At the same time, rumors are rife in Bangkok about an imminent coup. It is possible that the military will once again intervene to break the political deadlock if the crisis gets out of hand. Army chief Gen. Prayuth Chanocha has suggested that a coup is still an attractive option if the government proves unable to control the situation. If such whisperings are true, the Thai people will have to endure a new round of political conflict–and, more likely, a fresh round of violence.
– Extracted from Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Thailand’s rising nationalism”, The Wall Street Journal, 9 February 2011. Earlier New Mandala coverage of “coup talk” is available here.
This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation I have done on the probability of a coup in 2011.
Below are listed all the coups since 1932 (we are told there are 17 but I can only find references to 13) and the length of time between coups together with the average and standard deviation.
Assuming a normal distribution, I reckon there is a 48% chance of a coup this year.
Year Length of time between coups
1932
1933 1
1947 14
1951 4
1957 6
1971 14
1973 2
1976 3
1977 1
1977 0
1981 4
1985 4
1991 6
1992 1
2006 14
average length of time between coups: 5.29 years
standard deviation: 5.06
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Thanks yabz,
Thought provoking in many ways. I had never looked at these numbers from that particular angle. Fascinating that since ’32 there have been three occasions when it was (~imprecisely) 14 years between “drinks”. And those are the only three occasions when it took more than six years for somebody to pull the trigger. Itchy trigger fingers for years 4, 6 and 14?!?
I think the reason you have 13 and not more is that your list counts the “successful” interventions since ’32. I think there were also coup “attempts” of one sort or another in 1912, 1917, 1949, 1951 (Manhattan), 1958 (self-coup?), etc. As ever, it depends how they get counted.
Any New Mandala readers who can put other interesting numbers on these matters will be more than welcome to jump in. And if anyone wants to counter the 48% chance of a coup in 2011 claim they can certainly feel free to show us their numbers…
As an aside, I once examined all of Thailand’s coup attempts in the 20th and 21st centuries to see if there were any discernible patterns that could make sense astrologically or in other ways. A curious little research sideline, I know. It turns out that they are distributed pretty evenly across the days of the week, times of the month, etc, and, at least with my modest exposure to such esoteric matters, I couldn’t discern any strong patterns (if they exist). And ambiguities about when a coup “starts” and “ends” only further muddied the waters.
Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Saturdays seem, I recall, to be favoured days. And I suppose everyone will, at the moment, keep an eye out for 9s…or 10s…
This old post may thus prove relevant.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
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Interesting that in Thai coup reports there is almost always no real indication of the political implications. Probably because it matters not a wit whether it’s General Chaiyasit or General Prem cooking it up, since the result is a foregone conclusion for us mere mortals who are content to earn an honest living. Let the lot of them rot in their own self-created hell! The best way to avoid violence in Thailand is to make damned sure we are not acting the martyr while the ‘elite’ sit back and pull our strings. We can send a much more powerful message to the stupid elite if we sit back and ignore their pathetic amateur dramatics.
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I really don’t believe there will be a military coup this year, and that’s because nothing will happen while the current coalition government holds sway and the military generals and admirals keep getting everything they can reasonably expect. For example, funding for Prem’s “birthday gift” project of the 70 billion baht armored calvary military base in Khon Kaen seems assured, and aren’t there also two German-made submarines in the procurement package?
However, I for one would be one of the thousands of protesters in the streets if they do attempt one. The key difference is the Red Shirt movement, which didn’t exist in 2006, and I do not believe the Army generals can really trust their own troops to engage in the crackdown that would be necessary to put down the popular revolt that would result. One or two hand picked battalions, yes, could be relied upon to initiate the coup, but not the rest of the Army necessary to sustain it once the masses take to the streets and start seizing provincial halls and government buildings (again as they did in May 2010). And of course, the Royal Thai Police, who are also well armed, could not be relied upon to take any action against the populace and might prove quite obstructionist.
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We still seem to be on schedule for parliamentary elections in the next few months so it’s worth thinking who would benefit from a coup before these. (Afterwards is a different question altogether which obviously depends on the results.)
First, and the most obvious is the PAD who must now realize that their parliamentary hopes are unlikely to be realized. Without a Thaksin threat most of their mass support disappears or moves to the Democrats.
