See, you are once again blinded by your royalist propaganda. Not everyone in the country loves the King, as you are told. And untold numbers are much more reasonable than Republican.
Once again, you yourself offer more proof that it is in fact lese majeste that keeps people in the dark and reinforces the effect of royalist propaganda.
If the Democrats can form a coalition government?
The court cases against PMThaksin will go through due process. The ending should not differ too much from Prachai Leophairatana’s case but significantly in scale (PMThaksin would likely get a few decades jail term, but he won’t be there to serve it ofcourse). The Thai parliament returns to its lively times with Samak-Chalerm in opposition. PPP will try it’s hardest to destabilize the government ofcourse, as the longer it spends in opposition, fundings from PMThaksin will dry up, and MPs will naturally start to leave for more favorable pastures. Abhisit will need both luck and strong support to pull through as it will be the hardest two years of his life – that would be the most time he has to establish himself as a viable leader to reduce the influence of the cult of Thaksin (an uneviable task). However, if he is like PMChuan before him – and is a man of strong (elitist) principles, he may not last too long. He has to learn the dark arts and apply it quick (it is a good sign that he has already visited the astrologers). The ‘alternative’ Thai democracy (to PMThaksin’s model) depends much on him.
If PPP wins big, Samak/Chalerm + the internal security bill may return absolute power to PMThaksin. But I also think Samak/Chalerm with lots of power will also start to reveal their own agendas, independent of Thaksin’s intents – which I think is mainly to get ‘his’ money back and pave a way for his return to power. What timeframe this would happen will depend on how fast the security bill + money can break the Thai courts will to drop all cases. The challenge is to get this done before Samak-Chalerm messes up and offends everyone in society (which is also a great ‘opportunity’ for Thaksin to stage a grand entry, welcomed by a million people, at Suvarnabhumi to ‘save’ the country).
In this scenario, the urban middle-classes and the PAD will be back on the streets. This would likely lead to an inevitable violent crackdown mainly carried out by the police – mainly with batons, tear gas and not guns. The courts will be back on side with PMThaksin and the oppositions will be charged/jailed. This will be a long drawn out process taking months until the will of the middle class is broken and Thaksin becomes absolute ruler.
Thaksin rules for another 10 years and here there are two scenarios – the Philipines/Indonesia under Marcos/Suharto or Malaysia/Singapore under Mahathir/Lee Kuan Yew. Thailand may become worse off as the Shinawatras enters the 10 ten Forbes list of richest families – leading to Thaksin’s eventual downfall and a post-Thaksin blossoming of democracy. Or Thailand may achieve the wealth levels comparable to Malaysia/Singapore and the reigns are handed to Paethongthan, Thaksin’s youngest daughter.
The discredited military have probably long resigned to this inevitability in handing the reigns to GenAnupong and not GenSaprang (who, with GenSonthi, is exiled in England and becomes avid ManUnited fans). PMThaksin, a fast learning that he is, will have totally neutralize and co-opt them this time (everyone, no matter how resistance at the first and second instances, has a price)…
By my count, Baird & Shoemaker use the term “anchor/ing” only once in their 54 page Probe report ‘Aiding or Abetting’, and even here it is used in explicitly metaphorical quotes . They use the term to describe the efforts of one upland development program which is explicitly looking to manouevre around the imperatives of the GoL upland resettlement initiative by providing basic services to villages(see below).
On the other hand, High uses the term “anchor” or “anchoring” 5 times in her above short critique… as a way of suggesting that Baird and Shoemaker… are arguing that all rural Lao villagers should stay in their rural place (?)
Seems like High may be overstating the counter-critique of B & S a bit here…
sincerely,
keith barney
—————-
Aiding or Abetting (2005):
p. 44:
”
CWRWC: Based on their partner Refugee Care Netherland’s (ZOA) past work with refugee repatriation in Laos, the
INGO CRWRC concluded that it makes more sense to provide development assistance to upland villages than to
assist in their resettlement. In 2003, CRWRC negotiated a project agreement with the GoL to work with 12 remote
ethnic Hmong villages in two districts of Xieng Khouang province. One important aspect of the project is improving
access – CRWRC is funding roads, which provide the villages with vehicle access for the first time. The project sees
accessibility as a prerequisite for the marketing of new cash crops as alternatives to now-prohibited opium cultivation.
The provision of other rural infrastructure – primary schools, gravity feed water systems, etc., are also intended
to help ‘anchor’ these villages in place and make it more difficult for the GoL or other international agencies to
justify relocation. This project is still in the early stages so it is too soon to predict its long-term impact on the
intended beneficiaries. However, project staff, villagers, and local officials appear optimistic.
