James, I’m not sure if “passive acquiescence” to coups is the right way of describing his position.
He seemed passive in 1991, although Paul Handley describes some pretty intricate behind-the-scenes stuff concerning conflicts of economic interest between the palace and Chatichai’s business cronies as well as the Queen’s active support for Suchinda.
1985 was settled by force of arms in a short but bloody manner rather than through royal approval or disapproval. It was probably the most bloody coup attempt since the Boworadej Rebellion in 1933, which led directly to the abdication of R.7. Prem was visiting Indonesia at the time while the King was in the South.
He was certainly not passive in 1981, when rebels took over Bangkok and Prem and the royal family fled to Khorat. His continued support of Prem was pivotal.
He passively accepted Kriangsak’s 1977 coup against Tanin, but still let the world know his disapproval to it by immediately appointing Tanin to his Privy Council.
And his role in the 1976 coup and the 6 October massacre is still debated today. The King was passively supportive to the coups of the Three Tyrants in the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s. But that’s because he had actively supported of Sarit’s 1957 coup. The Three Tyrants were Sarit’s cronies, so it could be argued that he had no need to be particularly active.
Thanks for your comments Patiwat.
I don’t know if bringing back ISOC would help either – but the point I was trying to make is that I think Prem thinks it would.
I don’t think the King is inactive generally – as you point out, he has been very active in terms of rural development and other causes close to his heart. I think that the particular circumstances of the moment (his fractured rib, etc) combined with the fact that he has usually been in a position of passive acquiescence to coups in the past (since a confrontation between King and Army would probably lead to civil war) means that he is unlikely to have played any active role in this one. It was enough that he was known to dislike Thaksin especially after Thaksin tried to upstage him during the Jubilee.
I have seen Stallone’s films since my childhood. Yea,here,
“Rambo” I was crazy about this film while I was in a primary
school in Thantlang, Chin State.I am amazed and thrilled
that he is going to rambo again in this jungle of rarely explored Burma. I hope Rambo alone could fight any kind of juntas in in the world. But, he must come here with a very fast chopper with long legs so it could land down at any place since Burma has only few airports.
Caution: Hey, Big Rambo, don’t forget to bring your Burmese natioanal ID card to enter Burma. he he !!!!
Oh you are such a dreamer Andrew. Now be sure to keep your hat on and don’t let all that sunshine in Brighton affect your head!!!
While I agree that the rural urban divide is ‘blurred by demographic fluidity’ I think that the extent of it is often overstated to the extent that it is sometimes argued that (the divide) doesn’t exist any more. The location people live and work is often a very different place to where they call home – I guess there are many and varied reasons for this.
But I guess that you are referring to the issue of house registration in your post. I understand that it determines where and for whom you can vote – unless, strangely, you reside overseas. However, I assumed that your house registration also determined where you received your basic education and primary health care. This was put to me, once, as a reason why so many parents left their kids to be nurtured by their grandparents and older relatives in the villages while their parents worked in Bangkok. Can any of your readers clarify for me if this is so or not?
I’ve listened every single words of the sufficient economy from it’s origin. I agree that it is reasonable and that people should listen and may consider applying it for their daily life as a good suggestion. But it is up to individual to take or to interpret or to adapt it in their own ways, there is no way for anyone to tell right or wrong from something that considered as relatively vague. To take it as an economic theory or a country economic policy it has be able to answer a lot of questions which many has already been asked in this forum. Many or most policies of Thaksin’s government can be considered as the policies that are in line with sufficient economy, for example village fund, and cheap health care service for all or even all the mega infrastructure projects, because the purposes of all these policies are to put in things that are needed but lacked in Thailand although many may like to think that they are just for politicians to corrupt. Please don’t be angry at those people who questioned or criticised, if it is good or genuine, it should be able to stand for itself.
Nice post James – could I add the breakdown of ‘traditional’ notions of the ‘client patron relationship’ to your list of possible reasons for the coup? Or if as a reason for the coup is a bit too fanciful perhaps as a possible reason for the non-government parties boycotting the election earlier this year.
The ‘client patron relationship’ implies that, amongst other things, the client gains some benefit from the relationship – it’s a two-way thing. If the benefit is reduced or disappears then the relationship weakens. I know that surface appearances suggest that this relationship is alive and well – I see people happily perform and act it out all the time (I have lots of great stories to tell). However, as some of the observations and discussion around ‘vote buying’ suggest, relying on ‘traditional’ structural relationships like these do not always lead to electoral success. Therefore, if relying on the ‘client patron relationship’ is the only electoral strategy that you can come up with, and from hard experience you know that it is going to fail, why bother contesting the elections at all?
His comments show the dramatic stability in Thai-Burmese relations for the past decade. Despite what Asda Jayanama would have you think, constructive engagement didn’t start with Thaksin. It started with Chuan 1, and was continued by Banharn and Chuan 2 and Thaksin.
