Commenting on Thai politics and political reform in Thailand these days is no fun, because the situation is unusually complicated, and the ideological climate has become almost suffocating. Anyway, I will make six observations that I think are pertinent to the current discussion of political reform, three each concerning structural and ideological issues.
First, if democracy means that, “Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens” (Dahl), how does Thailand score on this issue? Thai elected governments have to accept their limited policy-making capabilities. Security policy has been the prerogative of an independent-minded military, while the civil bureaucracy has maintained its own policy plans vis-├а-vis their ministers, who they often despise. Many technocrats still do not see why elected politicians are an improvement compared to authoritarian times. The 2007 Constitution even forces governments, in its long chapter V on “Directive principles of fundamental state policies,” to implement a wide range of policies. This essentially reduces the policy-making government to a set of elected managers of a constitutional policy agenda. And this agenda was made compulsory by a democratically illegitimate group of academics and bureaucrats serving on constitution-drafting committees established by the coup-plotters. Thus, the chapter on state policies fundamentally contradicts the key democratic principle stated in article 3, “The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people.”
Second, the Thai polity has not yet developed what for European political history has been referred to as “nationally available categories” (Tilly) of political contestation (for example, Labor-Conservatives-Liberal Democrats). Rather, politics remains “highly localized and territorialized” (Caramani). The political party system, therefore, shows a very low degree of institutionalization. Parties have largely remained exclusive clubs of local notables and their supra-provincial factions. This seriously undermines the policy-making and administrative capabilities of national-level political personnel (in fact, all societal areas in Thailand have similarly serious capacity building problems). This way, the performance advantages of a mature democracy cannot be realized. Not surprisingly, this situation in some circles has undermined the ideas of freedom and democracy as the most desirable foundations of governance.
Third, although citizens are allowed to vote in elections, the political system mostly lacks inclusive formal mechanisms that would allow ordinary people interested in active political participation to access institutions of decision-making. There remains a “wide gulf between political elites and citizens” (Carothers). At the provincial level, political structures are largely informal and invisible. Rather than being expressions of democratic public affairs, up-country politics are mostly treated by its important personnel as mere extensions of their family households and personal friendship networks (phuak). This situation fundamentally contradicts the principle of equal democratic citizenship.
Together with the preceding point, it is thus not surprising that voting is largely determined by local conditions, rather than being an expression of a nationally homogenized electorate (the proportional vote, though, does have a strong element of nationalization).
From the perspective of the Thai socio-political and monarchist Establishment representing the old hierarchical nature of the Thai polity as well as subsequent long periods of military and bureaucratic rule, the preceding three observations are unproblematic. On the contrary, they only confirm that the present form of democracy, including the lack of democratic qualification supposedly exhibited by politicians and voters, does not serve “the country/nation” well, which is the reason used to justify continued paternalist elite rule, though in a democratized way. The following three ideological issues are more problematic, certainly to the Establishment (no malicious intent here; the following issues merely serve to highlight certain causal elements of the current political conflicts; these elements will have to be considered in search for solutions).
First, the monarchy and the actions of the royal family are strictly removed from any public debate, even if such actions and the monarchy as an institution are politically significant. This relationship between the monarchy and the citizens of Thailand’s democratic polity has recently gained publicity under the label of lèse majesté. The king himself-in his speech given on the eve of his birthday anniversary on December 4, 2005-had said that the king can be criticized, and that it was actually the king who was in trouble if people were punished for lèse majesté. Grant Evans made a pertinent remark on this issue in the Bangkok Post:
With each charge of lese majeste people are being asked to chose between monarchy and democracy and ultimately this will work against the former’s stature. … vigilante monarchists seem to be the main threat to the monarchy’s longevity.
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has sent a few signals about changing the application of lèse majesté. However, one might doubt-given strong opposition-whether key issues will be tackled, such as the transfer of the right to initiate complaints, a significant reduction of penalties, the permission of academic and journalistic analysis, and the dissociation of lèse majesté from the issue of national security.