Second would be the UDD. If after their campaign for an even earlier election, the loss of life and arrest of their leaders, the population didn’t give their political allies either a majority or leadership of a coalition, it will seem to point to a defeat of their aims. This was why the Korat by-election was so intertesting.
The above may explain some of the statements being made during the last few weeks.
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Whether there is a coup or no coup, the anti-coup people, especially the reds, are ready for it. Of course, they are also waiting to see if the coup will get the usual “blessings” just like the latest one in 2006.
People are getting smarter now and can easily see who will benefit from the coup. They also know they get short-changed despite the rhetorics announced in the electronic media by the coup-makers.
Now the would-be coup leaders will have to think hard of what to do if people carry out the 10-point advice that Thida just issued.
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Quite likely ‘YABZ’ is reading it all wrong.
What if in Thailand’s case ‘Military regimes’ are the norm and the ‘democratically elected regimes’ are the aberrations?
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If we take into account the political system in which the coup or revolt happened, we come to other conclusions. Roughly eight coup happened during authoritarian rule (too many to list here). On the average a coup within such systems happened all three to four years, and these tended to be successful. There were three coup in semi-democratic system (1951, 1981, 1985, 1991) and on the average a coup happened about all four to five years, but most failed. Three coup ended more or less democratic periods (1947, 1976, 2006). Here the average is a bit more than ten years (so much for stability of democratic or authoritarian systems!). (This changes to nine years if we add the 1991 coup under “democratic”). Therefore, it depends on how the period since 2006 is regarded. When democratic no coup, if not, a coup is quite probable.
Certainly the characterization of the political systems during the respective periods is open for interpretation and change. The criteria was mainly if a “democratic” constitution existed or not.
Another interesting calculation would be, how many rumors of a coup do we have during one month. Does a coup happen during periods of much or little rumor?
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I think the coup has already happened. Abhisit obediently authorized their invasion of Cambodia, aka an ‘artillery exercise with live rounds’. The military has clearly got the bit in its teeth and are waging a war against Cambodia. Their self-described “jek” has just ‘advised’ them to capture Angkor Wat and then trade it for Preah Vihar.
The unofficial ‘elite’ mouthpiece over at the “jek’s” electronic rage observed the other day that the military didn’t like the idea of an early election because Puea Thia might win… and come to think of it, they didn’t really like the idea of the Democrats winning either… might make them more independent.
Whether or not there will be war with Cambodia is up to the Thai military. Whether or not there will be an election is up to the Thai military.
The coup is a fait accompli.
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Will there be a coup?
I predict elections. Followed by a Judicial Coup again. Enough Red cards to disqualify enough TRT/PPP/PT candidates to make the shaky coalition hobbled together get bare majority to keep PT out of power.
If PT wins outright, another dissolution with executives banned again. Only problem with that is that shortly the 5 year limit is up on the first group of 111.
If PT is able to get a government together, it will not be allowed to goveren (again), and the courts, military, and the amart willl be in the background obstructing them.
If PT does win and is allowed to govern their will be a new election shortly after the limit on the 111 exectives expires.
There will be attempts to get a referendum between the 2007 constitution and the 1997 constitution, and that just prior to the vote there will be a coup because the military will quake in their boots at the thought of being held resposible for for the crimes they committed against the Thai people.
Again, the will of the Thai people will be snuffed out.
This time however, the world will start to slap restictions on Thailand. And the similarities to Burma and other authoritain governents will not be overlooked and sanctions will follow.
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Les,
Who would benefit?
The military of course!
If their puppet loses, they wont allow a government to come to power that will hold them accountable for their accounts and actions.
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I think August and December are the two months that never had any coup, or successful one that is, interesting?
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Analysis of the occurrance of coup years. Presumably tongue firmly in cheek? Seems a bit like wasted effort though. Most of the longtermers are content with the thought that a coup is always imminent. And if it is not a fullblown job complete with tanks, then there is undoubtedly a virtual coup going on every week of the year. One can’t help feeling that the observation of such utterly decadent behaviour is somewhat akin to voyeurism. Titillating, but ultimately useless. Let the fools play their silly games!
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After 18 days of unrelenting expanding massive Egyptian peaceful protests demanding transformational change, Mubarak (in power for 30 years) resigns, transfers his powers to the military (is that counted as a ‘coup’ gentlemen), and bloodshed on the streets of Cairo was thankfully avoided. But Egypt is a police state and the world was ecstatic at the success of Egypt’s People Power. Conclusion: A successful popular peaceful street protest at Egypt to remove Mubarak.
