, he would also not be subject to the ‘moral legitimacy’ constraints mentioned by David W.
We’ve seen what the military can do when it’s on the side of the monarchy, just think what it would be capable of under another kind of leader.
To replay to David’s last point, my belief is that what Thaksin was doing seriously undermined both institutions, however, it was not done for the sake of progressing democracy. The truth is that we must rely on increased globalization and the economic enfranchisement of the rural poor as the best method of bringing democracy. With economic change will come gradual social changes and then perhaps an attitude change in the bureaucracy. I certainly believe they will not be able to stand for much longer.
As for ways to accelerate the fall (or decline of influence) of both institutions, the creation of a political party machine dominating parliament a la TRT seems to be the strongest vehicle, but that runs the risk of an undemocratic leader simply replacing another. At the very least, Thaksin was not covered by any lese majeste law.
Klein seeks to discredit the TRT and PPP coming out on top by, first, saying there was something wrong with the electoral setup under the 1997 constitution (in that it pushed party consolidation), and then, there is something wrong with the setup in the 2007 constitution (in that it allowed deconsolidation of parties — a more fragmented system like the pre-Thaksin days).
Well, you can’t have it both ways. No one ever got 50 percent of the vote before the 1997 constitution, and little parties always muddied the picture. That meant always fractious coalitions. The 1997 charter was designed to end that, to make it possible for one political party to dominate government — and to challenge the others (the Democrats) to seek to win their own majority. Instead the Democrats played the old game, and then took their toys home in 2006 when they still didn’t get it.
The 2007 charter sought to moderate the change — not “force” a large majority party as the 1997 constitution appeared to do — but to also prevent multiple dinky parties from securing seats and leaving government too dependent on 6-party coalitions. (Though it appears the Prem/military view is that isn’t so bad.)
Anyway, now we’re somewhat back to the old way, when it is impossible to win a majority, but some dinky parties still get pushed out. That’s the system. But Klein says that proves PPP/Thaksin aren’t really popular and don’t really have the right to form a government.
I’d have to agree with Srithanonchai: Klein’s partisanship is hard to miss here. And I do recall something about his sympathy for the coup, just can’t find it right now.
And no, to those who rant and rave — I am not a Thaksin fan.
Thanks for all your work and clarification. I think you were a little rough on Taxi driver: everyone recalls the photos of people in military fatigues and carrying war weaponsin and around Thammasat. There’s no reason why not to call these guys “soldiers” even if they weren’t in the army. Indeed, the border patrol police and special police units were trained not as law enforcers but as soldiers.
And of course that is one problem in Thailand even today, separating what is war-fighting/national defence duties and capabilities and from law enforcement. And actually, the real “soldiers” — the army — aren’t very hot on defense, if that little 1987 war with Laos is any indicator.
But anyway, you’ve made clear that it was not the core army leadership behind the massacre but paramilitary units tied mainly to the police and, for Navapol, the palace. (Again, Border Patrol Police were hardly paramilitary — they were military, as the CIA helped set them up to fight with the KMT.)
But since you mentioned the military role on Oct 14 and May 1992 by comparison, I would just like to point out that in 1992 the police were set out in front, and set out to fail, so that the military could intervene. Since they already controlled the government a coup wasn’t useful so they followed up with a brutal crackdown.
Was that not similar in Oct 14 1973? And was there not a parallel in Oct 6: the police and their agents were allowed to completely screw things up so someone else had an excuse to step in?
I’ll accept that there was a lot of chaos and multiple groups looking to seize power. But I can’t accept that the army did/does not know what is going on, especially with the police, or that its leaders did not make a decision to let things happen to further their own goals.
By the way I thing it was Salang Bunnag who was in charge of the blatant execution in ?Saraburi? in 1996 of 6 men who had already been arrested and secured.
Hmm, I wonder where he was during Thaksin’s “drug dealer” purge/murder.
The data I am using for my study are surveys and interviews with Thai students of EFL, Foreign EFL teachers teaching in Thailand, and Thai teachers of EFL; classroom observations; and MoE policy documents.
Thanks for the link to Dr. Krishnan’s article. I am familar with some of his work. Concerning Thai sociopedagogy, I come to similar conclusions as he does; however I don’t particularly see Asian students’ reluctance to engage in Anglosphere-style classroom discussion and debate as “tiring, frustrating and scary.” Every culture has it’s own culturally appropriate student/teacher expectations and student/teacher interactional style. “Problems” only occur in a cross-cultural setting, such as going to study abroad.
