If I am not mistaken that’s the place where Chamlong was held after he broke his word and failed to starve to death before being taken for his historic meeting with the King and General Suchinda. How fitting for Thaksin to serve a token night of his sentence in a luxury cell there on 4th December before being pardoned of his crime by popular consent the following day!
Thanks John, getting more interesting now. So we have local leaders who are are “generally thought of more like leaders that is doing good for the whole community.” But then you suggest that these leaders are among “the very people that are the real problem for the rural poor”. How does this work in the local context you are familiar with? How do people who are part of the problem manage to maintain their electoral support and come to be thought of a “doing good for the whole community”? Are the voters simply misinformed, or do they have reasons to believe that their political representatives justify the vote they give them? AW
Where can I find the papers delivered at the “Conference On Five Years After The Military Coup: Thailand’s Political Developments Since Thaksin’s Downfall”?
I wasn’t able to attend but am interested to read them.
I’m sure they’re available online… and that I just haven’t been able to find them.
I was a student of Bob Taylor’s at Sydney Uni back in the 1970s, studying International Relations. As a mature adult student, I always found him the easiest going lecturer with heaps of advice to people like myself, relatively new to academia. I knew he’d gone to LSE, and always retained good memories of him.
I remember him being visibly moved at the massacre of Burmese students around that time. I just came across this interview with New Mandela and could almost see the man himself, sitting easily behind his desk. I always wished we’d had a few drinks together:-)
Eisel Mazard 7
Thank you very much for broadcasting a timely reminder. “Lest We Forget”
To my mind the issue has never been entirely about les-majeste per se but the prevalent culture of state political/social/economic repression utilised by whoever climbs to the top of the fragrant junk-heap. (and hence the true need for the les-majeste law) to be kept sharp and omniscient (pour encourager les autres)
….and the culture of fear, obeisance and aquiescence; front and centre).
There’s no need for the multiple names. Please stick to the one identifier so that those following your input can keep up. I note that you have used a fair number of other names over the years too.
Most fundamentally, perhaps, it’s beyond that and is really about self-determination vs. determination-from-above. There are two places for those seeking self-determination: prison or abroad.
“Or are the darker-skinned, less-educated, lower-income rural residents of Thailand (by far majority of the Thailand population) not entitled to enjoying the benefits of their own patronage systems?”
Tell that to the skin-lightened, degree-milled, nepotistic fat cat puppet PM. Her idea of a well-run society, like most ‘elite’, is that she monopolises the benefits of your labor and imagination for the glory of her own family and their ‘friends’.
The trick is to prevent this continual hijack. That takes long-term strategy and the foresight not to get diverted down yet another dead-end. Unfortunately, there is usually a tendency to opt for the short-term fix, that HAS always ended up in long-term failure. Current trends again seem to be conforming to that ongoing waste of time.
From this year forward the dec 5 b-day may be remarketed (and PR + marketing has always been the key) as the daynThailand’s Mandela got his freedom after suffering injustices, humiliating loss of face, double standards, and , oh yeah that tax free billion or so confiscation.
So like Nelson, after suffering spending 27 years (cockroach years of course with 1 day = 1 year, symbolized by 27 days, of coursed reduced to 8 days because of his personal vouching for his own integrity and love for the monarchy), the New Face of Freedom and Democracy is released on dec 5, which from that day forth change it’s status to Thai Red shirt freedom day and the anniversary of the return of the billionaire to his proper status as the One.
I never said anything about an “all pervading presence in which people lived in fear”. The only ones that live in fear are those that are actively opposing the godfathers and those are few and far between and tend to henchmen of other families trying to encroach on the territory. It certainly is not the UDD or Thaksin.
In fact, the godfathers are generally thought of more like leaders that is doing good for the whole community. The fact that the family is personally enriched by doing so does not seem to matter as there is a definite trickledown effect for many. In a US context you might think of the Longs or Tallmadges. Few in their fiefdoms hated them, it was the outsiders that hated them and worked (mostly fruitlessly) on their downfall. It was only the emergence of an independent middle class that brought about the end of the US Southern populists. I believe the younger generation that has moved to Bangkok and the Eastern Seaboard, but maintain ties at home, will be the end of the political influence of the godfathers and their ability to deliver MP’s into Parliament, but it is going to take another generation before that happens.
