I would say that making excuses for the behavior of these groups would hardly apply to me in particular. So, i do strongly reject this, and i also reject the attempts of coercing me to use a particular terminology. That, to use another such emotionally loaded term, is a bit Stalinist 😉
Militarization and ultra-nationalist propaganda alone do not make a system fascist. Wilhelminian Germany, for example, was equally militarized and ultra-nationalist, but hardly a fascist system.
Again, while there may be similarities, especially on the street mob level, there are also significant differences. Fascism always was a revolutionary ideology, but the military alliance with the traditional elites and supported by capitalist groupings is not revolutionary, regardless of the propaganda.
Bureaucratic polity or Michael Nelson’s analyses of the rule of the Aphichon is in my view a more suitable description of the present system of governance. I do not think we do need to transport a term from a particular western background and of a particular historical time in order to describe this system, especially as it has certain difficulties of application in its definition.
Hi Mythai. Just to be clear, my quibble was with the use of the term to refer to the person of Prayuth. I wasn’t making any judgement on its appropriateness in the current Thai context.
This i do agree with. Tactics, strategies and appearance of the different Yellow street mobs may have been strongly fascist in nature and appearance, but they were never more than a pretend reactionary revolution, never ran the show and were instead instrumentalized indeed by a somewhat strange mixture of varied different vested interests of old stakeholders. The so-called revolutionary element has always been quickly contained and sidelined.
While the Red Shirts are accused of the same, other than huge ideological differences, a main difference is that the wider Red Shirt movement (UDD and free Red Shirt groups) underwent a not yet finished evolution in which grassroots levels continues to gain increasing empowerment within their own movement that also forces all to constantly redefine the relationship with both leadership and party.
NN 8.1. “situation on it’s own merits” seems to me a rather lame excuse for not giving proper attention or taking action on the violent, reactionary militaristic behaviour and its mass/hysterical propaganda that we have seen in Thailand in recent years. In much the same way as we hear extreme pro-palace devotees say that they don’t care about universal rights or freedoms because it is “[our] Thai democracy”. This may or may not be categorised in universal frames of analysis (taking into account the particular) or as a rationalisation argument. I doubt that historical modalities of fascism found elsewhere necessarily fit exactly (for socio-cultural, economic and historical reasons). But in my view we have for too long been making just these kind of excuses (we will not name what we see) and therefore in turning a blind eye to the well orchestrated violence and mass repression in Thailand.
Many of us have been throwing the ‘F-bomb’ around since the violent turn in the PAD’s development from a displaced TV show to an insurgent force occupying airports.
Both the PAD and the PDRC could adequately be described as fascist movements and, unlike the present government, both were possessed of a more or less explicit (if malleable) ideology that absolutely fit into the fascist frame.
They also acted as and saw themselves as “revolutionary” movements, something rather fundamental to fascism in its various iterations.
With Suthep at its head, the PDRC was possessed of a “charismatic” leader and so had even more “fascist legitimacy” than PAD could aspire to with limp Sondhi the failed courtier leading the charge.
But this government is not all that similar to its precursor street insurgency.
I would challenge anyone to find a coherent statement of ideology produced by Prayuth or anyone in the junta that would compare with the Falange’s “Twenty Seven Points” or the Nazi’s “Twenty Five”.
It is unfortunately the case that the NCPO, in spite of its obvious intention to maintain a slightly “harder” version of Thailand”s traditional “soft” authoritarianism, whether electoral or installed by coup, is more of the same old same old in Thai governance.
And you really can’t call that ‘revolutionary’.
As for their cleaving to a ‘syndicalist’ or ‘corporatist’ economic vision, it’s hard to see how any particular label could stick to the messy combination of neo-liberal continuity, revivified state agencies moved back to the center in areas like telecom, and fitful stabs at “Thaksinite” populism.
As always in Thailand, economic policies seem to be determined by the need to satisfy the various stakeholders in the group at the helm. National capitalists get theirs, bureaucrats and generals get theirs, and whatever will maximize profit from corruption for all and sundry determines the “ideology” du jour.
In short, there are very real and relatively powerful fascist elements in the Thai body politic, but they have yet to get it together sufficiently to actually take power for themselves.