“
I would be interested to hear more about your southern Laos case study in this instance. Why and how did the farmers you met become “landless”? Real landlessness in rural Laos is not typical situation, i.e. unlike elsewhere in SE Asia where population growth has in effect outstripped the productive capabilities of ‘customary’ village lands, or where a high degree of land consolidation has occurred through market and debt processes. Rather, a situation of landlessness in most areas of rural Laos that I know of would typically itself be a result of restrictive state zoning policies (i.e. Land and Forest Allocation), or resettlement policies, or from e.g. agri-business or hydropower concessions.
Indeed, in your New Mandala article on Vieng Xai in northern Laos, you write the following:
“The practice of classifying all land as one sort or another has become standard in contemporary Laos. This has the effect of squeezing settlement options for the poor down to a few prescribed areas. Furthermore, the practice of defining ownership in terms of “use” (and a very narrow definition of “use” at that) leaves many Hmong unable to prove a legally sanctioned authority over the upland fields that they cultivate and leave fallow, and the forest that forms an integral part of their productive activities.”
In order to have a better sense of your example and how it fits into the resettlement debate, we would need to know if the landless- resettlers in your fields site in southern Laos were “resistant” to the idea of returning to their former areas, because they had already been effectively displaced by some other government policy, program, or project.
I might note that Baird and Shoemaker also frame their critique of resettlement in Laos in the context of these other programs and policies, which *together* are resulting in an artificial, policy-induced squeeze on land availability in the countryside.
Can you expand on this local history a bit more for us?
Thanks and cheers,
Keith Barney
York University
ps: my students (and I) this year really enjoyed reading your “Sojourn” paper on solidarity and village formation processes in southern Laos. It was well written and argued, and usefully accessible for undergraduate students :~)
The high “human security” index in Isan certainly seems strange in light of:
a. Migration out of the region.
b. Low education index.
c. Dissatisfaction expressed by voting (pro radical change as exemplified by Thaksin)
Maybe what it really means that in light of all the problems they face, family has become even more important in Isan. Family as the last line of defense.
BTW one big education issue at the tertiary level is making universities independent self-supporting entities. Chula was even threatened with this recently.
The biggest problem with this is that it throws universities into the hands of high-level bureaucrat experts-PhDs in “educational management” who wouldn’t know excellence and world-class scholarship, in science, engineering, or the humanities, for instance, if it hit them in the face and who can circumvent term-limit regulations also.
When a university is thrown into self-support mode, there are invetives to build a spa or golf-course or offer popular educational marketing driven degree programs in cosmetic science before even starting a math or philosophy department to create true thinkers actively engaged intellectually, instead of students going just going through the motions. Not to denigrate vocational training, the European or Japanese notion of skilled craftspeople, skilled bakers, welders, precision machinists, really has to be borrowed also. Japanese training programmes are actively doing this. You can even see their ads on BRT.
Teth (#147) said “I trust that if they were allowed to apply the full might of their rhetorical prowess without fear of retribution whether by laws or by uncivilized royalist mobs the King’s popularity would surely wane. ”
Now who would “they” be? Republican perhaps? Do you sincerely believe Republican’s fully weighted “rhetorical prowess” could hurt the Thai monarchy?
(The unimaginative and dull me descends into deeper hibernation at every Republican’s lengthy prose.)
When Thongchai’s piece came out, I was quite annoyed with the way he framed his objection to the proposed amendments. Why? Writing articles for newspapers should be about enlightening, educating people, not adding to their prejudices, wrong opinions, et. To pick just one example (already high-lighted by Republican):
“The lese majeste law has done more harm than good to the monarchy.”
Of course, Thongchai knows very well that, say, in 6 Tula, the lese majeste law was extremely, shall we say, “benefitial” to the monarchy, for it helped eliminate the entire political movement that had been challenging the institution. (Besides, suppose it’s true that the law did more harm than good to the monarchy, why would we care anyway? Are we monarchists?)
Is it necessary, I mean, as a ‘tactic’?
Absolutely not, in my view. In fact, I was quite surprised to find Thongchai using this kind of argument. I accept and even support that in specific circumstances, e.g. fighting an actual court case of less majeste, one can use certain “tactical” argument that otherwise one wouldn’t be using in writing articles about the law. To give a recent example, the FaDiewKan people have cited HM’s own speech (“King can do wrong” speech) to fight off the less majeste charge already laid at them. But even in this case, to cite HM’s speech isn’t the same as using the above “more harm than good to the monarhy” argument. (The latter simply isn’t true to begin with.) And if I was to write an article about the speech itself in other circumstances I wouldn’t use it as my supporting argument either without very heavy qualification (HM never gave similar speech, say, in 1975-1977 when it would have been truly helpful.)