In the meantime, the liberals will continue to support a movement that in fact is supported and financed by the very people that are the real problem for the rural poor, a movement that has done a excellent job of creating demagoguery that uses the Amart and the “Bangkok Elite” as the enemy of the people, keeping the heat well away from themselves. The western liberals will continue to support this as it fits perfectly with their rooting for the underdog against the establishment. They will continue to dismiss the real issue as one that is an inaccurate “stereotype” that is “complex and diverse” and is not really a problem. It’s those hated Bangkok people that are the problem.
I do note that certain people have managed to divert the discussion away from the real issue, which is the fact that by early 2006, TRT was well on its way to establishing a UNMO style single party government and the boycott of the 2006 election and subsequent events put a stop to that. With the results of the July 2011 put that back on track? We shall see.
The irony that the leaders of UDD, now MP’s, would at the forefront of the single party government, actively suppressing and dissent is lost on the liberals.
The graphic Andrew chose for this article is the perfect example.
Instead of an M-16, wouldn’t a more accurate photo be one of the many from that week in September 2006 that showed the people welcoming the troops with flowers and food? Few were happy that it had come to that, but relief that at least a solution to the chaos of that summer had been found was palatable across the kingdom.
I am in total agreement with Eisel.
In the last week the Political Prisoners in Thailand web site has become blocked again.
It is not about reds and yellows, or your side against my side, it’s about a balanced view and freedom of speech and being able to explore both sides of the argument.
John #28. That’s a good starting point, but surely if we want to understand rural politics is not a very satisfactory end point. You say that the MP election was a “non event”. If I was to spend time doing research there I would want to know how much of a “non event”. What were the voting patterns? How many people voted against the winner? Why did they vote against him? What reasons did people give for voting for the winner? Fear? Affection? Support for his development of the area? Localism? Personal attributes? I suspect the reasons were probably a mix. How has the mix changed and evolved? How do people evaluate political representatives? What is important to them? Do decisions made at national elections automatically translate into decisions in local elections? How has the changing economy affected political perspectives? Who are people’s patrons? Is there only one patron, or a very small number? Or do people have other sources of support, protection, patronage (human and non-human)?
Some may be happy with the conclusion that it was a non-event. I would want to understand much more about the micro-events that contributed to the macro-non-event.
“A video promoting the right to vote has been taken off the air by local broadcasters despite a push for greater democracy because it contains opposition figures and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah’s speech talking about Malaysia having problems.
The Malaysian Insider learnt that the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) directed local broadcasters this week not to use the public service announcement (PSA) produced by musician Pete Teo just days after its launch on September 16…..
Teo, who produced the independent video as a voluntary project, said the alleged directive was “disturbing” as it went against Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s latest announcement to loosen media control and strengthen civil liberties in the country.
1) Crocodile tears for the ‘plight of the citizenry’
2) Alleging others of ignoring it
3) As if all the generals needed was a pat on the back and economic support.
Proof please.
1) The dying and the slowly dying from deprivation of education and economic among the most vulnerable will refute your baseless, labeling well. You can find proof for the here in New Mandala.
2) For your info. not “alleging” but “accusing” Certainly will not have difficulty finding in New Mandala as well.
3) That is how you and your ilks see lifting sanction as. Another proof of ‘Fixation’ on generals and forget about the real victims the citizenry.
From my own experience of rural Sa Kaew – admittedly not spent a year there, the will to live starts to wane within about 4 days(!) – I’m not convinced by John Smith’s analysis.
Of course the Thienthong’s won the elections, but an all pervading presence in which people lived in fear, I’m not so sure. Sanoh seemed to generate neither fear nor affection, although some were very positive about Thaksin.
Which brings me to my point. While Thaksin certainly needed to buy the godfathers to win in 2001, by 2005 it was starting to look like the godfathers needed him (and Thai Rak Thai) as much as he needed them. Let’s not forget that as this process took place, Thaksin reduced the status of Sanoh in TRT much to Sanoh’s disgust. Nevertheless Sanoh didn’t have his relatives run AGAINST Thai Rak Thai in 2005 did he? It would have been interesting to see how inevitable the Thienthong victory would have been if he’d dared to do so.
