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Thailand through the prism of the dual state
Within days of taking office, the new Pheu Thai government has found itself at the center of a new and intense conflict. The conflict is not set in the halls of parliament, nor is it subject to the transparency of an election or the safeguards of an independent judiciary. Just as in the aftermath of the two previous elections, in 2006 and 2007, from which the predecessors of the Pheu Thai party received strong mandates from the people, forces outside the official political process threaten the survival of the government in the wake of its overwhelming victory in the 2011 elections. The extra-parliamentary, extra-legal character of the conflict reflects Thailand’s nature as a “Dual State,” a subject I have written about extensively in my work on Russia.
German political theorist Ernst Fraenkel defined the Dual State based on the coexistence of two functional systems. The Normative State is a state governed according to clearly elaborated legal norms, adhering to some level of accountability and due process pursuant to the law. The Prerogative State is a state defined by the arbitrary exercise of power, unchecked by law, subject to the discretion of more or less hidden powers. While some polities function exclusively as either Normative States (e.g., Norway) or Prerogative States (e.g., Libya under Gadhafi), many countries described as “authoritarian” or “hybrid” regimes, including Thailand, combine elements of both. As Ernst Fraenkel has argued, the operation of a Dual State allows illiberal regimes to preserve the appearance of legalism. Legalism not only helps the regime’s legitimacy; it is crucial to capitalist economic activity. Formal laws enforced by semi-autonomous courts preserve entrepreneurial liberty, the integrity of contracts, private property rights, and competition, making it possible for the economic system to work in a smooth and predictable fashion.
Thailand’s Normative State is ruled by a government supported by a majority in the elected parliament. Written rules and procedures regulate the operation of the state, demarcate the separation of powers between different branches of government, and set the limits of government authority. Based on the formal structure of the Normative State, Thailand is often described as a parliamentary democracy that operates under the framework of constitutional monarchy. That is clearly not the whole story though, as the Normative State in Thailand coexists with a Prerogative State (or, as the exiled Red Shirt leader Jakrapob Penkair called it, a “state within the state”) defined by the presence of political actors, informal networks, and institutions (including the bureaucracy, the armed forces, Privy Councilors, and their cronies in the business community) that exercise unchecked, unaccountable powers outside the formal rules of the Normative State. Thailand has its own expression for the Prerogative State, which is commonly referred to as the “invisible hand.” In truth, the hand is not so much “invisible” as it is opaque. Laws such as the widely abused Article 112 are there to obscure the intricacies of the Prerogative State, shielding the army and other elites from public scrutiny so long as their actions are justified by the false pretense of “protecting the monarchy.” As Ernst Fraenkel observed, the more insidious side of the Dual State “thrives by veiling its true face.” The “veil” is kept in place by banishing discussion of the Prerogative State’s workings to the margins of tolerated public discourse.
The Prerogative State has come into being in Thailand thanks in part to the backing and financial support of the United States government, which saw in a strong and unaccountable military, as well as in the rough justice it meted out to its opponents, a dependable ally in the fight against communism. The Prerogative State, however, did not wither away with the demise of the communist threat. Over twenty years since the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States government is happy to do business with elements of the Prerogative State. Beyond the perfunctory public condemnation of the 2006 coup, and bland encouragements that both sides “avoid violence,” throughout Thailand’s crisis the United States government has been content to sit back and watch as the democratic institutions of a long-time ally were being torn down, its citizens murdered or left to rot in prison for expressing an opinion. In fact its attachment to the Prerogative State in Thailand is so strong that the United States government has scarcely lifted a finger even when an American citizen was recently jailed for lese majeste.
The ease with which the Normative State and the Prerogative State co-exist in Thailand depends on the composition of the government. Whenever the Normative State has been governed by Thaksin Shinawatra, or Thaksin’s associates, the two components of the Dual State have been in conflict with each other. In those instances the elected government has tried to diminish the range of action of the Prerogative State, with limited success, while elements of the Prerogative State fought back using civil unrest, spurious judicial proceedings, and military might to weaken or change the government. When elements of the Prerogative State managed to topple governments that had sprung from the legal procedures of the Normative State, as in the military coup in 2006 and the “judicial coups” in 2008, the two components of the Dual State have interfaced in a more seamless fashion. In that situation, those governing the Normative State agreed to provide a legalistic front for the more authoritarian and unaccountable Prerogative State, thanks to which they had come into office, giving the Prerogative State a free pass on corruption and human rights violations. Now that Pheu Thai has won another election, the friction between the two sides of the Dual State has intensified yet again, as forces that work in the shadows of Thailand’s Prerogative State maneuver to remove the new government, or at least bully the administration into leaving the status quo untouched.
At least two institutions that function within the Normative State in Thailand have operated as the conduits for the creeping dominance of the Prerogative State: the judiciary and the Democrat Party. Though subject to corruption and the influence of powerful interests, the judiciary was until recently one of the most respected institutions in Thailand. Since the 2006 elections, however, the judiciary has played an increasingly political role, often acting as the linchpin in the Prerogative State’s effort to carry out its agenda through the procedures of the Normative State. After the military coup of September 2006, the power of the courts to remove governments and dissolve popular political parties at the behest of forces in the Prerogative State has been increased and formalized in the constitution. Written by the military junta in 2007, the primary goal of the new constitution was to curtail the ability of institutions within the Normative State to check the activities of actors in the Prerogative State. The fierce opposition to the proposed reinstatement of the 1997 constitution reflects fears that the old rules would make it more difficult for the Prerogative State to impose its will in a relatively discreet and legalistic fashion.
Since 2006, one of the main beneficiaries of the judicialization of politics, and the politicization of the judiciary, has been the Democrat Party. In a series of dubious verdicts, the judiciary cleared the only path that could ever have led the Democrat Party, a perennial loser of elections, to come into office in 2008, backed by forces within the Prerogative State dead set on keeping allies of Thaksin Shinawatra out of power. Having spent more than two years in government thanks to the help of the military and the judiciary, it is well understood that the Democrat Party did not compete in the last elections to win. The Democrats had a much more limited set of objectives, namely, prevent Pheu Thai from winning a majority and perform well enough to allow the “invisible hand” to put Abhisit Vejjajiva back in power. The judiciary, which had previously dissolved Thai Rak Thai and the People Power Party, remained the Democrats’ ace in the hole. Had the Democrats come close enough, Pheu Thai’s dissolution could have paved the way for the same corrupt deals that made Abhisit Prime Minister in December 2008.