Indeed, so far I have interpreted the data as showing that Thai sociopedagogy can provide students with authentic opportunities to engage in critical thinking; however, the machinations of the Thai bureaucracy, through shaping the national curriculum in its attempts at moral education and citzenship building, tend to be an extrinstic factor that shapes the classroom environment to one that avoids this opportunities. However, it must be noted that there are other factors in play as well! For example, classical Theravadian views of epistemology and pedagogy.
That having been said, in my paper, I only discuss the national curriculum breifly as part of the background to my model of Thai sociopedagogy. My research was more focused on how affect in the classroom is effected by “sociopedagogic mismatch/conflict” between teacher expectation and student expectation, when the teacher and students are of different cultural backgrounds.
Teth, Don’t say you own the country as I never did. Actually what you can claim you own is the little tiny space in this blog where i’m typing to answer your call and that’s it. When you mentioned “my country” I feel sicked. What you did for her is just showing off your seem-to-be-smart ideas and blah blah blah. Nothing constructive for her indeed and you call her “my country”?? The fact is nobody will halt you from turning away from something you don’t feel like it, literally. Show some respect to the country who gives away her peaceful land for you to live a happy life, having good friends and families. р╕бр╕╖р╕нр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕Юр╕▓р╕вр╕Бр╣Зр╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╣Ар╕нр╕▓р╣Ар╕Чр╣Йр╕▓р╕гр╕▓р╕Щр╣Нр╕▓
Perhaps, Jim Klein has damaged his–and the Asia Foundation’s–credibility with this article (didn’t he also say something odd about the coup of 2006?)? Isn’t his partisan interest a little too obvious? PPP has lost the election and was “rejected” by the great majority of Thai voters; the proportional vote must decide who gets the first shot of forming a government (how come this is “a” “decisive” factor?); a poll by Ramkhamhaeng (!) University said that more people wanted Abhisit than Samak; therefore, the Democrats should form the government–wow! Of course, his analysis is not “simplistic”…
People would have voted for PPP paid or otherwise??? Apparently Thaksin Shinawatra did not carry your blind faith Historicus because ‘otherwise’ never entered the Thaksin metrics of how to win an election.
But the Supreme Court will soon rule within a week whether Samak-the-Proxy or PPP the disgraced TRT party nominee, is disqualified or not in the recent election by their ‘nominee’ circumstances. And there are red cards and/or yellow cards still waiting to be handed out to players who cheated on the election (buying votes is cheating Historicus or have you forgotten the rules?).
Me thinks Thaksin is again back to his hi-risk do-or-die win-by-my-rules style. I would have loved for Thailand to have a democratically elected civilian government (and the generals to the barracks), but Thaksin, Newin, Sudarat and all the bunch of convicted ex-TRT bunch (on election fraud) cannot help themselves to play the spoiler.
So do I believe that Thaksin Shinawatra is sincere when he says he will gladly submit himself to Thailand’s judicial process? Ha ha ha!
You say: “In my opinion it is very important that we analyse the situation correctly, which means recognizing that it is not the military that is the obstacle to democracy in Thailand, but the monarchy.”
Do you mean by this statement that the military is not an obstacle to democracy, or that it is not AS MUCH of an obstacle as the monarchy? I have no problem accepting the following statement by you: “What we need to be saying in academic discourse and in the media is that the monarchy is in fact constantly interfering in politics to defend itself and its royalist allies.” Clearly the military and the palace are obstacles to a maturing of liberal constitutional democracy in Thailand. The debate seems to be over their relative control and effectiveness as obstacles, both in the short term and the long term.
I basically take a more institutional approach to social power, and from this perspective, it is obvious why these two institutions frequently collude in their obstruction. While the palace possesses considerable (and in the case of the present monarch, unassailable) moral legitimacy in the eyes of most of the Thai public to intervene in Thai politics, precisely because of the ideology that it is above politics, it must do so either covertly and / or by acting through other public, institutional intermediaries such as the courts, the bureaucracy, the military, etc. This is a considerable weakness for it as an institutional actor. The military claim to any such clear moral legitimacy to intervene in politics is usually much more complicated and more ambiguous (see the coup of ’06 and its changing perception), yet it can act publicly and directly, and doesn’t have to rely on other intermediaries (certainly, at least not to the same degree). Moreover, the military – unlike the palace – can resort to relatively public coercive and violent force to back up its interventions, if necessary. Another considerable advantage as an institutional actor in enforcing its vision and interests in society, especially vis-a-vis the social power of the palace.
