Patrick. Good answer. I should have realized the headline was not yours. Sorry. We all suffer from this practice. I also suspect the article came over to me a little different from your intention, whether because of editing or my careless reading.
I think the interesting thing about Ratthaprahan 19 kanya is the way it moves things ahead. It’s like a papal conclave. Certain people are excommunicated, and the areas for discussion in the dogma are redefined. Sure, some people are clinging to old positions. But many more are quietly eating humble pie, and trying to compute the new coordinates. With hindsight, it’s easy to condemn. But was a coup inevitable? Especially a coup of a type which has not succeeded for the past 50 years?
I think the book is important because of the way some contributors are trying to help others to understand and confront what has changed with this coup. In this respect, many of the post-Octobrists are the more interesting – perhaps a passing of the torch. Thanapol’s narrative is very powerful, and has a very clear message. Banjerd makes the case you are backing very strongly. Pitch gets a bit muddled but his stance is clear.
There’s also an issue of timing. Immediately after the coup, lots of people got lost. But the intervening months have been a great learning process. Sure you have to look back, but in a spirit which helps people to move ahead.
For some reason Anonymous, Baker seem interested in playing down the AsiaSentinel article. First of all, the Phaisan/FEER article was never more of an outline of the CPB, saying its existed and owned Siam Cement and Siam Commercial Bank and some land. As an uninterpretive introduction, ok. But nothing to write home about. As for the new academic studies, from what I heard they are more historical.
The Asia Sentinel piece offers a new perspective on how the CPB is rushing to develop its land holdings, one shopping center and luxury hotel after another. What’s the rush for the money? What’s the social justification for the type of projects? What’s the value-added to the country? How do they add to the urban mess of Bangkok? Doesn’t the CPB have any constructive idea for Thailand on the science and technology end?
As for Anonymous’ hangup about Chirayut and Selby: It’s unlikely any document research is going to find out dirty stuff about Chirayut; he’s probably fairly clean. Selby was in the 1980s a fixer for Bangkok bank and was brought to the CPB by Bangkok bank’s VIchit Surapongchai. He and the other bankers at CPB are the guys to figure out. Selby probably just engineers the deals they decide on.
And Baker says: “That means its interests are by and large the same as other corporate groups. So…” Is this really true? Does it really have the same interests? What does it have planned for its property income — to buy more property and expand its holdings? To invest in long-term industry? To buy stocks onthe SET? M&A? Diversify overseas? There has to be some creativity to make any of those choices, and all are politically sensitive. Do they have any real strategy at all or are they on auto-pilot to maximise income generation without risk, and to whose benefit?
On reflection you are spot on. Written quickly on the night of 19 September I was just trying to get the “Th” and “atra” cleaned up. I overlooked the “Sh”/”Ch”.
Not much of a choice for the academics really……support Thaksin (democracy?) or support removing Thaksin (coup).
It’s a pity removing Thaksin by vote was not an option.
The electorate also did not have much of a choice….. TRT or Democrats.
If those continue to be the only choices, then coups will remain on the table as an option (despite the apparent decline in popularity of the junta)
The time of the protests definitely was not a time of reasoned public discourse, and to bee seen as a suspected “intellectual crony” of Thaksin by merely providing a differentiated analysis of the options, or by questioning the options chosen by the majority, was not many academics’ cup of tea. The intellectual atmosphere at that time was rather restrictive (it was better not to say that one still used AIS). Even asking whether Thaksin’s dissolution of parliament was not a rather logical decision given the thrust of the protests–lack of legitimacy–could lead to angry reactions.
However, it was only the Shin Corp sale that really broke all dams. In this context, one can expand Jory’s criticism to the newspapers. Before the sale, The Nation, for example, took an anti-Sonthi stance. “Mob politics is not the answer” and irresponsible, they wrote. Only a short while later, after the Shin Corp sale, this had changed into “The real war has just begun”–i.e. the mob politics to oust Thaksin. From this point onwards, almost all papers looked like those in a totalitarian country–only one single point of view: Thaksin must go. Especially significant was when Thai Rath joined this line. And as important as academics are, newspapers are certainly not any less important. In the case of the protests, professionally responsible reporting was largely abandoned. This would be a nice case study for students of mass communication looking for a topic for their MA theses.