But the Democrat Party could not live up to its own end of the bargain. Pheu Thai did win a majority, and the Democrats came in a distant second, left in the dust over a hundred seats behind. The election result was a devastating blow, to the Democrat Party and for the ambitions of much of the Prerogative State. Worst of all, a defeat of this magnitude complicates the possibility of a “judicial coup,” limiting the ability of the Prerogative State to remove a hostile government under the cover provided by the procedures of the Normative State. Even if the courts were to dissolve Pheu Thai, it would be extremely difficult for the Democrats to muster the numbers in parliament to form their own government.
Unfortunately, that has not led the Democrat Party, or the interests for which it serves as a front in parliament, to engage in any soul searching. For its part, the Democrats have decided to stick to the same course of action they have pursued for the last decade to such disastrous lengths. On the one hand, the Democrat Party shows no sign of weaning itself off the dependency on the courts. Since the election, Democrat officials have sought the dissolution of Pheu Thai, the disqualification from office of members of parliament duly elected on Pheu Thai’s party list, and even the impeachment of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and Foreign Minister Surapong Towijakchaikul, following the Japanese government’s decision to grant Thaksin a visa. On the other hand, instead of focusing on rebuilding the party, or rehabilitating its soiled image, the Democrats have taken actions suggesting they might have given up on ever even trying to win an election. While Abhisit’s resignation after the shellacking in 2011 offered the Democrat Party a chance to turn the page, he was chosen to serve as party leader once again, as if he had not already demonstrated that he is utterly unelectable. The Democrats have clearly cast their lot with forces in the Prerogative State, as opposed to trying to improve their dwindling appeal in the Thai electorate.
As for the Prerogative State itself, though the Democrats’ election defeat has made it hard to replace the Pheu Thai government with a more favorable one, it has not diminished the motivation to at least try to weaken the new government, limit its ability to bring about any actual change, and pre-empt all attempts to investigate and prosecute officials responsible for the Bangkok Massacres of 2010. Efforts are underway to revitalize the People’s Alliance for Democracy, under the slightly less controversial guise of the “multi-color” shirts. The establishment mouthpieces in the mass media, including but not limited to the two main English-language daily newspapers, have begun a campaign to discredit the government as a “puppet” cabinet, obsessing over Thaksin Shinawatra’s every move while fear-mongering about conspiracies supposedly putting Thailand in “imminent danger of falling prey to crafty foreigners.” The “solution” this campaign points to is the same as ever: build support for the Prerogative State to step in and save Thailand from its own voters. Given that the Prerogative State is undergoing a profound crisis that threatens its undoing, it remains to be seen if and when the campaign will be successful, leading to the activation of the courts or possibly the deployment of the armed forces on the streets of the capital. While the increasing recourse to naked oppression is an obvious sign of weakness, the repression unleashed as a result is no less destructive. Thailand has been down this road before.
In the immediate term, the new government must be defended from threats to its survival that are coming from outside the legal and democratic process. In the long run, though, the Prerogative State’s renewed onslaught demonstrates that reforming Thailand’s political system requires the demise of the Dual State, accomplished by compelling institutions now working beyond the reach of the law to play exclusively by the rules of the Normative State. In other words, Thailand must move from a formal (or “thin”) conception of the rule of law, where the law is used as a tool to shield powerful institutions from accountability, stifle free and open debate, abuse human rights, persecute dissidents, or cripple the electoral process, to a more substantive (or “thick”) conception, which mandates that rulers relate to the ruled only through law. This requires not only that every major actor or institution operate according to the law’s specifications, without special powers or prerogatives not contemplated by the law, but also vigorous and unfettered public debate, not to mention an independent judiciary committed to upholding the rule of law by scrutinizing the actions of state officials without fear or favor. No less important, Thailand needs an opposition whose chances of coming to power are not premised entirely on using the law as an instrument to destroy democracy.
Didn’t Bill Clinton say something like, “It depends on how you define ‘state?'” They say, do they not, that if they say it isn’t about sex it’s about sex.
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RA: [i]The establishment mouthpieces in the mass media, including but not limited to the two main English-language daily newspapers, have begun a campaign to discredit the government as a “puppet” cabinet, obsessing over Thaksin Shinawatra’s every move while fear-mongering about conspiracies supposedly putting Thailand in “imminent danger of falling prey to crafty foreigners.” [/i]
I hope the irony of this being written by a lobbist paid for by Thaksin is not lost by some.
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After the army led massacre in the 1990s I did support the Democrat Party. Thailands other parties were syndicates of mobsters cum politicians who used their provincial gangster syndicate bases to increase their own wealth.
When Thaksin came to power, he did so on the coat-tails of the most debilitation financial crisis to hit Thailand since the Depression. He was overly opressive and forced the society that Thailand had become to change dramatically quickly. Instead of imprisoning and disabling the gangster mob politicians, he instead incorporated them into the TRT. The Democrat party to a lesser degree had the same problem in its base areas in the south (Phuket and Surat Thani come to mind).
Anyway, I was skeptical. However the mobster bosses were forced to close some of their lucrative rackets and conform (like the morality campaigns that shuttered much of Patpong and similar red light districts. Their constitution companies like the one in Chomburi still got lucrative government contracts but they actually had to build the roads, bridges, and sewers that they were contracted to. It was not perfect but the mobsters who didn’t were sometimes convicted in court even if they then were able to escape across the porous border of Cambodia destined to live out there lives outside their native Thailand.
But what impressed me with Thaksin was that when he saw a problem, he acted in a CEO fashion to solve it. Traffic in Bangkok improved, huge infrastructure projects were approved and built including the BTS, The Ring Roads, a new Airport, a Metro. And most importantly he was able to bring health care to the masses especially the rural inhabitants of farming communities. He ran the country like he ran AIS. He was the boss and when he said jump he expected people to do it.
But he lacked a certain amount of Tact, was abrasive, and alienated those who disagreed.
Still Thailand moved ahead.