So I agree with others here who argue it can be a bit like splitting hairs as to which one is more powerful or in control at the moment, BUT after the passing of the king, the palace’s social power and influence will be on the decline (although certainly not a steep and inevitable decline as the palace machinery will work overtime on instensifying and expanding the passing king’s moral authority and the cult around it), while the military’s institutional (and legally legitimated) advantages will persist, even as it seeks other sources of moral and political legitimacy to butress its goal of continuing to obstruct democracy, while still holding onto the royalist card / claim.
But really, shouldn’t good republicans like yourself be seeking strategies to neutralize them BOTH, both ideologically and institutionally. Why fixate on WHICH one is in control at the moment? They both have staying power and they both will do everything in their power to prevent the maturing of a liberal constitutional democratic order in Thailand. It frankly seems to me that the real dilemma for democrats in Thailand is precisely this dilemma – what strategy will and can neutralize both of these institutional actors SIMULTANEOUSLY so that a democratic project built on the political parties and a constitutional legal order can emerge, institutionally develop, gain dominant political legitimacy as the BEST form of political leadership, and gain pragmatic institutional dominance as well in its ability to shape, regulate and structure the political order of the state bureaucracy?
Siam, who are you to tell me what to debate, what to think, or what to consider as important? Who are you?
Don’t you think we among us here have decent families, decent lives, decent jobs as well? It is not our right to debate these issues? Furthermore, is understanding the history and the future course of the country not an important issue?
We can very much survive in real life, thank you very much. I don’t know what it is that makes you royalist (fanatics) always spout the same old rubbish. You speak with no evidence and no reason at all, but that is not surprising. You always assume we either are degenerate or are the bumbling, absent-minded professors, but no, we are normal people with lives, jobs, families, and our own interests and hobbies, of which this is one.
Stay ignorant as you wish. And once again, who the hell are you to tell me to get our of my country? I own it as much as you do.
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Using wisdom to see reality
LSS: Thanks for the additional information; I look forward to reading your paper.
“Every culture has it’s own culturally appropriate student/teacher expectations and student/teacher interactional style. ‘Problems’ only occur in a cross-cultural setting, such as going to study abroad.” >> I am not sure about this point. Merle Wallace, in 2003, saw the Thai teachers’ “cultural dilemma” as having to be both “moral parents and critical thinkers” in dealing with their students. It seems to me that it is not only the ministry that wants to see moral education. Parents also put pressure on the schools hoping that teachers would compensate their own educational deficiencies as well as the increasingly uncontrolled peer-group pressure.
Moreover, both mass schooling and universities in fact are genuinly cross-cultural settings, if we look at their origins. The sociological institutionalists around Meyer et al have looked into the effects this might have on “national” educational cultures. But whether there really is (developing) a “world culture of schooling”, and what it actually entails, remains a controversial issue (see Anderson-Levitt 2003, and the chapter on Thailand therein by Junck/Boonreang).
So, in the Thai context, there is the potential for critical thinking. Can we also hope for cognitive dynamics concerning curiositas? After all, little seem to have changed since Mulder wrote, “[Academics] are curiously incurious, uninquiring, do little if any research, and tend to shy away from discussion.” He related this to the “traditional idea of knowledge [.] exemplified by the three-tiered nagtham courses that constitute the curriculum for formal Buddhist learning.” Is this the same what you mean by “classical Theravadian views of epistemology and pedagogy”?
The King Never Smiles?
Teth,
Thanks for adding aditional clarification and nuance. As you point out, authoritarian (nationalist) populist parties / leaders are, like a politicized military, common threats to the emergence and consolidation of a liberal consitutional democratic order during transition periods. And clearly Thaksin is a good example of the former. Thailand’s democratic transition is even more complicated than many other regimes’ transitions precisely because in its case there is also a third obstacle that most other polities don’t have – a viable, popular, influential (and absurdly rich) royal institution (and network). Neutralizing all three obstacles simultaneously is a serious challenge.