Your ideas are insightful and well worded, but I take issue to several of them, particularly regarding the South as a key factor behind the coup.
The key reason is that the post-coup policy to the South has not really changed. Has the military government shown a greater willingness to negotiate? In public yes, but there’s nothing really new about that. It’s been suggested at various times in the previous government, but ultimately failed, not because Thaksin didn’t support it (which he did, and then didn’t, and then did, and then didn’t…), but because military intel never figured out who to negotiate with. Up until the coup, they still admitted that they had no idea who was behind the insurgency.
The military government has suggested bringing back the ISOC’s Southern Command. ISOC was one of Prem’s babies, so it sort of makes sense. But I really don’t see how bringing the ISOC back to the South would help bring peace back there. Remember, the ISOC Deputy Director Pallop Pinmanee gave the “attack” order at Krue Sae Mosque.
I also think your analysis under-estimates the active role of the King. He’s been called a tired old man since the 1980’s, when there were also rumors that he might retire/abdicate. But he’s never been one to lie back and just let things happen to him. Witness his high level of activity in the 1980’s over those controversial water management projects (Pa Sak, Pak Panang, Bajoh) and his vigorous advocacy in the 1990’s for the self-sufficient economy. He may be old but he will not fade away. A good thing for those who think he’s a stabilizing or progressive figure – a bad thing for those who think he’s a reactionary.
These are both, no doubt, of interest to a number of New Mandala readers. If any other readers have Southeast Asia sites/conferences/etc they would like New Mandala to have a look at/draw attention to/briefly review then we will certainly consider it.
We are always happy to devote posts to events, publications and websites of interest to the wider Southeast Asian studies community.
I think Prem, his approach to defending the state, and the structure of the Thai state he defends are the keys to understanding this coup.
I’ve been thinking about the Coup and how it’s been discussed and I think there is a missing historical and structural perspective. While it’s good that New Mandala has been free to discuss the role of the network monarchy (to use Duncan McCargo’s useful term) in the coup, I think the way it has been discussed has tended to focus too much on the personal and the proximate (the conflict between HM King Bhumibol and PM Thaksin) rather than ultimate causes. This leads us into a couple of traps – the “Mr Thaksin is a bad man” trap, and the wrath of the network monarchy as the discussion forum becomes swamped by the “we love our King” mob. Indeed, despite Nick’s prudent action in censoring some comments, this is a demonstration of the sort of thing Duncan is talking about – no monarch told these people to log on and flood the board with ad hominem attacks. Rather, the institution of the monarchy has become such that it catches nearly all Thais in its net and influences them to drown out criticism.
Let me offer up some hypotheses. First, I don’t believe that the king had anything much to do with the coup. In the first place, HM King Bhumibol is a 79 year old man, who had just been through some probably very tiring jubilee celebrations, and then fallen over and fractured a rib. I doubt he is in condition for manufacturing elaborate plots. In the second, it would not fit with HM’s previous behaviour. The king has always ridden coups out rather than actively supporting them. His acts of intervention in 1973, 1992 and 2006 have all been efforts to prevent “counter coups” by sections of the populace from destroying the structure of Thai society. During military coups he has always kept his head down.
Rather, as someone remarked earlier, this coup has Papa Prem’s fingerprints all over it. It is worth remembering that Prem came up under Kriengsak, who deposed PM Thanom in 77 despite the more or less explicit support that Thanom had been receiving from both the King and the Queen. This is an indication of the actual respect that the military has for the monarchy as a central decision maker rather than a central symbol. I would guess that this coup, and probably all previous coups, was presented to the King as a fait accompli, and his choice was either to graciously acquiece or suffer the fate of Rama VII at the hands of Phibulsongkram
.
Assuming that Prem is the driving force behind this coup (which means that Thaksin’s unwise rantings about “extra constitutional charismatic figures” were entirely correct), it is worth examining his motives. The last time Prem took control in 1980, his overriding motive, to which the economic boom of the time was simply a means to an end, was to defeat the communist insurgency. The CPT was booming at the time. Having Vietnamese troops on 2 borders (Cambodia and Laos) was a clear danger to Thailand that the corrupt military was completely unprepared to deal with, especially after losing American bases, air support, etc post 73 (let’s remember that the Vietnamese conquered Cambodia in a matter of weeks, and then beat off an attack by the PRC for good measure. They could have gone through 1980 Thailand like a hot knife through butter). With the CPT as a potential 5th column, especially given the (as it turned out, never utilised) potential for urban infiltration and uprising by the “october generation” (some of whom explicitly blamed the monarchy for the 76 massacre), the fall of the Kingdom was a real possibility.