Thaksin, a deeply flawed democratically elected leader (6 years in office), resisted the massive months long peaceful street protests specifically demanding his resignation for a long list of transgressions (Thaksin transgressions still being boringly argued to this day by Thaksin supporters and critics alike) and was ousted by a 2006 Thai military coup (remembered for the ecstatic Bangkok people happy to give flowers to tanks that roared in the streets). For the most part, the world was unhappy at Thailand’s regression to military rule but inevitably adjusted to Thailand’s situation as it quickly reverted to civilian rule. Conclusion: A successul popular peaceful Thai street protest to remove Thaksin S.
Abhisit resisted violent Red street protests specifically demanding his resignation in year 2009, and then again in Y2010 (punctuated by M79 grenade launchers, high-powered assault rifle attacks and wide-spread arson from violent elements of the Red camp) and as a result there were scores of dead and injured. Abhisit V. remains Thailand PM (with promise to hold elections mid Y2011) and for the most part the Thais (and the world?) approved of his handling of the Red Shirts unrest. Conclusion: Unsuccessful (and unpopular) violent Thai Red Shirts protests to remove Abhisit.
Question is: Why was the Red street protests unsucessful?
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Street led Thai Government is not a trustworthy partner in international negotiations
On Monday, February 14, 2011, the United Nations Security Council will convene on the request of Cambodia to discuss the Thai-Cambodian border issue. While this meeting is doubtlessly a victory for the Cambodian diplomacy, the only question that matters for the Cambodian people is: will it help achieve a lasting solution?
To everyone, the Thai-Cambodian issue seems to be a simple border conflict as reported world wide by the media and as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa stated ┬лit is a common border dispute like many others among ASEAN countries┬╗. Because of this perception of the problem, the French Foreign Ministry offered France’s help by providing the maps annexed to the 1907 Franco-Siamese Treaty that delimited the frontiers between Siam and Cambodia. The offer was swiftly turned down by the Thai Government. This dismissal clearly shows that, from the Thai point of view, the conflict is not a matter of border demarcation.
Over the last two years, the Cambodian diplomacy unsuccessfully and hopelessly tried to have the Thai side accepting those maps drawn between 1904 and 1908 as the basis for their border negotiations as they constitute the only legal internationally recognized documents about the Thai-Cambodian border. The Thai dismissal of these maps has to be understood as a blatant rebuff of the June 15, 1962, Judgement of the International Court of Justice of the Hague, as the ruling was entirely based on the Franco-Chinese maps that were annexed to the ruling.
This far, the Thai stance has obviously been to arrogantly and unilaterally wipe out any legal frameworks. So, what will the UN Security Council meeting be about? The only outcome of the meeting to be reasonably expected is a resolution calling both parties to peacefully settle their dispute. If it were so, then the meeting would be useless as it would only provide another legal frameworks to be rejected by Thailand and leave Cambodia prey to its power politics.
In this regard, the UNSC has to consider, not only the armed confrontation between the two countries, but the bellicose declarations that were made by Thai leaders. On June 25, 2008, when he was then an opposition leader, Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said that ┬лThailand had never accepted the map that Cambodia presented to the World Court in 1962┬╗. He also added that ┬лTailand intended to seek the return of Preah Vihear “when the opportunity arose”┬╗. Question is: By what means? The answer was bluntly given on February, 9, 2011, by street opposition leader Sondhi Limthongkul when he urged the Thai military ┬лto seize Cambodian territory, including Angkor Wat, to barter for Preah Vihear Temple┬╗. Democrats led Thailand clearly chose to become an international outlaw.
To be successful, the UNSC meeting has to be a first step towards finding a lasting solution that is, to begin with, to protect Cambodia, not from small clashes, but from a large scale open conflict as the far superiorly equipped Thai military is building up along the 800 kilometer border between the two countries.
In this regard, the most important — and the trickiest — problem to be considered by the UNSC is surely the reliability and the relevance of an international outlaw Thai government that does not even care pretending to respect its own agreements. Then how can the current street-led Thai government be a trustworthy partner in any negotiation?
Without a reliable negotiation partner, Cambodia needs the international protection, the same as she needed during the reign of Pol Pot and that was refused to her. It is to be hoped that this time, the international community would have learnt the lesson and not pretend to give justice to the Cambodian people thirty years later.