He did make a number of drastic mistakes, like changing laws in Parliament on Friday and suddenly AIS would reap a 4 billion baht sale on Monday because of the New Law. This kind of behavior alienated the upper middle class of which Thaksin had been a member and a beneficiary.
There were improvement in anti-corruption efforts. The skimming was somewhat limited (nothing like the level that occurred in the pre-crisis era nor subsequently in the Democrat/coup era. This is why Phua Thai, with its third string team did so well, that and of course the senseless massacre of civilians on the streets in 2009 and last year.
Now that his team is back in the seat of government (although by my account not actually being allowed to rule) I hope that for the sake of Democracy the Democrat Party and the non-state actors actually step back and allow it to rule. Contest in the ballot box not the back rooms of coup-appointed courts.
Instead of attacking the legally elected government they need to help democracy by doing their job and keep the ruling accountable.
But more importantly the corruption of the State needs to be penalized. The guilty need to go to jail when they commit larceny of public funds. Courts need to try and convict on evidence not forced confessions. Trials need to open and fair, no matter who is in power.
The LM law needs to be modified if not completely scrapped and the penalties greatly reduced. Ditto with the criminal defamation laws. And in the interests of all, the amount of political space for free speech needs to expand.
The non-liberal elements of the TRT/PPP/PT need to respect differences (for example the rabid attack of the Gay Pride Parade in Chang Mai by the Rak 51 group).
Now that PT is back, I hope it is allowed to rule and hopefully its leader has learned a few things in his time away like how to respect differences and use consensus rather than always commanding. and micro managing.
After the coup and the judicial coups, the only road back to democracy for Thailand was through Thaksin. That is still true in my opinion. If this government is not allowed to rule, then the consequences will be catastrophic and I fear the result will be on the order of a civil war rather than a couple of days of police action.
The red shirts need to remain committed to reform just like the liberal wing of America’s Democratic Party.
For me a person who just wants the best for the nation, we need to support those who are elected and demand that they do the best to lead in ways that they run on. If not, then we need to vote them out. And our votes need to be respected.
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PR is hardly an honest trade. Amsterdam is a big-bucks PR man in a world where PR men have become (rightly) notorious for looking after the entrenched interests of the already rich – in order to manipulate, describe and limit democracy for their own ends. There is nothing new about pretending to be a democrat for the sake of subverting those who have rather more honest and open democratic leanings. The moment darling Robert stops playing PR chess for a living, he might actually begin to make sense.
This debate gains nothing new from the views of celebrities and academics anyway. A satisfactory democracy can never be created by the instant brainwaves of a supposedly enlightened elite of celebs – which is why local pols are still stuck in the same old rut of long-term failure. And to take that notion even further, I would also suggest that just about all of Thailand’s revered institutions are laboring under the same old illusions about the usefulness of their supposed enlightment to the average citizen. I would trust the grounded comments of long-term non-celeb residents over Amsterdam’s obvious power-career moves any day of the week.
There may be quite a few elements of truth in the words of both Amsterdam and his current client, but after decades of the same old completely worn-out faux democracy of the chosen (& supposedly popular) few, it should be very obvious that the likes of CEO politics have completely failed in their pathetic wrong-headed reactionary attempts to run this country in a more-or-less equitable manner.
If our two heroes wish to return to their winning ways, they should both return to their small-minded commercial roots and make room for the numerous ordinary people who actually have some belief in developing democracy – and who don’t necessarily feel that it is their god-given right to always benefit financially from trying to create a more equitable society.
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Whatever position Mr Amsterdam holds in regards to Thaksin, it doesnt downgrade the analysis and comment on the Democrat party, every word of which is spot on including Thailand’s need to have a viable alternative to the current government. And yet so little comment is ever made on the subject of the damage done to democracy and Thailand by the Democrat party’s menagerie of mistakes since 2005 especially inside the party itself. The Thaksin obsession leaves so many blind to so much that needs to be changed
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Nobody #5
The damage done to democracy and Thailand by the Democrat Party’s menagerie of mistakes since 2006 scarcely exceeds that done by the Thai Rak Thai Party’s menagries of mistakes prior to 2006. Thaksin had systematically undermined virtually all of the checks and balances of a democratic system, leaving the army as the last unbalanced check. And what have we now? Regime exchange, not regime change.
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c3
My thanks and compliments to D.N. for what strikes me as one of the most perceptive and realistic summaries of Thailand’s tortuous progress I can remember seeing.
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Which state is the “real” state? The forces of darkness, the Royal Thai Army and Democrat Party at the fore, actually and publicly pledge allegiance to the Prerogative State. That’s what LM persecutions, party dissolutions, and abrogation of the Constitution, the rule of law, are all about.
Yes the battle for democracy begins and will be fought in the Normative State, but the real power in terms of the ruthlessness to resort to violent coercion lies with the Royal Thai Army and the Democrat Party. They are the self-selected Real Thais fighting to preserve their Real Thailand… their Prerogative State.
Unless and until the Prerogative State is ‘delegitimated’… to use a term floating about the present buzz sphere… and its minions recognized as anti-democratic and, hence, anti-Thai, the real battle in the Normative State cannot even begin, subject as it is and has been to continuing cycles of arbitrary beheading and rebirth at the prerogative of its nemesis.
Whether Robert Amsterdam appropriated this argument to serve the purposes of his client or not, this seems a compact and accurate analysis of the state of the State in Thailand, according to my lights.
The minions of the Prerogative State are the real Outlaws and all of Thailand must stand up and publicly acknowledge that fact before real progress can be made toward democracy.
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Thaksin made us do it. I tried that with my mom when I was about ten and learned very quickly that some excuses are so base and intolerable that even my sainted mom’s eyes shot sparks at the pusillanimous temerity of someone, even/especially, her own offspring to mouth something so lame and shameful.
We live and learn. Never too late.
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Obsession? Something more like ‘fear of the inevitable, based on previous experience’ would seem far more appropriate – tempered by the inevitable failure of the Democrats to be a real and effective opposition.
It would be only fair to warn you, that large quantities of fruit and nut-based products have previously been processed on the same production line as the present government.
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Interesting analysis, but it’s worth mentioning that the author is Mr. Thaksin’s PR representative (this is not a vague “paid by X” allegation, the link is quite public).