Sufficient unto the situation is the evil thereof. No need to invoke a Godwin’s.
What a mess listening to the outdated rolyal protocols, the best solution to all this mess is to abolish the monarchy from Thailand in its entirety, not even as a figure-head either!
No Filipino calls themselves “Malay”, not even those Muslim groups in Mindanao and Palawan. Your designation is archaic pseudo-anthropology. The designations as they exist now are just fine. Calling both Tamils and Sikhs “Indians”, will not lead to race riots in Malaysia. Something else will. You haven’t fixed anything; only made it far worse.
Jovan #9 thanks for the note: in fact it should have been more clearly worded as the “prinzip”, –under Prayut’s authority demanding absolute /illogical/ obedience to the point of transcending right or wrong. The whole “madness” starting since the 1950s I have elsewhere referred to as the “White Crow period”; a time of contradictions, duplicity, and moral inversions.
You know that this is lese majeste, don’t you? Chaging the royal law of succession is against the monarchy. HM the King has installed the crownprince already as his successor, thus selecting someone else implies that HM the King did something wrong!
I have equal misgivings with applying the term fascism to the present system or situation in Thailand. While there are no doubts that there are elements of fascism, there are also elements of Wilhelminian militarism, and many strong religious- feudal factors at play. Maybe it’s the need and tendency of academia to fit things into pre-existing frames, but i prefer to look at the situation on it’s own merits.
I agree with you wholeheartedly, Mythai, that one should avoid Thailand as it is at the moment like the plague, but unfortunately I had already planned and paid for my holiday there in February this year. I also have acquaintances there. However, next year I am going to relocate to Bali.
Thank you Olivier for this interesting update on the state of play of just one of several major dams being built on Lao tributaries of the Mekong, which unlike the dams on the mainstream Mekong, receive relatively little critical scrutiny by social science researchers. The Nam Theun 2 and Theun-Hinboun hydropower projects are exceptions, but even for these projects, the research is relatively sparse and patchy in terms of longitudinal exposure to particular dam-impacted communities (the work of Keith Barney documenting Ban Pak Veng is one notable exception). This is a definite lacuna in terms of objective social science research in the region, that to me speaks of the (usually) unstated fear of intimidation, violence, state-induced silencing, and hidden forces that surrounds dam development, leading to a culture of self-censure and intimidation amongst researchers who consider studying this field. And for riparian researchers, one can quite understand and sympathise with this sense of hopelessness in getting to grips with the dynamics of dam-induced development transformations, often before they really start.
But back to Nam Tha, which you may recall I wrote about as a case study in the International Rivers report, “Power Surge: The Impacts of Rapid Dam Development in Laos”, published in 2008, quite soon after you wrote your first article on NM concerning this project. It is interesting to see how the numbers estimated to be impacted by the dam have increased from 7,979 persons in 34 villages based on 2007 data, to 10,523 persons in 37 villages in 2015, a 32 % increase in 8 years presumably based on natural population growth and recognition of 3 more villages impacted as the development has moved forward.
It would be most interesting to hear about people’s hopes, fears and actual experiences on the ground of this massive shock to their lives, livelihoods and cultures, as they contemplate and go through the massively socially and pyschologically disruptive process (on an individual and collective level) of resettlement and readjustment to the transformations wrought by a large-dam project. As you may know, Thayer Scudder, who has studied the social impacts of dam-induced resettlement at many projects worldwide (including being a member of the Panel of Experts for NT2) has developed a four stage framework for conceptualising the process within a behavioural perspective, with the entire process, he maintains taking two generations to be successful (not always the case with many dam projects). His stages are as follows:
Stage 1 is labelled the Planning and Recruitment Stage.
Stage 2: Adjustment and Coping
Stage 3: Community Formation and Economic Development
Stage 4: Handing Over and Incorporation.
(Scudder, T. 2005. The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, Institutional and Political Costs. Eathscan, London)
In his book, Scudder deals with criticisms of this four stage model and goes on to suggest a potential combination with Michael Cernea’s “impoverishment risks and reconstruction model” as an improved way forward for researchers. However, such an analytical model I imagine is aimed far more at large-scale studies for well funded multi-disciplinary teams to conduct, not individual anthropologists with presumably limited resources. Therefore, I wondered if you are considering using an existing analytical framework to study the communities you’ve become familiar with and are in the process of transition, or how you intend to approach the multiple dimensions of involuntary resettlement? Issues of access, trust and willingness of impactees to speak on the record, I imagine will be a major issue?