Which brings us to the evolving and more nuanced picture of rural politics which Andrew is seeking to draw our attention to. A picture that seems a broadly positive trend, where there are “policies” as well as “patronage”.
When people complain, criticize, belittle and attack so-called “patronage networks in rural Thailand”, it should never be overlooked that there is one patronage network in Thailand that overshadows all others in terms of power, reach, available funds, access to weapons and access to media.
Without their own, albeit smaller, less powerful, less effective patronage networks, how could any person or group even begin to counter or compete with Thailand’s supreme and almost totally dominant patronage network?
Or are the darker-skinned, less-educated, lower-income rural residents of Thailand (by far majority of the Thailand population) not entitled to enjoying the benefits of their own patronage systems?
The first clarification you are offering here is that you consider Pr─Бс╣Зa to be a category of “downward wind” that includes flatulence, but that is not strictly limited to flatulence, as it also includes what was imagined to be air-pressure (shall we say?) inducing the outward motion of the excrement, semen, etc., in the ancient Indian conception of the body.
I would invite you to consider that such a clarification is a relatively minor matter in contrast to the mistranslation(s) that insist that a group of related terms mean a breath that both exits and enters through the nose/mouth. This clarification you’re advancing does not contradict what I’ve said myself above, nor does it contradict what I’ve quoted from Brown.
You and I apparently agree that pr─Бс╣Зa is not breathing (in any reasonable sense of the English verb “to breathe”) and that it is absurd to translate the corresponding passages as “breathing meditation” (etc.) as has been done in hundreds Buddhist tracts in the English language. We also seem to agree that “we are not merely missing the precise sense of the original [in such mistranslations], we are losing an important aspect of the cultural context and the intended meaning of the primary source text… completely obliterating the ancient Indian philosophy of the body…” (etc., quoting the selfsame article above).
Even if we disagree about everything else, I don’t really see any basis for the rather arch and combative tone of this reply of yours –except, of course, for the fact that you hold teaching certificates for “Hatha-yoga”, etc., and thus I imagine that you might not regard these text with the same detachment as myself. If we agree on such a fundamental point of such great importance, I wonder why you haven’t challenged the PTS translations yourself in a similar article? I wonder why you haven’t gone through the same sources, and challenged the dictionaries and the textbooks?
You do, however, go further than merely offering this clarification: if you genuinely expect me to accept a supernatural existence of pr─Бс╣Зa as something “outside material existence and scientific proof” (as you say) you’re doomed to disappointment.
Conversely, if you’re trying to say that pr─Бс╣Зa was presumed to be supernatural in these ancient texts, that is another matter, but you have a more difficult argument than you might expect. The elements of the body, and air especially, are indeed described as material elements in ancient Buddhist sources… including the return of those elements during the decomposition of the body, etc.
I’ve written about this at length elsewhere: those elements are neither supernatural nor magical “objects of meditation”… but instead reflect one position in a set of debates on the material elements (be they 4 or more) in that period of ancient India (and these are debates that are well-attested within the suttas of the Pali canon). If there are later Sanskrit sources wherein these airs of the body have come to be regarded as supernatural (and not palpable air) I’d be interested to read about it; however, it would be difficult for you to build a bridge backward to demonstrate that this was the sense presumed in the Pali canon (given the evidence to the contrary).
I would observe, also, that your retort has misrepresented my thesis (in presuming to attack it), as well as what I say about the meaning of the word pr─Бс╣Зa itself –and that is a rather needless shame. The thesis of the article is not that pr─Бс╣Зa is “nothing but a fart” (as you complain) –on the contrary, a range of culturally-loaded meanings are unpacked (linking this notion to death, the final breath, funeral rituals, the formation of the embryo, notions of self, etc.) in discussing various aspects of the source texts and ramifications of the mistranslation (briefly!). We miss out on all of these nuances in the PTS translations. Given all this, and also that my actual thesis concerns the problems arising from the apotheosis of the dictionary (not of farting), it is quite wrong for you to say that I’m offering “a long proof that ap─Бna means ‘fart’ or ‘farting’ apparently insisting that ap─Бna can have no other meaning”.