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yabz, Nicholas, hrk:
I think measuring the duration of democratic regimes is quite interesting. Then it can also be compared with countries in the rest of the world.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi did a study on this of all countries between 1950 and 1990, and classified them in income groups. This is their some of their conclusion:
In democratic countries with a per capita income of under $1,500, the regime on average had a life expectancy of 8 years. Between $1,500 and $3,000 it survived on average for about 18 years. Between $6,000 and $9,000 democracies become highly resistant. The chance it will die is only 1 in 500. No democracy above the income of $9,000 has ever failed (as of 1990).
(I have drawn this information from Fareed Zakaria’s book “The Future of Freedom”)
If Thailand is following the trend of the of the world, the duration of democratic regimes should last longer and longer.
Thailand’s per capita income currently stands at $4,000, so it should be approaching a state where democracy can take root more permanently (I don’t know what $4,000 is in 1990 dollars, and using per capita income in PPP may be a better measurement anyway).
In any case I don’t think it’s the income level that is the determinant, but the proportion of middle class (which is quite closely correlated with per capita income).
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Vichai N – 14
Question is: Why was the Red street protests unsucessful?
Vichai I think the English saying “You can’t make a silk purse of a sow’s ear.” is rather apt here. The UDD couldn’t make a pro-democracy movement out of a campaign to restore Thaksin.
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There won’t be an overt military coup while the current Cobra Gold military exercises with the United States, and other nations, are happening.
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Sorry Les – 17, but I already knew you’d say what you just said.
I was more interested in what the people who openly support the Red Shirts: (like John Francis Lee, David Brown, nganadeeleg, Jim Taylor and many more) would say . . . frankly and honestly . . . why the Red Shirt movement, with all its fireworks and fiery rhetorics failed in Y2009, failed again in Y2010 . . . and fail again in Y2011 (if they stick to their tried and failed tactics).
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The argument that the red-shirt movement is only about restoring the power of Thaksin is the government’s propaganda to dismiss its cause.
This may be a successful strategy politically to gain more supporters, but for solving the conflicts that Thailand are facing, it’s a disaster that will only cause more chaos and violence.
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LesAbbey – 17
The UDD couldn’t make a pro-democracy movement out of a campaign to restore Thaksin
Couldn’t agree more with you on that one, the UDD (and many other group associate to it) should gear the movement more toward changing system, not changing head. I’ve show you the bread wielding reds already, I hope more people will move in that direction.
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Question is: Why was the Red street protests unsuccessful?
Serious question or not? Probably not from Vichai, for he has an answer provided.
Another answer is that they were unsuccessful because the repressive power of the state and military was used to crush the red shirts.
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Vichai: My take on why the people have failed to achieve victory in Thailand is similar to Ralph’s, although I would add that in Egypt the wall of fear was dismantled, but that process is still happening in Thailand.
“We broke down the wall of fear,” said Mohammed Gamal, a 21-year-old Cairo University student, one of a new generation of web-savvy young people behind the revolt. “We changed our people,” he added.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/hosni-mubarak-cedes-power-to-egyptian-military-strongmen/story-e6frg6so-1226004852592
(Though Egypt still has a long way to go – it’s military overthrew the monarchy 60 years ago and now the military strongman has been overthrown by the people, but it’s yet to be determined who will run the country from now on)
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Tarrin – 21
Couldn’t agree more with you on that one, the UDD (and many other group associate to it) should gear the movement more toward changing system, not changing head.
So why doesn’t the left leave the UDD controlled movement and go into the rural areas fighting on policies of more democracy, republicanism, and whatever else they believe in. It’s been done before and even if the outcome wasn’t successful it certainly recruited peasant farmers to their cause. Maybe Weng can say what changes need to be made this time.
The problem for those on the left who associate with the likes of UDD leadership is that the smell sticks. When a rich man tries to buy himself a putsch and a country and they support him, they just end up as followers of warlord. Maybe instead of reading about the Russian Revolution, reading about the various Mexican revolutions might supply more lessons to today’s Thailand.
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Nganadeeleg says the Red Shirts protests failed to dismantle Thailand’s ‘Wall of Fear’. (Which tempts me to ask: If those M79 grenade launchers, petrol-bottles and high powered assault rifles Red armory were intended to puncture holes in the said ‘wall’, those dumb Reds shooters should have been adequately told that ‘wall’ only exists, if it exists, in the mind.)