Huh??? There is no “sh-” sound in any of the Tai dialects of modern Thailand–either initial or final. Tones aside, “Taksin Chinawat” works better(the initial syllable in the family name, “chin”, pronounced like the part of the face).
nganadeeleg: Concerning your last sentence, yes, I agree. Thaksin used to say that a crisis must be turned into an opportunity. However, he has managed to turn lots of opportunities into a long-lasting crisis, including his probable end as a politician. That’s a baffling “achievement”, and largely due to his character flaws.
nganadeeleg: I wanted to make a distinction between Thaksin’s “fantasies” and the reason for the anti-Thaksin passions. That is, it was not him indulging in this or that, but his sale of Shin Corp that pushed things beyond Sonthi’s more limited possibilities, although those who joined him did this largely as “dancers” (hangkhrueng). I agree that Thaksin should never have sold Shin Corp. Whether this justified the end and the means of the protests is yet another question. And whether they will lead to a more democratic political system rather seems to be in doubt, given that the protests brought back the military, the bureaucracy, and the monarchy, etc. It might be that the overall outcome will be worse than with Thaksin. But this remains to be seen.
As for my opinion of politicians, I think that they are Thais who have to act within their respective social structures, just as any other group of people. Otherwise, they could not operate or succeed (it thus makes little sense to denounce them as “electocrats”). As such, politicians are neither better nor worse that journalists, academics, businessmen, Buddhist priests, bureaucrats, intellectuals, soldiers, or civil society activists.
After a decades of industrial development, the average Thai citizen has little to show for it other than a national self-image of greatness and a string of debts that they never quite finish paying off from downturn to downturn. Furthermore, they haven’t even really suceeded in improving their skillsbase to deal with the Chinese threat. Post-industrial Thailand could well be looming even before most people get to see any real benefit from industrialisation. Did Thaksin at any time point out these stark realities? That’s the fantasy! The fact that Thaksin proved as inept and corrupt as his predecessors (and successors) isn’t really much comfort to us all.
But the whole things is such a politically explosive issue that I doubt most would be able to untangle the truth from the knotted ball that is Cambodian/ Vietnamese relations
No doubt that we will be hearing more in the coming months
News on the plight of the Montegnards, another persecuted ethinic minority of Vieetnam has been scarce recently.
Thanks for the comments. Just a number of clarifications:
Firstly, “Silence of the Intellectual Lambs” was not my title, and I wasn’t informed that it was to be used. But I understand a newspaper’s desire to use a catchy title to attract the readers. It is not a title that I would have chosen, and in any case, I don’t regard the academics as “lambs”. Far from it.
Secondly, nowhere in the article did I say that the contributors supported the coup, although I suspect that a number of them believe (but are careful not to say outright) that the coup was a necessary evil to get rid of Thaksin.
The main point of the article was to raise the question why in the crisis leading up to the coup so many academics failed to support a democratically elected Prime Minister and his government in the face of royalist forces determined to use extra-Constitutional means to oust him. Why did so many of them repeatedly belittle the importance of elections, and publicly condemn (in newspaper articles, etc.) again and again Thaksin’s “immorality”, thereby weakening the government’s position further? And when in this issue of Fa Dio Kan a number of them come out and posture as democrats I believe that that hypocrisy needs to be pointed out.
In fact, this is exactly the point that Fa Dio Kan itself makes in the volume: in the interview with Nidhi, in including Somsak’s criticisms of the “song mai ao” position, and in numerous other places.
