Thanks, patiwat, for the preliminary analysis.
Hopefully your concerns will be addressed, and things don’t get sidetracked by the stupid ( or misguided) calls for Buddhism to be named as the state religion.
Some brief thoughts on the constitution. In short, it’ll take us back to the 1970’s/1980’s. I’ll save time and focus only on the bad and neutral points:
Bad
– Weakening of the political party system will produce short-sighted unstable coalition governments. A number of changes drives this: the reduction of the number of votes required for a no-confidence debate falls from 40% to 25%; the increase in MP independence, which also allows MPs to more easily whore themselves to the highest bidder; the new constituency system, which seems designed to produce a multi-party outcome
– 2 terms/8 year term limit. When combined with the above clauses that are intended to produce short unstable coalition governments, the 2 term limit could cause some short-sighted corruption prone policies. I’d prefer just an 8 year limit. (Sec 167)
– Appointed senators is just absurd. How the heck are appointed senators supposed to be more independent than elected ones? (Sec 106)
– Regional party lists. The old system of nation-wide party lists favored national parties which could put together a strong list based on politicians with nation-wide appeal. The regional party list system means that a party can focus on regional candidates, e.g., the Democrats could put its super-stars on a southern party list and forget about the rest of the nation. To me, this somewhat defeats the original purpose of the party list, which was to balance provincial/regional interests with the national interest.
– Ethics code ambiguity. The draft mentions a code of ethics, and says that ethical violations could result in removal from office, but doesn’t give any more details. So what exactly defines an ethical violation? Will calling for an election in the face of protests from hundreds of thousands be deemed unethical (the opposition certainly claimed so last year)? (Section 270)
– Legitimizing rebellion as a means of gaining power. This will come back to haunt all of us. What happens when, not if, the unity of the junta falls apart?
Neutral
– No 5% minimum cut-off for party list candidates + Fewer party list candidates. The lack of a 5% cut-off would mean that fringe parties could easily get party-list seats. However, since there are fewer part-list seats, this might be negated. I haven’t figured out how they’ll do seat rounding (i.e., whether they’ll continue to use the d’Hondt system).
– NCCC will focus only on high-ranking politicians and civil servants. Fine, this will reduce their workload. But who is going to look after medium-level politicians and civil servants? I don’t think provincial prosecutors are the best people to do this (Sec 249).
I’ll mention one good point though: the 100,000 signature minimum to start constitutional amendment procedures. This way, constitutional crises will be less of an excuse for coups. You don’t like the rules? Just start a petition to change them. No need for coups. That wont stop the military from interfering, of course, but still…
“but he couldn’t be any worse than Thaksin.” >> You don’t seem to have very high aspirations.
“a royalist regime with better policies> >> Rather, with different policies, which, accidentally, complied with some discursive clichees, for example that the dissolution of the SBPAC had something important to do with the increase of the insurgency. The ICG unneccesarily goes along with this, calling it a “conflict managment institution”, etc. This is about the Bangkok political discourse, not about the South.
In the Nation (April 23), Kavi Chongkittavorn wondered, “somehow, it [SBPAC] has not produced the same results as it used to do.” In fact, he should wonder whether those results mainly existed in the Bangkok-based policy discourse, critical of Thaksin, on the South, rather than in reality. In this sense, Surayudh reacted on this Bangkok-based policy suggestion, not on what the actual achievements of the SBPAC might have been, if any. Similarly, his “apology” reacted on the largely Bangkok-based approach to “reconciliation.”
In short, one needs to dissect the Bangkok-based policy discourse in order to understand what measures are being adopted in dealing with the South. One cannot look at the South alone.
Anyway, by now Surayud has lost almost all his credit he might have had in dealing with the South. Kavi suggests a “paradigm shift,” but all he can come up with–and one wonders whether he is really serious about it–is the suggestion that the recommendations made by the National Reconciliation Commission should be implemented.