The ‘Wall of Fear’ certainly existed in Egypt, and the Philippines when their People Power toppled their tyrants. I do not doubt there is some kind of nearly oppressive ‘Wall’ that restricts/distorts freedom of speech and rule of law in Thailand. Remember I said ‘nearly oppressive’ gentlemen, and, perhaps for most Thais they are content to be ‘inconvenienced, to put it mildly, by such a ‘wall’ until perhaps the passing of the reign of the current deeply revered King Bhumibhol.
There must be something sinister or suspicious about the Thai people’s perception of the Red Shirt movement. The Thaksin taint and uninspiring bunch of Red leaders that represented the face of the Red Shirts certainly must have something to do with it. But there must be more . . . Red Shirts persona that do not endear nor inspire.
The People’s Power of Egypt and the Philippines were able to draw Nobel Laureates, doctors, lawyers and professors to participate with the young students and professionals, and common workers and ordinary citizens in the streets in unmistakable popular protests. Under such circumstances, no tanks or soldiers dare challenge the people’s will being expressed in their streets.
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From the moment that Mubarak stepped down, I asked myself how long it would take for one of the truth-bending zealots to start comparing his fall with Thaksin’s. And in c14, the question is answered.
Sure – Egypt 2011 is just like Thailand 2006. Just ignore that Mubarak finally bowed to massive popular pressure and handed authority to the Egyptian military. BTW, that’s truly “massive” and truly “popular” as in millions nationwide from nearly all strata of Egyptian society (except the elite who have been doing very nicely, thanks) self motivating to protest and strike – as opposed to the pretend “massive popular”of usually a few thousand from largely one special interest group mobilised in Bangkok by Sondhi & Co, aided and abetted by the Thai military who stage an all-too-familiar coup.
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LesAbbey – 24
Again, why are you so particular with the left?? do you want the right to lead the red instead?
That doesn’t mean I like leader like Thida, however, Thida’s speech today really led me down, and I wish people will see her intention. The red really need to shake up their leaders roasters, if they even need one.
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Tarrin: “That doesn’t mean I like leader like Thida, however, Thida’s speech today really led me down, and I wish people will see her intention.” What do you think her intention is? Anyway, she must be more appealing to the unaligned (which the red shirts need to win over) than Jatuporn and Thaksin, right… or is that a false assumption?
To my mind, the best red leaders are the ones on the margins like Sombat and Somyot, but I can’t see them commanding large crowds of people. But then do they really have to do that? Perhaps there’s too much emphasis on leaders and speeches? Too much of the vertical and not enough of the horizontal.
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James Alex – 28
she must be more appealing to the unaligned (which the red shirts need to win over) than Jatuporn and Thaksin, right… or is that a false assumption?
If she is just there to win the “unaligned” then she better not be there at all, what’s the point of being leader if she can’t even stick to the principle that the people (that she claim the be leading) really stand for?? we are not in a popular contest here.
the best red leaders are the ones on the margins like Sombat and Somyot, but I can’t see them commanding large crowds of people. But then do they really have to do that?
Sombat was one of Thida’s close circle, I’m not sure what his intention really is. I actually have more fate with people like Somyot and Sunai. Furthermore, you don’t need people to be able to command the mass, you need people who can translate the principle and ideology to the mass. Sadly I dont think Thida or Jatuporn got any of that.
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#26 I guess you are referring to the fact that Mubarak took 18 days to step down so he could consolidate his ill-gotten gains. Yes, that does sound remarkably like Thaksin. If this current shower of a government seems intent on emulating Thaksin’s arrogance and greed, it should really be no surprise. This is how the local political game has panned out for decades. Thaksin came up (uncomplainingly) through a lousy system, heavily exploited that lousy system and is now miffed because the lousy system has kicked him out. That is ALL that traditional Thai political parties and their color-coded goon squads are capable of doing for this country.
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c30 – You guess wrong.
Further to my earlier post, are there really people who seriously maintain that Thaksin would have gone to New York if he was remotely concerned about the PAD protests unseating him? They didn’t – a military coup did.
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SteveCM (#31) believes that Thaksin was NOT seriously concerned that the months long street protests of Y2006 would not unseat him. Tut tut . . . overconfidence and overreaching . . . that indeed was the Thaksin trait that was his undoing.