Prem and the “Democratic Soldiers” dealt with the CPT through an ingenious counter-insurgency campaign, partly borrowed from Gen Slim’s suppression of the CPM during the Malayan emergency, and with the external threat by professionalising the military (where puppet PM Surayut got his big break). He was aided, as it turned out, by the CPT’s own Maoist ineptitude. The connection to current events is that the civilian-police-military counter-insurgency methods he established (including intensive pro-royal propaganda) were the same ones that were used, up until Thaksin’s election, to keep the south under control. Thaksin saw that many aspects of the CPM infrastructure had become patronage networks for the Democrats and so dismantled them for political advantage. This led to the flare ups which Thaksin’s ham-fisted suppression approach only worsened.
I am going to venture further out on the limb and speculate that the Hat Yai bombings may have been a turning point in the way Prem thought about the results of abandoning his CPM methodology. They marked the first time that the Islamists turned to Al Quaeda tactics of large-scale terrorist attacks against targets frequented by westerners, as opposed to attacking the Thai state in its various forms (army bases, schools, etc), one-on-one terror, and leaving the tourist trade alone. They may indicate that the southern insurgents are in contact with AQ, Jemaa Islamiya, or other international groups with a pan-islamist, anti-western, mass terror agenda and the resources to back it up. I can’t think of any other reason why Gen Sonthi is taking an approach of trying to open negotiations with the insurgents within weeks of such an atrocity (for which he was rebuked publicly by Thaksin, just a day or two before the coup – note that there were sufficient troops in Bangkok for a coup because they were in transit from the north “to deal with the southern insurgency” – perhaps they were used for just that). Just as Prem’s amnesties to CPT fighters broke the back of the Party, removing its urban 5th column potential and helping split it off from the Vietnamese threat, so I suspect Sonthi and Prem wish to split the southern insurgents off from Al Quaeda et al before they help AQ or JI attack Bangkok. While the southerners may be smaller than the CPT they have a far better ideological grip on their followers and now, an express willingness to attack urban infrastructure (banks, tourist spots, etc) which the CPT could never get it together to do. Prem may see them as just as big a threat to the centre, and thus justify the seizure of power in order to deal with a new external/internal combination threat. I see analogies with Musharref which could also be drawn, enabling him to believe that as long as he is tough on “terrorists” then the US would support the coup (note that although “military aid” was automatically cut by the US after the coup, anti-terrorist military aid was exempt from this).
It would be interesting to observe what the business families, networks, etc historically linked to Prem are doing at this time. While Thaksin is often analysed as the embodiment of a capitalist ruling class, it is worth remembering that capitalists, like other classes, only act as a “class” in response to external challenge – the rest of the time they fight amongst themselves. I am inclined to wonder who is moving in to the vacuum left by Shin Corp, and what their history of links to the military-commercial complex would reveal.
So much for my guesses at the historical background to the coup. On to the structural, and the reasons Prem has gotten away with it twice. Thailand is inherently vulnerable to coups. As explained by Luttwak in his classic Coup d’Etat, Coups rely on the concentration of power in the centre, since only by concentrating power in the centre does a decapitation attack become possible. Having seized the power in the centre, the coup-maker must keep it concentrated lest his control over it slip away – thus creating the circumstances for the next coup. Imagine if the australian army suddenly took it into its head to seize canberra. In a very real sense, they could not control the country – Canberra has only a fraction of Australia’s money and population, the army would be isolated, other parts of the country would rise against them, and they would fail.
Thailand, by contrast, is massively overconcentrated in its capital, as countries with royal histories tend to be (eg England and london; france and paris vs Australia/canberra and America/washington). Thailand is like this because it is a south-east asian monarchy – that is to say, it is a mandala, in which control of the people at the centre is important and control of the periphery is unimportant as long as it is kept subordinated. Thus economic development has been overconcentrated in Bangkok since the sack of Vientiane, and the rural areas have received railroads for troops rather than irrigation, and in general propaganda designed to ensure the loyalty of persons rather than money to ensure the productivity of places. The mandala state, the network monarchy, the traffic congestion, the history of coups and the attitude of elite groups towards rural areas are all part of an all but inseparable matrix which shapes and binds the relationship of core and periphery within Thailand. I am not arguing for complete structural determinism here; but it is a matrix which makes a coup more likely to be an option whenever there is some form of crisis.
It is worth noting that even the 1997 constitution was written to accomodate this dynamic. As Ji Giles Ungpakorn has pointed out, despite the constitution’s democratic base, the combination of University degree requirements for MPs and the restrictive voter registration rules meaning that urban-rural migrants stayed registered in the countryside rather than Bangkok, their place of residence and work, meant that any aspiration for labour-based parties which would (as Isaan and Northern MPs have historically done) demand redistribution of the wealth or that power move down the ladder was ruled out of court before entering the game. Thaksin’s political strategy flew directly in the face of this structure by drawing power from the diffuse rural vote. In one sense the coup was justified because the 97 constitution failed in its purpose. Its drafters believed in the power of mass, middle class, urban demonstration a la the PAD as the best way to preserve an elite democracy which kept a civilian version of the centralised structure above intact. After all, had they not seen the power of such demonstrations in 1992, despite the fact that the 91 elections featured massive rural vote buying by the “devil” parties (see Ruth McVey’s Money and Power in Provincial Thailand). When repeating the 92 gambit inexplicably failed to deliver governmental change away from a government out of the elite democracy’s control, the middle class blamed the same cause – rural vote buying and election rigging, despite lack of any particular evidence for such a thing this time around – and have now resorted to supporting the very process that they opposed the first time, the military coup, in order to preserve the deeper structure of power.