I would be grateful if you could update me and other readers interested in such issues your future findings through the useful medium of NM and direct us towards any published materials you may make on the Nam Tha case study, as its execution is taking place under rather different circumstances than the slightly more transparent NT2, so I would imagine will make for an interesting and illuminating comparative case.
Also, one minor correction I would like to point out from your report above, namely that there was effectively a 7 year long hiatus on official news concerning the Nam Tha project between 2007-14, and that only in November 2014 was there an announcement in VT Times that:
“an agreement had been signed between the Lao Ministry of Planning and Investment and the Nam Tha 1 Lao Power Co. Ltd, a company created by China Southern Grid (CSG), a major electricity company operating in Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Hainan provinces.”
However, I would like to draw your attention to an earlier official announcement that there was a groundbreaking ceremony held at the dam site on 28 December 2013, as outlined below:
(KPL) A groundbreaking ceremony for the US$ 471-million Nam Tha 1
Hydropower dam project was held on 28 December in Bokeo Province.
The groundbreaking ceremony was attended by Deputy Prime Minister
Somsavat Lengsavad and relevant officials.
The dam will be equipped with an installed capacity of 168 MW and an
annual power output of 759 GWH.
On a 28-year concession, the dam is co-operated by China Southern Grid
International (holding an eighty percent stake of shares alongside
Electricite Du Lao) and is expected to begin generating power by the end
of 2017.
The dam, for which a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in August
2006, is located in Pha-oudom District, Bokeo Province and Nalea
District in Luangnamtha Province. Power generated by the dam will be
supplied to Northern provinces.
The most reasonable thing to do is change the constitution / act of succession so
Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn can succeed the current king as queen, with the succession going to the eldest of the four sons of the Crown Prince now living in USA, upon her death or even if she does not want to accept the crown in the first place.
The current Crown Prince could accept being by-passed on grounds of his age and health. His young son by the third wife may not qualify since the divorce of his mother and he’s too young compared to his 4 older step brothers.
The infant son by the fourth wife is also too young to succeed as king at a time when Thailand needs a strong figure.
‘Chinese’ is more a nationality than an ethnicity. The correct term is ‘Han’. This should be the term used. Otherwise, another better term to use is ‘East Asian’ (EA).
‘Indian’ is also a nationality than an ethnicity. A better term to use is ‘South Asian’ (SA).
‘Malay’ is also not the best term to use since some prefer to call themselves Javanese or Bugis (which are Malay sub-groups), and are Filipinos Malay (since they are Malayo-Polynesian) or not? A better term is ‘Malayo-Polynesian’ or ‘Island South-east Asian’ (ISEA).
‘Other’ sounds like one is trying to exclude this group. Better to classify as ‘General Group’ (GG) or ‘General Classification’ (GC).
Thanks for the article James. A minor quibble, I would just question your use of “F├╝hrerprinzip” in reference to Prayuth. This term doesn’t refer to a person but to the political principle that all authority ultimately derives from the leader, therefore effectively placing him above the law.
The term fascist for the current system of governance in Thailand is misleading, as several defining features of it do not exist. For example:
1. Fascism is always connected to a revolution and the need for revival after a period of national decline. This ideology was applied by Phibul, but not by the current government.
2. It requires a secular, charismatic “leader” and a leadership cult. Of course, the leader has to be publicly visible, and politically active as the leader of the nation. So far I do not see that Prayud is described as charismatic or sees himself as such, while Phibul certainly was.
3. There has to be a popular mass-movement of followers of the charismatic leader. In many cases the fascists were even elected in a more or less democratic process, or a form of coup found strong popular support with limited opposition. The current government has not been elected. Although there had been support of the last coup, it can hardly be described as a popular, national mass movement following Prayud as the leader of the nation.