Finally, things start looking more positive–at least as far as coup plotter Gen Sonthi is concerned. He said, “We have already won the strategic game against the insurgents. We only need to continue fighting a little more in the tactical game” (Matichon, 26 April).
Thanks for this entry. Finally found something I want to blog about in my own personal blog. John Strong is one of strongest scholars out there. His book on Asokan myths and his paper on the Gavampti tradition being wonderful examples.
ICG is in the business of how to resolve nasty, protracted conflicts, in this case the South. It’s not writing a report on Bangkok politics. If a democratic government fails to take even basic steps to calm the South and bring killers (insurgents, soldiers) to justice, then it’s not surprising that a royalist regime with better policies starts to look attractive. Whatever you think about the coup against Thaksin, his handling of the South was an unmitigated disaster. I’m not saying Surayud has all the answers, or that he can stop the rot, but he couldn’t be any worse than Thaksin.
Has Republican traveled in South lately? Spoken to Muslims and Buddhists in red zone? If not, stick to dissecting Bangkok politics.
“Monetized” in this sort of discourse is part of the ethical rejection of vote-buying, corruption etc. This also includes the assumption of political exclusion, that is the non-existence of responsiveness and accountability. Thus the perceived need for extra-political, “people’s sector” organizations.
TAOs had existed before the 1997 Constitution, and the coup did not end anything abruptly in this area.
Certainly subsistence pressures make “local communities” a lot less relevant with people relocating from rural to urban contexts seasonally for working purposes like taxi drivers seem to do.
Certainly the vagaries of real estate prices (e.g. liquidating a house and distributing inheritance) and rental rates (much lower on the city periphery), migration (daughter marries someone in a far-off province, mother moves there to look after the baby), there are so many pressures making merely “living in local proximity” a lot less important than it once was.
Maybe even there are still local communities impenetrable to outsiders, or penetrable only with great psychological cost of always being the outsider, which I witnessed in more traditional Burma, an ethnic Burmese living with her son among the Inthas at Inle lake near Taungyi, for instance.
““Local communities” here are self-organized “groups” set up in order to increase public participation versus the monopolized and monetized area of official local politics and local authorities, such as TAOs.”
Is “monetised” bad? Doesn’t extending public water to a village require money whether by grant or loan?
To my understanding TAOs were an essential part of decentralisation of government under the 1997 constitution, the sort of decentralisation that might meet local needs like water supply. I guess all of this ended abruptly with the coup?
Khun Paiboon was not appointed by the military. He was appointed by Prime Minister Surayud (who was appointed by the military).
I don’t see any evidence that the current government ministers have had any role in drafting the constitution. It seemed to be done largely in secret by a small group of semi-military cronies.
I think it is going to be more and more important to distinguish between what the military controls (the South, the constitution, the parliment) and what the government controls (ministers, the ability to initiate legislation, not much).
One of the reasons this government has been ineffective is that they don’t control many of the things that typical governments control. TRT had a majority of the parliment, of course Thaksin could do more than Surayud, who has no memebers of parliment.
I know this is only tangentally relevant to your point. But I wanted to make clear that Khun Paiboon is not a military stooge. As I noted above, I think it will become increasinly clear that the “government” and the military are two separate entities with what could be very different agendas.
Again, i don’t see that the government has had much to do with the constitution or the South. As those issues become contentious, it will be important to see clearly who was behind them.
Now, this seem a common enough poll, but for the little “PRO&CON” caption is so painfully straight-forward that some might deem offensive.
It would be interesting to see if this Time issue would be banned from publishing in Thailand and the polling website blocked.
Would someone willing to start a betting pool if this would turn into another international lese-majeste fiasco?
A public relations team will head off overseas this week for a series of seminars aimed at informing people in other countries of the political situation in Thailand after the coup, PM’s Office Minister Theerapat Serirangsan said yesterday.
Theerapat, who chairs a special panel on public relations in times of crisis, said the group will head to Germany and the UK to talk at a series of seminars they have been invited to. They will leave today and return next Thursday.
The group will then head off on a similar mission to Australia and New Zealand and maybe Japan, depending on when they use up the Bt2.5-million allocated.
