Weird that I was attacked for writing this piece when it was published and now AFP have just put out an article that mirrors almost everything I wrote here. Seems as though my journalism was pretty much spot on.
A brown homepage? Who was the ‘artiste’ responsible for this less than aesthetically pleasing ‘upgrade’? The old look far superior in this regard. Distinctive. This unimaginative initiative seems almost bureaucratic. But I fully understand the the need to put a good deal of content on the first screen for the benefit of the reader. Keep up the good work.
I found another archival picture which has been edited in the past. In Laos it normally shows Ho Chi Minh and Souphanouvong sitting together. It was taken in September 1945. However, the original also shows there is a third party, the Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai.
Thank you very much for these thoughful responses.
With regard to the issue of membership, you’re quite right that such categories are problematic with regard to the social phenomena we are discussing. It seems to me, however, that the question can be asked whether a single “public sphere” really exists in Thailand. To the extent that there exists a rational debate on issues of public import in the “public sphere”, it seems to me to take place by in large within opposing camps and rarely if ever between them. Interactions between politically opposed groups in the coutry tend to take on the form of a zero-sum, winner take all battle, implying that the public sphere has fallen victim to the ‘colonizing’ influence of the instrumental rationality of power (and money). Following Cohen and Arato’s ideas on civil society, it is my own feeling that the development of a ‘modern’ democratic public sphere is contingent on the institutionalization of various rights as well as social norms regarding political opposition. I would suggest that this process is very much incomplete in Thailand and many other countries in region.
I have to admit that I struggle to connect what I’ve just written with the opposing categories of “civil” and “political” society we have been discussing. It does seem to me, however, that certain segments of “the public” in Thailand have enjoyed more stable protection of their political and civil rights than have others. When I referred to the “perceived denial of the right to engage in democratic politics” what I was (rather unclearly) referring to was results of democratic participation by very large numbers of Thai citizens being invalidated by military and judicial coup. What I intended to suggest was that the mode of political engagement such groups as the”red shirts” have pusued is influenced by this denial of the right to particpate and have the outcome of that participation respected by the state.
I must also admist that, as a graduate student, I am still in the process of coming to grips with this concecptually complex terrain (perhaps that is too obvious to bear stating!). But I do very much appreciate your responses to my previous posts as well as the suggested reading.
I don’t suppose by any chance you will be attending the upcoming conference on “Civil Society, Politics and Development in ASEAN Countries” at PSU Hat Yai Spetember 6-7? If so, I think it would be a very good opportunity to discuss these questions further.
He ‘works for’ the UDD but he … and the UDD ‘core leaders’? … are paid by Thaksin. So they follow Thaksin’s line.
Thailand’s line needs to be a Constitution in place of the present Substitution. Everyday the Substitutional Court assumes more power in Thailand. The Reds Shirts effectively may no longer speak in public.
The Royal Thai Army, too, is daily taking more off the table. Threatening those who make any attempt to prosecute those responsible for the Royal Thai Army’s latest massacre of Thais in 2010.
The only ones any longer even talking about the treasonous mutiny of 2006 are the Nitirat, and they are the only ones with a concrete proposal for a new Constitution as well. Guaranteeing popular sovereignty, with the government serving at the pleasure of the people.
And they are being sized up, once again.
That’s what needs support, in my view. As things stand … it’s just the slow slide down the slippery slope. Or else in a flash, all at once.
Let me get this straight. Amersterdam begins his defense of the Yingluk government’s approach to lese majeste by saying that it is better than Mark Vedge’s. Did I really hear that? And the murder that came with Thaksin’s war on drugs is a matter of “hype”? Did the Network drug Amsterdam before he did this interview with Dr Walker? How else to explain the sheer crudity of his analysis and the thread-bare quality of his invocations of human rights? Oh, wait. There is another explanation in fact. Amsterdam has fallen into the typical habits of vain American celebrity lawyers, I mean blowhards. Can the Red Shirts possibly need this guy?
“overlap between membership” > Generally, I think, membership-related categories are problematic when applied to societal phenomena that consist of the reproduction of communications. When we speak of a “public sphere,” for example, we mean that people observe politics, talk about politics, and maybe act with regard to politics (voting, becoming members of political parties, protests). One can then ask whether and in which way social position influences the way observations and communications (including actions) are made. But it makes little sense to say that only this or that social stratum makes up the members of the “public.” (And if they are “members” of that public already, can they still go shopping or make love? Role theory tried to make this a more flexible arrangement.)