I never believed that the “choice” was between Thaksin or the junta. I do strongly believe, however, that whatever one thought of Thaksin, at this stage in Thailand’s democratic development it was necessary to support AS STRONGLY AS POSSIBLE the principle of respecting the result of elections, especially when one had to know what the only alternative could have been. The academics, who wield great influence over political discourse in Thailand, completely failed to do this. That was their “choice”. When one sees the way that the majority of the poor are treated in this country, and when the academics (with some honorable exceptions) effectively help undermine the legitimacy of the only lever they have over the political process, I believe they deserve to be criticized.
As for the editor of Fa Dio Kan, I have the highest respect for the work he has done in making Fa Dio Kan the most lively and interesting Thai social science journal around today. I especially admire his willingness to critically discuss the monarchy publicly. In fact, I had written a paragraph precisely to that effect in the article but unfortunately it was cut in the editing. My article was in no sense whatsoever a “belittling” of his achievements. However at the same time I believe that rather than “celebrating” the pieces in the volume they deserve what all academic discourse deserves: analysis and criticism, in order to push the debate further.
For me the “big question” is different to the one that you posed at the end of your post. Of course there are forces ready to oppose the liberalizing, democratizing trend in Thai politics. We all know exactly who those forces are and why they oppose that trend. My question was why the majority of Thai academics supported these forces over a democratically elected government.
Finally, I should say that I have the utmost respect for the work of a number of Thai academics, whose abilities greatly outweigh my own meager talents, and who work under conditions far more challenging than those I have experienced. However I have numerous criticisms of certain aspects of Thai academia and in particular the political role of many of them in the events of last year. I strongly believe that on this and many other issues for more criticism is needed than is currently the case.
Srithanonchai said: “People indulge of all sort of things. What’s wrong with what Thaksin chose? …………since it was only the Shin Corp sale that really inflamed the passions of some Bangkokian self-appointed guardians of morality and the national good. Without that, he would still be in government.”
I share your obviously low opinion of politicians, Srithanonchai, however I still expect a PM to set a better example.
If Thaksin had more morality and respect for the national good, he would still be in government.
(however if he had TOO MUCH more morality and respect for the national good, he never even would have made it to PM in the first place).
“Thaksin set about indulging in his own set of fantasies about his extreme usefulness to the nation. So I believe he has been instrumental in helping to create this near civil war situation.”
People indulge of all sort of things. What’s wrong with what Thaksin chose?
“near civil war situation” > That’s very much “over” or “ver”. Moreover, the first and the second point are not connected, since it was only the Shin Corp sale that really inflamed the passions of some Bangkokian self-appointed guardians of morality and the national good. Without that, he would still be in government.
One doesn’t have to watch too much of the video to get the drift and the view of the film maker … the subtitle refers to “South Vietnam”, a term hardly ever used these days. She also uses a foreign spelling of the Mekong.
I’m certainly not going to shift blame from any of the parties you have all mentioned so far. Just to say this. Thaksin manoevred himself with money and dishonesty into a premiership with little initial opposition. We could have ignored how he got there if he had really done something positive to smooth the way for the future succession. Instead, he concentrated on recouping his investment and performing illusive economic miracles. The situation in Thailand has never been conducive to a quick fix, but that is precisely what we got. Instead of dealing with the reality of an aging and deluded monarchy with a diplomatic touch (as is so necessary when so many people so obviously do ‘love’ some of its members), Thaksin set about indulging in his own set of fantasies about his extreme usefulness to the nation. So I believe he has been instrumental in helping to create this near civil war situation.
Whatever I may wish for the future of this country, it most certainly does not encompass the feckless/reckless Thaksin, who is an even greater liability to the country than the heir apparent.
Do we now regret murdering all those grassroots radicals back in the 50s to 70s?
