Last night the special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Asia on the coup was launched at the Foreign Correspondent’s Club of Thailand. Here is the speech given by one of the editors, Kevin Hewison:
The last time the Journal of Contemporary Asia produced a special issue on Thailand was in 1978, it was a response to the bloody events of 6 October 1976 that marked the end to an important 3-year democratic interlude. The focus of that issue was on the destruction of democratic politics and the remarkable divisions that had emerged in Thai society, especially the divisions between the haves and the have-nots.
In hindsight, many now view the events of 1973-76 as a prelude to democratisation over the following three decades as a period of military-led political tutelage under General Prem Tinsulanond’s semi-democracy – we might call it “Thai-style democracy” – eventually gave way to parliamentary politics, at least until the coups of 1991 and then in 2006.
That a second Journal of Contemporary Asia on Thailand should be produced following the 2006 coup is a sad reflection on the troubled course of democracy in the country. Thaksin Shinawatra, the only Thai prime minister to win two successive general elections, projected himself as the political saviour of the domestic capitalist class following the 1997 economic meltdown, and became the self-declared saviour of the poor and dispossessed.
Thaksin led a political party that fundamentally changed the nature of Thailand’s politics. It also generated remarkable division.
Since the coup, these divisions have become deeper as the palace, the military and the bureaucracy have embedded their power and asserted their political and social dominance.
Tonight I do not want to detail all aspects of the special issue – that would be too time-consuming as the collection of papers deal with a number of aspects of the events leading up to the 2006 coup and the interpretation of the coup itself. And, we have some of the authors here tonight who can say a little more about their individual chapters and answer questions.
Let me begin by saying that this collection does not accept that the September 2006 coup was a “good coup.” In taking this position, among the various themes that can be seen in the collection, I think there are three that I should briefly mention.
The first relates to the conception of democracy in Thailand. So-called Thai-style democracy is a conservative definition of hybrid regime that allows an elite to maintain control over the political agenda against the demands of the disadvantaged masses. It does this by ensuring that political parties are weak and that political control is maintained through unelected positions. This conception has been developed and articulated since 1932, but has been embedded since 1957. Thus, in Thailand’s chequered history of democratisation the 2006 coup is yet another episode in the conservative elite’s attempt to control the political agenda.
A second and related theme is that the conservative control of the political agenda does not go unchallenged. Indeed, it is the disadvantaged (and sometimes disenfranchised) masses who pose the greatest challenge.
Whereas Thaksin supporters have often been painted as ignorant vote-sellers, studies in the north and northeast, show that rural electors have a preference for local candidates who support and deliver services to their constituency, and show strong leadership. Local politics is complex, and voters find themselves linked in many ways with local figures on all sides of political contests. Their preferences become a “road map” through the multiple demands of an election campaign. In this context, Thaksin’s populism was a response to the demands and insecurities of the poor and dispossessed. The problem was that this response was challenging to other constituencies and especially to the conservatives.
A failure to recognise the legitimacy of rural electoral decision-making and the demands of the dispossessed remain fundamental challenges for Thailand’s democracy.
Finally, the monarchy is placed at the centre of political events. The problem is that this also means that the monarchy – always said to be “above politics” except in times of crisis – is now situated at the heart of ongoing political struggles. Everything royal has substantially more political weight and political meaning than before the coup. Nationalist discourses place the monarchy at their core. Symbols of the monarchy are symbols of loyalty. The coup and its subsequent events – the constitution drafting and the upcoming election – may have been initially considered by conservative royalists as a political triumph. However, the coup may also be read as a failure of a “royal liberalism” – led by, for example, Anand Panyarachun and Prawase Wasi – associated with the 1997 Constitution.
Let me also quickly say what the collection doesn’t do. It doesn’t provide a detailed critique of the Thaksin period of government, its authoritarianism, its failed policies in the south, its cronyism and its human rights violations. Most of the authors in the collection have engaged in that criticism elsewhere. Pasuk and Baker have produced an important book on the Thaksin period and Ukrist is a co-author (with Duncan McCargo) of another significant study on The Thaksinization of Thailand. Other authors, myself included, have written numerous critical papers about the Thai Rak Thai government.
Finally, the collection does not specifically address the issue of whether the return to a ‘‘Thai-style democracy” will be successful. However, I think the thrust of the papers is clear: the emergent political system is unlikely to be inclusive; it will be dominated by a conservative palace, the royalist-military and the dead weight of the bureaucracy. Frankly, political demobilization and increasing the volume of highly conservative and nationalist discourses, promoting national forms of capitalism, and state-led campaigns teaching people the “proper” exercise of citizenship appear to be a recipe for political control rather than for reconciliation and democratisation.
Could Thaksin have been successful if he depended on Thailand’s “poor and dispossessed”? How many voters belong to this group?
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Now there’s some people doing something rather than going on and on about who is or was “song mai ao” and who is more anti-throne than the other and all that crap. Any report on how Hewison’s presentation was received?
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Now there’s some people doing something rather than going on and on about who is or was “song mai ao” and who is more anti-throne than the other and all that crap.
How short-sighted some can be! If “all that crap” that you’re referring to is actually the question of what was and is the correct attitude and course of action towards issue of democracy, elected government, the monarchy, etc. , then it’s not crap. In fact, I’d say, anyone’s not patient enough to think through such ‘crap’ can only jump to ‘action’ ‘blindly’. I’d argue that over the past years (last year especially) they DID jump and caused – and HAVE CONTINUED to cause – many harms to the course of Thai democracy.