Thus, there would be neither any “civil” nor any “political” society, but only one “public sphere” the communications of which are influenced by the different social positions of those who participate in those communications. Regarding the peasantry, then, the question has been (in Europe as well as in Thailand) in how far, and by which processes, they become politicized, meaning that they start to routinely observe politics and take part in reproducing the communications the political system consists of. This is quite different from the previous state-peasantry relations, as both Chatterjee and Walker point out. In some respects, one could speak of the “political mainstreaming” of the peasantry.
For an early work reflecting the problematic for Thailand, see Titaya Suvanajata. 1973. “Political Authenticity: An Appraisal of the Integration of Rural Thai Villagers Into the Thai Bureaucratic Polity.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri – Columbia. For a work on previous state-peasant relations in Thailand, see Andrew Turton. 1987. Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor Farmers’ Groups. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNSRISD).
“Where the peasantry has mobilized in reaction to a percieved denial of the right to engage in democratic politics” > This does not seem to be the case in Thailand.
Thayer, of course, tries to counter the depoliticized discourse on people’s politics that some academic observers of Vietnamese politics think is necessary under the given repressive conditions. This goes as far as including party-initiated mass organizations in the category of “civil society” (http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/viewFile/260/260 ). See also the recent collection of Terence Chong and Stefanie Elies eds. 2011. An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia. In short, there is a concept in the supranational discourse, and since it sounds useful, it is used for different purposes, and for quite different contexts. Never mind whether this approach muddies the conceptual waters even more…
I believe there will be a lengthy “waiting period” after a certain person’s demise, which could be 3 years or more but certainly will be at least 1 year, before the world’s most gigantic ritual funeral since Ancient Egypt. Does anyone know on what basis the “waiting period” time length will be determined, what length of time signifies in terms of reincarantion, etc., and who will in control of this decision and what happens in the possibly 3 year interim period? For instance, does the person’s son have to wait until after the actual funeral to ascend to full power? And in the meantime, who has control over the army and CPB billions?
I would agree that there are real problems with the application of Chaterjee’s concept of ‘political society’ to the Thai context. This is particularly the case if we assume an overlap between membership in it and employment in the informal sector. In Thailand (and in to a lesser extent in India) such an assumption makes very little sense. Where I think the concept can add something to our understanding of state society relations in Thailand’ however, is with regard to the peasantry, as Prof. Walker has argued (although, I haven’t yet read the book, so I can’t comment much further). Where the peasantry has mobilized in reaction to a percieved denial of the right to engage in democratic politics (and have the results of that participation respected by the state), it has engaged in a mode of interaction with the state that differs significantly from that usually asociated with civil society.
As to whether Chaterjee adds anything significant to the work, of Rokken, I have to plead ignorance, but thank you for the suggested reading. Regarding Thayer’s article, it is an interesting peice, but notion of ‘political civil society’ seems to me to muddy the already turbid waters!
Thaksin’s only real anti-royalist infraction was seeing the inevitable future and having the gall to be open about it. Thus, his cozying up to the Crown Prince, and his administrative preparations for a post-Rama 9 influence vacuum. Of course, the old guard has been making similar preparations for decades, but they have the Thai-face decency to do it in secret.
Like the strongmen before him (Sarit, Suchinda, et al) Thaksin knows a useful mythology when he sees one. The author’s note about “radical shifts in allegiance” cannot be overstated; the army is pragmatic to the core. But to refer to “the palace” in monolithic terms belies some pretty big factional variables, doesn’t it? The palace of the king, the palace of the queen, the palace of the Privy C, the palace of the prince, the palace of the princess, or the palace of the non-titled employees who haven’t had a real job for 65 years?
Whether Thaksin is invited to join the coalition depends on which “palace” has prominence 100 days after Rama 9’s funeral.
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New Mandala site upgrade
Looking good gents.
Human rights and lese majeste
Weird that I was attacked for writing this piece when it was published and now AFP have just put out an article that mirrors almost everything I wrote here. Seems as though my journalism was pretty much spot on.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jG1_z8WM3tNbwhxw5ceqI77glENA?docId=CNG.392d5578e0e2c7d8a0f7efa54d2c061b.4a1
New Mandala site upgrade
Congratulations on the excellent up-grade. Does make it considerably easier to navigate around these, in many cases, very complicated issues.
New Mandala site upgrade
A brown homepage? Who was the ‘artiste’ responsible for this less than aesthetically pleasing ‘upgrade’? The old look far superior in this regard. Distinctive. This unimaginative initiative seems almost bureaucratic. But I fully understand the the need to put a good deal of content on the first screen for the benefit of the reader. Keep up the good work.
New Mandala site upgrade
I like the new theme, much better than the old one. Like an academic journal from the 80s with lots of dust on top. Perfect!