In response to Bangkok Pundit, all that I can say is, “Have another look at the Phaisan article.” It offered data. Not the whole picture, to be sure, but enough to make the corporate logic of the CPB clear. I vividly recall, for example, its numbers on the proportion of CPB staff managing real estate–including rural lands–as opposed to share investments, at a time when the CPB’s income came largely from the latter. This is the sort of insight that can come from rigorous research … And, of course, there is no need to “ask about” the CPB at the Commerce Ministry. You take the bus from Victory Monument to Sanam Bin Nam, go the Department of Business Devlopment, pay the fee, and examine the registration files–including share-holder lists–of firms in which you are interested. Nothing on these files is marked “CPB”. People do research like this all the time. So my earlier point has no similarity with criticisms of Paul Handley, who went the extra mile and did the research needed to make his points thoroughly and convincingly. Too bad that the Asia Sentinel did not emulate him. The significance of all this requires it, as some of the other matters raised in my earlier post suggest. For example, there are paper trails for Chirayu and Selby. And the cultivation of trusted sources in Bangkok financial circles would yield much additional insight into their activities during the past decade. Your point about the failure of the local press to tackle this topic is fair, not least as it could be done rather obliquely–as by sharing a bit of data and leaving it to readers to draw their own conclusions …
I guess that there will have been elections shortly before the conference. That might not be a problem. However, I am still curious to learn what “the real issues in contemporary Thai studies” are.
Some see parallels with Turkey, but being the history geek that I am, I see parallels with medieval Europe, possible 16th century Germany. Thailand, despite the elimination of sakdina, seems to maintain feudal estates, with the extended palace (M.R.s & M.L.s and their descendents included), backed by the Sangha representing the traditional First Estate of King and clergy.
Then we have the modern nobility of the second estate, basically the wealthy Sino-Thai business leaders and banking families not represented in the traditional sakdina system. This is the estate of Thaksin, and the estate that is in the most turmoil relative to competition for leadership. It is also the estate engaged in a silent struggle with the first estate.
Of course the analogy must be changed a bit to somehow include a parallel estate, the military. Similar to medieval times where knights were usually the non-first born sons of the nobility who suffered from the law of primogeniture, the current military is also a bit hereditary, or at least acceptance to the school for future despots, Chulachomklao, is like other schools in Thailand and not based upon merit alone. Either way, it is a convenient place to send the wayward son of a good family for a little discipline.
Both the nobility and the military engage in the practice of simony, where they pay for positions, as in paying for a higher position within the military or police, or pay for Royal Ranking such as the Grand Order of the Pink Elephant and other such nonsensical medallions with which to adorn themselves when attending social functions at high end hotel ballrooms, with the hope of getting their pictures in the social pages of the leading newspapers.
And as in medieval Europe, these top estates vie to protect themselves from taxes by insuring that the lower classes take the brunt of the taxation, either directly or indirectly by paying less than market value for agricultural commodities. (I should note that the medieval avoidance of taxes by the elite is equally alive and well in other parts of the world such as in the US).
And again, as in medieval Europe, these top estates hope to divide the traditional Third Estate by setting the lower middle class against the rural peasantry as we see in the criticism of Thaksin’s “populist” programs by Sondhi and others who feign allegiance to the middle class.
There are also other parallels, such as the Santi Asoke movement to the Anabaptists movements of the 60th century, although fortunately the Santi Asoke folks are not as militant as the early Anabaptists.
Yes, I know there are plenty of differences between Thailand today and Europe of 450 years ago and my analogies would probably be ignored, if not laughed at, by those wearing tweed jackets. But it is food for thought.
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[…] to my post of yesterday in relation to the Kaeng Sua Ten dam, I have received the following comment from Chang Noi (of The […]
“The silence of the intellectual lambs”
Patrick. Good answer. I should have realized the headline was not yours. Sorry. We all suffer from this practice. I also suspect the article came over to me a little different from your intention, whether because of editing or my careless reading.
I think the interesting thing about Ratthaprahan 19 kanya is the way it moves things ahead. It’s like a papal conclave. Certain people are excommunicated, and the areas for discussion in the dogma are redefined. Sure, some people are clinging to old positions. But many more are quietly eating humble pie, and trying to compute the new coordinates. With hindsight, it’s easy to condemn. But was a coup inevitable? Especially a coup of a type which has not succeeded for the past 50 years?