I’m not denigrating the primary sources, old boy, and I’m not denigrating you. Try to re-read the thing, and try to follow what my thesis actually is here; both living authors and dead deserve to be looked upon with detachment.
I have a non-hostile objection to one aspect of the article:
“However, the witness testified, Prachatai only became a government target after the military’s coup d’etat in 2006.”
I published an article with Prachatai way back in the day (entitled, р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Хр╕▒р╕Фр╣Др╕бр╣Йр╣Гр╕Щр╕ер╕▓р╕зр╣Ар╕Юр╕╖р╣Ир╕н “р╕Вр╕Ир╕▒р╕Фр╕Др╕зр╕▓р╕бр╕вр╕▓р╕Бр╕Ир╕Щ” ?) and I met with Chiranuch in person several times when we were both in Bangkok. Let me tell you, anyone who can remember that era would know what the publication was a target of government harassment before the coup d’état in 2006. The nature of the harassment changed when the government changed, but it is quite false to say that they only faced such pressure after the Thaksin was deposed.
Genuinely, somebody could write a book about the struggle for press freedom during Thaksin Shinawatra’s reign –and then directly contrast the conditions that ensued thereafter. Chiranuch could write an autobiography in two volumes along these lines.
Prachatai itself was active in documenting (e.g.) radio stations (in Bangkok) being shut down by authorities during Shinawatra’s reign; the mode of censorship and bullying wasn’t the same as the repression that was to follow after the coup d’état, but it was a significant struggle that Chiranuch herself was an important voice in. I can recall editors and authors at Prachatai themselves being quoted in the mainstream Thai press when a recently-deposed Thaksin claimed (retrospectively) that his reign had been one that allowed freedom of the speech, i.e., the voices from Prachatai were forthcoming with evidence to the contrary. It was not a pro-Thaksin publication, back when Thaksin was in power, and they were keenly aware of the mode of suasion that was then exercised over the media in Thailand.
In the last few years, the accusation of lèse majesté has emerged as the preferred method of suppressing dissent in high-profile cases; however, in the earlier era, there certainly were other means, such as the police declaring that your office (or radio station) is in violation of an electrical code, throwing everyone out, and shutting it down.
Well, sure I agree that patron-clients is still an important part in Thai rural politics. However, I think it has changed in many parts of the country, some have succeed, some still made only little progress.
I think of one example: my girlfriend’s village in Kalasin. Back in time when there was a split of Nevin’s faction to form Bhum Jai Thai party, many MPs of former People’s Power party in Isan region move to Bhum Jai Thai. Of course, these people are long time “р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╣Ир╕н” in the locals.
My girlfriend used to tell me that “р╕Бр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Щр╕лр╕┤р╕Ф”, a current MP in her district ask his clients whether he should move to Bhum Jai Thai as well. Then his clients replied “You dare try that and you will see what will happen when the next election came!” Since then “р╕Бр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Щр╕лр╕┤р╕Ф” never mention about moving to Bhum Jai Thai again. Patrons should not be so scare of his clients like this, isn’t it?
Later , the election results in Isan shows that many long time “р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╣Ир╕н” that moved from PPP to Bhum Jai Thai lost its former stronghold districts to Phuea Thai’s “just somebody” candidates. “р╕Бр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Щр╕лр╕┤р╕Ф” was among the lucky ones who did not put too much confident on his influences as “р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╣Ир╕н” and moved to Bhum Jai Thai with his friends who later “р╕кр╕нр╕Ър╕Хр╕Б”.
I think this proves well that patron-clients system is declining in many parts of the country. If patron-client system is still prominent, such phenomenon would not be possible. Nevertheless, I am not suggesting in the other hand that this has become a stereotype of Thai rural politics and that Thailand has overcame this tradition.
For example, “Silapa-archa province” (Supanburi) or even Wang Nam Yen that John mentioned of is still stong in its patron-client tradition. I think this could be said to be an “uneven development” of Thai rural politics that some areas made a great progress while some areas are still strong in old style patron-client system.