The broader context of lèse majesté is a reframing of the relationship between monarchy and citizens. There are at least two opposing ways of handling this issue. The PAD, for example, adhered to the official ideology that the outstanding feature of Thai society was that “the king is at the center of the people’s soul” (Sondhi Limthongkul; sunruam chitwinyan khong prachachon). However, since the PAD also knew that this was rather more a normative statement than a reflection of reality, they wanted to impose this position upon the people by expanding the constitution’s chapter on the monarchy by a stipulation that would have made it a duty for every Thai to protect and worship the monarchy.
Obviously, this attempt to create artificial unity in the face of empirical diversity would face enforcement problems, not to mention that it collides with the normative and practical requirements of a democratic political order. Senior citizen and monarchist Prawase Wasi offered a view much more liberal than that of the PAD, saying
In a pluralistic society, people think differently. There are people who worship the monarchy and those who don’t-it is natural. The key is how to channel the differences towards creative collaboration and output. (Bangkok Post, April 18, 2009)
Prawase’ statement thus goes far beyond the usual ideological emphasis on national unity by stating that Thailand is pluralistic. (The “White Shirts” seem to regress to a nationalism-based unity, and thus do not show the way to a “new democratic deal” for Thailand. Matichon, May 7, 2009, headlined a major article, “Stop harming the country – dissolve the colored [political] camps by using the national flag.” At the end of this piece, we read, “Consider the following words, ‘We must join our hearts and stand in respect of our national flag with pride in our independence and the sacrifice of our Thai ancestors.’ Afterwards, we can join in singing the Thai national anthem before there will not be any nation left to respect.”)
This brings me to the second point. The official Thai state ideology of “Nation, Religion, Monarchy” (chart satsana phramahakasat) sees people as conformist subjects, not as responsible citizens. According to this trinity, the Thai state depends in its existence on the unity and functioning of these three “institutions,” or “pillars,” not on the democratic capacity of its citizens. The latter merely have a role in uncritically submitting to these three elements, and thereby secure the survival and the unity of the Thai nation.
Here, “nation” is conceptualized as an abstract entity that possesses its own inherent and superior interests, as defined by Thailand’s socio-cultural elite. It is actively promoted by state organizations (government offices, local authorities, schools). In a democracy, such an ideological subjectification should probably not exist, because it collides with the normative-democratic idea of a majoritarian will as formed in an ongoing pluralistic discourse among equal citizens. Ideological products such as “Nation, Religion, Monarchy” normally are key tools for the support of authoritarian regimes. Until today, state officials legitimize their operations by reference to this trinity, although the only reason for their existence is the constitution, based on the sovereignty of the people.
My final point concerns the latent (and sometimes manifest) conflict between monarchism and democracy that has not been resolved since it occurred in 1932. When the civilian leader of the revolution, Pridi Banomyong, had to leave Thailand for good after his failed anti-military “Grand Palace Rebellion” in 1949, much of the political potential for a more citizen-oriented conception of democracy was also lost. Thailand’s oldest political party, the Democrats, was founded in 1946 as a royalist-aristocratic defense of monarchist values against incipient citizens’ politics symbolized by Pridi. Six decades later, during the protests by the “People’s Alliance for Democracy” (PAD) in 2006 and 2008, which were heavily framed by royalist symbolism, the Democrats chose the side of the PAD. The protests of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), on the other hand, conspicuously lacked any royal symbols. Rather, their attacks against members of the king’s Privy Council indicated a conception of the Thai monarchy that is very different from what the PAD, the Democrats, and the amatayathipattai stand for.
This fundamental tension between the remains of an earlier stratified top-down societal order, in which all power was vested in the king, and the egalitarian and liberal implications of a democratic polity remains unresolved. In 1982, a well-known academic (PAD ideologue Chai-anand Samudavanija) wrote, “The tensions evident since 1973 are the result of a conflict between two alternative bases of legitimacy: one emanating from traditional hierarchical traditions, the other based on popular sovereignty”. More than a quarter century later, this conflict still exists, and it has gained additional urgency by the imminent issue of succession.