I think the book is important because of the way some contributors are trying to help others to understand and confront what has changed with this coup. In this respect, many of the post-Octobrists are the more interesting – perhaps a passing of the torch. Thanapol’s narrative is very powerful, and has a very clear message. Banjerd makes the case you are backing very strongly. Pitch gets a bit muddled but his stance is clear.
There’s also an issue of timing. Immediately after the coup, lots of people got lost. But the intervening months have been a great learning process. Sure you have to look back, but in a spirit which helps people to move ahead.
The tawdry cloak of sufficiency
For some reason Anonymous, Baker seem interested in playing down the AsiaSentinel article. First of all, the Phaisan/FEER article was never more of an outline of the CPB, saying its existed and owned Siam Cement and Siam Commercial Bank and some land. As an uninterpretive introduction, ok. But nothing to write home about. As for the new academic studies, from what I heard they are more historical.
The Asia Sentinel piece offers a new perspective on how the CPB is rushing to develop its land holdings, one shopping center and luxury hotel after another. What’s the rush for the money? What’s the social justification for the type of projects? What’s the value-added to the country? How do they add to the urban mess of Bangkok? Doesn’t the CPB have any constructive idea for Thailand on the science and technology end?
As for Anonymous’ hangup about Chirayut and Selby: It’s unlikely any document research is going to find out dirty stuff about Chirayut; he’s probably fairly clean. Selby was in the 1980s a fixer for Bangkok bank and was brought to the CPB by Bangkok bank’s VIchit Surapongchai. He and the other bankers at CPB are the guys to figure out. Selby probably just engineers the deals they decide on.
And Baker says: “That means its interests are by and large the same as other corporate groups. So…” Is this really true? Does it really have the same interests? What does it have planned for its property income — to buy more property and expand its holdings? To invest in long-term industry? To buy stocks onthe SET? M&A? Diversify overseas? There has to be some creativity to make any of those choices, and all are politically sensitive. Do they have any real strategy at all or are they on auto-pilot to maximise income generation without risk, and to whose benefit?
Note to Reporters Regarding Thai Pronunciation
Hi Ron,
On reflection you are spot on. Written quickly on the night of 19 September I was just trying to get the “Th” and “atra” cleaned up. I overlooked the “Sh”/”Ch”.
Thanks for your input.
Nich
“The silence of the intellectual lambs”
Not much of a choice for the academics really……support Thaksin (democracy?) or support removing Thaksin (coup).
It’s a pity removing Thaksin by vote was not an option.
The electorate also did not have much of a choice….. TRT or Democrats.
If those continue to be the only choices, then coups will remain on the table as an option (despite the apparent decline in popularity of the junta)
“The silence of the intellectual lambs”
The time of the protests definitely was not a time of reasoned public discourse, and to bee seen as a suspected “intellectual crony” of Thaksin by merely providing a differentiated analysis of the options, or by questioning the options chosen by the majority, was not many academics’ cup of tea. The intellectual atmosphere at that time was rather restrictive (it was better not to say that one still used AIS). Even asking whether Thaksin’s dissolution of parliament was not a rather logical decision given the thrust of the protests–lack of legitimacy–could lead to angry reactions.
However, it was only the Shin Corp sale that really broke all dams. In this context, one can expand Jory’s criticism to the newspapers. Before the sale, The Nation, for example, took an anti-Sonthi stance. “Mob politics is not the answer” and irresponsible, they wrote. Only a short while later, after the Shin Corp sale, this had changed into “The real war has just begun”–i.e. the mob politics to oust Thaksin. From this point onwards, almost all papers looked like those in a totalitarian country–only one single point of view: Thaksin must go. Especially significant was when Thai Rath joined this line. And as important as academics are, newspapers are certainly not any less important. In the case of the protests, professionally responsible reporting was largely abandoned. This would be a nice case study for students of mass communication looking for a topic for their MA theses.