How would you know that what Hewison , et al. is doing is correct? Actually, I DO have ceertain grave reservations with Hewison’s speech as reported above.
Why, for instance in the above speech, would Hewison refer to “Thaksin period of government, its authoritarianism, its failed policies in the south, its cronyism and its human rights violations” but only to the monarchy simply : “[t]he problem is that this also means that the monarchy – always said to be “above politics” except in times of crisis – is now situated at the heart of ongoing political struggles. ” Why wouldn’t he also mention “its cronyism and its human rights violations” in the latter case too? Because there was not any?
Those who don’t think the issue of “song mai ao” is seriuos will continue to speak and frame their discourse THIS WAY, and in effect help create the idelogical world in which only politicians can be mentioned FREELY, about “human right violations, etc.”
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Polo,
I was hard to interpret how Hewison’s presentation was received as they did not go to direct questions afterwards. I don’t recall any questions directed to the most controversial points, either in agreement or not. He did apologize in advance for extreme jet lag and, in my view, several of his unwritten responses seemed to refect this set back.
By the way, The FCCT event launched two books; the journal and Phasuk’s compilation Thai Capital. I have found the second far more readable and interesting. The journal has some fairly provacative titles, but I had a lot of trouble penetrating the articles themselves or finding a unique or compelling storyline. Thai Capital will, I believe, become another of Phasuk and Baker’s must reads.
If I had to identify a single theme running through the event, it might be a warning that the gloves are coming off. I think academia may be starting to feel embarrassed that Thai studies had become a “faith-based” practice.
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“I think academia may be starting to feel embarrassed that Thai studies had become a “faith-based” practice.”
They’ll still have to do the hard math.:
a. Cold war body count less than almost anywhere else, especially neighbors like Cambodia, bless my soul.
b. A country that despite being in the middle of political “turmoil,” you’d never recognise it when walking down the street. No violent street protests or conflicts, no deaths except some taxi driver who hung himself in protest (does that really count?)
Compare to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma,…the hard thing will be getting to the next step on the economic ladder, like where South Korea is now, but once Thailand gets there, they’ll be glad they have a King, an institution that seems to fill a gap in the human psyche, look at Burma (lost their king, now they have nasty generals) or South Korea (lost their king, seem to worship their ethnicity or race as a substitute), maybe they should think about loosening up the rules one day and having queens too.
The problem with western academia is that it’s like a broken democracy record, despite the fact that everytime they try to impose it (e.g. Iraq, Vietnam, Russia, that guy before Pol Pot, Lon Nol?) it doesn’t seem to work, and the countries that have found their way to growth led by exports to the west (South Korea, China) have hardly been democratic initially.
The cost of everyone arguing with each other all the time, probably slower growth, albeit greater equity, like in this week’s PTT case.
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I don’t think Thais should look at Cambodia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma, then declare themselves a great success. This country has so much going for it and I pray that its people have greater dreams.
Neither do I think that the lack of evidence of public disoredr means much. I am sure that if you walked the streets of Kuala Lumpur today, you would see little signs of strife. But only because a repressive security operation is disallowing it.
Yes, getting up the next step on the economic ladder seems to be a big challenge – but I don’t see how going backwards is helping.
Any of us may be right or wrong, but the country will only benefit by being able to discuss it all. Do you think it is a good idea for the military to own almost of the television networks? To me it seems perverse and backwards.
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Cold War body count?
That’s a nicely pragmatic way of looking at things.
Me, I might factor in all the Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodians who died or were maimed by US bombing missions originating from Thailand.
But I’m just an old bleeding-heart liberal, I guess.
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“Me, I might factor in all the Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodians who died or were maimed by US bombing missions originating from Thailand.”
I never thought of that. Good point. I guess these are all included in some moral balance sheet in the sky, perhaps. But Thailand cut a deal with the US and look where they are now. Look where Burma is, with its too proud to cut a deal: Burmese Way to Socialism. Non-aligned from even the non-aligned movement. Acting strategically has always been part of ensuring the long-term survival of states, and the Thais certainly have that down.
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“… However, the coup may also be read as a failure of a “royal liberalism” – led by, for example, Anand Panyarachun and Prawase Wasi – associated with the 1997 Constitution.”
“Let me also quickly say what the collection doesn’t do. It doesn’t provide a detailed critique of the Thaksin period of government …”
This may be a huge missed opportunity… How can an even-handed account of the “royalist coup” be carried out without consideration of political events of the 10 years since the passage of the 1997 Constitution?
And are we really back in square one assumed here? Successful court cases (including the recent rulings on PTT) initiated by consumer advocates such as KhunRosana Tositrakul against the Thai state are clearly some aspect of the 1997 Constitution that bore positive fruits.
Srithanonchai also has an interesting point about the “poor and dispossessed”… Things are often not as simple as many are trying to make it.
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Greetings from Seoul. I just noticed that Andrew posted my brief comments at the FCCT and that there have been some comments and questions. I am not going to answer them here, because the Journal of Contemporary Asia Special Issue (edited by Michael Connors and myself) is a rather long and complex collection, and people should really read it. The comments I made were just a 10 minute talk that set out some (not all) of the themes in the collection. I am sure that some of our authors will disagree with my selection of the themes.
I am equally sure that all of the commentators above will find the collection interesting and will have many questions and criticisms of the various papers and their arguments.
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