But Thongchai isn’t fighting a court case. Even if he were, I’m not sure the kind of argument he uses would be necessary. In sum, Thongchai’s argument in the article is not true, unnecessary and simply bad. Unless, of course, one is a royalsit.
When the proposed amendment became known, I was preparing to write an article opposing it too (unfortunately I couldn’t finish it in time). I thought I could proceed in either of the two ways, or both combined, namely a sarcastic “send-up” (“why stop here? let’s bring back the absolute monarchy”) or a stright-forward argument (“the law had already been instrumental in Sarit’s dictatorship and in increasing royal power beyond what is normal in modern constitutional monarchy, etc.”) As I said I was very surprised to read Thongchai’s piece, appearing in the Nation (no less) where it has already cowardly used the same less majeste accusation againt Thaksin.
Re: Paul Handley “abandoning support for Thaksin was not the same ….. as abandoning democracy.”
No one among the left-wing academics (myself included) ever suggested that abandoning Thaksin equal abandoning DEMOCRACY. But that fact didn’t prevent Thongchai from mis-representing me, or academics of similar standpoint, as suggesting it, (in a piece he said he’s writing a few months ago), and you’re implying the same here.
But does abandoning Thaksin (in last year circumstances) violate certain democratic PRINCIPLE, e.g. “PM must come from election”? Absolutely. Those who use this kind of argument – the “song mai ao” people were fond of using it : “Democracy isn’t election” “prachathippatai mai chai kan lueg thang” – simply try to divert attention from, or cover up, their own shameless, actual violation/disrespect of certain democratic principle.
(some right-wing royalists, when confronted with my argument would reply “but the elections were a sham”. But Thongchai never was so silly as saying that, in fact he wrote an article against the “clean elections” argument himself. How, then, would one justify not supporting an elected PM in face of royalist assualt?)
Let me try to answer Dickie Simpkins #123-124, but I will do it up to the line that would not put me in trouble. (After all, a weblog is also a public space, and I am using my real name.)
Re: the lese majeste law: I think it should be abolished. The suggestion that the law should be amended that only the palace people (whoever on the K’s behalf) can file a suit as the injured party is possibly an acceptable compromise. I am not a legal expert, and need to learn more about this option, or it needs more discussion to understand its virtue and pitfalls better.
What matters most are:
1) The law has been a legal mechanism that absolves the monarch from accountibility and responsibility. Good citizens who care about the country but have different views about the monarchy have been victims of LM. Crimes, abuses and unfair business practices have been practically absolved because they cannot be brought to public knowledge. The further the monarchy is from reality and becomes more devine, the stronger dose of LM and more often of it, is needed to sustain the divinity of the institution.
2) The fact is also that it has been used in ways that has nothing to do with protecting the monarchy but to destroy opponents and people of different opinions.
Will or how the compromise option above solve the above 2 problems? Perhaps it solves #2. But not sure about #1.
What do I think about a republic Thailand?
Let put it this way — Those who have power (official and unofficial, legally-sanctioned or politically so) must be accountable. Be the person a king, a queen, a president, a prime minister, a chairman, etc. etc.
If a Thai king (I am talking theoretically, not about any king in particular, let alone the present one), truly has no power and never exercises it (because having none), thus nothing to be accountable, a republic or not wouldn’t have been an issue. If nobody use and abuse power in the name of the monarchy (such as killing other people to protect the monarchy), a republic or not wouldn’t be much as issue. But if a monarchy does exercise power in whatever forms, does being part of the political system and actively involved even without legal validity, the monarch should not receive a blanket impunity. He must be accountable and responsible for the right and wrong he did. In that situation, a republic or not becomes a crucial public issue.
The fact is also that the Thai monarchists (plural, i.e. including x y z of course) have been hindrance to democracy (power of poeple) throughout modern Thai history. Of coursem theyhave done so in the name of the monarchy. By being part of politics (i.e. power relations), all the monarchists must be accountable like every other citizens.
To me, republic or not republic is not a question in itself.
I am not sure if you mean websites from individuals alone or if you would include those by organisations. I recommend the website of the Peranakan Association in particular. The community of acculturated Chinese living in Singapore, Penang and Malacca have a unique fusion of lifestyle combining Malay, Chinese, Indian and European elements.