Note to Reporters Regarding Thai Pronunciation
Huh??? There is no “sh-” sound in any of the Tai dialects of modern Thailand–either initial or final. Tones aside, “Taksin Chinawat” works better(the initial syllable in the family name, “chin”, pronounced like the part of the face).
Surayud regime: crisis, disarray, morass, doubts, sad reflection
nganadeeleg: Concerning your last sentence, yes, I agree. Thaksin used to say that a crisis must be turned into an opportunity. However, he has managed to turn lots of opportunities into a long-lasting crisis, including his probable end as a politician. That’s a baffling “achievement”, and largely due to his character flaws.
Surayud regime: crisis, disarray, morass, doubts, sad reflection
nganadeeleg: I wanted to make a distinction between Thaksin’s “fantasies” and the reason for the anti-Thaksin passions. That is, it was not him indulging in this or that, but his sale of Shin Corp that pushed things beyond Sonthi’s more limited possibilities, although those who joined him did this largely as “dancers” (hangkhrueng). I agree that Thaksin should never have sold Shin Corp. Whether this justified the end and the means of the protests is yet another question. And whether they will lead to a more democratic political system rather seems to be in doubt, given that the protests brought back the military, the bureaucracy, and the monarchy, etc. It might be that the overall outcome will be worse than with Thaksin. But this remains to be seen.
As for my opinion of politicians, I think that they are Thais who have to act within their respective social structures, just as any other group of people. Otherwise, they could not operate or succeed (it thus makes little sense to denounce them as “electocrats”). As such, politicians are neither better nor worse that journalists, academics, businessmen, Buddhist priests, bureaucrats, intellectuals, soldiers, or civil society activists.
Surayud regime: crisis, disarray, morass, doubts, sad reflection
After a decades of industrial development, the average Thai citizen has little to show for it other than a national self-image of greatness and a string of debts that they never quite finish paying off from downturn to downturn. Furthermore, they haven’t even really suceeded in improving their skillsbase to deal with the Chinese threat. Post-industrial Thailand could well be looming even before most people get to see any real benefit from industrialisation. Did Thaksin at any time point out these stark realities? That’s the fantasy! The fact that Thaksin proved as inept and corrupt as his predecessors (and successors) isn’t really much comfort to us all.
Khmer Krom
well they seem to be hanging out in your neck of the woods, perhaps you should send someone out on a reconnaisance mission to report back ASAP
http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2007/03/australian-cambodians-and-khmer-krom.html
But the whole things is such a politically explosive issue that I doubt most would be able to untangle the truth from the knotted ball that is Cambodian/ Vietnamese relations
No doubt that we will be hearing more in the coming months
News on the plight of the Montegnards, another persecuted ethinic minority of Vieetnam has been scarce recently.
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/vietnam0505/
“The silence of the intellectual lambs”
Reply to Chris Baker
Thanks for the comments. Just a number of clarifications:
Firstly, “Silence of the Intellectual Lambs” was not my title, and I wasn’t informed that it was to be used. But I understand a newspaper’s desire to use a catchy title to attract the readers. It is not a title that I would have chosen, and in any case, I don’t regard the academics as “lambs”. Far from it.
Secondly, nowhere in the article did I say that the contributors supported the coup, although I suspect that a number of them believe (but are careful not to say outright) that the coup was a necessary evil to get rid of Thaksin.
The main point of the article was to raise the question why in the crisis leading up to the coup so many academics failed to support a democratically elected Prime Minister and his government in the face of royalist forces determined to use extra-Constitutional means to oust him. Why did so many of them repeatedly belittle the importance of elections, and publicly condemn (in newspaper articles, etc.) again and again Thaksin’s “immorality”, thereby weakening the government’s position further? And when in this issue of Fa Dio Kan a number of them come out and posture as democrats I believe that that hypocrisy needs to be pointed out.
In fact, this is exactly the point that Fa Dio Kan itself makes in the volume: in the interview with Nidhi, in including Somsak’s criticisms of the “song mai ao” position, and in numerous other places.