Of course, several other aspects like ultra-nationalism, resentment against minorities, denunciation of political and cultural pluralism as treason, etc. fit characteristics of fascism. However, in the case of Thailand I find it more precise to speak of an authoritarian regime combined with a bureaucratic polity, based on an alliance between (factions?) of an elite, parts of a petty bourgeoisie and military/bureaucratic factions. The interesting question is, what political power can be applied by the political leader, who neither has charisma, nor is a full member of the elite, or has full support of the whole military and bureaucracy? Perhaps these deficits are reasons for some of the “madness”.
Excellent article – Professor Taylor’s usual high standard penetrating, sharp, accurate analysis. Especially apt is the Spanish comparison, and its’ monarchist, Falangist reaction against republicanism. However, Franco’s army had at least won DECISiVE victories against a foreign power, albeit weak Morroco. Thailand’s miltary have never even done that ! All Thailand’s miltary have EVER proved themselves decisivily victorious at, is killing their own people. And now they are not even proving victorious at that in Patani. Prayut’s repression is an expression of very worried insecurity.
Yes, the recent events raise doubts and pessimism about pluralism in the Southest Asia.
The author is mentioning the John Furnivall’s doctrine, a form of pluralism which was imposed according to the “divide et impera” principle, replacing the ancient traditional forms of cultural accommodation. The clashes that erupted after the end of the colonialism in part can be explained as a result of this pathological pluralism.
The only positive signals are coming from those experiences where administrative and political autonomy are guaranteed to the minorities (for example for the Muslim Moro of Mindanao in the Philippines and Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia). These directions (empowering the minorities at the ballot box) could promote a new idea of pluralism and have positive implication also at the level of the social integration.
It’s something to be promoted and supported, not the current political winning direction.
Do you think this positive meaning of pluralism is still a west-centric idea that cannot be applied in the Southest Asia?
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A state of madness
I would say that making excuses for the behavior of these groups would hardly apply to me in particular. So, i do strongly reject this, and i also reject the attempts of coercing me to use a particular terminology. That, to use another such emotionally loaded term, is a bit Stalinist 😉
Militarization and ultra-nationalist propaganda alone do not make a system fascist. Wilhelminian Germany, for example, was equally militarized and ultra-nationalist, but hardly a fascist system.
Again, while there may be similarities, especially on the street mob level, there are also significant differences. Fascism always was a revolutionary ideology, but the military alliance with the traditional elites and supported by capitalist groupings is not revolutionary, regardless of the propaganda.
Bureaucratic polity or Michael Nelson’s analyses of the rule of the Aphichon is in my view a more suitable description of the present system of governance. I do not think we do need to transport a term from a particular western background and of a particular historical time in order to describe this system, especially as it has certain difficulties of application in its definition.
A state of madness
Thanks for clarifying James.
A state of madness
Hi Mythai. Just to be clear, my quibble was with the use of the term to refer to the person of Prayuth. I wasn’t making any judgement on its appropriateness in the current Thai context.
A state of madness
This i do agree with. Tactics, strategies and appearance of the different Yellow street mobs may have been strongly fascist in nature and appearance, but they were never more than a pretend reactionary revolution, never ran the show and were instead instrumentalized indeed by a somewhat strange mixture of varied different vested interests of old stakeholders. The so-called revolutionary element has always been quickly contained and sidelined.
While the Red Shirts are accused of the same, other than huge ideological differences, a main difference is that the wider Red Shirt movement (UDD and free Red Shirt groups) underwent a not yet finished evolution in which grassroots levels continues to gain increasing empowerment within their own movement that also forces all to constantly redefine the relationship with both leadership and party.
A state of madness
NN 8.1. “situation on it’s own merits” seems to me a rather lame excuse for not giving proper attention or taking action on the violent, reactionary militaristic behaviour and its mass/hysterical propaganda that we have seen in Thailand in recent years. In much the same way as we hear extreme pro-palace devotees say that they don’t care about universal rights or freedoms because it is “[our] Thai democracy”. This may or may not be categorised in universal frames of analysis (taking into account the particular) or as a rationalisation argument. I doubt that historical modalities of fascism found elsewhere necessarily fit exactly (for socio-cultural, economic and historical reasons). But in my view we have for too long been making just these kind of excuses (we will not name what we see) and therefore in turning a blind eye to the well orchestrated violence and mass repression in Thailand.