I apologise if these ideas are still incoherently formed and clumsily worded.
The Society for Heterodox Economics is having a session about “Burma’s economic Dystopia” at their next annual conference and have called for papers. They’re an interesting bunch.
Ji Giles Ungpakorn has been calling for voting laws to be changed in that direction for a while now. Some left oriented people have been pressing for something of the sort to be in the new constitution (slim hope).
This is all well and good but don’t overlook the national, political and personal agendas that sit behind awarding degrees and what is gained through doing so…they are more than mere recognition of “good deeds”.
Handley’s book is actually very well written and extremely well researched. I have yet to have found a single major factual error in it, which is quite shocking considering the myriad errors often found in Thai history books.
Its coverage of the history of Thai constitutionalism is unrivaled in a mass market book. Its description of the complex relationship between the King, Marshal Plaek, and Sarit is excellent. His description of the various theories behind the death of King Ananda is comprehensive and very fair. He’s very open about the issues surrounding the Crown Prince, but he seems fairly sympathetic to the man.
Little negative information in the book is hearsay. One of them is that the King unsuccessfully lobbied to get a Nobel Prize for Princess Chulabhorn. Another is criticism he made of Aung San Su Kyi in front of a bunch of Nobel laureates who were visiting him. Handley claims confidential diplomatic sources for both.
When he makes use of questionable sources, e.g., communist propaganda, he makes it very clear that the sources might be biased. He does this at least three times: first referring to the child of the Queen’s little sister and second referring to expenses incurred during one of the Queen’s trips abroad. He also quotes from open letters attacking one of the Crown Prince’s women, presumably written by another one of his women.
But the book is a lot more than a collection of negative information; the analysis of political development in Thailand is very sharp. Anybody interested in Thai history can’t really skip this book.
Oh yeah, it also says that Prem is gay. Not in a bigoted way though. He just states it as a fact and then moves on.
Actually, most of those PhDs came from Thai universities. Kaset University once gave him 10 honorary PhDs in one day. The tradition is that every time a new academic department is established, it’s first order of business is to give an honorary degree to the King or member of the royal family.
A very quick Google search revealed that this includes the University of North Texas, the University of Hawaii, the University of Victoria, Griffith University, and the University of Nottingham (I have no time to find the other 131 institutions – if someone can find a complete list please post it for the benefit of New Mandala readers).
What this shows is that over the last 30 years Western academic institutions have played a major role in credentially the knowledge of the King of Thailand, and indeed of other members of the royal family.
In Thailand this credentialization of the knowledge of the royal family plays an extremely important role in legitimating the power of the monarchy and also their involvement in various fields, especially development and education. It is well known that the king has over two thousand royal projects. Knowledge is power, as they say, and the PhD is one of the ways in which the holder of this knowledge is “empowered” – especially in developing countries.
This raises two issues. Firstly, as has been noted already on New Mandala, in Thailand it is forbidden by law to criticise the monarchy, and in turn the public works in which members of the family involve themselves, such as development, education, etc. As has also been raised on this website, there have been serious problems with a number of royal projects that have not been made public because of the ban on criticism of the monarchy. However freedom of speech and freedom to debate and criticize are the hallmarks of Western universities and the academic methodology used in these institutions. Surely these principles should be embodied by the recipients of honorary doctorates. Why do these universities make an exception in the case of honorary doctorates awarded to members of the Thai royal family?
Secondly, I am wondering what is the position of these Western academic institutions on the king’s endorsement of the recent coup d’etat against a democratically elected government. Do they agree with the king’s endorsement of the overthrow of a democratically elected government, and if they do not, do they still stand by their award of the honorary degree? If the latter, does this mean that democratic principles are no longer a requirement for recipients of honorary doctorates?
I am particularly interested in getting a response from international relations offices in Western universities that deal with the awarding of honorary doctorates.
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The empire strikes back
James, I’m not sure if “passive acquiescence” to coups is the right way of describing his position.
He seemed passive in 1991, although Paul Handley describes some pretty intricate behind-the-scenes stuff concerning conflicts of economic interest between the palace and Chatichai’s business cronies as well as the Queen’s active support for Suchinda.
1985 was settled by force of arms in a short but bloody manner rather than through royal approval or disapproval. It was probably the most bloody coup attempt since the Boworadej Rebellion in 1933, which led directly to the abdication of R.7. Prem was visiting Indonesia at the time while the King was in the South.