However, the point is I suggest we should not feel hopeless at all that Thai people could overcome patron-clients system someday, in the other hand, we should not overlook such a tradition that it could be overcome easily.
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New prison for political prisoners in Thailand?
If I am not mistaken that’s the place where Chamlong was held after he broke his word and failed to starve to death before being taken for his historic meeting with the King and General Suchinda. How fitting for Thaksin to serve a token night of his sentence in a luxury cell there on 4th December before being pardoned of his crime by popular consent the following day!
The coup: five years on
Thanks John, getting more interesting now. So we have local leaders who are are “generally thought of more like leaders that is doing good for the whole community.” But then you suggest that these leaders are among “the very people that are the real problem for the rural poor”. How does this work in the local context you are familiar with? How do people who are part of the problem manage to maintain their electoral support and come to be thought of a “doing good for the whole community”? Are the voters simply misinformed, or do they have reasons to believe that their political representatives justify the vote they give them? AW
The coup: five years on
Where can I find the papers delivered at the “Conference On Five Years After The Military Coup: Thailand’s Political Developments Since Thaksin’s Downfall”?
I wasn’t able to attend but am interested to read them.
I’m sure they’re available online… and that I just haven’t been able to find them.
Interview with Professor Robert Taylor
I was a student of Bob Taylor’s at Sydney Uni back in the 1970s, studying International Relations. As a mature adult student, I always found him the easiest going lecturer with heaps of advice to people like myself, relatively new to academia. I knew he’d gone to LSE, and always retained good memories of him.
I remember him being visibly moved at the massacre of Burmese students around that time. I just came across this interview with New Mandela and could almost see the man himself, sitting easily behind his desk. I always wished we’d had a few drinks together:-)
I wish him well.
Gordon
Prachatai’s defence
Eisel Mazard 7
Thank you very much for broadcasting a timely reminder. “Lest We Forget”
To my mind the issue has never been entirely about les-majeste per se but the prevalent culture of state political/social/economic repression utilised by whoever climbs to the top of the fragrant junk-heap. (and hence the true need for the les-majeste law) to be kept sharp and omniscient (pour encourager les autres)
….and the culture of fear, obeisance and aquiescence; front and centre).
“Forget it Jake, it’s Chinatown”
Pavin Chachavalpongpun at the ANU
Hope there’s a recording of this as I’ll be in class. Kha-da!
The coup: five years on
A quick tip for “dan”/”William Cobbett”/”G”:
There’s no need for the multiple names. Please stick to the one identifier so that those following your input can keep up. I note that you have used a fair number of other names over the years too.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Prachatai’s defence
Most fundamentally, perhaps, it’s beyond that and is really about self-determination vs. determination-from-above. There are two places for those seeking self-determination: prison or abroad.
The coup: five years on
“Or are the darker-skinned, less-educated, lower-income rural residents of Thailand (by far majority of the Thailand population) not entitled to enjoying the benefits of their own patronage systems?”
Tell that to the skin-lightened, degree-milled, nepotistic fat cat puppet PM. Her idea of a well-run society, like most ‘elite’, is that she monopolises the benefits of your labor and imagination for the glory of her own family and their ‘friends’.
The trick is to prevent this continual hijack. That takes long-term strategy and the foresight not to get diverted down yet another dead-end. Unfortunately, there is usually a tendency to opt for the short-term fix, that HAS always ended up in long-term failure. Current trends again seem to be conforming to that ongoing waste of time.
New prison for political prisoners in Thailand?
Perhaps we are seeing the birth of a new holiday.
From this year forward the dec 5 b-day may be remarketed (and PR + marketing has always been the key) as the daynThailand’s Mandela got his freedom after suffering injustices, humiliating loss of face, double standards, and , oh yeah that tax free billion or so confiscation.
So like Nelson, after suffering spending 27 years (cockroach years of course with 1 day = 1 year, symbolized by 27 days, of coursed reduced to 8 days because of his personal vouching for his own integrity and love for the monarchy), the New Face of Freedom and Democracy is released on dec 5, which from that day forth change it’s status to Thai Red shirt freedom day and the anniversary of the return of the billionaire to his proper status as the One.