Why did Thaksin fly to New York while the streets of Bangkok was boiling with angry protesters who were unrelenting, unbowed and certainly very very determined? Perhaps Thaksin was very very scared?
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#31
QUOTE c30 – are there really people who seriously maintain that Thaksin would have gone to New York if he was remotely concerned about the PAD protests unseating him? They didn’t – a military coup did. UNQUOTE
I really couldn’t care a toss whether one uniformed tyrrant showed bad judgement in his dealings with another set of uniformed tyrrants. In any case, it was a forgone conclusion that the military would have to do (the weak) PAD’s dirty work. The RTA could just as easily have swung behind General Chaiyasit Shinawatra, at that time. Indeed, it STILL could. Precisely where is the democracy in either side? Neither set of color-coded weasels is engaged in this power struggle for the greater good. It’s all about what faction gets to dip its fingers into the exchequer what when the (weak) succession occurs.
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re Vichai N (#32): Thaksin went to New York to attend the opening of the UN General Assembly session, standard operating procedure. And the streets of Bangkok were more or less devoid of protesters that day, rather than boiling, as the phase of marathon mass protests had not yet started.
It’s a pity to see PAD fantasy history cited as fact. I thought we were over that.
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I could appreciate that ‘superanonymous’ was being literally accurate when he said ‘that streets of Bangkok were more or less devoid of protesters that day’ Thaksin flew to NY. Literally accurate, that is.
Of course the ‘street protests’ that went on several months previous, the coup rumors fogging Bangkok’s air just days or weeks before Thaksin’s flight, (to cite a few tense issues in Y2006) were hardly ‘boiling’ and of no particular concern the day Thaksin bolted for safety at NY.
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Vichai N and Les Abbey are so completely disingenuous it would be cause for side-splitting satire in most sentient parts of the worlds.
Why did the Reds “fail”?
Oh, the 80+ dead, 2000+ wounded might have a little something to do with it.
The crackdown on them was as brutal as any state on earth has exerted on its civilians in recent history.
The Thai Army used SNIPERS…. let me repeat that SNIPERS… to execute unarmed civilians on the streets of Bangkok.
Now Vichai N and Les Abbey can cook up any mish-mash of tawdry, ill-fitting and frankly oddball political theories they want as to the reasons why the Red Shirts “failed” (aren’t the Red Shirts still around as a significant political movement?) but the reason why the April/May protests didn’t successfully remove Abhisit from power was because the Thai military murdered them. In their dozens. Shot them down like vermin (I am sure Vicha and Les were cheering as each bullet split open the skull of every Red Shirt, journalist and ambulance driver).
As for Vichai N’s pronouncements on Thaksin’s departure and the quiet on BKK streets. Well, he might not have yet noticed but BKK is only one small part of Thailand. I was in Bangkok at the time and also didn’t see one single flower given to one single soldier though I am sure the PAD staged a few photo ops.
And finally, what did Thaksin do when confronted with mass protests in 2006? He called an election which the Democrats, absolving themselves completely of any belief in democracy, knowing that they’d lose, boycotted. Pathetic.
The judgement on Thaksin came from the entire Thai electorate. He won. Repeatedly. The only failure here is Vichai N’s and Les Abbey’s rationale and their fervent belief in extremism and military rule.
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Dictionary.com defines ‘extremist’ as “a person who favours or resorts to immoderate, uncompromising, or fanatical methods or behaviour, esp in being politically radical.” [by fanatical methods meaning violent methods]
I am of the opinion, from my reading the many posters from Les Abbey at New Mandala forum, that his well-articulated views are non-radical and non-extremist at all. I could safely therefore aver to anyone that Les Abbey won’t be totting or firing an M79 grenade launcher, or a a high-assault rifle, or carry out an arson burning-spree to make his point or out of spite.
I could not course say the same thing for myself. Hey . . . there could be moments that I could be tempted to resort to radical really extreme tactics . . . but those moments have yet to reveal themselves to me.
Thaksin had been judged, and had been judged harshly, by his peers, by Thai judges (‘guilty as charged’), by the people of Thailand (‘dangerous and vindictive’) and their judgement had been loudly declared to the world. Why else do you think Thaksin ran to save his hide at Montenegro?
Should I ‘Take U for a Fool’? Well you said so yourself, didn’t you?
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