The Peranakan Association http://www.peranakan.org.sg
Their newsletter is informative and has vivid photographs (right bar, pdf)
I feel that Holly’s analysis is right on here. I would like to add that the perspectives of Lao state agents in implementing resettlement plans may not always fall on the coercive side of the continuum that Holly describes. A deputy director of a department in the Lao Ministry of Agriculture who I know feels very strongly that these resettlement plans are good; she specifically counterposes them to problems of landlessness in places like Thailand. I remember her saying something like, “In Laos we have plenty of land, so all we need to do is just move people there if they don’t have any; in Thailand they don’t help farmers this way.” The sentiment expressed her may not fully express reality on the ground. But the point is, Lao government agents aren’t always sinister when it comes to projects like these; international development agencies are certainly not always innocent.
Republican, you may revel in being in the minority of one in this exchange. Your bloodymindedness on this one is staggering. That you fail to understand or don’t want to understand the points being made in response, by a whole range of usually reasonable respondents, should tell you something. You can decide that they are all wrong, dyslexic or whatever, but being the only correct person can be a decidedly lonely position. As I’ve said several times, my preference is that you return to attacking the real enemies. That is, unless you really do think that a few public intellectuals are your real enemies. My view is that the military with their guns, acting as the puppets of the palace, is the place to focus. So do forgive me, but I will leave this tirade of yours to others.
The King never smile are contruction imagination to Thai feel who is the most power people as the best politician that loving of Thai always and the best of King of Thailand.
Sufficiency economics is philosophy that explain everyday life is not see context of Thai social is Class struggle and Having many ” roots of grass”
Yes, at the train station, there is a cluster of an increasing number of posters. It started with only one by Thitima/Wuthipong. There is also a smaller sign saying “Space for placing election posters”, obviously erected by the municipality. Same goes for a similar space in front of the Rajaphat University, i.e. the road running along the river that you mentioned, and in front of the bus terminal.
I never really know how to call these election signs. Technically, the ECT distinguishes between “announcements (posters)” that must not be bigger than A3 (to be placed at boards provided bt local governments and government offices), and election signboards, which must not exceed 130×245 cm, to be placed at designated spaces, with or without signs saying so.
As I said, I will have a post on posters later, i.e. when the situation is more consolidated. These things started rather slowly, but have picked up since.
If PPP wins big, does it really matter who the nominee-PM will be? Mr. Frank of Manchester City will be calling all the shots anyway according to his usual form, all the TRT . . . correction I mean PPP . . . members will be merely clapping their fists loudly unless the clutched cash bonuses from Potjaman defeat the decibels.
Colonel, you are wrong. Imagine what would happen if books like The King Never Smile were allowed to be freely published in Thailand? You may attribute the King’s popularity more to the royalist propaganda machine than to the lese majeste law, but note that even with the lese majeste law, there are still people who dare voice their opposition to the monarchy in slight, subtle, and reasonable ways. I trust that if they were allowed to apply the full might of their rhetorical prowess without fear of retribution whether by laws or by uncivilized royalist mobs the King’s popularity would surely wane. I myself was persuaded by Handley’s book (and before any of you spring on to it as a vile, rumor-mongering book, I did verify the important historical facts, and shockingly found that his thesis was very much supported by sound research) obtained in a foreign country where lese majeste did not apply. Surely that offers some proof with regards to the effect of lese majeste upon the King’s popularity.
BTW, Khon Thai, I pity you and your “ignorance is bliss” argument. Enjoy living in your delusion.
A clarification – this being my first time to Chachoengsao and not so familiar with the streets, I don’t believe it is Thanon Thepsothon that has the posters, but rather the one (I forget the name) that run along the river, past the hospital / park / and down towards the military base. Running around rather quickly, I think I conflated the streets. But basically, I did notice a number of posters up here and there at certain points, seemingly more than you suggested. I don’t remember any small signs on the ground. But clearly there are certain “zones” for poster. Such as in front of the train station, for example.
Thanks for your detailed reporting on one province’s experience with the elections. I enjoy reading them.
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The King Never Smiles?
See, you are once again blinded by your royalist propaganda. Not everyone in the country loves the King, as you are told. And untold numbers are much more reasonable than Republican.
Once again, you yourself offer more proof that it is in fact lese majeste that keeps people in the dark and reinforces the effect of royalist propaganda.
Thinking like a Thai Army general
If the Democrats can form a coalition government?