Thaksin is in no way a champion of transparency, democracy, or human rights, he was just cast in a position where he’s using those forces to regain power. He would drop the democratic mask in a snap and support authoritarian, “prerogative state” forces in a snap if he calculated he’d benefit — in fact, he’s been consistently trying to coopt those elements.
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It’s mildly ironic that “puppet government” is used by anyone here in government, as all civil servants that I have run into – other than those who quit out of principle – are attached to strings.
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[…] Amsterdam propose un article interessant sur ce qu’il appelle “le double gouvernement Thailandais” […]
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[…] New Mandala’s blog, Robert Amsterdam offers an interesting article about what he calls “Thailand’s dual state”: “The Normative State is a […]
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Seh Fah #6
The army never got held to account before, so your ‘blank check’ is invalid. They’re thugs, they don’t need checks. They just take.
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Aren’t all Amsterdams Thai articles ghost written by Gi Ungpakorn?
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Leeyiankun #15
I believe I said “unbalanced check”, not “blank check”. According to my Macquarie dictionary, “unbalanced” means:
1. not balanced, or not properly balanced.
2. lacking steadiness or soundness of judgement.
3. mentally disordered or deranged.
Definitions 2 and 3 could perhaps apply to several participants on both sides.
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@D.N.
Traffic in Bangkok improved, huge infrastructure projects were approved and built including the BTS, The Ring Roads, a new Airport, a Metro.
Hate to quibble, but not entirely true. The BTS was already opened before Thaksin was elected. Many road improvements in the city were the initiatives of governors Bhichai and Samak. The Metro was also the initiative of an earlier government, and was already nearly complete when Thaksin was first elected.
The airport was also started before Thaksin, but he did play a role in speeding it up. For better or for worse.
And most importantly he was able to bring health care to the masses especially the rural inhabitants of farming communities.
I won’t quibble with this. Thaksin was more effective in efforts targeting the needs of the rural majority than he was in addressing urban issues. Had he tackled problems like urban crime and traffic, his once-broad support among urban voters might not have dissipated so quickly after the Shin sale. IIRC, TRT alienated many of their urban voters after they appeared to flip-flop on their 2005 campaign promise to extend mass transit to outlying areas of Bangkok just a few months after that election.
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C6 Seh Fah
To be qualified to check government in a democracy an opposition must show support for democracy first and foremost. The Dems by making mealy mouthed comments rather than unconditionally opposing the coup and then doing the deal to put the coalition together rather than demanding an election abbrogated their right to be in a position to check anything. It is going to take ages for them to right this wrong. If you want to be a viable party in a democracy you have to first and foremost believe in democracy and trust its institutions
In the meantime, short of the PTP and reds splitting, Thailand will see a continued period of Thaksin party government whatever name the party has unless of course a coup comes along, but there really isnt any support for that except in the very small percentage of true anti-Thaksinistas and it would result in utter chaos.
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#14 Do we seriously believe that it is only the RTA that ‘takes’ here? It strikes me we have some posters here whose ability to address the entire issue is hamstrung by their team allegiances to other successionist contenders. Surely, Ai Lerm’s whole purpose in this government is to cut his fellow corrupt cops a piece of the exchequer action, use cop casinos as his excuse to put a Damaphong in charge of the RTP and put a Chaiyasit-friendly man in charge of the RTA. As a paid contractor, Amsterdam has no interest in these issues. When Robert drops his connection to the desperado, he might then be worth heeding.
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Nobody #19
I’ve always thought of politics as the process of deciding who makes the decisions, and democracy as perhaps the best means of adding a little decorum to the process.
The first Thai (sorry, Siamese) coup d’etat, back in 1932, was probably a good thing because at least it initiated the transition from absolute monarchy to democracy under a constitutional monarch. A bit more difficult to say anything particularly positive about any of those that followed.
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Ernst Fraenkel’s “Doppelstaat” was an analysis of Germany’s Nazi regime. Since the Nazi’s had abolished the rule of law, they needed some normative structures (den “Normenstaat”) that would enable the capitalist economy to function. The “Massnahmenstaat” (prerogative state of illegality and injustice) on the other hand, was directed at the enemies of the Nazi regime.
Hard to imagine how Fraenkel could be used for an analysis of the Thai hybrid political system…
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Offshore Oilfield #20
I disgree with the “whole purpose” assessment. Surely advancing the careers of Luk Ai Lerm are also among his priorities, not just hs fellow cops.
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Seh Fah:
“…damage done to democracy …. done by the Thai Rak Thai Party….Thaksin had systematically undermined virtually all of the checks and balances of a democratic system, leaving the army as the last unbalanced check…”
Spot on, Seh Fah.
Ahistorical client-biased arguments is what you would expect from a lawyer for-hire representing their client.
It is almost as if the second Thai Rak Thai state-within-a-state drama is resuming where it left off in 2006.
Chuvit exposes gambling dens, Chalerm vows to close them all down, Wichean loses his job as head of police, Thaksin’s brother-in-law Priewphan rises up the hierarchy, fast forward one or ten years and police are still running gambling dens as they always have (Chang Noi, Jungle Book, The police and the Golden Pig, 55).
It really is worth reviewing the **historical facts** again of how the military and police became extensions of Thaksin’s political machine, as this appears to be happening again slowly as we speak (See chapters Thaksin and the Military and Thaksin and the Police in McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanond, The Thaksination of Thailand, 2005, 225-233, 121-165).
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jonfernquest – 24
What you said could also be apply to our former government (whos side do you think Prayuth is on? yeah)
Moreover, I would like to add on D. N. – 3
That Thaksin didn’t just think of the telecom sector liberalization one night and implement it in the morning, the whole thing was written in the 1997 consitution! exactly demand the government to liberate telecom sector, which Thaksin did. The whole reason why the middle-class were piss about it because they didn’t know about the constitution and the media just turn a blind eye on just because they can have one more topic the bash Thaksin.
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Might be worth re-familiarizing ourselves with the Thaksin-era government, which was as ‘prerogative’ as it was ‘normative’ — http://www.amazon.com/Thaksin-Business-Politics-Pasuk-Phongpaichit/dp/9749575555 (and for a fair review, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FH21Ae05.html).
F.F.