He was certainly not passive in 1981, when rebels took over Bangkok and Prem and the royal family fled to Khorat. His continued support of Prem was pivotal.
He passively accepted Kriangsak’s 1977 coup against Tanin, but still let the world know his disapproval to it by immediately appointing Tanin to his Privy Council.
And his role in the 1976 coup and the 6 October massacre is still debated today. The King was passively supportive to the coups of the Three Tyrants in the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s. But that’s because he had actively supported of Sarit’s 1957 coup. The Three Tyrants were Sarit’s cronies, so it could be argued that he had no need to be particularly active.
The empire strikes back
Thanks for your comments Patiwat.
I don’t know if bringing back ISOC would help either – but the point I was trying to make is that I think Prem thinks it would.
I don’t think the King is inactive generally – as you point out, he has been very active in terms of rural development and other causes close to his heart. I think that the particular circumstances of the moment (his fractured rib, etc) combined with the fact that he has usually been in a position of passive acquiescence to coups in the past (since a confrontation between King and Army would probably lead to civil war) means that he is unlikely to have played any active role in this one. It was enough that he was known to dislike Thaksin especially after Thaksin tried to upstage him during the Jubilee.
New Rambo and Free Burma
I have seen Stallone’s films since my childhood. Yea,here,
“Rambo” I was crazy about this film while I was in a primary
school in Thantlang, Chin State.I am amazed and thrilled
that he is going to rambo again in this jungle of rarely explored Burma. I hope Rambo alone could fight any kind of juntas in in the world. But, he must come here with a very fast chopper with long legs so it could land down at any place since Burma has only few airports.
Caution: Hey, Big Rambo, don’t forget to bring your Burmese natioanal ID card to enter Burma. he he !!!!
Kaan muang and kaan baan
Oh you are such a dreamer Andrew. Now be sure to keep your hat on and don’t let all that sunshine in Brighton affect your head!!!
While I agree that the rural urban divide is ‘blurred by demographic fluidity’ I think that the extent of it is often overstated to the extent that it is sometimes argued that (the divide) doesn’t exist any more. The location people live and work is often a very different place to where they call home – I guess there are many and varied reasons for this.
But I guess that you are referring to the issue of house registration in your post. I understand that it determines where and for whom you can vote – unless, strangely, you reside overseas. However, I assumed that your house registration also determined where you received your basic education and primary health care. This was put to me, once, as a reason why so many parents left their kids to be nurtured by their grandparents and older relatives in the villages while their parents worked in Bangkok. Can any of your readers clarify for me if this is so or not?
The King Never Smiles?
Can you pls advise where The Kind Never Smiles by Paul Handley can be purchased in Melbourne
Thk you
Sufficiency and the junta
To Khun Vichai,
I’ve listened every single words of the sufficient economy from it’s origin. I agree that it is reasonable and that people should listen and may consider applying it for their daily life as a good suggestion. But it is up to individual to take or to interpret or to adapt it in their own ways, there is no way for anyone to tell right or wrong from something that considered as relatively vague. To take it as an economic theory or a country economic policy it has be able to answer a lot of questions which many has already been asked in this forum. Many or most policies of Thaksin’s government can be considered as the policies that are in line with sufficient economy, for example village fund, and cheap health care service for all or even all the mega infrastructure projects, because the purposes of all these policies are to put in things that are needed but lacked in Thailand although many may like to think that they are just for politicians to corrupt. Please don’t be angry at those people who questioned or criticised, if it is good or genuine, it should be able to stand for itself.
The empire strikes back
Nice post James – could I add the breakdown of ‘traditional’ notions of the ‘client patron relationship’ to your list of possible reasons for the coup? Or if as a reason for the coup is a bit too fanciful perhaps as a possible reason for the non-government parties boycotting the election earlier this year.
The ‘client patron relationship’ implies that, amongst other things, the client gains some benefit from the relationship – it’s a two-way thing. If the benefit is reduced or disappears then the relationship weakens. I know that surface appearances suggest that this relationship is alive and well – I see people happily perform and act it out all the time (I have lots of great stories to tell). However, as some of the observations and discussion around ‘vote buying’ suggest, relying on ‘traditional’ structural relationships like these do not always lead to electoral success. Therefore, if relying on the ‘client patron relationship’ is the only electoral strategy that you can come up with, and from hard experience you know that it is going to fail, why bother contesting the elections at all?
Junta to junta, heart to heart
Nit is the great field marshal’s son.
His comments show the dramatic stability in Thai-Burmese relations for the past decade. Despite what Asda Jayanama would have you think, constructive engagement didn’t start with Thaksin. It started with Chuan 1, and was continued by Banharn and Chuan 2 and Thaksin.
The empire strikes back
Your ideas are insightful and well worded, but I take issue to several of them, particularly regarding the South as a key factor behind the coup.