Michael H. Nelson is a Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. These are his notes for a presentation at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT), 13 May 2009.
A very good read.
Thanks for sharing.
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For those who can read Thai, see Nidhi Aeosriwong’s column in Matichon, May 18, 2009. It adds to the ideological issues raised in the text above. The link is
http://www.matichon.co.th/matichon/view_news.php?newsid=01act01180552§ionid=0130&day=2009-05-18
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This is an interesting and thought provoking article. I also agree that Thailand’s "Nation, Religion, Monarchy” trinity seems to be an official state ideology. However, I think the author has singled out Thailand in this regard when, in fact, most nations have similar state ideologies. Even the ideas of liberty democracy and pluralism are cultural preferences and only seem superior, to say, for example, Confucianism, based ion our cultural preferences.
For example, as a child in the USA, my classmates and I learned that pluralistic democratic ideals were our creed. My schoolmates and I were required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance each morning in white shirts and the children who wore scout or crossing guard uniforms had special rights. The Pledge of Allegiance included references to God and religion and was very nationalistic and dogmatic.
I consider that the concepts of Egalitarianism and Democracy and Monotheistic comprise a secular ideology in the West as much as the Monarchy-Buddhist ideology of Thailand. In a similar vein, the Confucian based paternalistic government of Singapore or the Leftist-Humanistic bias in Sweden’s government also control the thinking and behavior of its subjects.
However, I disagree that the Lese Majeste laws are not representative of a desire by the elite to control. Thailand is not the only nation that has Lese Majeste laws and the purpose of these laws is purely practical and reasonable. The Royal Family could choose to privately hire Thai attorneys to file court cases under Thailand severe defamation laws. However, the Thai government chooses to defamation cases on behalf of the Royal Family. The reason is that the Monarchy is a symbolic representative of the nation.
When people attack the monarchy, they are normally attacking the monarchy in its official capacity and the attack would not likely have come about if the royal family members were not symbolic representatives of the nation. Accordingly, it is not fair that the Royal Family be charged with privately filing legal cases against persons who defame them when that defamation came about as a result of the their official status.
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I found this article a bit long winded and complicated but as someone who is trying to find a reason for Thailands recent unrest many of the points mention were interesting and educational. I agree with tigger who says that the Lese Majeste laws are used by the elite to control, but i had no idea that other contries have similar rules, maybe this is because they are not used as much as they are or have been in Thailand.
Thanks for posting this and i shall read it all again and hopefully understand a bit more each time i do.
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there is no news about this rally in Thai MSM
Thai anti-gov’t group rallies demanding Parliament to deliberate their charter draft
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/18/content_11395360.htm
“BANGKOK, May 18 (Xinhua) — A group of the Thai anti-government protestors or the red-shirted people Monday submitted a letter to a representative official of the Parliament, demanding the Parliament to include their version of the charter draft for deliberation.
The group, which consisted of around 300 red-shirted people, said in the letter their version of the charter draft together with signatures of Thais has been proposed to the Parliament since September 2008, however, the Parliament has not yet taken the charter draft to deliberate. “
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And perhaps the Divine Beings and their Poo-Yai Hangers-On should pull their head out of their arse before the country descends into anarchy. I’ve heard enough of this ‘born to rule’ crap to last a complete lifetime. When it comes to putting their supposed wisdom into real action, they are just as inept as the rest of us. (I would also level exactly the same criticism at the self-proclaimed heir apparent Thaksin Shinawatra. As a President, he would almost certainly be just more of the same old arrogant & elitist BS that has sucked this country dry for decades.)
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My schoolmates and I were required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance each morning in white shirts and the children who wore scout or crossing guard uniforms had special rights. The Pledge of Allegiance included references to God and religion and was very nationalistic and dogmatic.