I never believed that the “choice” was between Thaksin or the junta. I do strongly believe, however, that whatever one thought of Thaksin, at this stage in Thailand’s democratic development it was necessary to support AS STRONGLY AS POSSIBLE the principle of respecting the result of elections, especially when one had to know what the only alternative could have been. The academics, who wield great influence over political discourse in Thailand, completely failed to do this. That was their “choice”. When one sees the way that the majority of the poor are treated in this country, and when the academics (with some honorable exceptions) effectively help undermine the legitimacy of the only lever they have over the political process, I believe they deserve to be criticized.
As for the editor of Fa Dio Kan, I have the highest respect for the work he has done in making Fa Dio Kan the most lively and interesting Thai social science journal around today. I especially admire his willingness to critically discuss the monarchy publicly. In fact, I had written a paragraph precisely to that effect in the article but unfortunately it was cut in the editing. My article was in no sense whatsoever a “belittling” of his achievements. However at the same time I believe that rather than “celebrating” the pieces in the volume they deserve what all academic discourse deserves: analysis and criticism, in order to push the debate further.
For me the “big question” is different to the one that you posed at the end of your post. Of course there are forces ready to oppose the liberalizing, democratizing trend in Thai politics. We all know exactly who those forces are and why they oppose that trend. My question was why the majority of Thai academics supported these forces over a democratically elected government.
Finally, I should say that I have the utmost respect for the work of a number of Thai academics, whose abilities greatly outweigh my own meager talents, and who work under conditions far more challenging than those I have experienced. However I have numerous criticisms of certain aspects of Thai academia and in particular the political role of many of them in the events of last year. I strongly believe that on this and many other issues for more criticism is needed than is currently the case.
Surayud regime: crisis, disarray, morass, doubts, sad reflection
Srithanonchai said: “People indulge of all sort of things. What’s wrong with what Thaksin chose? …………since it was only the Shin Corp sale that really inflamed the passions of some Bangkokian self-appointed guardians of morality and the national good. Without that, he would still be in government.”
I share your obviously low opinion of politicians, Srithanonchai, however I still expect a PM to set a better example.
If Thaksin had more morality and respect for the national good, he would still be in government.
(however if he had TOO MUCH more morality and respect for the national good, he never even would have made it to PM in the first place).
Surayud regime: crisis, disarray, morass, doubts, sad reflection
“Thaksin set about indulging in his own set of fantasies about his extreme usefulness to the nation. So I believe he has been instrumental in helping to create this near civil war situation.”
People indulge of all sort of things. What’s wrong with what Thaksin chose?
“near civil war situation” > That’s very much “over” or “ver”. Moreover, the first and the second point are not connected, since it was only the Shin Corp sale that really inflamed the passions of some Bangkokian self-appointed guardians of morality and the national good. Without that, he would still be in government.
Khmer Krom
One doesn’t have to watch too much of the video to get the drift and the view of the film maker … the subtitle refers to “South Vietnam”, a term hardly ever used these days. She also uses a foreign spelling of the Mekong.
The tawdry cloak of sufficiency
Is the CPB “crony capitalism”?
Surayud regime: crisis, disarray, morass, doubts, sad reflection
I’m certainly not going to shift blame from any of the parties you have all mentioned so far. Just to say this. Thaksin manoevred himself with money and dishonesty into a premiership with little initial opposition. We could have ignored how he got there if he had really done something positive to smooth the way for the future succession. Instead, he concentrated on recouping his investment and performing illusive economic miracles. The situation in Thailand has never been conducive to a quick fix, but that is precisely what we got. Instead of dealing with the reality of an aging and deluded monarchy with a diplomatic touch (as is so necessary when so many people so obviously do ‘love’ some of its members), Thaksin set about indulging in his own set of fantasies about his extreme usefulness to the nation. So I believe he has been instrumental in helping to create this near civil war situation.