The court cases against PMThaksin will go through due process. The ending should not differ too much from Prachai Leophairatana’s case but significantly in scale (PMThaksin would likely get a few decades jail term, but he won’t be there to serve it ofcourse). The Thai parliament returns to its lively times with Samak-Chalerm in opposition. PPP will try it’s hardest to destabilize the government ofcourse, as the longer it spends in opposition, fundings from PMThaksin will dry up, and MPs will naturally start to leave for more favorable pastures. Abhisit will need both luck and strong support to pull through as it will be the hardest two years of his life – that would be the most time he has to establish himself as a viable leader to reduce the influence of the cult of Thaksin (an uneviable task). However, if he is like PMChuan before him – and is a man of strong (elitist) principles, he may not last too long. He has to learn the dark arts and apply it quick (it is a good sign that he has already visited the astrologers). The ‘alternative’ Thai democracy (to PMThaksin’s model) depends much on him.
Thinking like a Thai Army general
If PPP wins big, Samak/Chalerm + the internal security bill may return absolute power to PMThaksin. But I also think Samak/Chalerm with lots of power will also start to reveal their own agendas, independent of Thaksin’s intents – which I think is mainly to get ‘his’ money back and pave a way for his return to power. What timeframe this would happen will depend on how fast the security bill + money can break the Thai courts will to drop all cases. The challenge is to get this done before Samak-Chalerm messes up and offends everyone in society (which is also a great ‘opportunity’ for Thaksin to stage a grand entry, welcomed by a million people, at Suvarnabhumi to ‘save’ the country).
In this scenario, the urban middle-classes and the PAD will be back on the streets. This would likely lead to an inevitable violent crackdown mainly carried out by the police – mainly with batons, tear gas and not guns. The courts will be back on side with PMThaksin and the oppositions will be charged/jailed. This will be a long drawn out process taking months until the will of the middle class is broken and Thaksin becomes absolute ruler.
Thaksin rules for another 10 years and here there are two scenarios – the Philipines/Indonesia under Marcos/Suharto or Malaysia/Singapore under Mahathir/Lee Kuan Yew. Thailand may become worse off as the Shinawatras enters the 10 ten Forbes list of richest families – leading to Thaksin’s eventual downfall and a post-Thaksin blossoming of democracy. Or Thailand may achieve the wealth levels comparable to Malaysia/Singapore and the reigns are handed to Paethongthan, Thaksin’s youngest daughter.
The discredited military have probably long resigned to this inevitability in handing the reigns to GenAnupong and not GenSaprang (who, with GenSonthi, is exiled in England and becomes avid ManUnited fans). PMThaksin, a fast learning that he is, will have totally neutralize and co-opt them this time (everyone, no matter how resistance at the first and second instances, has a price)…
Unequal access
Whoops, two mistakes above:
1. there are incentives to build a spa or golf-course
2. You can even see their ads on BTS (the skytrain).
The Lao resettlement controversy
ps:
By my count, Baird & Shoemaker use the term “anchor/ing” only once in their 54 page Probe report ‘Aiding or Abetting’, and even here it is used in explicitly metaphorical quotes . They use the term to describe the efforts of one upland development program which is explicitly looking to manouevre around the imperatives of the GoL upland resettlement initiative by providing basic services to villages(see below).
On the other hand, High uses the term “anchor” or “anchoring” 5 times in her above short critique… as a way of suggesting that Baird and Shoemaker… are arguing that all rural Lao villagers should stay in their rural place (?)
Seems like High may be overstating the counter-critique of B & S a bit here…
sincerely,
keith barney
—————-
Aiding or Abetting (2005):
p. 44:
”
CWRWC: Based on their partner Refugee Care Netherland’s (ZOA) past work with refugee repatriation in Laos, the
INGO CRWRC concluded that it makes more sense to provide development assistance to upland villages than to
assist in their resettlement. In 2003, CRWRC negotiated a project agreement with the GoL to work with 12 remote
ethnic Hmong villages in two districts of Xieng Khouang province. One important aspect of the project is improving
access – CRWRC is funding roads, which provide the villages with vehicle access for the first time. The project sees
accessibility as a prerequisite for the marketing of new cash crops as alternatives to now-prohibited opium cultivation.
The provision of other rural infrastructure – primary schools, gravity feed water systems, etc., are also intended
to help ‘anchor’ these villages in place and make it more difficult for the GoL or other international agencies to
justify relocation. This project is still in the early stages so it is too soon to predict its long-term impact on the
intended beneficiaries. However, project staff, villagers, and local officials appear optimistic.
“
The Lao resettlement controversy
Dear Holly:
Greetings from Toronto Canada.