Council on Thai Studies Conference
The 2nd Thai Studies Conference in Melbourne is now calling for papers. Please visit our website at:
http://thaistudiesinmelbourne.blogspot.com.au/
Thank you guys!
Peasant political society
Karl Marx is worth reading to get a different perspective. NOTHING is new.
Two’s company …
I found another archival picture which has been edited in the past. In Laos it normally shows Ho Chi Minh and Souphanouvong sitting together. It was taken in September 1945. However, the original also shows there is a third party, the Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai.
Peasant political society
Srithanonchai,
Thank you very much for these thoughful responses.
With regard to the issue of membership, you’re quite right that such categories are problematic with regard to the social phenomena we are discussing. It seems to me, however, that the question can be asked whether a single “public sphere” really exists in Thailand. To the extent that there exists a rational debate on issues of public import in the “public sphere”, it seems to me to take place by in large within opposing camps and rarely if ever between them. Interactions between politically opposed groups in the coutry tend to take on the form of a zero-sum, winner take all battle, implying that the public sphere has fallen victim to the ‘colonizing’ influence of the instrumental rationality of power (and money). Following Cohen and Arato’s ideas on civil society, it is my own feeling that the development of a ‘modern’ democratic public sphere is contingent on the institutionalization of various rights as well as social norms regarding political opposition. I would suggest that this process is very much incomplete in Thailand and many other countries in region.
I have to admit that I struggle to connect what I’ve just written with the opposing categories of “civil” and “political” society we have been discussing. It does seem to me, however, that certain segments of “the public” in Thailand have enjoyed more stable protection of their political and civil rights than have others. When I referred to the “perceived denial of the right to engage in democratic politics” what I was (rather unclearly) referring to was results of democratic participation by very large numbers of Thai citizens being invalidated by military and judicial coup. What I intended to suggest was that the mode of political engagement such groups as the”red shirts” have pusued is influenced by this denial of the right to particpate and have the outcome of that participation respected by the state.
I must also admist that, as a graduate student, I am still in the process of coming to grips with this concecptually complex terrain (perhaps that is too obvious to bear stating!). But I do very much appreciate your responses to my previous posts as well as the suggested reading.
I don’t suppose by any chance you will be attending the upcoming conference on “Civil Society, Politics and Development in ASEAN Countries” at PSU Hat Yai Spetember 6-7? If so, I think it would be a very good opportunity to discuss these questions further.
Robert Amsterdam on Thaksin, Prayuth, lese majeste and the red shirts
He ‘works for’ the UDD but he … and the UDD ‘core leaders’? … are paid by Thaksin. So they follow Thaksin’s line.
Thailand’s line needs to be a Constitution in place of the present Substitution. Everyday the Substitutional Court assumes more power in Thailand. The Reds Shirts effectively may no longer speak in public.
The Royal Thai Army, too, is daily taking more off the table. Threatening those who make any attempt to prosecute those responsible for the Royal Thai Army’s latest massacre of Thais in 2010.
The only ones any longer even talking about the treasonous mutiny of 2006 are the Nitirat, and they are the only ones with a concrete proposal for a new Constitution as well. Guaranteeing popular sovereignty, with the government serving at the pleasure of the people.
And they are being sized up, once again.
That’s what needs support, in my view. As things stand … it’s just the slow slide down the slippery slope. Or else in a flash, all at once.
Robert Amsterdam on Thaksin, Prayuth, lese majeste and the red shirts
Let me get this straight. Amersterdam begins his defense of the Yingluk government’s approach to lese majeste by saying that it is better than Mark Vedge’s. Did I really hear that? And the murder that came with Thaksin’s war on drugs is a matter of “hype”? Did the Network drug Amsterdam before he did this interview with Dr Walker? How else to explain the sheer crudity of his analysis and the thread-bare quality of his invocations of human rights? Oh, wait. There is another explanation in fact. Amsterdam has fallen into the typical habits of vain American celebrity lawyers, I mean blowhards. Can the Red Shirts possibly need this guy?
Robert Amsterdam on Thaksin, Prayuth, lese majeste and the red shirts
[…] 1: New Mandala has a video interview with […]
Thailand’s silver snatched?
Nick and Vichai:
Are there differences between Darwinism and evolution ? This red shirt is for sale:
https://fbcdn-sphotos-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-snc7/295477_468595446484220_675968793_n.jpg
Ho Chi Minh’s surprise letter
Thanks for the review
Peasant political society
Doug:
“overlap between membership” > Generally, I think, membership-related categories are problematic when applied to societal phenomena that consist of the reproduction of communications. When we speak of a “public sphere,” for example, we mean that people observe politics, talk about politics, and maybe act with regard to politics (voting, becoming members of political parties, protests). One can then ask whether and in which way social position influences the way observations and communications (including actions) are made. But it makes little sense to say that only this or that social stratum makes up the members of the “public.” (And if they are “members” of that public already, can they still go shopping or make love? Role theory tried to make this a more flexible arrangement.)