The coup: five years on
I never said anything about an “all pervading presence in which people lived in fear”. The only ones that live in fear are those that are actively opposing the godfathers and those are few and far between and tend to henchmen of other families trying to encroach on the territory. It certainly is not the UDD or Thaksin.
In fact, the godfathers are generally thought of more like leaders that is doing good for the whole community. The fact that the family is personally enriched by doing so does not seem to matter as there is a definite trickledown effect for many. In a US context you might think of the Longs or Tallmadges. Few in their fiefdoms hated them, it was the outsiders that hated them and worked (mostly fruitlessly) on their downfall. It was only the emergence of an independent middle class that brought about the end of the US Southern populists. I believe the younger generation that has moved to Bangkok and the Eastern Seaboard, but maintain ties at home, will be the end of the political influence of the godfathers and their ability to deliver MP’s into Parliament, but it is going to take another generation before that happens.
In the meantime, the liberals will continue to support a movement that in fact is supported and financed by the very people that are the real problem for the rural poor, a movement that has done a excellent job of creating demagoguery that uses the Amart and the “Bangkok Elite” as the enemy of the people, keeping the heat well away from themselves. The western liberals will continue to support this as it fits perfectly with their rooting for the underdog against the establishment. They will continue to dismiss the real issue as one that is an inaccurate “stereotype” that is “complex and diverse” and is not really a problem. It’s those hated Bangkok people that are the problem.
I do note that certain people have managed to divert the discussion away from the real issue, which is the fact that by early 2006, TRT was well on its way to establishing a UNMO style single party government and the boycott of the 2006 election and subsequent events put a stop to that. With the results of the July 2011 put that back on track? We shall see.
The irony that the leaders of UDD, now MP’s, would at the forefront of the single party government, actively suppressing and dissent is lost on the liberals.
The graphic Andrew chose for this article is the perfect example.
Instead of an M-16, wouldn’t a more accurate photo be one of the many from that week in September 2006 that showed the people welcoming the troops with flowers and food? Few were happy that it had come to that, but relief that at least a solution to the chaos of that summer had been found was palatable across the kingdom.
Prachatai’s defence
I am in total agreement with Eisel.
In the last week the Political Prisoners in Thailand web site has become blocked again.
It is not about reds and yellows, or your side against my side, it’s about a balanced view and freedom of speech and being able to explore both sides of the argument.
The coup: five years on
John #28. That’s a good starting point, but surely if we want to understand rural politics is not a very satisfactory end point. You say that the MP election was a “non event”. If I was to spend time doing research there I would want to know how much of a “non event”. What were the voting patterns? How many people voted against the winner? Why did they vote against him? What reasons did people give for voting for the winner? Fear? Affection? Support for his development of the area? Localism? Personal attributes? I suspect the reasons were probably a mix. How has the mix changed and evolved? How do people evaluate political representatives? What is important to them? Do decisions made at national elections automatically translate into decisions in local elections? How has the changing economy affected political perspectives? Who are people’s patrons? Is there only one patron, or a very small number? Or do people have other sources of support, protection, patronage (human and non-human)?
Some may be happy with the conclusion that it was a non-event. I would want to understand much more about the micro-events that contributed to the macro-non-event.
AW
Happy Malaysia Day
Extraced from, “Undilah video taken off-air over Ku Li speech, opposition figures“, Jahabar Sadiq, The Malaysian Insider, 23 September, 2011.
Sheridan and Selth on Burma today
1) Crocodile tears for the ‘plight of the citizenry’
2) Alleging others of ignoring it
3) As if all the generals needed was a pat on the back and economic support.
Proof please.
1) The dying and the slowly dying from deprivation of education and economic among the most vulnerable will refute your baseless, labeling well. You can find proof for the here in New Mandala.
2) For your info. not “alleging” but “accusing” Certainly will not have difficulty finding in New Mandala as well.
3) That is how you and your ilks see lifting sanction as. Another proof of ‘Fixation’ on generals and forget about the real victims the citizenry.
The coup: five years on
From my own experience of rural Sa Kaew – admittedly not spent a year there, the will to live starts to wane within about 4 days(!) – I’m not convinced by John Smith’s analysis.