I would be interested to hear more about your southern Laos case study in this instance. Why and how did the farmers you met become “landless”? Real landlessness in rural Laos is not typical situation, i.e. unlike elsewhere in SE Asia where population growth has in effect outstripped the productive capabilities of ‘customary’ village lands, or where a high degree of land consolidation has occurred through market and debt processes. Rather, a situation of landlessness in most areas of rural Laos that I know of would typically itself be a result of restrictive state zoning policies (i.e. Land and Forest Allocation), or resettlement policies, or from e.g. agri-business or hydropower concessions.
Indeed, in your New Mandala article on Vieng Xai in northern Laos, you write the following:
“The practice of classifying all land as one sort or another has become standard in contemporary Laos. This has the effect of squeezing settlement options for the poor down to a few prescribed areas. Furthermore, the practice of defining ownership in terms of “use” (and a very narrow definition of “use” at that) leaves many Hmong unable to prove a legally sanctioned authority over the upland fields that they cultivate and leave fallow, and the forest that forms an integral part of their productive activities.”
In order to have a better sense of your example and how it fits into the resettlement debate, we would need to know if the landless- resettlers in your fields site in southern Laos were “resistant” to the idea of returning to their former areas, because they had already been effectively displaced by some other government policy, program, or project.
I might note that Baird and Shoemaker also frame their critique of resettlement in Laos in the context of these other programs and policies, which *together* are resulting in an artificial, policy-induced squeeze on land availability in the countryside.
Can you expand on this local history a bit more for us?
Thanks and cheers,
Keith Barney
York University
ps: my students (and I) this year really enjoyed reading your “Sojourn” paper on solidarity and village formation processes in southern Laos. It was well written and argued, and usefully accessible for undergraduate students :~)
Unequal access
Thanks for the reference to the UNDP report.
The high “human security” index in Isan certainly seems strange in light of:
a. Migration out of the region.
b. Low education index.
c. Dissatisfaction expressed by voting (pro radical change as exemplified by Thaksin)
Maybe what it really means that in light of all the problems they face, family has become even more important in Isan. Family as the last line of defense.
BTW one big education issue at the tertiary level is making universities independent self-supporting entities. Chula was even threatened with this recently.
The biggest problem with this is that it throws universities into the hands of high-level bureaucrat experts-PhDs in “educational management” who wouldn’t know excellence and world-class scholarship, in science, engineering, or the humanities, for instance, if it hit them in the face and who can circumvent term-limit regulations also.
When a university is thrown into self-support mode, there are invetives to build a spa or golf-course or offer popular educational marketing driven degree programs in cosmetic science before even starting a math or philosophy department to create true thinkers actively engaged intellectually, instead of students going just going through the motions. Not to denigrate vocational training, the European or Japanese notion of skilled craftspeople, skilled bakers, welders, precision machinists, really has to be borrowed also. Japanese training programmes are actively doing this. You can even see their ads on BRT.
The Lao resettlement controversy
excellent article – parallels my exprience exactly
The King Never Smiles?
Teth (#147) said “I trust that if they were allowed to apply the full might of their rhetorical prowess without fear of retribution whether by laws or by uncivilized royalist mobs the King’s popularity would surely wane. ”
Now who would “they” be? Republican perhaps? Do you sincerely believe Republican’s fully weighted “rhetorical prowess” could hurt the Thai monarchy?
(The unimaginative and dull me descends into deeper hibernation at every Republican’s lengthy prose.)
The King Never Smiles?
When Thongchai’s piece came out, I was quite annoyed with the way he framed his objection to the proposed amendments. Why? Writing articles for newspapers should be about enlightening, educating people, not adding to their prejudices, wrong opinions, et. To pick just one example (already high-lighted by Republican):
“The lese majeste law has done more harm than good to the monarchy.”
Of course, Thongchai knows very well that, say, in 6 Tula, the lese majeste law was extremely, shall we say, “benefitial” to the monarchy, for it helped eliminate the entire political movement that had been challenging the institution. (Besides, suppose it’s true that the law did more harm than good to the monarchy, why would we care anyway? Are we monarchists?)
Is it necessary, I mean, as a ‘tactic’?
Absolutely not, in my view. In fact, I was quite surprised to find Thongchai using this kind of argument. I accept and even support that in specific circumstances, e.g. fighting an actual court case of less majeste, one can use certain “tactical” argument that otherwise one wouldn’t be using in writing articles about the law. To give a recent example, the FaDiewKan people have cited HM’s own speech (“King can do wrong” speech) to fight off the less majeste charge already laid at them. But even in this case, to cite HM’s speech isn’t the same as using the above “more harm than good to the monarhy” argument. (The latter simply isn’t true to begin with.) And if I was to write an article about the speech itself in other circumstances I wouldn’t use it as my supporting argument either without very heavy qualification (HM never gave similar speech, say, in 1975-1977 when it would have been truly helpful.)