A state of madness
Many of us have been throwing the ‘F-bomb’ around since the violent turn in the PAD’s development from a displaced TV show to an insurgent force occupying airports.
Both the PAD and the PDRC could adequately be described as fascist movements and, unlike the present government, both were possessed of a more or less explicit (if malleable) ideology that absolutely fit into the fascist frame.
They also acted as and saw themselves as “revolutionary” movements, something rather fundamental to fascism in its various iterations.
With Suthep at its head, the PDRC was possessed of a “charismatic” leader and so had even more “fascist legitimacy” than PAD could aspire to with limp Sondhi the failed courtier leading the charge.
But this government is not all that similar to its precursor street insurgency.
I would challenge anyone to find a coherent statement of ideology produced by Prayuth or anyone in the junta that would compare with the Falange’s “Twenty Seven Points” or the Nazi’s “Twenty Five”.
It is unfortunately the case that the NCPO, in spite of its obvious intention to maintain a slightly “harder” version of Thailand”s traditional “soft” authoritarianism, whether electoral or installed by coup, is more of the same old same old in Thai governance.
And you really can’t call that ‘revolutionary’.
As for their cleaving to a ‘syndicalist’ or ‘corporatist’ economic vision, it’s hard to see how any particular label could stick to the messy combination of neo-liberal continuity, revivified state agencies moved back to the center in areas like telecom, and fitful stabs at “Thaksinite” populism.
As always in Thailand, economic policies seem to be determined by the need to satisfy the various stakeholders in the group at the helm. National capitalists get theirs, bureaucrats and generals get theirs, and whatever will maximize profit from corruption for all and sundry determines the “ideology” du jour.
In short, there are very real and relatively powerful fascist elements in the Thai body politic, but they have yet to get it together sufficiently to actually take power for themselves.
Sufficient unto the situation is the evil thereof. No need to invoke a Godwin’s.
A state of madness
Hi Jovan,
Article 44 may not be the glove that fits snugly, but it goes a long way towards towards satisfying the political term “F├╝hrerprinzip”.
A dangerous and far reaching “power tool” in “A State of Madness”
The last king of Thailand?
What a mess listening to the outdated rolyal protocols, the best solution to all this mess is to abolish the monarchy from Thailand in its entirety, not even as a figure-head either!
Searching for Singapore’s soul
No Filipino calls themselves “Malay”, not even those Muslim groups in Mindanao and Palawan. Your designation is archaic pseudo-anthropology. The designations as they exist now are just fine. Calling both Tamils and Sikhs “Indians”, will not lead to race riots in Malaysia. Something else will. You haven’t fixed anything; only made it far worse.
A state of madness
Jovan #9 thanks for the note: in fact it should have been more clearly worded as the “prinzip”, –under Prayut’s authority demanding absolute /illogical/ obedience to the point of transcending right or wrong. The whole “madness” starting since the 1950s I have elsewhere referred to as the “White Crow period”; a time of contradictions, duplicity, and moral inversions.
The last king of Thailand?
You know that this is lese majeste, don’t you? Chaging the royal law of succession is against the monarchy. HM the King has installed the crownprince already as his successor, thus selecting someone else implies that HM the King did something wrong!
A state of madness
I have equal misgivings with applying the term fascism to the present system or situation in Thailand. While there are no doubts that there are elements of fascism, there are also elements of Wilhelminian militarism, and many strong religious- feudal factors at play. Maybe it’s the need and tendency of academia to fit things into pre-existing frames, but i prefer to look at the situation on it’s own merits.
A state of madness
I agree with you wholeheartedly, Mythai, that one should avoid Thailand as it is at the moment like the plague, but unfortunately I had already planned and paid for my holiday there in February this year. I also have acquaintances there. However, next year I am going to relocate to Bali.
The silenced river
Thank you Olivier for this interesting update on the state of play of just one of several major dams being built on Lao tributaries of the Mekong, which unlike the dams on the mainstream Mekong, receive relatively little critical scrutiny by social science researchers. The Nam Theun 2 and Theun-Hinboun hydropower projects are exceptions, but even for these projects, the research is relatively sparse and patchy in terms of longitudinal exposure to particular dam-impacted communities (the work of Keith Barney documenting Ban Pak Veng is one notable exception). This is a definite lacuna in terms of objective social science research in the region, that to me speaks of the (usually) unstated fear of intimidation, violence, state-induced silencing, and hidden forces that surrounds dam development, leading to a culture of self-censure and intimidation amongst researchers who consider studying this field. And for riparian researchers, one can quite understand and sympathise with this sense of hopelessness in getting to grips with the dynamics of dam-induced development transformations, often before they really start.