I would be interested if anyone has a comparative sense of comparable situations regarding other countries’ democratic transitions. Is there any historical examples of a polity successfully navigating these three obstacles without (at least temporarily) relying on any one of them at early moments in the transitions to push back against the other institutional obstructions? Which is to say, should one temporarily concede the necessity of authoritarian, nationalist populism to weaken the military and the palace, only to later push strenously for the deepening democratization and rule of law that will lower the potential for authoritarian populism?
It seems to me that many critics who have argued for a third option between Thaksin and the coup are in many ways implicitly arguing for that staged process of democratization I outlined above. Better to let the democratic political party system and rule of law slowly, eventually corral and undermine authoritarian populism (i.e. Thaksin) – suffering corruption, injustice and administrative dysfunction in the short term – than to reset the whole political system by appealing to extra-legal, extra-parliamentary actors to “solve” the problem. Because the latter option deeply undemines the long-term viability of the whole political project of democratization itself.
New Mandala on the airwaves
Good job Andrew. I realize how difficult it is to get a message across in the media that is not too complicated in just a few sound bytes. I don’t know how much of the interview was edited, but you can probably already guess my criticism: “elite”, “generals” , their “backers”, “certain people in the elite” … Why no mention of the “king”, the “monarchy”, or at least the “Palace”, the “privy council” and especially the “royalists”? This is the discourse that I think needs to be used more, so people understand that this whole crisis of the last 2 years is about the monarchy, and that it is the monarchy that is standing in the way of Thailand’s democratization.
Thailand’s coup by stealth
………in the United States, the Supreme Court was allowed to decide a close election in a pretty non-rational and opaque manner and it did not turn out well…………….
…….all the bruhaha is not really ab0ut who did and who did not follow whatever capricious and arbitrarily enforced set of rules, nor is it about whatever ruling a shakey and opaque Supreme Court issues according to their subjective and mystical definition of the Rule of Law, nor is it about which set of Thai politicians is more pristine and virtuous……….
……….it is really about which of Thailand’s citizens, no matter how small their numbers might be, feel it is their inheritance and right to control and dominate the rest of Thailand’s citizens, based on education level, income level, family history and ethnic persuasion………….
………..not all that different from what is playing out in Kenya at the moment between the traditional rulers, the Kikuyu group, and the rest of Kenya’s citizens who have been recently disenfranchised by also having their votes and their right to elect representatives and a government of their choosing denied……….
Thailand’s coup by stealth
Colonel: Bags of money from HK? Are these the bags that the police and military agreed were not for election expenses? Or have you seen another set of bags? Or are you just assuming?
As usual, you haven’t answered the question and you ignore the points made, except where you want to get all frothy at the mouth. Was it that you made up the bit about bags of money? Or was it a throwaway line? And you ignore vote-buying by other parties? Or is it that the sizeable but reduced vote for TRT/PPP just scared the pants off you?
Mandate to rule?
What an odd article. This is the same author who claimed that the coup was “apolitical.” Now if that wasn’t a partisan and just plain silly statement, I’ve never seen one.
By Mr. Klein’s logic, the Democrats didn’t win either, so no government could be formed in Thailand! The usual practice – and even the awful Mr. Samak made this point – is that the party with the largest number of seats has the opportunity to form a government.
That the remarkably opaque Electoral Commission is perhaps rigging the result surely deserves the attention of a legal eagle like Mr. Klein?
Srithanonchai might like to look more closely at the Asia Foundation. It has lost considerable credibility since being made into a Republican-dominated think-tank. I agree that Mr. Klein is showing considerable partisanship, but that is the way American political commentators work these days. Manipulate information, shout it very loudly, and ignore contrary views, analysis and facts. In other words, Mr. Klein has descended to the same level as Fox News commentators.
Mandate to rule?
Perhaps not so many years from now, we will all look back at Mahidon family royalism and the way that it long stunted Thai society and politics with utter incredulity. How hard it will be to explain these times to younger people, people familiar only with a more open, less constrained Thailand than the one that we all know?
One among many sobering aspects of the story will be Mahidon success in turning so many foreigners and foreign institutions into its willing servants. James Klein and, alas, the Asia Foundation’s Bangkok office are a case in point. A year and a half ago, Klein did in fact endorse the royalists’ anti-Thaksin coup. In the face of the coup’s manifest failure, he now puts pen to paper to try to explain that it did not fail at all.