…
The Nation, April 24, 2007
Interestingly, Matichon (April 22) reported what The Nation was too shy to list, namely the composition of the travelers. According to that news piece, participants of the trip to Germany and the UK include Sulak Srivarak, Kraisak Choonhavan, Surasith Kosanawin, Charas Suwanmala, Nakharin Mektrairat, and Surat Horachaikun. However, that article mentioned 17-26 May as travel time. So, maybe, two groups will go?
It sure pays to have sided with the military junta, it seems.
In the CDC’s summary, we read that community rights are expanded by the addition of local community (chumchon thongthin) rights in order to include cases of people who join together to establish a community. For this, it is not necessary for them to have been together for a long time.
The inclusion of such “local communities” might respond to CODI’s work under Phaiboon Watthanasiritham, currently the military-appointed minister for social development and human security. His first priority is to push through the already-drafted Local Community Assembly Act (phoropo sapha chumchon thongthin). “Local communities” here are self-organized “groups” set up in order to increase public participation versus the monopolized and monetized area of official local politics and local authorities, such as TAOs. The leaders of all the groups in one tambon form the assembly–under the chairmanship of the kamnan! The MoI does not seem to be happy with the draft law, because they see that council as a competition of the TAOs, which they supervise.
One might also ask what actually the difference is between the local groups under CODI’s supervision, and the local groups set up by the MoI’s department of community development.
[…] be “preserved” or “revived” by “communities” may be broad and dynamic enough to include coyote dancers, mobile phones and even, god forbid, political […]
It would help if the organizers were more transparent in their operations. Until now, visitors to their web site have no way of knowing who actually is on the committee that will decide about panels and papers. Emails often are not answered. There still is no list of suggested panels. They could sure learn something from how the organization of the EUROSEAS conference in September in Naples is handled.
I think you’re right Alice, at least currently, those are the two approaches available to the international community. I think the ‘strategy re-think’ that we all agree is necessary, though, would lead us to a third approach. Which would start, at least, with acknowledging that the UN and the Western governments currently trumpeting for reform are simply not a reliable avenue for change. They will never make more than symbolic and token gestures like sanctions. The US will not save the people the Burma. Maybe the UN could do something, given enough pressure, but that’s a long shot. So, let’s forget the governments, let’s forget arguing over token things like sanctions. Let’s just forget the approaches that have been tried over and over again and consistenty fail to stop mass atrocities in other countries over the last 100 years.
No, this doesn’t seem to leave us with much, but nothing we’ve tried so far, in Burma, or anywhere, seems to have worked. Perhaps some serious thinking about strategies that can work in spite of the governments is what we need. I certainly don’t have the answer to what those might be, but there are smarter people than me involved in this.
But at least let’s admit what’s not working, and it would seem, the US, the UK, the UN is not working. Maybe that does means taking the fight to China and India, maybe, probably, it means something we haven’t even thought of yet.
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Draft Thai charter: Councils of the elderly and distributive equality?
Thanks, patiwat, for the preliminary analysis.
Hopefully your concerns will be addressed, and things don’t get sidetracked by the stupid ( or misguided) calls for Buddhism to be named as the state religion.
Draft Thai charter: Councils of the elderly and distributive equality?
Some brief thoughts on the constitution. In short, it’ll take us back to the 1970’s/1980’s. I’ll save time and focus only on the bad and neutral points:
Bad
– Weakening of the political party system will produce short-sighted unstable coalition governments. A number of changes drives this: the reduction of the number of votes required for a no-confidence debate falls from 40% to 25%; the increase in MP independence, which also allows MPs to more easily whore themselves to the highest bidder; the new constituency system, which seems designed to produce a multi-party outcome
– 2 terms/8 year term limit. When combined with the above clauses that are intended to produce short unstable coalition governments, the 2 term limit could cause some short-sighted corruption prone policies. I’d prefer just an 8 year limit. (Sec 167)
– Appointed senators is just absurd. How the heck are appointed senators supposed to be more independent than elected ones? (Sec 106)
– Regional party lists. The old system of nation-wide party lists favored national parties which could put together a strong list based on politicians with nation-wide appeal. The regional party list system means that a party can focus on regional candidates, e.g., the Democrats could put its super-stars on a southern party list and forget about the rest of the nation. To me, this somewhat defeats the original purpose of the party list, which was to balance provincial/regional interests with the national interest.