Whatever I may wish for the future of this country, it most certainly does not encompass the feckless/reckless Thaksin, who is an even greater liability to the country than the heir apparent.
Do we now regret murdering all those grassroots radicals back in the 50s to 70s?
The tawdry cloak of sufficiency
In response to Bangkok Pundit, all that I can say is, “Have another look at the Phaisan article.” It offered data. Not the whole picture, to be sure, but enough to make the corporate logic of the CPB clear. I vividly recall, for example, its numbers on the proportion of CPB staff managing real estate–including rural lands–as opposed to share investments, at a time when the CPB’s income came largely from the latter. This is the sort of insight that can come from rigorous research … And, of course, there is no need to “ask about” the CPB at the Commerce Ministry. You take the bus from Victory Monument to Sanam Bin Nam, go the Department of Business Devlopment, pay the fee, and examine the registration files–including share-holder lists–of firms in which you are interested. Nothing on these files is marked “CPB”. People do research like this all the time. So my earlier point has no similarity with criticisms of Paul Handley, who went the extra mile and did the research needed to make his points thoroughly and convincingly. Too bad that the Asia Sentinel did not emulate him. The significance of all this requires it, as some of the other matters raised in my earlier post suggest. For example, there are paper trails for Chirayu and Selby. And the cultivation of trusted sources in Bangkok financial circles would yield much additional insight into their activities during the past decade. Your point about the failure of the local press to tackle this topic is fair, not least as it could be done rather obliquely–as by sharing a bit of data and leaving it to readers to draw their own conclusions …
Thai Studies Conference, Bangkok, 2008
I guess that there will have been elections shortly before the conference. That might not be a problem. However, I am still curious to learn what “the real issues in contemporary Thai studies” are.
Sufficiency casualty
Some see parallels with Turkey, but being the history geek that I am, I see parallels with medieval Europe, possible 16th century Germany. Thailand, despite the elimination of sakdina, seems to maintain feudal estates, with the extended palace (M.R.s & M.L.s and their descendents included), backed by the Sangha representing the traditional First Estate of King and clergy.
Then we have the modern nobility of the second estate, basically the wealthy Sino-Thai business leaders and banking families not represented in the traditional sakdina system. This is the estate of Thaksin, and the estate that is in the most turmoil relative to competition for leadership. It is also the estate engaged in a silent struggle with the first estate.
Of course the analogy must be changed a bit to somehow include a parallel estate, the military. Similar to medieval times where knights were usually the non-first born sons of the nobility who suffered from the law of primogeniture, the current military is also a bit hereditary, or at least acceptance to the school for future despots, Chulachomklao, is like other schools in Thailand and not based upon merit alone. Either way, it is a convenient place to send the wayward son of a good family for a little discipline.
Both the nobility and the military engage in the practice of simony, where they pay for positions, as in paying for a higher position within the military or police, or pay for Royal Ranking such as the Grand Order of the Pink Elephant and other such nonsensical medallions with which to adorn themselves when attending social functions at high end hotel ballrooms, with the hope of getting their pictures in the social pages of the leading newspapers.
And as in medieval Europe, these top estates vie to protect themselves from taxes by insuring that the lower classes take the brunt of the taxation, either directly or indirectly by paying less than market value for agricultural commodities. (I should note that the medieval avoidance of taxes by the elite is equally alive and well in other parts of the world such as in the US).
And again, as in medieval Europe, these top estates hope to divide the traditional Third Estate by setting the lower middle class against the rural peasantry as we see in the criticism of Thaksin’s “populist” programs by Sondhi and others who feign allegiance to the middle class.
There are also other parallels, such as the Santi Asoke movement to the Anabaptists movements of the 60th century, although fortunately the Santi Asoke folks are not as militant as the early Anabaptists.
Yes, I know there are plenty of differences between Thailand today and Europe of 450 years ago and my analogies would probably be ignored, if not laughed at, by those wearing tweed jackets. But it is food for thought.
A “Peasants’ War” anyone?