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c24
So, also for jonfernquest, aiming at the (yes, paid) messenger trumps dealing with the message…..
Just a detail in passing: “Thaksin’s brother-in-law Priewphan rises up the hierarchy, fast forward one or ten years….”. Fast forward just one year and Priewphan would no longer be National Police Chief – having reached mandatory retirement age. What then?
Finally, an overall observation. How many times over the years have we read that XXX is close to YYY, so XXX is moved/appointed? Until appointments are based solely on merit – or even just “Buggins’ turn” seniority – we will simply go on seeing this game of musical chairs with every change of government. As things are, I can’t blame any government for wanting their “own(ed) man” (rather than someone else’s – in this case their opponent’s) in a politically key position. Given Wichean’s court police pedigree and the fact that Prem very definitely wants him to stay (see http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/254079/) and the fact that Abhisit also saw the Police Chief appointment as particularly important (see http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/22405/abhisit-loses-police-vote)….. then why all the extravagant hoo-ha now that a PT government may also want to shuffle the stacked deck?
Frankly, given that things are as they are, it would strike me as bizarre bordering on reckless if they didn’t.
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Possibly Amsterdam’s best article yet. If he can tone down the rabidity a bit more he could even become convincing.
Not bad for a paid PR hack.
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For all those readers who immediately diss the various posts on Robert Amsterdam’s website/blog, they should slow down a bit and read the actual posts which are often authored by various highly intelligent and articulate writers and scholars rather than by Robert Amsterdam himself. As such, some of the posts are really quite interesting and well-thought out, whereas others are not so interesting, depending on the actual writer.
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I hope my gut feeling is right.That is Robert (Bob) Amsterdam has joined the growing list of professionals,be they journalists,lawyers or any other parties,that has seen the cruel violence meated out by the so called “third hand” in Thailand and relegated financial reward to concentrate on putting his best efforts into bringing about a fairer society in Thailand.After watching Robert Amsterdams passionate response to the Bangkok Post in Japan,I believe that “Bob” does deserve to be listened to,but hope he keeps the pressure on his client Thaksin to provide the truth about past acts of Thai state crimes.
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A lawyer’s first obligation is to his own interests, secondly to his firm, then to his client, and finally, if time and opportunity permit, to society as a whole.
Anyone who has ever had to balance an act knows how something can sound and how it really is. And complicating that further, not only how it is but how it is NOW and how it might be LATER.
In short, you still, after all these centuries, can’t judge a book by its cover.
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If this government is not allowed to rule, then the consequences will be catastrophic and I fear the result will be on the order of a civil war rather than a couple of days of police action. DN #3
If the Prerogative State component of the Dual State is not disabled, there is a danger of the Dual State morphing into its mirror image, Lenin’s idea of Dual Power.
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QUOTE I believe that “Bob” does deserve to be listened to,but hope he keeps the pressure on his client Thaksin to provide the truth about past acts of Thai state crimes. UNQUOTE
That is a totally unrealistic expectation. Bob might eventually wake up and realise he’s been used, but his client – like most local pols – is not one for u-turns. Indeed, any u-turn would also be suspicious. There is plenty of current evidence in the world that some people are prepared to take the whole country down with their own sinking fortunes.
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In the gross scheme of things, Robert’s opinions are pretty much an irrelevance anyway. He might change some outsider perceptions of this country, but that opinion is likely to show no real little interest in interfering in the local succession bunfight. How much has western public opinion done to stave off the far higher priority fiascos in North Africa, for instance? Fact is, western public opinion is about as good as useless in resolving just about any crisis in the world today. Not that it has ever really been any different. Western governments will continue to appease such lowlife in the short-term interests of keeping the multinationals happy. They really do not care a toss whether it is Thaksin or Abhiset violating human rights. Thailand will largely have to deal with this problem for itself. Most locals are too cowed to do anything other than stay at home and watch the various political mafias destroy their country.
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One thing which I still don’t quite understand until today is why the Thai elites decide to use the ‘Ratchada Land Deal’ case to get rid of Thaksin.
According to my understanding (I have not done much study on this case, so my opinion on this case is admittedly very shallow and can be incorrect, so anyone please feel free to correct me), the Ratchada Land Deal case is, at most, a case about seeking unauthorised profit. Thus it is likely to be the civil case, and the worst which would happen (in any western courts) is that the Court would invalidate such transaction. It can never be a criminal case with an imprisonment penalty, especially not after Thaksin had sought legal advice prior to the transaction and that his lawyer told him that “everything would be all right”, because he had sought legal advice beforehand, and relied on such advice before entering into the transaction.
Thus the decision to imprison Thaksin because of this deal does not make any sense. It won’t happen in any independent court in any western countries.
Nonetheless, if the elites really want to put Thaksin in jail, the best case to put him in there is the extra judicial killings in southern Thailand. If they want to put him in jail, that’s the right case to charge him. Thus, I wonder why the elites didn’t use that case to charge Thaksin? Instead they relied on this land deal and delivered questionable legal principle to imprison him?
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#35 Not really that much of a mystery. They are constantly looking to make accusations that won’t leave them open to accusations of hypocrisy,but which can be easily fixed in court through incentives or threats. As the duplicity of both sides is breathtaking, they constantly have to think up lame excuses. This should be obvious from this week’s judicial copouts.
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c35
CT, as I’ve mentioned before, reading Slimdog’s detailed analysis of the background to the land case is at least a good start: http://slimdogsworld.blogspot.com/
On why that case was pursued rather than others, I suspect the answer has a lot to do with where else (i.e. to whom) other cases would properly lead if properly pursued.
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@See Fah #6
Which powers are you referring to when you say that Thaksin “systematically undermined virtually all of the checks and balances”? And how was it done? I am not arguing that you are wrong, I am just interested in the details.
Let’s have a look at the records of the Democrats.
The primary checking power to control a government is the judiciary. I know little about the process to ensure that judges are independent and politically unbiased. But in the last 5 years, one political side has won every case while the other side has lost almost all. The Democrats have not only ignored this, but pretended that everything is fine.
Another checking power is the media. In the Press Freedom Index Thailand’s rating went from 23 in 2002 to 28 in 2005. For 2010 it is 57 and Thailand is now ranked 153 out of 178. If Thaksin “systematically undermined” the media, what words would you choose for what the Democrats has done?