– Ethics code ambiguity. The draft mentions a code of ethics, and says that ethical violations could result in removal from office, but doesn’t give any more details. So what exactly defines an ethical violation? Will calling for an election in the face of protests from hundreds of thousands be deemed unethical (the opposition certainly claimed so last year)? (Section 270)
– Legitimizing rebellion as a means of gaining power. This will come back to haunt all of us. What happens when, not if, the unity of the junta falls apart?
Neutral
– No 5% minimum cut-off for party list candidates + Fewer party list candidates. The lack of a 5% cut-off would mean that fringe parties could easily get party-list seats. However, since there are fewer part-list seats, this might be negated. I haven’t figured out how they’ll do seat rounding (i.e., whether they’ll continue to use the d’Hondt system).
– NCCC will focus only on high-ranking politicians and civil servants. Fine, this will reduce their workload. But who is going to look after medium-level politicians and civil servants? I don’t think provincial prosecutors are the best people to do this (Sec 249).
I’ll mention one good point though: the 100,000 signature minimum to start constitutional amendment procedures. This way, constitutional crises will be less of an excuse for coups. You don’t like the rules? Just start a petition to change them. No need for coups. That wont stop the military from interfering, of course, but still…
ICG, Southern Thailand and the coup
Puzzling, isn’t it — supposedly better policies, but higher body count…
More on the 2008 Thai Studies conference
For amberwaves: Hewison’s paper on the monarchy and democratisation was not presented at an ICTS or an AAS, but at a small workshop in Perth in 1993.
Has there been any outcome yet on Thongchai’s (and other) critical panels suggested to the conference organisers?
ICG, Southern Thailand and the coup
With respect to the South, Surayud is actually worse than Thaksin.
Results matter more than talk. And under Surayud, the insurgency has gotten much more violent and widespread than under Thaksin.
ICG, Southern Thailand and the coup
“but he couldn’t be any worse than Thaksin.” >> You don’t seem to have very high aspirations.
“a royalist regime with better policies> >> Rather, with different policies, which, accidentally, complied with some discursive clichees, for example that the dissolution of the SBPAC had something important to do with the increase of the insurgency. The ICG unneccesarily goes along with this, calling it a “conflict managment institution”, etc. This is about the Bangkok political discourse, not about the South.
In the Nation (April 23), Kavi Chongkittavorn wondered, “somehow, it [SBPAC] has not produced the same results as it used to do.” In fact, he should wonder whether those results mainly existed in the Bangkok-based policy discourse, critical of Thaksin, on the South, rather than in reality. In this sense, Surayudh reacted on this Bangkok-based policy suggestion, not on what the actual achievements of the SBPAC might have been, if any. Similarly, his “apology” reacted on the largely Bangkok-based approach to “reconciliation.”
In short, one needs to dissect the Bangkok-based policy discourse in order to understand what measures are being adopted in dealing with the South. One cannot look at the South alone.
Anyway, by now Surayud has lost almost all his credit he might have had in dealing with the South. Kavi suggests a “paradigm shift,” but all he can come up with–and one wonders whether he is really serious about it–is the suggestion that the recommendations made by the National Reconciliation Commission should be implemented.
Finally, things start looking more positive–at least as far as coup plotter Gen Sonthi is concerned. He said, “We have already won the strategic game against the insurgents. We only need to continue fighting a little more in the tactical game” (Matichon, 26 April).
Upakhut – saint and spirit
Thanks for this entry. Finally found something I want to blog about in my own personal blog. John Strong is one of strongest scholars out there. His book on Asokan myths and his paper on the Gavampti tradition being wonderful examples.