Thus, there would be neither any “civil” nor any “political” society, but only one “public sphere” the communications of which are influenced by the different social positions of those who participate in those communications. Regarding the peasantry, then, the question has been (in Europe as well as in Thailand) in how far, and by which processes, they become politicized, meaning that they start to routinely observe politics and take part in reproducing the communications the political system consists of. This is quite different from the previous state-peasantry relations, as both Chatterjee and Walker point out. In some respects, one could speak of the “political mainstreaming” of the peasantry.
For an early work reflecting the problematic for Thailand, see Titaya Suvanajata. 1973. “Political Authenticity: An Appraisal of the Integration of Rural Thai Villagers Into the Thai Bureaucratic Polity.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri – Columbia. For a work on previous state-peasant relations in Thailand, see Andrew Turton. 1987. Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor Farmers’ Groups. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNSRISD).
“Where the peasantry has mobilized in reaction to a percieved denial of the right to engage in democratic politics” > This does not seem to be the case in Thailand.
Thayer, of course, tries to counter the depoliticized discourse on people’s politics that some academic observers of Vietnamese politics think is necessary under the given repressive conditions. This goes as far as including party-initiated mass organizations in the category of “civil society” (http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/viewFile/260/260 ). See also the recent collection of Terence Chong and Stefanie Elies eds. 2011. An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia. In short, there is a concept in the supranational discourse, and since it sounds useful, it is used for different purposes, and for quite different contexts. Never mind whether this approach muddies the conceptual waters even more…
Thaksin and the palace
I believe there will be a lengthy “waiting period” after a certain person’s demise, which could be 3 years or more but certainly will be at least 1 year, before the world’s most gigantic ritual funeral since Ancient Egypt. Does anyone know on what basis the “waiting period” time length will be determined, what length of time signifies in terms of reincarantion, etc., and who will in control of this decision and what happens in the possibly 3 year interim period? For instance, does the person’s son have to wait until after the actual funeral to ascend to full power? And in the meantime, who has control over the army and CPB billions?
Thaksin and the palace
The question to ask is who will be supporting the lese majeste law and who will be opposed to it and why in the near future.
Peasant political society
Srithanonchai,
I would agree that there are real problems with the application of Chaterjee’s concept of ‘political society’ to the Thai context. This is particularly the case if we assume an overlap between membership in it and employment in the informal sector. In Thailand (and in to a lesser extent in India) such an assumption makes very little sense. Where I think the concept can add something to our understanding of state society relations in Thailand’ however, is with regard to the peasantry, as Prof. Walker has argued (although, I haven’t yet read the book, so I can’t comment much further). Where the peasantry has mobilized in reaction to a percieved denial of the right to engage in democratic politics (and have the results of that participation respected by the state), it has engaged in a mode of interaction with the state that differs significantly from that usually asociated with civil society.
As to whether Chaterjee adds anything significant to the work, of Rokken, I have to plead ignorance, but thank you for the suggested reading. Regarding Thayer’s article, it is an interesting peice, but notion of ‘political civil society’ seems to me to muddy the already turbid waters!
Thaksin and the palace
Thaksin’s only real anti-royalist infraction was seeing the inevitable future and having the gall to be open about it. Thus, his cozying up to the Crown Prince, and his administrative preparations for a post-Rama 9 influence vacuum. Of course, the old guard has been making similar preparations for decades, but they have the Thai-face decency to do it in secret.
Like the strongmen before him (Sarit, Suchinda, et al) Thaksin knows a useful mythology when he sees one. The author’s note about “radical shifts in allegiance” cannot be overstated; the army is pragmatic to the core. But to refer to “the palace” in monolithic terms belies some pretty big factional variables, doesn’t it? The palace of the king, the palace of the queen, the palace of the Privy C, the palace of the prince, the palace of the princess, or the palace of the non-titled employees who haven’t had a real job for 65 years?
Whether Thaksin is invited to join the coalition depends on which “palace” has prominence 100 days after Rama 9’s funeral.
Thaksin and the palace
Apirux, # 1
If that person can live up to 120 years old, he can be added to the list of the Chinese Eight Immortals:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eight_Immortals
Or perhaps Dhammakaya temple can now predict which heaven that person will be reborn after this life:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/308543/dhammakaya-boasts-steve-jobs-afterlife