The key reason is that the post-coup policy to the South has not really changed. Has the military government shown a greater willingness to negotiate? In public yes, but there’s nothing really new about that. It’s been suggested at various times in the previous government, but ultimately failed, not because Thaksin didn’t support it (which he did, and then didn’t, and then did, and then didn’t…), but because military intel never figured out who to negotiate with. Up until the coup, they still admitted that they had no idea who was behind the insurgency.
The military government has suggested bringing back the ISOC’s Southern Command. ISOC was one of Prem’s babies, so it sort of makes sense. But I really don’t see how bringing the ISOC back to the South would help bring peace back there. Remember, the ISOC Deputy Director Pallop Pinmanee gave the “attack” order at Krue Sae Mosque.
I also think your analysis under-estimates the active role of the King. He’s been called a tired old man since the 1980’s, when there were also rumors that he might retire/abdicate. But he’s never been one to lie back and just let things happen to him. Witness his high level of activity in the 1980’s over those controversial water management projects (Pa Sak, Pak Panang, Bajoh) and his vigorous advocacy in the 1990’s for the self-sufficient economy. He may be old but he will not fade away. A good thing for those who think he’s a stabilizing or progressive figure – a bad thing for those who think he’s a reactionary.
Burma Digest
Thanks James and Richard,
These are both, no doubt, of interest to a number of New Mandala readers. If any other readers have Southeast Asia sites/conferences/etc they would like New Mandala to have a look at/draw attention to/briefly review then we will certainly consider it.
We are always happy to devote posts to events, publications and websites of interest to the wider Southeast Asian studies community.
Best wishes to all.
NSF
Burma Digest
The man behind Burma Digest also runs a great UK yahoo group on Burma, a great source for up to date information.
Junta to junta, heart to heart
Is Nitya a relative of THE Phibulsongkram? That’s just too perfect if so.
The empire strikes back
I think Prem, his approach to defending the state, and the structure of the Thai state he defends are the keys to understanding this coup.
I’ve been thinking about the Coup and how it’s been discussed and I think there is a missing historical and structural perspective. While it’s good that New Mandala has been free to discuss the role of the network monarchy (to use Duncan McCargo’s useful term) in the coup, I think the way it has been discussed has tended to focus too much on the personal and the proximate (the conflict between HM King Bhumibol and PM Thaksin) rather than ultimate causes. This leads us into a couple of traps – the “Mr Thaksin is a bad man” trap, and the wrath of the network monarchy as the discussion forum becomes swamped by the “we love our King” mob. Indeed, despite Nick’s prudent action in censoring some comments, this is a demonstration of the sort of thing Duncan is talking about – no monarch told these people to log on and flood the board with ad hominem attacks. Rather, the institution of the monarchy has become such that it catches nearly all Thais in its net and influences them to drown out criticism.
Let me offer up some hypotheses. First, I don’t believe that the king had anything much to do with the coup. In the first place, HM King Bhumibol is a 79 year old man, who had just been through some probably very tiring jubilee celebrations, and then fallen over and fractured a rib. I doubt he is in condition for manufacturing elaborate plots. In the second, it would not fit with HM’s previous behaviour. The king has always ridden coups out rather than actively supporting them. His acts of intervention in 1973, 1992 and 2006 have all been efforts to prevent “counter coups” by sections of the populace from destroying the structure of Thai society. During military coups he has always kept his head down.
Rather, as someone remarked earlier, this coup has Papa Prem’s fingerprints all over it. It is worth remembering that Prem came up under Kriengsak, who deposed PM Thanom in 77 despite the more or less explicit support that Thanom had been receiving from both the King and the Queen. This is an indication of the actual respect that the military has for the monarchy as a central decision maker rather than a central symbol. I would guess that this coup, and probably all previous coups, was presented to the King as a fait accompli, and his choice was either to graciously acquiece or suffer the fate of Rama VII at the hands of Phibulsongkram
.
Assuming that Prem is the driving force behind this coup (which means that Thaksin’s unwise rantings about “extra constitutional charismatic figures” were entirely correct), it is worth examining his motives. The last time Prem took control in 1980, his overriding motive, to which the economic boom of the time was simply a means to an end, was to defeat the communist insurgency. The CPT was booming at the time. Having Vietnamese troops on 2 borders (Cambodia and Laos) was a clear danger to Thailand that the corrupt military was completely unprepared to deal with, especially after losing American bases, air support, etc post 73 (let’s remember that the Vietnamese conquered Cambodia in a matter of weeks, and then beat off an attack by the PRC for good measure. They could have gone through 1980 Thailand like a hot knife through butter). With the CPT as a potential 5th column, especially given the (as it turned out, never utilised) potential for urban infiltration and uprising by the “october generation” (some of whom explicitly blamed the monarchy for the 76 massacre), the fall of the Kingdom was a real possibility.