But Thongchai isn’t fighting a court case. Even if he were, I’m not sure the kind of argument he uses would be necessary. In sum, Thongchai’s argument in the article is not true, unnecessary and simply bad. Unless, of course, one is a royalsit.
When the proposed amendment became known, I was preparing to write an article opposing it too (unfortunately I couldn’t finish it in time). I thought I could proceed in either of the two ways, or both combined, namely a sarcastic “send-up” (“why stop here? let’s bring back the absolute monarchy”) or a stright-forward argument (“the law had already been instrumental in Sarit’s dictatorship and in increasing royal power beyond what is normal in modern constitutional monarchy, etc.”) As I said I was very surprised to read Thongchai’s piece, appearing in the Nation (no less) where it has already cowardly used the same less majeste accusation againt Thaksin.
Re: Paul Handley “abandoning support for Thaksin was not the same ….. as abandoning democracy.”
No one among the left-wing academics (myself included) ever suggested that abandoning Thaksin equal abandoning DEMOCRACY. But that fact didn’t prevent Thongchai from mis-representing me, or academics of similar standpoint, as suggesting it, (in a piece he said he’s writing a few months ago), and you’re implying the same here.
But does abandoning Thaksin (in last year circumstances) violate certain democratic PRINCIPLE, e.g. “PM must come from election”? Absolutely. Those who use this kind of argument – the “song mai ao” people were fond of using it : “Democracy isn’t election” “prachathippatai mai chai kan lueg thang” – simply try to divert attention from, or cover up, their own shameless, actual violation/disrespect of certain democratic principle.
(some right-wing royalists, when confronted with my argument would reply “but the elections were a sham”. But Thongchai never was so silly as saying that, in fact he wrote an article against the “clean elections” argument himself. How, then, would one justify not supporting an elected PM in face of royalist assualt?)
Royalist propaganda and policy nonsense
Have you read the book, Big? Or perhaps you didn’t understand it like I don’t understand your post.
The King Never Smiles?
Let me try to answer Dickie Simpkins #123-124, but I will do it up to the line that would not put me in trouble. (After all, a weblog is also a public space, and I am using my real name.)
Re: the lese majeste law: I think it should be abolished. The suggestion that the law should be amended that only the palace people (whoever on the K’s behalf) can file a suit as the injured party is possibly an acceptable compromise. I am not a legal expert, and need to learn more about this option, or it needs more discussion to understand its virtue and pitfalls better.
What matters most are:
1) The law has been a legal mechanism that absolves the monarch from accountibility and responsibility. Good citizens who care about the country but have different views about the monarchy have been victims of LM. Crimes, abuses and unfair business practices have been practically absolved because they cannot be brought to public knowledge. The further the monarchy is from reality and becomes more devine, the stronger dose of LM and more often of it, is needed to sustain the divinity of the institution.
2) The fact is also that it has been used in ways that has nothing to do with protecting the monarchy but to destroy opponents and people of different opinions.
Will or how the compromise option above solve the above 2 problems? Perhaps it solves #2. But not sure about #1.
What do I think about a republic Thailand?
Let put it this way — Those who have power (official and unofficial, legally-sanctioned or politically so) must be accountable. Be the person a king, a queen, a president, a prime minister, a chairman, etc. etc.
If a Thai king (I am talking theoretically, not about any king in particular, let alone the present one), truly has no power and never exercises it (because having none), thus nothing to be accountable, a republic or not wouldn’t have been an issue. If nobody use and abuse power in the name of the monarchy (such as killing other people to protect the monarchy), a republic or not wouldn’t be much as issue. But if a monarchy does exercise power in whatever forms, does being part of the political system and actively involved even without legal validity, the monarch should not receive a blanket impunity. He must be accountable and responsible for the right and wrong he did. In that situation, a republic or not becomes a crucial public issue.
The fact is also that the Thai monarchists (plural, i.e. including x y z of course) have been hindrance to democracy (power of poeple) throughout modern Thai history. Of coursem theyhave done so in the name of the monarchy. By being part of politics (i.e. power relations), all the monarchists must be accountable like every other citizens.
To me, republic or not republic is not a question in itself.
Southeast Asian websites for posterity
Hi Andrew,
I am not sure if you mean websites from individuals alone or if you would include those by organisations. I recommend the website of the Peranakan Association in particular. The community of acculturated Chinese living in Singapore, Penang and Malacca have a unique fusion of lifestyle combining Malay, Chinese, Indian and European elements.