I don’t think this is quite the same thing as in Thailand. Some phrases of the Pledge are more like fossils – the results of path-dependence rather than a statement about the highly ideological nature of the American “creed” (if there even is such a thing that can be termed as such anymore). Just because dollar bills still say “In God We Trust” doesn’t convert every sale into an economic act. Political life in the US and almost every developed democracy is overwhelmingly secular (this doesn’t preclude people from being religious outside the public sphere though), and ideological differences are not religiously driven (neo-conservatism for example is a distinctly secular political movement – the movement may support some conservatives social policies, but the intellectual rationales behind it are secular; neocons include Christians, Jews and atheists).
In a similar vein, the Confucian based paternalistic government of Singapore or the Leftist-Humanistic bias in Sweden’s government also control the thinking and behavior of its subjects.
Labeling Singapore’s regime as “Confucian” was a brilliant propaganda tactic by Lee Kuan Yew. Lee isn’t a Confucian, he’s essentially a latter-day Victorian. He grew up in an English-speaking Straits Chinese household, his political rhetoric up until S’pore achieved full independence (and he assumed full control) was entirely couched in the language and ideology of English liberalism. It was only ex post that he opportunistically developed his theme of “Asian Values” to legitimize his rule.
But back to the subject at hand. There’s something about those nightly news reports at 8:30 that I have always felts insults my intelligence that I haven’t seen anywhere else. Partly as a result, most Thais aren’t aware that the reigning ideology isn’t something that has existed from the time of King Ramkamhaeng, or even since Rama V. It was carefully crafted as as part of the Cold War propaganda campaign in the 1950s and the 1960s, with the support of certain outside powers. Much of what is celebrated today as the essence of Thai identity is really just the product of invented traditions. Of course, invented traditions aren’t unique to Thailand. The US holiday of Thanksgiving is a western example of an invented tradition. But the difference is that nobody was ever thrown into jail because of their refusal to follow the tradition of eating turkey at Thanksgiving.
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re: tettyan
Political life in the US and almost every developed democracy is overwhelmingly secular
*sigh* If only… if only…
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Tigger:
Too much in your comment I might be tempted to comment on or untangle. So, just one thing:
“most nations have similar state ideologies”
As a German, I might well have missed the existence of an official elite state ideology designed to subjugate the citizens in my country and create “national unity” based on Establishment norms. This certainly appplies to its democratic part, although I assume that things were much different in the former communist part of Germany (as it equally certainly was in the preceding Nazi regime).
Being obliged to respect the constitution and the democratic rules of the game certainly is not the same as “NRM.”
P.S.: I “singled out Thailand,” because this is a text on Thailand (this simple logic also applies to the other five points mentioned, although there are some very brief comparative references).
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I find the article very educating and interesting like most of what Dr. Nelson has produced throughout the years.
Thanks Michael
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Dr. Nelson:p>
Thank you for your kind comment. I shall try to "untangle" my post for you.
My premise is that all nations have normative creeds that are enforced through the prevailing social order. I believe that it is cultural bias that prevents people from perceiving the prevailing cultural mores or creed of their own society. The cultural assumptions that societies operate on seem invisible to the members of that society because the normative creeds are so pervasive.
Your article seems to imply that Thailand’s having a national creed is somehow negative. My use of the term “single out” was meant to convey that criticizing Thailand for having a national creed is unusual since as all nations have national creeds. To assert that the Western creeds of egalitarianism, liberty and democracy are superior to Asian concepts of religion, duty and family is, in my humble opinion, a cultural bias.
The Thailand Law of Lese Majeste law suffers from a bad name. The law is more closely related to criminal defamation laws. Whereas in normal situations a private citizen can privately defend his rights against defamation, in the context of Royal Family, the state is prosecuting the defamation case on behalf of the Royal Family. To not do so would lead to an absurd and unfair situation where the Royal Family has to defend privately defend legal actions for defamation against them. The theory behind the law is that the Royal Family has official duties that take place in the public that benefit the State and, in exchange, the State owes a duty to the Royal Family to protect them against defamation that also occurs in public.