ICG, Southern Thailand and the coup
ICG is in the business of how to resolve nasty, protracted conflicts, in this case the South. It’s not writing a report on Bangkok politics. If a democratic government fails to take even basic steps to calm the South and bring killers (insurgents, soldiers) to justice, then it’s not surprising that a royalist regime with better policies starts to look attractive. Whatever you think about the coup against Thaksin, his handling of the South was an unmitigated disaster. I’m not saying Surayud has all the answers, or that he can stop the rot, but he couldn’t be any worse than Thaksin.
Has Republican traveled in South lately? Spoken to Muslims and Buddhists in red zone? If not, stick to dissecting Bangkok politics.
Modern Thai community
Jon:
“Monetized” in this sort of discourse is part of the ethical rejection of vote-buying, corruption etc. This also includes the assumption of political exclusion, that is the non-existence of responsiveness and accountability. Thus the perceived need for extra-political, “people’s sector” organizations.
TAOs had existed before the 1997 Constitution, and the coup did not end anything abruptly in this area.
Modern Thai community
Certainly subsistence pressures make “local communities” a lot less relevant with people relocating from rural to urban contexts seasonally for working purposes like taxi drivers seem to do.
Certainly the vagaries of real estate prices (e.g. liquidating a house and distributing inheritance) and rental rates (much lower on the city periphery), migration (daughter marries someone in a far-off province, mother moves there to look after the baby), there are so many pressures making merely “living in local proximity” a lot less important than it once was.
Maybe even there are still local communities impenetrable to outsiders, or penetrable only with great psychological cost of always being the outsider, which I witnessed in more traditional Burma, an ethnic Burmese living with her son among the Inthas at Inle lake near Taungyi, for instance.
Modern Thai community
““Local communities” here are self-organized “groups” set up in order to increase public participation versus the monopolized and monetized area of official local politics and local authorities, such as TAOs.”
Is “monetised” bad? Doesn’t extending public water to a village require money whether by grant or loan?
To my understanding TAOs were an essential part of decentralisation of government under the 1997 constitution, the sort of decentralisation that might meet local needs like water supply. I guess all of this ended abruptly with the coup?
Modern Thai community
Khun Paiboon was not appointed by the military. He was appointed by Prime Minister Surayud (who was appointed by the military).
I don’t see any evidence that the current government ministers have had any role in drafting the constitution. It seemed to be done largely in secret by a small group of semi-military cronies.
I think it is going to be more and more important to distinguish between what the military controls (the South, the constitution, the parliment) and what the government controls (ministers, the ability to initiate legislation, not much).
One of the reasons this government has been ineffective is that they don’t control many of the things that typical governments control. TRT had a majority of the parliment, of course Thaksin could do more than Surayud, who has no memebers of parliment.
I know this is only tangentally relevant to your point. But I wanted to make clear that Khun Paiboon is not a military stooge. As I noted above, I think it will become increasinly clear that the “government” and the military are two separate entities with what could be very different agendas.
Again, i don’t see that the government has had much to do with the constitution or the South. As those issues become contentious, it will be important to see clearly who was behind them.
Modern Thai community
Sorry for going off topic, but there is a little poll done by Time on “The Most Influential figure”.
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/time100walkup/article/0,28804,1611030_1610841_1610324,00.html
Now, this seem a common enough poll, but for the little “PRO&CON” caption is so painfully straight-forward that some might deem offensive.
It would be interesting to see if this Time issue would be banned from publishing in Thailand and the polling website blocked.
Would someone willing to start a betting pool if this would turn into another international lese-majeste fiasco?
More on the 2008 Thai Studies conference
I agree with Thongchai and I want to add that a BOYCOTT MEANS NOTHING.
Are you muzzling yourselves by boycotting this event?
Are you academics or cowards?
Go to the conference, submit your papers…and when you are at the podium eloquently state what you need to say.
Odd how so many academics who aren’t even citizens of Thailand are terrified to voice their concerns.