The resultant article is, of course, just plain silly. As Klein fully knows, in electoral democracies people do not vote *against* parties. They vote for them. And, hard as this is for him to accept, more Thais voted for the PPP than for any other party that contested the 23 December polls.
Klein and his office were committed backers of the 1997 constitution. It is thus no surprise that he so privileges party-list votes as “a decisive factor in [determining] who should form the next government”. For, lest we forget, the party list was originally conceived as nothing less than a device to dilute the electoral power of less educated, provincial voters of the sort whose will Klein and his friends in the Network clearly find so hard to abide.
Now, the fact that the Democrats did win a higher percentage of party-list seats than constituence seats is worth noting. While less extreme at that time, the same effect was apparent in 2001. It speaks to the greater institutionalization of the Democrat Party, to its six-decade-long history. It thus underlines the promise of an institutionalized party system for Thailand. And it highlight just how damaging, in retarding the development of such a system , repeated coups by royalists and soldiers have been.
Such characters also coined the appalling phrase, “parliamentary dictatorship”, as least as far back as 1991, in order to justify the coup that toppled Chatchai Chunhawan. That Klein now uses the phrase with a straight face, with no apparent irony, puts him in pretty choice company. What he needs to know is that, in his own country, what he calls “parliamentary dictatorship” is known as “a congressional majority” and that it reflects–guess what?–the collective will of the voters under a constitutionally enshrined system of government.
One more mystery. Klein labels Chat Thai “a spoiler” in Bangkok races that PPP won. But how can he be so certain that, in two-party contests between the Democrats and the PPP, Chat Thai voters in the constituencies involved would have supported the former party? Perhaps he could explain.
After, that is, he has finished explaining to his boss in San Francisco why he serves as a flack for coup-makers and hereditary monarchs. During his years in the United States Congress, current Asia Foundation president Douglas Bereuter became known as a man with relatively enlightened views of Asia. One wonders how he can countenance what has become of the Foundation’s Bangkok office. One assumes that the Mahidons are not paying pay the Foundation for this backing, directly or indirectly. But they sure are enjoying service better than money could, in any case, buy.
The King Never Smiles?
Teth #250,
“The truth is that we must rely on increased globalization and the economic enfranchisement of the rural poor as the best method of bringing democracy.”
I would add to that significant improvements in education standards. Social change does come through economic enfranchisement, but needs an educated poor to ensure it’s direction is fair.
Thaksin, as we know, wasn’t interested in debate, just power, both economic and political.
Siam #246,
Unfortunately this debate is about life and death, and the fact that the contributors are passionate about the future of Thailand does not make them any less passionate about other issues in world politics.
Ian
The King Never Smiles?
everyone recalls the photos of people in military fatigues and carrying war weaponsin and around Thammasat. There’s no reason why not to call these guys “soldiers” even if they weren’t in the army. Indeed, the border patrol police and special police units were trained not as law enforcers but as soldiers.
It’s important, if one wants to really understand recent Thai political history and the role of key factions within the rulling class, to understnad exactly what the difference between the Border Patrol Police as a politcial force and the army.
The BPP, especially its most letal unit, the Parashut, that went into Thammasat on the morning of October 6, originally was set up by Phao in the 1950s as a political instrument to compete with his great rival, Sarit who controled the army (apparently with the backing of the CIA, as against the backing of the Pentagon of Sarit).
After the 1958 coup Sarit dismantled the unit, but later Thanom resurrected it. The king came into contact with the unit in the 1960s as part of his activity of fighting communsit insurgency. The most important and visible fruit of their “union” was, of course, the Village Scout, set up under the supervision of the BPP and the King’s patronage.
In political terms, the BPP and its civilian arms, the Village Scouts, had become, in effect, the King’s private army.
Now, in the 1970s, the Thai rulling elite were EXTREMELY fractionalised and this fractionalism had a great bearing on the struggle between the elite and the emergence left-wing urban movement led by the students, as well as on their own internal struggle for power
In both the October 14 and the October 6, the fractionalisation of the ruling elite played a vital role in deciding the outcome (I had no time to go into details here). Also important is the ideological propagation about the events afterward (the king was the savior of 14 October, the “Three Tyrants” were the culprits in the crash in the early morning near Jitladda Palace, and so on).