But back to Nam Tha, which you may recall I wrote about as a case study in the International Rivers report, “Power Surge: The Impacts of Rapid Dam Development in Laos”, published in 2008, quite soon after you wrote your first article on NM concerning this project. It is interesting to see how the numbers estimated to be impacted by the dam have increased from 7,979 persons in 34 villages based on 2007 data, to 10,523 persons in 37 villages in 2015, a 32 % increase in 8 years presumably based on natural population growth and recognition of 3 more villages impacted as the development has moved forward.
It would be most interesting to hear about people’s hopes, fears and actual experiences on the ground of this massive shock to their lives, livelihoods and cultures, as they contemplate and go through the massively socially and pyschologically disruptive process (on an individual and collective level) of resettlement and readjustment to the transformations wrought by a large-dam project. As you may know, Thayer Scudder, who has studied the social impacts of dam-induced resettlement at many projects worldwide (including being a member of the Panel of Experts for NT2) has developed a four stage framework for conceptualising the process within a behavioural perspective, with the entire process, he maintains taking two generations to be successful (not always the case with many dam projects). His stages are as follows:
Stage 1 is labelled the Planning and Recruitment Stage.
Stage 2: Adjustment and Coping
Stage 3: Community Formation and Economic Development
Stage 4: Handing Over and Incorporation.
(Scudder, T. 2005. The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, Institutional and Political Costs. Eathscan, London)
In his book, Scudder deals with criticisms of this four stage model and goes on to suggest a potential combination with Michael Cernea’s “impoverishment risks and reconstruction model” as an improved way forward for researchers. However, such an analytical model I imagine is aimed far more at large-scale studies for well funded multi-disciplinary teams to conduct, not individual anthropologists with presumably limited resources. Therefore, I wondered if you are considering using an existing analytical framework to study the communities you’ve become familiar with and are in the process of transition, or how you intend to approach the multiple dimensions of involuntary resettlement? Issues of access, trust and willingness of impactees to speak on the record, I imagine will be a major issue?
I would be grateful if you could update me and other readers interested in such issues your future findings through the useful medium of NM and direct us towards any published materials you may make on the Nam Tha case study, as its execution is taking place under rather different circumstances than the slightly more transparent NT2, so I would imagine will make for an interesting and illuminating comparative case.
Also, one minor correction I would like to point out from your report above, namely that there was effectively a 7 year long hiatus on official news concerning the Nam Tha project between 2007-14, and that only in November 2014 was there an announcement in VT Times that:
“an agreement had been signed between the Lao Ministry of Planning and Investment and the Nam Tha 1 Lao Power Co. Ltd, a company created by China Southern Grid (CSG), a major electricity company operating in Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Hainan provinces.”
However, I would like to draw your attention to an earlier official announcement that there was a groundbreaking ceremony held at the dam site on 28 December 2013, as outlined below:
Lao PDR’s News Agency Report Online, Dec. 30, 2013
Nam Tha 1 Hydropower Dam breaks ground
(KPL) A groundbreaking ceremony for the US$ 471-million Nam Tha 1
Hydropower dam project was held on 28 December in Bokeo Province.
The groundbreaking ceremony was attended by Deputy Prime Minister
Somsavat Lengsavad and relevant officials.
The dam will be equipped with an installed capacity of 168 MW and an
annual power output of 759 GWH.
On a 28-year concession, the dam is co-operated by China Southern Grid
International (holding an eighty percent stake of shares alongside
Electricite Du Lao) and is expected to begin generating power by the end
of 2017.
The dam, for which a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in August
2006, is located in Pha-oudom District, Bokeo Province and Nalea
District in Luangnamtha Province. Power generated by the dam will be
supplied to Northern provinces.
http://www.kpl.net.la/english/news/edn6.htm
—
Please keep NM readers updated in future.
The last king of Thailand?