If this message is not posted then clearly you have proven my point.
“Unrealistic expenses”?: the 5.5 million baht “sufficiency teow”
Again: sufficiency teow:
Overseas PR mission
A public relations team will head off overseas this week for a series of seminars aimed at informing people in other countries of the political situation in Thailand after the coup, PM’s Office Minister Theerapat Serirangsan said yesterday.
Theerapat, who chairs a special panel on public relations in times of crisis, said the group will head to Germany and the UK to talk at a series of seminars they have been invited to. They will leave today and return next Thursday.
The group will then head off on a similar mission to Australia and New Zealand and maybe Japan, depending on when they use up the Bt2.5-million allocated.
…
The Nation, April 24, 2007
Interestingly, Matichon (April 22) reported what The Nation was too shy to list, namely the composition of the travelers. According to that news piece, participants of the trip to Germany and the UK include Sulak Srivarak, Kraisak Choonhavan, Surasith Kosanawin, Charas Suwanmala, Nakharin Mektrairat, and Surat Horachaikun. However, that article mentioned 17-26 May as travel time. So, maybe, two groups will go?
It sure pays to have sided with the military junta, it seems.
Modern Thai community
In the CDC’s summary, we read that community rights are expanded by the addition of local community (chumchon thongthin) rights in order to include cases of people who join together to establish a community. For this, it is not necessary for them to have been together for a long time.
The inclusion of such “local communities” might respond to CODI’s work under Phaiboon Watthanasiritham, currently the military-appointed minister for social development and human security. His first priority is to push through the already-drafted Local Community Assembly Act (phoropo sapha chumchon thongthin). “Local communities” here are self-organized “groups” set up in order to increase public participation versus the monopolized and monetized area of official local politics and local authorities, such as TAOs. The leaders of all the groups in one tambon form the assembly–under the chairmanship of the kamnan! The MoI does not seem to be happy with the draft law, because they see that council as a competition of the TAOs, which they supervise.
One might also ask what actually the difference is between the local groups under CODI’s supervision, and the local groups set up by the MoI’s department of community development.
Lewd dancing and Buddhist festivals
[…] be “preserved” or “revived” by “communities” may be broad and dynamic enough to include coyote dancers, mobile phones and even, god forbid, political […]
More on the 2008 Thai Studies conference
It would help if the organizers were more transparent in their operations. Until now, visitors to their web site have no way of knowing who actually is on the committee that will decide about panels and papers. Emails often are not answered. There still is no list of suggested panels. They could sure learn something from how the organization of the EUROSEAS conference in September in Naples is handled.
Liberating Burma with $2 million a year?
I think you’re right Alice, at least currently, those are the two approaches available to the international community. I think the ‘strategy re-think’ that we all agree is necessary, though, would lead us to a third approach. Which would start, at least, with acknowledging that the UN and the Western governments currently trumpeting for reform are simply not a reliable avenue for change. They will never make more than symbolic and token gestures like sanctions. The US will not save the people the Burma. Maybe the UN could do something, given enough pressure, but that’s a long shot. So, let’s forget the governments, let’s forget arguing over token things like sanctions. Let’s just forget the approaches that have been tried over and over again and consistenty fail to stop mass atrocities in other countries over the last 100 years.
No, this doesn’t seem to leave us with much, but nothing we’ve tried so far, in Burma, or anywhere, seems to have worked. Perhaps some serious thinking about strategies that can work in spite of the governments is what we need. I certainly don’t have the answer to what those might be, but there are smarter people than me involved in this.
But at least let’s admit what’s not working, and it would seem, the US, the UK, the UN is not working. Maybe that does means taking the fight to China and India, maybe, probably, it means something we haven’t even thought of yet.
Liberating Burma with $2 million a year?
Alice, “high maintenance or low maintenance” ??? — Unfortunately this is not a tv chat show!
When using rhetoric such as “hope for the best” in a IR context… it’s rather condescending and arrogant … or even imperialistic, no?