Now, to argue, as Taxi Driver does, that the role of “soldiers” in the Thammasat massacre is evendence in support of his naive view that the military was more important than the monarhcy is just plain wrong. Because there was no soldiers in the massacre which means that the army factions were not the one reposible for the killing at Thammasat that morning.And in direct contradiction to his argument, this fact about the role of the BPP in the killing means that the Palace played far more important role in the events of October 6 (as Khun Teth originally argued). Hence the important to understand who exactly entered Thammasat and did the killing that morning.
P.S. I’m not arguing that, since the Palace was the dominant player in the October 6 events, it is also the dominant player in all the other events before and after (Oct 14, May 92, Sep 19). But as regard its role in the latest coup, I agree with Republican that it’s the more dominant factor than the military. Without the palace, there would be no Prem to plot and direct the coup in the first place. (Not that Prem can be viewed as “military” in any meaningful sense either.)
P.S.(2) It’s true that “everyone recalls the photos of people in military fatigues …” . In other word, there is a widespread MIS-understanding of the fact about the role of the miliatary and more importantly, the palace in the events that morning. This happened among the Thai activists of this generation too. In fact, there was such widespread confusion at the time of the 20th anniversary of the events on precisely this point, that one of the reasons I wrote an article titled “Who’s who in the 6 October events” was to correct this confusion. I’d say that since then there has been general acceptance among the activists of this fact (that there’s NO soldiers doing the killing, but “someone else’s” armed power base) .
The King Never Smiles?
‘Republicans’ should really be disappointed in Thaksin, because even if the monarchy was out to get him, it was only made possible by Thaksin’s winner take all greed and arrogance.
(unless of course they think it was all part of his master plan, lose a battle to win the war, and they are just crying crocodile tears over ‘democracy’ as another part of the battle strategy)
The King Never Smiles?
Good points Teth, and I might add that although a Thaksin is not covered by lese majeste, he would also not be subject to the ‘moral legitimacy’ constraints mentioned by David W.
We’ve seen what the military can do when it’s on the side of the monarchy, just think what it would be capable of under another kind of leader.
The King Never Smiles?
To replay to David’s last point, my belief is that what Thaksin was doing seriously undermined both institutions, however, it was not done for the sake of progressing democracy. The truth is that we must rely on increased globalization and the economic enfranchisement of the rural poor as the best method of bringing democracy. With economic change will come gradual social changes and then perhaps an attitude change in the bureaucracy. I certainly believe they will not be able to stand for much longer.
As for ways to accelerate the fall (or decline of influence) of both institutions, the creation of a political party machine dominating parliament a la TRT seems to be the strongest vehicle, but that runs the risk of an undemocratic leader simply replacing another. At the very least, Thaksin was not covered by any lese majeste law.
Mandate to rule?
Klein seeks to discredit the TRT and PPP coming out on top by, first, saying there was something wrong with the electoral setup under the 1997 constitution (in that it pushed party consolidation), and then, there is something wrong with the setup in the 2007 constitution (in that it allowed deconsolidation of parties — a more fragmented system like the pre-Thaksin days).
Well, you can’t have it both ways. No one ever got 50 percent of the vote before the 1997 constitution, and little parties always muddied the picture. That meant always fractious coalitions. The 1997 charter was designed to end that, to make it possible for one political party to dominate government — and to challenge the others (the Democrats) to seek to win their own majority. Instead the Democrats played the old game, and then took their toys home in 2006 when they still didn’t get it.
The 2007 charter sought to moderate the change — not “force” a large majority party as the 1997 constitution appeared to do — but to also prevent multiple dinky parties from securing seats and leaving government too dependent on 6-party coalitions. (Though it appears the Prem/military view is that isn’t so bad.)
Anyway, now we’re somewhat back to the old way, when it is impossible to win a majority, but some dinky parties still get pushed out. That’s the system. But Klein says that proves PPP/Thaksin aren’t really popular and don’t really have the right to form a government.
I’d have to agree with Srithanonchai: Klein’s partisanship is hard to miss here. And I do recall something about his sympathy for the coup, just can’t find it right now.
And no, to those who rant and rave — I am not a Thaksin fan.
The King Never Smiles?
Somsak,
Thanks for all your work and clarification. I think you were a little rough on Taxi driver: everyone recalls the photos of people in military fatigues and carrying war weaponsin and around Thammasat. There’s no reason why not to call these guys “soldiers” even if they weren’t in the army. Indeed, the border patrol police and special police units were trained not as law enforcers but as soldiers.