The most reasonable thing to do is change the constitution / act of succession so
Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn can succeed the current king as queen, with the succession going to the eldest of the four sons of the Crown Prince now living in USA, upon her death or even if she does not want to accept the crown in the first place.
The current Crown Prince could accept being by-passed on grounds of his age and health. His young son by the third wife may not qualify since the divorce of his mother and he’s too young compared to his 4 older step brothers.
The infant son by the fourth wife is also too young to succeed as king at a time when Thailand needs a strong figure.
Searching for Singapore’s soul
‘Chinese’ is more a nationality than an ethnicity. The correct term is ‘Han’. This should be the term used. Otherwise, another better term to use is ‘East Asian’ (EA).
‘Indian’ is also a nationality than an ethnicity. A better term to use is ‘South Asian’ (SA).
‘Malay’ is also not the best term to use since some prefer to call themselves Javanese or Bugis (which are Malay sub-groups), and are Filipinos Malay (since they are Malayo-Polynesian) or not? A better term is ‘Malayo-Polynesian’ or ‘Island South-east Asian’ (ISEA).
‘Other’ sounds like one is trying to exclude this group. Better to classify as ‘General Group’ (GG) or ‘General Classification’ (GC).
So instead of C-I-M-O, have EA-SA-ISEA-GC.
A state of madness
Thanks for the article James. A minor quibble, I would just question your use of “F├╝hrerprinzip” in reference to Prayuth. This term doesn’t refer to a person but to the political principle that all authority ultimately derives from the leader, therefore effectively placing him above the law.
A state of madness
The term fascist for the current system of governance in Thailand is misleading, as several defining features of it do not exist. For example:
1. Fascism is always connected to a revolution and the need for revival after a period of national decline. This ideology was applied by Phibul, but not by the current government.
2. It requires a secular, charismatic “leader” and a leadership cult. Of course, the leader has to be publicly visible, and politically active as the leader of the nation. So far I do not see that Prayud is described as charismatic or sees himself as such, while Phibul certainly was.
3. There has to be a popular mass-movement of followers of the charismatic leader. In many cases the fascists were even elected in a more or less democratic process, or a form of coup found strong popular support with limited opposition. The current government has not been elected. Although there had been support of the last coup, it can hardly be described as a popular, national mass movement following Prayud as the leader of the nation.
Of course, several other aspects like ultra-nationalism, resentment against minorities, denunciation of political and cultural pluralism as treason, etc. fit characteristics of fascism. However, in the case of Thailand I find it more precise to speak of an authoritarian regime combined with a bureaucratic polity, based on an alliance between (factions?) of an elite, parts of a petty bourgeoisie and military/bureaucratic factions. The interesting question is, what political power can be applied by the political leader, who neither has charisma, nor is a full member of the elite, or has full support of the whole military and bureaucracy? Perhaps these deficits are reasons for some of the “madness”.
A state of madness
Excellent article – Professor Taylor’s usual high standard penetrating, sharp, accurate analysis. Especially apt is the Spanish comparison, and its’ monarchist, Falangist reaction against republicanism. However, Franco’s army had at least won DECISiVE victories against a foreign power, albeit weak Morroco. Thailand’s miltary have never even done that ! All Thailand’s miltary have EVER proved themselves decisivily victorious at, is killing their own people. And now they are not even proving victorious at that in Patani. Prayut’s repression is an expression of very worried insecurity.
Pluralism imperiled in Southeast Asia
Yes, the recent events raise doubts and pessimism about pluralism in the Southest Asia.
The author is mentioning the John Furnivall’s doctrine, a form of pluralism which was imposed according to the “divide et impera” principle, replacing the ancient traditional forms of cultural accommodation. The clashes that erupted after the end of the colonialism in part can be explained as a result of this pathological pluralism.
The only positive signals are coming from those experiences where administrative and political autonomy are guaranteed to the minorities (for example for the Muslim Moro of Mindanao in the Philippines and Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia). These directions (empowering the minorities at the ballot box) could promote a new idea of pluralism and have positive implication also at the level of the social integration.
It’s something to be promoted and supported, not the current political winning direction.
Do you think this positive meaning of pluralism is still a west-centric idea that cannot be applied in the Southest Asia?