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Chris L #38
If you’re interested in the details of how Thaksin undermined virtually all of the checks and balances of the democratic system that facilitated his election, primarily the judiciary and the media, I suggest you read Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker’s biography “Thaksin”.
The words I’ve already used in comparing the Democrats with Thai Rak Thai were that if Abhisit was “Murderous Mark”, then Thaksin was “Monstrous Maew”. That was to point out that if Abhisit was responsible for the 91 deaths during the Red Shirt rallies of 2010, then Thaksin was also responsible for the 76 deaths at Tak Bai in 2004. There were many similarities between their two regimes and the way they did business. Different regime, same game plan.
By mid-2006 the only possible means of restraining Thaksin was the military, which is why General Prem spent so much time visiting army bases to address the troops and remind them that their primary duty was to “protect the monarchy”, not serve the elected government. As I said, the army was the last available check, but unfortunately it was an unbalanced check.
This time around, watch how the new Thaksin/Yinglak Government tries to control the army by pitting the Wong Thewan against the Burapha Phayak, and see who replaces Prem at the head of the privy council. My money is on Thaksin, especially if Rama X replaces Rama IX before Prem goes.
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Now I understand why sick folk when they really want to get to the cause use a CT scan. Scan no 35 above about ‘Ratchada Land Deal’ case to get rid of Thaksin reveals a deep malignancy in the Thai legal system.
But as for puzzling about failure to try nabbing Thaksin over the southern killings I wound think there is an obvious answer. With the army and police which both have strong links to the Prerogative State, it would be unthinkable to raise this. Rather like bringing Osama bin Laden back alive and giving him a fair trial.
What do folk think about Robert’s comment: “The Prerogative State has come into being in Thailand thanks in part to the backing and financial support of the United States government, which saw in a strong and unaccountable military, as well as in the rough justice it meted out to its opponents, a dependable ally in the fight against communism. “??
Read Chomsky to see how US backing of Prerogative States has continued long after the USSR was gone. Does this indicate a line of healthy independent thinking shared with paymaster Thaksin? And how might this translate into action with the new government? Another question for Andrew Spooner’s work .
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This is a pretty good blog covering the entire court case of the Ratchada land purchase controversy:
http://slimdogsworld.blogspot.com/2009/09/ratchada-phisek-land-scandal.html
Regarding the South there a mainly two events.
1. As for the massacre in the Krue Se Mosque, the army disobeyed a direct order from the government to solve it peacefully. Not a good case to bring to light.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Thailand_insurgency#Krue_Se_Mosque_Incident
2. In the case at Tak Bai where demonstrators where stacked on a truck and suffocated to death the problem is the same. If there is no link between Thaksin and the actions of the army, the security forces on the ground are responsible.
The Ratchada case was the best choice because it it would not get their own allies into trouble, and it could be sold easily to a middle class that would not dig into the details.
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this is a clear and brilliant expose from someone is well qualified to comment… But to me it is also a shame that such astute political insight has to come from a non-academic pen which begs the question: where were our eminent thai political economists looking the past five years? up the karsie?
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Amaart, on both sides, really do have their hands tied about what they can say about each other. One might think of it as a class code of honor, but it is undoubtedly something more like they have the dirt on each other, but can’t really cleanse it without exposing their own filth to the public gaze. Thus we are forced to witness a constant stream of rather over-inventive off-at-a-tangent legal cases with the judiciary as the proxy bogeyman. The judiciary then either opts for the highest bidder or capitulates to save its future skin (as with this week’s case).
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Seh Fah #39
This view brings a debate on the role of the army. In no mature democracy is the army a part of checks and balances. The army is under the control of the government. Period. E.g. if a general is not loyal to Obama, he will be sacked immediately.
If you believe that the army should be independent from the government, you are actually arguing for the dual state system that Amsterdam is highlighting.
Regarding the comparison between Tak Bai and the Red Shirt crack down, the responsibility depends on Thaksin’s and Abhisit’s involvement. Did the army act independently or did they follow orders directed from the government?
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That class “code of honor” might be more akin to a twisted omerta, the Mafia code of silence that with the Mafia prohibits reliance on state authorities. In the Thai case it is sort of a prohibition on using human rights protections or accountable methods in policing the state.
Today’s Thai Post, by the way, had a headline indicating that the police state was expected to resurface. An observer recently asked when did it disappear…
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Re: CT #35
The reason the Thai royalists and rightwing elites have not used the so-called “War on Drugs” murders (whether or not the number is actually 2500 is in question as apparently that number was created by an AFP wire service article that was never substantiated) to prosecute Thaksin is that:
1. The War on Drugs was actually instigated and promoted by the King with Thaksin following along in an attempt to ingratiate himself.
2. The War on Drugs involved many police and army officers and units participating in extra-judicial killings for all sorts of reasons, not only for “drug dealing”. After all, any close follower of the Thailand situation knows that it is the Army and Police Generals themselves who are the largest drug dealers in Thailand.
3. Thaksin had no direct control over the details of who was being targeted and for what reason in the “War on Drugs”. While some would say that he was “responsible”, in actual fact, he was really just tagging along with the drug-related mayhem which is part of the ongoing struggle between different power groups in the Army and Police over who gets what revenues from what territory and who controls which suppliers in Burma and Laos.
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CT – 35
The case should not even be a case, civil or criminal. First, it is not about making unauthorized profit, its about conflict of interest. If we look at the nature of the case, this case is actually didn’t involve Thaksin, but his wife Pojaman since Pojaman was the buyer and the FIDF (under the BOT) was the seller. Now, any conscious mind should be aware of the fact that none of the seller or the buyer actually go to jail. So, under “normal” legal interpretation, there’s no wrong doing. So how did Thaksin, a third party in this case, got a 2 years jail term for something totally legit?.
Now, the core of the case is, whether Thaksin actually can use his position as the PM to influence the auction. Again, any conscious mind would wonder, how can someone influence the result of the open envelop auction? since the price was announce to all party until no one want to outbid the highest bidder. Somehow the prosecutors and the court thought theres something to it.