And of course that is one problem in Thailand even today, separating what is war-fighting/national defence duties and capabilities and from law enforcement. And actually, the real “soldiers” — the army — aren’t very hot on defense, if that little 1987 war with Laos is any indicator.
But anyway, you’ve made clear that it was not the core army leadership behind the massacre but paramilitary units tied mainly to the police and, for Navapol, the palace. (Again, Border Patrol Police were hardly paramilitary — they were military, as the CIA helped set them up to fight with the KMT.)
But since you mentioned the military role on Oct 14 and May 1992 by comparison, I would just like to point out that in 1992 the police were set out in front, and set out to fail, so that the military could intervene. Since they already controlled the government a coup wasn’t useful so they followed up with a brutal crackdown.
Was that not similar in Oct 14 1973? And was there not a parallel in Oct 6: the police and their agents were allowed to completely screw things up so someone else had an excuse to step in?
I’ll accept that there was a lot of chaos and multiple groups looking to seize power. But I can’t accept that the army did/does not know what is going on, especially with the police, or that its leaders did not make a decision to let things happen to further their own goals.
By the way I thing it was Salang Bunnag who was in charge of the blatant execution in ?Saraburi? in 1996 of 6 men who had already been arrested and secured.
Hmm, I wonder where he was during Thaksin’s “drug dealer” purge/murder.
Using wisdom to see reality
re: Srithanonchai
The data I am using for my study are surveys and interviews with Thai students of EFL, Foreign EFL teachers teaching in Thailand, and Thai teachers of EFL; classroom observations; and MoE policy documents.
Thanks for the link to Dr. Krishnan’s article. I am familar with some of his work. Concerning Thai sociopedagogy, I come to similar conclusions as he does; however I don’t particularly see Asian students’ reluctance to engage in Anglosphere-style classroom discussion and debate as “tiring, frustrating and scary.” Every culture has it’s own culturally appropriate student/teacher expectations and student/teacher interactional style. “Problems” only occur in a cross-cultural setting, such as going to study abroad.
Indeed, so far I have interpreted the data as showing that Thai sociopedagogy can provide students with authentic opportunities to engage in critical thinking; however, the machinations of the Thai bureaucracy, through shaping the national curriculum in its attempts at moral education and citzenship building, tend to be an extrinstic factor that shapes the classroom environment to one that avoids this opportunities. However, it must be noted that there are other factors in play as well! For example, classical Theravadian views of epistemology and pedagogy.
That having been said, in my paper, I only discuss the national curriculum breifly as part of the background to my model of Thai sociopedagogy. My research was more focused on how affect in the classroom is effected by “sociopedagogic mismatch/conflict” between teacher expectation and student expectation, when the teacher and students are of different cultural backgrounds.
The King Never Smiles?
Teth, Don’t say you own the country as I never did. Actually what you can claim you own is the little tiny space in this blog where i’m typing to answer your call and that’s it. When you mentioned “my country” I feel sicked. What you did for her is just showing off your seem-to-be-smart ideas and blah blah blah. Nothing constructive for her indeed and you call her “my country”?? The fact is nobody will halt you from turning away from something you don’t feel like it, literally. Show some respect to the country who gives away her peaceful land for you to live a happy life, having good friends and families. р╕бр╕╖р╕нр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕Юр╕▓р╕вр╕Бр╣Зр╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╣Ар╕нр╕▓р╣Ар╕Чр╣Йр╕▓р╕гр╕▓р╕Щр╣Нр╕▓
Mandate to rule?
Perhaps, Jim Klein has damaged his–and the Asia Foundation’s–credibility with this article (didn’t he also say something odd about the coup of 2006?)? Isn’t his partisan interest a little too obvious? PPP has lost the election and was “rejected” by the great majority of Thai voters; the proportional vote must decide who gets the first shot of forming a government (how come this is “a” “decisive” factor?); a poll by Ramkhamhaeng (!) University said that more people wanted Abhisit than Samak; therefore, the Democrats should form the government–wow! Of course, his analysis is not “simplistic”…
Thailand’s coup by stealth
People would have voted for PPP paid or otherwise??? Apparently Thaksin Shinawatra did not carry your blind faith Historicus because ‘otherwise’ never entered the Thaksin metrics of how to win an election.
