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Indonesia’s oligarchs are flexing their muscles. But to what extent were they defeated by Jokowi in the first place?
In the latest edition of the journal Indonesia, the Australian National University’s Edward Aspinall details the political career of “oligarchic populist” Prabowo Subianto, noting that the majority of Indonesia’s oligarchs provided support for his presidential campaign.
My article in the same journal examines the ways in which Jokowi became a media phenomenon and most popular candidate for President in all polls in 2013 and 2014, despite not being part of the oligarchic elite – and via media which is owned by the very oligarchs who were also in the running as presidential candidates.
While quite obviously some oligarchs played a significant role in Jokowi’s campaign, the Suharto-era oligarchic power and dominance had been openly and somewhat spectacularly challenged by Jokowi’s victory.
This was epitomised in Time magazine’s front cover of Jokowi with the headline ‘A New Hope’.
What we’ve seen so far in a Jokowi Presidency has shown those oligarchs who supported him have flexed their muscles. At first, it was feared Prabowo’s opposition, the KMP [Koalisi Merah Putih] would be the predominant source of hindrance for reforms.
Rather, Indonesians now joke that it is another ‘KMP’ who are the biggest hindrances – oligarchs who supported Jokowi in the election – Jusuf Kalla [Vice-President], Megawati Sukarnoputri [PDI-P Party Leader], and Surya Paloh [Head of NasDem and owner of MetroTV].
In early 2014 Tempo reported how Surya effectively has the keys to the Presidential Palace. He is said to arrive on occasion four times a day. Recently, the Australian National University’s Liam Gammon wrote of Megawati’s performance putting Jokowi in his place at the PDI-P conference. Jokowi wasn’t even given the chance of talking to the party faithful. Others have seen Jusuf Kalla as aiming for the presidency himself, a concern pointed out when he was on the verge of being nominated as Vice President last year.
Meanwhile, those oligarchs who didn’t support Jokowi are rallying. Hary Tanoesoedibyo has started his own political party, Perindo, and will soon launch a 24-hour news station to rival major networks TVOne and MetroTV. Jokowi was even forced to meet with his vanquished rival Prabowo, as Megawati continued to try to call the shots.
Media mogul Chairul Tanjung’s companies continue to prosper, and former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is now a commissioner of a media outlet linked to his company, but he has, to date, been quiet politically since the election.
Only Aburizal Bakrie seems in trouble. His grip as Golkar chief is being contested, and he’s rumoured to be looking at selling stakes in some of his media companies.
Sukarnoputri. Tanoesoedibjo. Kalla. Bakrie. Djojohadikusumo. Paloh. ‘They’re all just spokes on a wheel. This one’s on top, then that one’s on top and on and on it spins.’ (When politics is this messy, a Game of Thrones reference is inevitable).
One is tempted to end with a statement of whether civil society can enable a ‘return of the Jedi’, or whether Jokowi or others might eventually ‘break the wheel’. But I’ll spare you any further popular culture references (because New Mandala is classy that way).
Jokowi’s ascendancy from local Mayor to eventually become President showed a period of contestation in Indonesia’s politics, where rather than submitting to the same old predatory practices of oligarchy, new practices and initiatives to gain political momentum were forged.
His success was to a large extent driven by ‘grassroots’ campaigning and volunteer communities, as well as new media initiatives and the prod-user [someone who produces and consumes media content], and many in the general public who yearned for news of a politician who represented a break from the “old faces” of Indonesian politics.
Certainly, rich individuals will continue to dominate the political economy of the media industry in Indonesia, as they do in many other democracies around the world. But Jokowi’s rise shows that “non-oligarchic or counter-oligarchic actors and groups” negated their power and influence.
The struggle between oligarchic and populist forces will continue, and to a large extent be facilitated by and played out in digital media platforms.
The role of Kawal Pemilu (Guard the Elections), an initiative of civilian Internet users to ‘crowdsource’ voting tabulation around the country, was but one example of these increasingly popular forces enabled by digital technologies.
As Inaya Rakhmani previously wrote for New Mandala, the 2014 elections “show that citizens are sharing knowledge, information and expertise, and often form allies with mainstream media and journalists to guard their democracy”.
At the time, the Indonesian Parliament’s decision to abolish direct local elections (with seemingly tacit support from the then soon to be outgoing President SBY) saw outrage on social media. The #shameonyouSBY was trending worldwide on Twitter, causing much international embarrassment of the then president, who then later implemented strategies to change the decision.
Yet the oligarchs have emerged largely victorious against digital media campaigns in the early stages of Jokowi’s presidency.
The idea to “crowdsource” Jokowi’s cabinet never eventuated, with selection of ministers far more determined by oligarchs, namely the three individuals of the ‘KMP’.
The battle between the police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) saw media elites rallying behind police-chief candidate and Megawati favourite Budi Gunawan, and civil society using Twitter to campaign to “save the KPK”. Jokowi made Budi Gunawan Deputy Police Chief, saying that the bid had “evoked different opinions among the people”.
The question is: has President Jokowi given Indonesian civil society enough reason to rally to his cause through these platforms?
Or, at a time when online and social media platforms seem to shorten attention spans, are Indonesians beginning to look elsewhere for a new champion?
We will know soon enough. But for now, there is little doubt that the oligarchs are fighting back.