Of course the Thienthong’s won the elections, but an all pervading presence in which people lived in fear, I’m not so sure. Sanoh seemed to generate neither fear nor affection, although some were very positive about Thaksin.
Which brings me to my point. While Thaksin certainly needed to buy the godfathers to win in 2001, by 2005 it was starting to look like the godfathers needed him (and Thai Rak Thai) as much as he needed them. Let’s not forget that as this process took place, Thaksin reduced the status of Sanoh in TRT much to Sanoh’s disgust. Nevertheless Sanoh didn’t have his relatives run AGAINST Thai Rak Thai in 2005 did he? It would have been interesting to see how inevitable the Thienthong victory would have been if he’d dared to do so.
Which brings us to the evolving and more nuanced picture of rural politics which Andrew is seeking to draw our attention to. A picture that seems a broadly positive trend, where there are “policies” as well as “patronage”.
The coup: five years on
When people complain, criticize, belittle and attack so-called “patronage networks in rural Thailand”, it should never be overlooked that there is one patronage network in Thailand that overshadows all others in terms of power, reach, available funds, access to weapons and access to media.
Without their own, albeit smaller, less powerful, less effective patronage networks, how could any person or group even begin to counter or compete with Thailand’s supreme and almost totally dominant patronage network?
Or are the darker-skinned, less-educated, lower-income rural residents of Thailand (by far majority of the Thailand population) not entitled to enjoying the benefits of their own patronage systems?
Flatulence and breathing meditation
Ah, Dr. Matthew Kosuta… we meet again…
The first clarification you are offering here is that you consider Pr─Бс╣Зa to be a category of “downward wind” that includes flatulence, but that is not strictly limited to flatulence, as it also includes what was imagined to be air-pressure (shall we say?) inducing the outward motion of the excrement, semen, etc., in the ancient Indian conception of the body.
I would invite you to consider that such a clarification is a relatively minor matter in contrast to the mistranslation(s) that insist that a group of related terms mean a breath that both exits and enters through the nose/mouth. This clarification you’re advancing does not contradict what I’ve said myself above, nor does it contradict what I’ve quoted from Brown.
You and I apparently agree that pr─Бс╣Зa is not breathing (in any reasonable sense of the English verb “to breathe”) and that it is absurd to translate the corresponding passages as “breathing meditation” (etc.) as has been done in hundreds Buddhist tracts in the English language. We also seem to agree that “we are not merely missing the precise sense of the original [in such mistranslations], we are losing an important aspect of the cultural context and the intended meaning of the primary source text… completely obliterating the ancient Indian philosophy of the body…” (etc., quoting the selfsame article above).
Even if we disagree about everything else, I don’t really see any basis for the rather arch and combative tone of this reply of yours –except, of course, for the fact that you hold teaching certificates for “Hatha-yoga”, etc., and thus I imagine that you might not regard these text with the same detachment as myself. If we agree on such a fundamental point of such great importance, I wonder why you haven’t challenged the PTS translations yourself in a similar article? I wonder why you haven’t gone through the same sources, and challenged the dictionaries and the textbooks?
You do, however, go further than merely offering this clarification: if you genuinely expect me to accept a supernatural existence of pr─Бс╣Зa as something “outside material existence and scientific proof” (as you say) you’re doomed to disappointment.
Conversely, if you’re trying to say that pr─Бс╣Зa was presumed to be supernatural in these ancient texts, that is another matter, but you have a more difficult argument than you might expect. The elements of the body, and air especially, are indeed described as material elements in ancient Buddhist sources… including the return of those elements during the decomposition of the body, etc.
I’ve written about this at length elsewhere: those elements are neither supernatural nor magical “objects of meditation”… but instead reflect one position in a set of debates on the material elements (be they 4 or more) in that period of ancient India (and these are debates that are well-attested within the suttas of the Pali canon). If there are later Sanskrit sources wherein these airs of the body have come to be regarded as supernatural (and not palpable air) I’d be interested to read about it; however, it would be difficult for you to build a bridge backward to demonstrate that this was the sense presumed in the Pali canon (given the evidence to the contrary).