But the Supreme Court will soon rule within a week whether Samak-the-Proxy or PPP the disgraced TRT party nominee, is disqualified or not in the recent election by their ‘nominee’ circumstances. And there are red cards and/or yellow cards still waiting to be handed out to players who cheated on the election (buying votes is cheating Historicus or have you forgotten the rules?).
Me thinks Thaksin is again back to his hi-risk do-or-die win-by-my-rules style. I would have loved for Thailand to have a democratically elected civilian government (and the generals to the barracks), but Thaksin, Newin, Sudarat and all the bunch of convicted ex-TRT bunch (on election fraud) cannot help themselves to play the spoiler.
So do I believe that Thaksin Shinawatra is sincere when he says he will gladly submit himself to Thailand’s judicial process? Ha ha ha!
The King Never Smiles?
Dear Republican,
You say: “In my opinion it is very important that we analyse the situation correctly, which means recognizing that it is not the military that is the obstacle to democracy in Thailand, but the monarchy.”
Do you mean by this statement that the military is not an obstacle to democracy, or that it is not AS MUCH of an obstacle as the monarchy? I have no problem accepting the following statement by you: “What we need to be saying in academic discourse and in the media is that the monarchy is in fact constantly interfering in politics to defend itself and its royalist allies.” Clearly the military and the palace are obstacles to a maturing of liberal constitutional democracy in Thailand. The debate seems to be over their relative control and effectiveness as obstacles, both in the short term and the long term.
I basically take a more institutional approach to social power, and from this perspective, it is obvious why these two institutions frequently collude in their obstruction. While the palace possesses considerable (and in the case of the present monarch, unassailable) moral legitimacy in the eyes of most of the Thai public to intervene in Thai politics, precisely because of the ideology that it is above politics, it must do so either covertly and / or by acting through other public, institutional intermediaries such as the courts, the bureaucracy, the military, etc. This is a considerable weakness for it as an institutional actor. The military claim to any such clear moral legitimacy to intervene in politics is usually much more complicated and more ambiguous (see the coup of ’06 and its changing perception), yet it can act publicly and directly, and doesn’t have to rely on other intermediaries (certainly, at least not to the same degree). Moreover, the military – unlike the palace – can resort to relatively public coercive and violent force to back up its interventions, if necessary. Another considerable advantage as an institutional actor in enforcing its vision and interests in society, especially vis-a-vis the social power of the palace.
So I agree with others here who argue it can be a bit like splitting hairs as to which one is more powerful or in control at the moment, BUT after the passing of the king, the palace’s social power and influence will be on the decline (although certainly not a steep and inevitable decline as the palace machinery will work overtime on instensifying and expanding the passing king’s moral authority and the cult around it), while the military’s institutional (and legally legitimated) advantages will persist, even as it seeks other sources of moral and political legitimacy to butress its goal of continuing to obstruct democracy, while still holding onto the royalist card / claim.
But really, shouldn’t good republicans like yourself be seeking strategies to neutralize them BOTH, both ideologically and institutionally. Why fixate on WHICH one is in control at the moment? They both have staying power and they both will do everything in their power to prevent the maturing of a liberal constitutional democratic order in Thailand. It frankly seems to me that the real dilemma for democrats in Thailand is precisely this dilemma – what strategy will and can neutralize both of these institutional actors SIMULTANEOUSLY so that a democratic project built on the political parties and a constitutional legal order can emerge, institutionally develop, gain dominant political legitimacy as the BEST form of political leadership, and gain pragmatic institutional dominance as well in its ability to shape, regulate and structure the political order of the state bureaucracy?
The King Never Smiles?
Siam, who are you to tell me what to debate, what to think, or what to consider as important? Who are you?
Don’t you think we among us here have decent families, decent lives, decent jobs as well? It is not our right to debate these issues? Furthermore, is understanding the history and the future course of the country not an important issue?
We can very much survive in real life, thank you very much. I don’t know what it is that makes you royalist (fanatics) always spout the same old rubbish. You speak with no evidence and no reason at all, but that is not surprising. You always assume we either are degenerate or are the bumbling, absent-minded professors, but no, we are normal people with lives, jobs, families, and our own interests and hobbies, of which this is one.
Stay ignorant as you wish. And once again, who the hell are you to tell me to get our of my country? I own it as much as you do.