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Dr. Nelson’s piece is a refreshing contribution to NM because of its intelligence and thoughtfulness.
I wish, however, to slightly correct his quotation from my article in the Bangkok Post. He quotes: “vigilant monarchists seem to be the main threat to the monarchy’s longevity.” What I wrote was “vigilante monarchists” which perhaps, as a German speaker, he corrected to “vigilant”. Vigilanties are people who take the law into their own hands and, for example, lynch people they see as wrongdoers. So, my sentence’s meaning was much stronger than Dr. Nelson understood.
While I think Dr Nelson’s paper is very helpful one problem is see with many analyses of Thailand’s politics is that Thai political reality is compared with ideal models of democracy and found wanting. Indeed, most democracies would fail such a test to varying degrees. Of course, this is a useful exercise, but it needs to be complemented by serious comparative political and historical analysis of other countries in order to get Thai reality into some perspective. In a sense, the analyses to date are too Thai-centric. Comparative analysis is not easy, but it can be very rewarding.
A second problem is that there is little substantial political sociology. While people sound off all the time about the ‘middle class’ there are in fact few substantive analyses of this ‘class’ – Michael Connors, and Pasuk Ponpaichit and Chris baker are the exceptions. Similarly, there is little substantive analysis of the Thai working class which has burst onto the political stage so dramatically.
Attention to some of these issues would hopefully save us from the repetitive and often fruitless analyses of Thai politics that are dished up regularly in NM and elsewhere.
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Tigger:
As is clear from my text, I don’t consider NRM a “national creed” but rather an ideological reflection of a previous stratified or hierarchical order of society (plus times of military and bureaucratic rule) that comes into conflict with a model of politics reflecting an increased functional differentiation (called “democracy”).
If you essentialize NRM to a “national creed,” it is difficult to analyze the conflicts inherent in a change of the mode of societal differentiation. It will also make it difficult to understand people such as Chai-anand (quoted at the end), Prawase (Thailand as a pluralistic society), BKK mayor Sukhumbandh (the elite consensus has broken down, with no mechanism in place to reestablish it), or Thitinan (consensus has broken down). Neither would it be easy to understand attempts of the elite to reestablish ideological dominance, or to place the “reds” within the “Thai Nation” (can they be Thais if they don’t accept the “national creed”?).
Grant Evans:
Thanks for drawing my attention to a typo that unfortunately reduced the intended meaning of your quote. I apologize for this error.
Re “ideal models of democracy” >> I also find such comparisons sterile, which is why I am more interested in how Thai politics operate rather than in Freedom House or Bertelsmann stuff. Following the globalization literature , one might call Thailand’s political system (as most of its other function systems) “hybrid,” that is, emanating from processes of global-local interactions, rather than from merely copying western models.
Having worked on Thai politics for quite some time (and from having prepared a comprehensive bibliography on this subject), I only too painfully realize the huge gaps in our knowledge, and being a political sociologist myself, I really would welcome if there were a few more scholars who could help with analyzing Thai politics from this perspective on a long-term and empirical basis.
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Grant Evans claims that there is little that is “substantive” political sociology on the middle class and working class.
I guess it depends on how one defines “substantive” and pol sociology. At the risk of having these rejected as not substantive or not political sociology, one could mention on the middle class, in addition to quite a lot in Thai: McCargo in his now out-of-print book on Chamlong and the New Thai Politics, Ockey’s collection, Hewison in Goodman and Robison, Ockey in Pinches. On the working class, where there is little funding for research or support for publication, see Brown’s work in his book and edited collection, his articles with Hewison, Vorovidh’s work in Thai and English, FES publications, all the Thai Labor Campaign and associated reports, and Robertson’s various publications.
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interesting indeed.
i did my paper on democracy in thailand, and i think this section is really interesting. thanks for sharing your thoughts.
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