Prem and the “Democratic Soldiers” dealt with the CPT through an ingenious counter-insurgency campaign, partly borrowed from Gen Slim’s suppression of the CPM during the Malayan emergency, and with the external threat by professionalising the military (where puppet PM Surayut got his big break). He was aided, as it turned out, by the CPT’s own Maoist ineptitude. The connection to current events is that the civilian-police-military counter-insurgency methods he established (including intensive pro-royal propaganda) were the same ones that were used, up until Thaksin’s election, to keep the south under control. Thaksin saw that many aspects of the CPM infrastructure had become patronage networks for the Democrats and so dismantled them for political advantage. This led to the flare ups which Thaksin’s ham-fisted suppression approach only worsened.
I am going to venture further out on the limb and speculate that the Hat Yai bombings may have been a turning point in the way Prem thought about the results of abandoning his CPM methodology. They marked the first time that the Islamists turned to Al Quaeda tactics of large-scale terrorist attacks against targets frequented by westerners, as opposed to attacking the Thai state in its various forms (army bases, schools, etc), one-on-one terror, and leaving the tourist trade alone. They may indicate that the southern insurgents are in contact with AQ, Jemaa Islamiya, or other international groups with a pan-islamist, anti-western, mass terror agenda and the resources to back it up. I can’t think of any other reason why Gen Sonthi is taking an approach of trying to open negotiations with the insurgents within weeks of such an atrocity (for which he was rebuked publicly by Thaksin, just a day or two before the coup – note that there were sufficient troops in Bangkok for a coup because they were in transit from the north “to deal with the southern insurgency” – perhaps they were used for just that). Just as Prem’s amnesties to CPT fighters broke the back of the Party, removing its urban 5th column potential and helping split it off from the Vietnamese threat, so I suspect Sonthi and Prem wish to split the southern insurgents off from Al Quaeda et al before they help AQ or JI attack Bangkok. While the southerners may be smaller than the CPT they have a far better ideological grip on their followers and now, an express willingness to attack urban infrastructure (banks, tourist spots, etc) which the CPT could never get it together to do. Prem may see them as just as big a threat to the centre, and thus justify the seizure of power in order to deal with a new external/internal combination threat. I see analogies with Musharref which could also be drawn, enabling him to believe that as long as he is tough on “terrorists” then the US would support the coup (note that although “military aid” was automatically cut by the US after the coup, anti-terrorist military aid was exempt from this).
It would be interesting to observe what the business families, networks, etc historically linked to Prem are doing at this time. While Thaksin is often analysed as the embodiment of a capitalist ruling class, it is worth remembering that capitalists, like other classes, only act as a “class” in response to external challenge – the rest of the time they fight amongst themselves. I am inclined to wonder who is moving in to the vacuum left by Shin Corp, and what their history of links to the military-commercial complex would reveal.
So much for my guesses at the historical background to the coup. On to the structural, and the reasons Prem has gotten away with it twice. Thailand is inherently vulnerable to coups. As explained by Luttwak in his classic Coup d’Etat, Coups rely on the concentration of power in the centre, since only by concentrating power in the centre does a decapitation attack become possible. Having seized the power in the centre, the coup-maker must keep it concentrated lest his control over it slip away – thus creating the circumstances for the next coup. Imagine if the australian army suddenly took it into its head to seize canberra. In a very real sense, they could not control the country – Canberra has only a fraction of Australia’s money and population, the army would be isolated, other parts of the country would rise against them, and they would fail.
Thailand, by contrast, is massively overconcentrated in its capital, as countries with royal histories tend to be (eg England and london; france and paris vs Australia/canberra and America/washington). Thailand is like this because it is a south-east asian monarchy – that is to say, it is a mandala, in which control of the people at the centre is important and control of the periphery is unimportant as long as it is kept subordinated. Thus economic development has been overconcentrated in Bangkok since the sack of Vientiane, and the rural areas have received railroads for troops rather than irrigation, and in general propaganda designed to ensure the loyalty of persons rather than money to ensure the productivity of places. The mandala state, the network monarchy, the traffic congestion, the history of coups and the attitude of elite groups towards rural areas are all part of an all but inseparable matrix which shapes and binds the relationship of core and periphery within Thailand. I am not arguing for complete structural determinism here; but it is a matrix which makes a coup more likely to be an option whenever there is some form of crisis.
It is worth noting that even the 1997 constitution was written to accomodate this dynamic. As Ji Giles Ungpakorn has pointed out, despite the constitution’s democratic base, the combination of University degree requirements for MPs and the restrictive voter registration rules meaning that urban-rural migrants stayed registered in the countryside rather than Bangkok, their place of residence and work, meant that any aspiration for labour-based parties which would (as Isaan and Northern MPs have historically done) demand redistribution of the wealth or that power move down the ladder was ruled out of court before entering the game. Thaksin’s political strategy flew directly in the face of this structure by drawing power from the diffuse rural vote. In one sense the coup was justified because the 97 constitution failed in its purpose. Its drafters believed in the power of mass, middle class, urban demonstration a la the PAD as the best way to preserve an elite democracy which kept a civilian version of the centralised structure above intact. After all, had they not seen the power of such demonstrations in 1992, despite the fact that the 91 elections featured massive rural vote buying by the “devil” parties (see Ruth McVey’s Money and Power in Provincial Thailand). When repeating the 92 gambit inexplicably failed to deliver governmental change away from a government out of the elite democracy’s control, the middle class blamed the same cause – rural vote buying and election rigging, despite lack of any particular evidence for such a thing this time around – and have now resorted to supporting the very process that they opposed the first time, the military coup, in order to preserve the deeper structure of power.