The Peranakan Association
http://www.peranakan.org.sg
Their newsletter is informative and has vivid photographs (right bar, pdf)
I have been trying to tag useful websites on Singapore and Southeast Asia in the following
http://del.icio.us/singaporestuff – many originate locally
http://del.icio.us/bonnysoutheastasia – many originate in the US
http://singaporestuff.blogspot.com
Feel free to sieve through these
Cheers Bons
The Lao resettlement controversy
I feel that Holly’s analysis is right on here. I would like to add that the perspectives of Lao state agents in implementing resettlement plans may not always fall on the coercive side of the continuum that Holly describes. A deputy director of a department in the Lao Ministry of Agriculture who I know feels very strongly that these resettlement plans are good; she specifically counterposes them to problems of landlessness in places like Thailand. I remember her saying something like, “In Laos we have plenty of land, so all we need to do is just move people there if they don’t have any; in Thailand they don’t help farmers this way.” The sentiment expressed her may not fully express reality on the ground. But the point is, Lao government agents aren’t always sinister when it comes to projects like these; international development agencies are certainly not always innocent.
The King Never Smiles?
Republican, you may revel in being in the minority of one in this exchange. Your bloodymindedness on this one is staggering. That you fail to understand or don’t want to understand the points being made in response, by a whole range of usually reasonable respondents, should tell you something. You can decide that they are all wrong, dyslexic or whatever, but being the only correct person can be a decidedly lonely position. As I’ve said several times, my preference is that you return to attacking the real enemies. That is, unless you really do think that a few public intellectuals are your real enemies. My view is that the military with their guns, acting as the puppets of the palace, is the place to focus. So do forgive me, but I will leave this tirade of yours to others.
Royalist propaganda and policy nonsense
The King never smile are contruction imagination to Thai feel who is the most power people as the best politician that loving of Thai always and the best of King of Thailand.
Sufficiency economics is philosophy that explain everyday life is not see context of Thai social is Class struggle and Having many ” roots of grass”
Taking an oath for a clean and fair election
David,
Yes, at the train station, there is a cluster of an increasing number of posters. It started with only one by Thitima/Wuthipong. There is also a smaller sign saying “Space for placing election posters”, obviously erected by the municipality. Same goes for a similar space in front of the Rajaphat University, i.e. the road running along the river that you mentioned, and in front of the bus terminal.
I never really know how to call these election signs. Technically, the ECT distinguishes between “announcements (posters)” that must not be bigger than A3 (to be placed at boards provided bt local governments and government offices), and election signboards, which must not exceed 130×245 cm, to be placed at designated spaces, with or without signs saying so.
As I said, I will have a post on posters later, i.e. when the situation is more consolidated. These things started rather slowly, but have picked up since.
Thanks thst you find my reports useful.
Thinking like a Thai Army general
If PPP wins big, does it really matter who the nominee-PM will be? Mr. Frank of Manchester City will be calling all the shots anyway according to his usual form, all the TRT . . . correction I mean PPP . . . members will be merely clapping their fists loudly unless the clutched cash bonuses from Potjaman defeat the decibels.
The King Never Smiles?
Colonel, you are wrong. Imagine what would happen if books like The King Never Smile were allowed to be freely published in Thailand? You may attribute the King’s popularity more to the royalist propaganda machine than to the lese majeste law, but note that even with the lese majeste law, there are still people who dare voice their opposition to the monarchy in slight, subtle, and reasonable ways. I trust that if they were allowed to apply the full might of their rhetorical prowess without fear of retribution whether by laws or by uncivilized royalist mobs the King’s popularity would surely wane. I myself was persuaded by Handley’s book (and before any of you spring on to it as a vile, rumor-mongering book, I did verify the important historical facts, and shockingly found that his thesis was very much supported by sound research) obtained in a foreign country where lese majeste did not apply. Surely that offers some proof with regards to the effect of lese majeste upon the King’s popularity.
BTW, Khon Thai, I pity you and your “ignorance is bliss” argument. Enjoy living in your delusion.
Taking an oath for a clean and fair election
Michael,
A clarification – this being my first time to Chachoengsao and not so familiar with the streets, I don’t believe it is Thanon Thepsothon that has the posters, but rather the one (I forget the name) that run along the river, past the hospital / park / and down towards the military base. Running around rather quickly, I think I conflated the streets. But basically, I did notice a number of posters up here and there at certain points, seemingly more than you suggested. I don’t remember any small signs on the ground. But clearly there are certain “zones” for poster. Such as in front of the train station, for example.
Thanks for your detailed reporting on one province’s experience with the elections. I enjoy reading them.