Dr Ross Tapsell is a lecturer at the Australian National University. He researches the media in Indonesia and Malaysia. Sections of this piece were taken from his article, ‘Indonesia’s media oligarchy and the “Jokowi phenomenon”’ in the journal Indonesia, which you can read here.
Indonesia has demonstrated that no good deed goes unpunished. Perhaps even the cleaner election itself was a managed puppet show, and the foregone conclusion was a “Deus ex Indonesia”. There is still a very long way to go for this nation. People want a free and open society, but the tools necessary to achieve those goals, are kept hidden behind the curtain.
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This post would have gained somewhat in persuasiveness had the author ventured a definition of ‘oligarch’. In the absence of such a definition, the reader is forced to conclude that the author shares the misleading Indonesian habit of describing party bosses, as well as wealthy businessmen and women, as oligarchs.
This is equivalent to saying not just that the two Clintons have served and serve the oligarchs of Wall Street and of other sectors of the American economy around which the one per cent cluster, but that, if not Hillary, at least Bill is an oligarch himself. This only obfuscates the situation rather than clarifying it.
In a democracy operating in a capitalist economy, it can be taken for granted that party bosses will not eke out frugal existences. This does not, however, warrant their being described ipso facto as oligarchs.
If Megawati is an oligarch, when did she become one? Presumably she was not part of the Soeharto-era oligarchic elite. I have no doubt that money has flowed towards her in recent years at a faster pace than that at which the Ganges flows towards the Bay of Bengal. But does this mean she is in the same sociological category as people like Bakrie? He was super-wealthy before taking over Golkar.
Is SBY now also an oligarch? If not, why does his name appear immediately after Chairul Tanjung’s? Chairul may have been the richest Indonesian ever to have held the post of coordinating minister for the economy. If SBY has indeed become an oligarch, perhaps there was a case after all for tapping Ani’s phone.
Are all the leaders of Indonesian political parties oligarchs? If not, which are oligarchs and which are not? How does one distinguish one from the other?
On another front, I am as fervent an admirer of pop culture as the author seems to be, but even I draw the line at quoting a Time magazine headline as evidence of what is happening in Indonesia.
Some very wealthy Indonesians supported Prabowo in the 2014 presidential campaign and other very wealthy Indonesians supported Jokowi. It is up to the author to establish that there were more of the former than of the latter. Maybe that was the case, but there needs to be proof, and Time magazine won’t help out here.
One interesting question is how much of Indonesian-Chinese business backed Jokowi out of fear that Prabowo would reassume the anti-Chinese politics he practised in 1997-98. I can readily imagine that Sofjan Wanandi ‘worked his butt off’ trying to raise money for Jokowi from the community from which he himself, Liem Bian Khoen, sprang.
It makes one nostalgic to be reminded of the Manichean dimension of last year’s choice between the evil Prabowo and the knight in shining armour who opposed him and won. How simple political analysis becomes when one faces such a black and white choice. But what has Jokowi the reformer done since taking office to justify that Manicheanism?
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Irrespective of the extent to which he has gained the backing of Indonesia’s oligarchs, Jokowi at least deserves the staunch support of older Indonesian voters. This is because of his resolute if discreet campaign against ageism in government appointments.
The latest milestone in this campaign is his nomination to the DPR of Sutiyoso for the post of chief of the national intelligence agency, BIN. Sutiyoso, like Jokowi a former governor of Jakarta, weighs in at seventy and a half years, and may be Jokowi’s oldest candidate for appointment so far. Vice-president Kalla, who is two years older than Sutiyoso, is a different case.
Sutiyoso’s nomination follows Jokowi’s appointment of Tedjo, now almost 63, Ryamizard Ryacudu, 65, and Prasetyo, 68. This trio, soon perhaps to become a quartet if the DPR approves Sutiyoso’s appointment, points to Jokowi’s apparent preference for placing some of the security and law portfolios in the safe hands of veterans, no matter what their level of competence may be. Beyond his rather advanced age, however, Sutiyoso has few other qualifications for the post of head of BIN. The party he leads doesn’t have any parliamentary seats.
As Jakarta commander, Sutiyoso notoriously earned his late New Order spurs by arranging the attack on PDI-P headquarters in 1996 in which many Megawati followers were killed or injured. Megawati surprisingly didn’t bear any long-lasting grudge against him for this performance, notably backing Sutiyoso’s bid for re-election as governor when she was president. This suggests that Megawati may not have opposed his nomination for the BIN post, assuming that she knew of it.
On another front, Jokowi has also nominated General Gatot Nurmantyo, army chief of staff, to replace TNI Commander General Moeldoko. Gatot is just 55, so his nomination doesn’t form part of the anti-ageism campaign mentioned above.
By nominating Gatot, Jokowi has broken with the tradition that developed in the democratic era of rotating the TNI command among the three services. The air force was due to have its turn upon Moeldoko’s retirement.
By backing Gatot, Jokowi may be signalling his support for this officer’s combat against ‘proxy war’, of which he has made himself Indonesia’s leading theorist by devoting a series of speeches to this theme over the past twelve months.
Proxy war, according to Gatot, is being carried out by Indonesia’s external and internal enemies to help the expropriation of the country’s natural resources, to debilitate Indonesia’s youth by getting them hooked on drugs, to promote foreign products over Indonesian ones and in various other ways to weaken the fibre of the nation and society. In other words, it is an ultra-nationalist discourse which has deep roots in Indonesia’s post-independence history. Jokowi presumably finds this discourse to his taste.
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