I apologise if these ideas are still incoherently formed and clumsily worded.
Burma Digest
The Society for Heterodox Economics is having a session about “Burma’s economic Dystopia” at their next annual conference and have called for papers. They’re an interesting bunch.
Kaan muang and kaan baan
Ji Giles Ungpakorn has been calling for voting laws to be changed in that direction for a while now. Some left oriented people have been pressing for something of the sort to be in the new constitution (slim hope).
The empire strikes back
This is all well and good but don’t overlook the national, political and personal agendas that sit behind awarding degrees and what is gained through doing so…they are more than mere recognition of “good deeds”.
The empire strikes back
Handley’s book is actually very well written and extremely well researched. I have yet to have found a single major factual error in it, which is quite shocking considering the myriad errors often found in Thai history books.
Its coverage of the history of Thai constitutionalism is unrivaled in a mass market book. Its description of the complex relationship between the King, Marshal Plaek, and Sarit is excellent. His description of the various theories behind the death of King Ananda is comprehensive and very fair. He’s very open about the issues surrounding the Crown Prince, but he seems fairly sympathetic to the man.
Little negative information in the book is hearsay. One of them is that the King unsuccessfully lobbied to get a Nobel Prize for Princess Chulabhorn. Another is criticism he made of Aung San Su Kyi in front of a bunch of Nobel laureates who were visiting him. Handley claims confidential diplomatic sources for both.
When he makes use of questionable sources, e.g., communist propaganda, he makes it very clear that the sources might be biased. He does this at least three times: first referring to the child of the Queen’s little sister and second referring to expenses incurred during one of the Queen’s trips abroad. He also quotes from open letters attacking one of the Crown Prince’s women, presumably written by another one of his women.
But the book is a lot more than a collection of negative information; the analysis of political development in Thailand is very sharp. Anybody interested in Thai history can’t really skip this book.
Oh yeah, it also says that Prem is gay. Not in a bigoted way though. He just states it as a fact and then moves on.
The empire strikes back
Actually, most of those PhDs came from Thai universities. Kaset University once gave him 10 honorary PhDs in one day. The tradition is that every time a new academic department is established, it’s first order of business is to give an honorary degree to the King or member of the royal family.
The empire strikes back
‘credentialization of the knowledge’ – Is that what a honorary does?
Some ‘academics’ seem to be rather petty minded when it comes to the King.
The empire strikes back
“According to the Guinness Book of Records, King Bhumipol of Thailand has received no fewer than 136 honorary degrees”; “Worthy degrees?” BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/features/mike_baker/1710522.stm Saturday, 15 December, 2001.
A very quick Google search revealed that this includes the University of North Texas, the University of Hawaii, the University of Victoria, Griffith University, and the University of Nottingham (I have no time to find the other 131 institutions – if someone can find a complete list please post it for the benefit of New Mandala readers).
What this shows is that over the last 30 years Western academic institutions have played a major role in credentially the knowledge of the King of Thailand, and indeed of other members of the royal family.
In Thailand this credentialization of the knowledge of the royal family plays an extremely important role in legitimating the power of the monarchy and also their involvement in various fields, especially development and education. It is well known that the king has over two thousand royal projects. Knowledge is power, as they say, and the PhD is one of the ways in which the holder of this knowledge is “empowered” – especially in developing countries.
This raises two issues. Firstly, as has been noted already on New Mandala, in Thailand it is forbidden by law to criticise the monarchy, and in turn the public works in which members of the family involve themselves, such as development, education, etc. As has also been raised on this website, there have been serious problems with a number of royal projects that have not been made public because of the ban on criticism of the monarchy. However freedom of speech and freedom to debate and criticize are the hallmarks of Western universities and the academic methodology used in these institutions. Surely these principles should be embodied by the recipients of honorary doctorates. Why do these universities make an exception in the case of honorary doctorates awarded to members of the Thai royal family?
Secondly, I am wondering what is the position of these Western academic institutions on the king’s endorsement of the recent coup d’etat against a democratically elected government. Do they agree with the king’s endorsement of the overthrow of a democratically elected government, and if they do not, do they still stand by their award of the honorary degree? If the latter, does this mean that democratic principles are no longer a requirement for recipients of honorary doctorates?
I am particularly interested in getting a response from international relations offices in Western universities that deal with the awarding of honorary doctorates.