The main question that need to be answer is, does FIDF, a branch of BOT considered itself as “state agency”. Since Thaksin was the PM so he does have power to influence the state organization. By law, the BOT is not a part of state organization. This is apply to anywhere in the world, like the Federal Reserve is not part of the US government so on.
In history, if I’m not mistaken, there were about 3 outer cases that involve the supreme court to give the definition to the FIDF, which all the 3 cases found that the FIDF was in fact “not” part of state. Somehow, the Thaksin ratchada land plot over rule all the previous decisions.
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Excellent summary Gunter,just a shame Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International don’t read this blog,because up until now it seems that according to them responsibility rests with just the one man and thats Thaksin himself who by all appearances and wording in the Thai constitution appears just like many other Thai prime ministers and took orders directly from the palace.But hey, the label “Thaksin’s WOD”.is now stuck with araldite.So even when the Thai constitution gives the King most power and says “..the idea of war came from this man…” it means nothing to Brad Adams and Benjamin Zawacki who trot out”accountability from all parties” or ask you to “guess who”.
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@Everyone, thank you for answering my question in detail. Oh and also thank you for giving me the URL address to see the analysis of the case. Now I understand this case much more than I used to.
@Khun Tarrin, thank you for your explanation. And yes, you are quite right that I should have used the word “conflict of interest”. But even then, the worst which would happen (assuming that it can be proven that there really was a conflict of interest) is the transaction would be void. But he would not have to go to jail. Jail term is something which should never be ordered unless the crime is a serious one.
@Gunter #46, are you sure that the war on drugs is instigated by the K? I do not mean to undermine your assertion, but I would like to know what makes you believe that the K is behind it? (ie. any ‘circumstantial’ evidence?) I have not been interested in politics during that period, so I actually don’t know much about what happened back then. Please explain (actually anyone please explain, if you know)…thanks.
So why the PULO website still states that they demand Thaksin to be brought to trial for crimes against humanity? Why the southern three provinces are still loyal Democrat followers (as evidenced by latest election result)? If the K is really behind it, they would have stopped supporting the Democrats I would think.
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Chris L #44
General McCrystal being the case in point.
I have no way of knowing whether the army acted independently or under the orders of the PM at Tak Bai or during the Red Shirt. However, given the generally accepted view that Abhisit only became PM because of the army, it’s unlikely that he had the authority to order them to do anything much. They certainly didn’t obey his order to cooperate with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigation into the dispersal of the Red Shirt rally.
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c46 Gunter
As I live in Thailand, I feel I have to leave comment on Para 1) to others who are less vulnerable to sanction than I am.
Para 2) largely fits in with my understanding – though the main role is likely to have been played by the police. The army’s role was probably greater in the border areas.
Para 3) – particularly “he [Thaksin] was really just tagging along…” does seem to paint a picture of an unwitting (almost unwilling?) PM simply caught up in events. Looking at both public statements of intent and internal orders issued from the PM’s Office, it’s very difficult to accept that interpretation. Highly ambitious targets and very tight deadlines were set for local forces to meet – with clear, dire warnings of repercussions for those who failed to meet them. A ‘data collection’ phase to produce categorised lists of drugs-involved individuals was closely followed by phases which demanded comprehensive action against those identified – in most categories the target being to reduce the list to nil. As a former Police Lt-Colonel, it’s difficult to accept that Thaksin could have been unaware of where all those “most urgent” directives were at least very likely to lead.
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Even the Bangkok taxi driver who I rode with today knows Robert Amsterdam’s name. What an outstanding achievement
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Once again the imposter corporate-paid “academics” at ANU’s New Mandala give space to a paid lobbyist to air his latest PR campaign. Can’t wait for Andrew Walker to explain what this has to do with academia and how it is not part of some politically motivated agenda he is being paid to promote.
Once again Walker, you make all of us “little people” without PhD.’s realize we are not missing out on anything.
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TC/Land Destoryer/Tony Cartalucci: You’ve been so quiet lately, I thought you had moved on, but no, here you are ranting against New Mandala & Andrew Walker now that you’ve become bored with ranting on Pracahtai. Such a powerful all-knowing man. I am finally convinced and ready to come over to your side………
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Evidence Tony? Rants should be cut. TC is not pithy, not original and sounds like the Koch brothers.
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Actually, the suggestion that facts and evidence be presented isn’t so illogical.
It’s fine to throw accusations about, and spend a lot of time in “the corporation had to have bought you” syndrome, but when you put it down on paper sometimes whats there does not stand the test of logic.
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It is one thing to dispute Amsterdam’s analysis of the situation in Thailand but quite another to describe him as a big-bucks PR man. He’s done much to help the cause (often on a pro-bono basis) in many jurisdictions where anti-democratic practices remain entrenched.
For example he published a detailed piece about the crushing of the opposition and civil liberties by the Singapore government, and helped give a much needed airing on the political situation in the city-state. No big-bucks involved. Indeed, no bucks involved.
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It looks to me that certain “deals” are done between the “dual state” parties and that is what I believe happened with the WOD-Tak Bai-ect.It’s getting more and more obvious now how royal meddling is interfering with goverment. And as Abhisit and Thaksin have both found to their own detriment,it is only they who are named and blamed by human rights groups.We learn through wikileaks and political whispers (eg Shawn Crispin) that the Queen sees herself as the protector of Thailand and it’s territory.And the weak king hides behind hospital walls but signs and backs coupmakers and extra judicial policies.I would imagine the queen wants the Yingluck goverment to continue with her policies of brute force and un-accountability,especially in the South.How long before a human rights group dares to ask the role of the monarchy in past state crimes……It’s all so ridiculous really. Everyone says they love the monarchy,…then we hear from cables this: “Thaksin told him he knew the king hated him”
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Darren Nelson #58
>>then we hear from cables this: “Thaksin told him he knew the king hated him”
Ah, but in a legit democracy system, should that matter? Since he know that the people love him. Food for thought.
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The reason why the King and all his toadies hate Thaksin, the key to Thailand’s troubles? Thaksin has eclipsed the King in popularity. Such is the state of Thailand’s political development: more like a squabbling troop of monkeys or a wolf-pack than a nation state. Thailand is a reminder that the institution of monarchy predates the evolution of human beings, and is no longer fit for them.
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R. N. England 60
“the institution of monarchy predates the evolution of human beings” Ouch!!
I say R.N. that’s a bit previous isn’t it? More Richard Dawkins or Charles Darwin than Sir James Fraser?
Could we settle for “predates the Age of Enlightenment” or I’d say The Great War was when the penny finally dropped for the western hemisphere. Asia’s a little trickier I agree.
Be careful with the sweeping statements or you’ll be eating out at Tony Carlucci’s (I hear the spaghetti sauce is excellent….)
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Billy Budd #61
I think R.N. England may have had “king of the beasts” in mind.
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Steve CM#51
With a case in Ayuthaya, which raised a nick name to Yuth TooYen (frige)!. In an early morning polices surrounded a house in Ayuthya to crack down a drug dealer, bullets teared all the house down just to find out that the house belonged to a poor couple. The old lung (uncle) had to covered himself up in a refigerater to got survive from the shootings. This case was leaded by one of TRT leading member. After the dust settled down, there were hundred of bullets on the frige shell, poor uncle.
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I’m sure R.N. England will enjoy this: http://www.zenjournalist.com/2011/09/wanted-for-crimes-against-thailands-revered-monarchy/
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Billy Budd (61). I’m quite prepared to defend my assertion that dominance hierarchies like the one that afflicts Thailand are very clearly evident in many species of social animals, though necessarily on a smaller scale. But I agree with your historical approach as well. The founding fathers of the United States were the first to devise a system in which people could, if they liked, largely free themselves from the power hierarchies of their European past. The rise of the corporation has shown how few people really want that freedom. But corporations can be dissolved according to accepted rules without bloodshed (they can go broke). The most pernicious dominance hierarchies are those that threaten bloodshed if their power is challenged by popular vote.
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QUOTE The founding fathers of the United States were the first to devise a system in which people could, if they liked, largely free themselves from the power hierarchies of their European past. UNQUOTE
I guess what you really mean is that the founding fathers found a way to coerce people into accepting a more local power hierarchy. One could argue that American democracy has been stagnant ever since. It isn’t that hard to figure out that both sets of Tea Parties were largely self-serving.
In Thailand’s case, you can leave out the local bit. Cash subversion of the kamnans and pooyaibahns (and other local mafias) will continue to prevent any real freedom – regardless of which CEO spends his way to the PMship.
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One thing that Sondhi Limthongkul said that I rather agree with is, “р╕кр╕▒р╕Зр╕Др╕бр╣Др╕Чр╕вр╣Ар╕ор╕╡р╣Йр╕в.” This means that the problem is not with police or politicians, but with society as a whole where civics, civility, and civil rights are basically left off the “Let’s keep having fun.” menu.
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Re: the King and Prem’s involvement in the War on Drugs (Gunter c46, Darren 48, CT c49)…
PPT has today posted two BKK Post articles by Wassana Nanuam from Dec 2002 and 20o5 describing both Prem and the King’s instigation, enthusiasm and backing for the War on Drugs:
http://thaipoliticalprisoners.wordpress.com/2011/09/11/prem-and-the-war-on-drugs/
Thus, it would have been almost impossible, even in Thailand, to prosecute Thaksin for his role in War on Drugs, without involving Prem, the King, some Generals, etc.
Hence the dubious use of his wife’s purchase of the Ratchada land in an open auction to manufacture the Thaksin as “criminal” and “international fugitive” message and propaganda.
It is worth noting that neither Interpol nor many other countries took this so-called “conviction” as anything other than political persecution of a democratically-elected leader overthrown by a military coup.
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As a postscript to my c51, I recommend reading what’s at:
https://thaipoliticalprisoners.wordpress.com/2011/09/11/prem-and-the-war-on-drugs/
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Dear Robert
One thing that puzzles me about the Rachada case is why Thaksin did not lodge an appeal?
Even though he might not have expected justice, I would have thought he need not ppear in person and thus not face unjust imprisonment and the case could have exposed to ridicule the Thai Legal system.
Is it not true that such an exposure is in itself illegal and leads the exposers to proseution and jailing so no lawyer would dare to represent Thaksin?
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Unfortunately there was no appeal process available and the IIRC (the court) refused to hold another session to consider new evidence that Thaksin’s lawyers submitted.
Thaksin had left the country and broken his bail conditions. He didn’t return. Thus he became known as the “fugitive” and latterly the “criminal.”
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Dear Battle
Thank you for responding to my longstanding question about why did Thaksin not appeal. ( Apologies for the typos)
I find it interesting you chose this auspicious day to explain the situation. I wonder if you were waiting in the hope of hearing some words about justice this morning? Well you and I , both disappointed.
The punishment meted out to Thaksin has surely been extreme as it includes stealing government from him and forcing him into a long exile and yet the yellows are still baying for blood.
I wish he would just land here in ChiangMai and we would have a crowd to rival the “Joyous Multitudes” seen on TV this morning.
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Noting Albert’s comment 68 :
“Thus, it would have been almost impossible, even in Thailand, to prosecute Thaksin for his role in War on Drugs, without involving Prem, the King, some Generals, etc.”
Thaksin , to his credit, has apologized for his being over zealous in his War on Drugs, and being too much the policeman.
This is unusual as he no nearly past his prime. It is perhaps more usual for the very elderly to contemplate their misdeeds and excesses and admit them in the hope of some forgiveness. I have in mind Robert MacNamara, one time US Secretary of Defense, who featured in a film The Fog of War and in his last years became a passionate advocate of nuclear disarmament.
None of the others in the list have expressed any regrets and the chance that was there today was passed up.
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Ricky
We got caught up in the celebrations near Khao San road last night.
I just read Amsterdam’s piece today and the many responses and I was very impressed by D.N’s comments. I just happened today to be researching the land deal and came across this other blog which is well worth looking at.
http://slimdogsworld.blogspot.com/2009/06/fidf-land-sales.html
It would appear that the land was sold for a total of 2.43 billion baht including 772 million from Pojaman .
It appears that all 4 plots were re-sold at auction on the 17th August 2011 to Supalai PLC at a price of Baht 1,815,000,000.
thus leaving a shortfall/loss seemingly of 615 million baht.
It is clear that Pojaman paid a fair price and also that no laws were broken. The FIDF were happy that they got more than their own valuation.
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