I would observe, also, that your retort has misrepresented my thesis (in presuming to attack it), as well as what I say about the meaning of the word pr─Бс╣Зa itself –and that is a rather needless shame. The thesis of the article is not that pr─Бс╣Зa is “nothing but a fart” (as you complain) –on the contrary, a range of culturally-loaded meanings are unpacked (linking this notion to death, the final breath, funeral rituals, the formation of the embryo, notions of self, etc.) in discussing various aspects of the source texts and ramifications of the mistranslation (briefly!). We miss out on all of these nuances in the PTS translations. Given all this, and also that my actual thesis concerns the problems arising from the apotheosis of the dictionary (not of farting), it is quite wrong for you to say that I’m offering “a long proof that ap─Бna means ‘fart’ or ‘farting’ apparently insisting that ap─Бna can have no other meaning”.
I’m not denigrating the primary sources, old boy, and I’m not denigrating you. Try to re-read the thing, and try to follow what my thesis actually is here; both living authors and dead deserve to be looked upon with detachment.
Prachatai’s defence
I have a non-hostile objection to one aspect of the article:
“However, the witness testified, Prachatai only became a government target after the military’s coup d’etat in 2006.”
I published an article with Prachatai way back in the day (entitled, р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Хр╕▒р╕Фр╣Др╕бр╣Йр╣Гр╕Щр╕ер╕▓р╕зр╣Ар╕Юр╕╖р╣Ир╕н “р╕Вр╕Ир╕▒р╕Фр╕Др╕зр╕▓р╕бр╕вр╕▓р╕Бр╕Ир╕Щ” ?) and I met with Chiranuch in person several times when we were both in Bangkok. Let me tell you, anyone who can remember that era would know what the publication was a target of government harassment before the coup d’état in 2006. The nature of the harassment changed when the government changed, but it is quite false to say that they only faced such pressure after the Thaksin was deposed.
Genuinely, somebody could write a book about the struggle for press freedom during Thaksin Shinawatra’s reign –and then directly contrast the conditions that ensued thereafter. Chiranuch could write an autobiography in two volumes along these lines.
Prachatai itself was active in documenting (e.g.) radio stations (in Bangkok) being shut down by authorities during Shinawatra’s reign; the mode of censorship and bullying wasn’t the same as the repression that was to follow after the coup d’état, but it was a significant struggle that Chiranuch herself was an important voice in. I can recall editors and authors at Prachatai themselves being quoted in the mainstream Thai press when a recently-deposed Thaksin claimed (retrospectively) that his reign had been one that allowed freedom of the speech, i.e., the voices from Prachatai were forthcoming with evidence to the contrary. It was not a pro-Thaksin publication, back when Thaksin was in power, and they were keenly aware of the mode of suasion that was then exercised over the media in Thailand.
In the last few years, the accusation of lèse majesté has emerged as the preferred method of suppressing dissent in high-profile cases; however, in the earlier era, there certainly were other means, such as the police declaring that your office (or radio station) is in violation of an electrical code, throwing everyone out, and shutting it down.
The coup: five years on
Well, sure I agree that patron-clients is still an important part in Thai rural politics. However, I think it has changed in many parts of the country, some have succeed, some still made only little progress.
I think of one example: my girlfriend’s village in Kalasin. Back in time when there was a split of Nevin’s faction to form Bhum Jai Thai party, many MPs of former People’s Power party in Isan region move to Bhum Jai Thai. Of course, these people are long time “р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╣Ир╕н” in the locals.
My girlfriend used to tell me that “р╕Бр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Щр╕лр╕┤р╕Ф”, a current MP in her district ask his clients whether he should move to Bhum Jai Thai as well. Then his clients replied “You dare try that and you will see what will happen when the next election came!” Since then “р╕Бр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Щр╕лр╕┤р╕Ф” never mention about moving to Bhum Jai Thai again. Patrons should not be so scare of his clients like this, isn’t it?
Later , the election results in Isan shows that many long time “р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╣Ир╕н” that moved from PPP to Bhum Jai Thai lost its former stronghold districts to Phuea Thai’s “just somebody” candidates. “р╕Бр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Щр╕лр╕┤р╕Ф” was among the lucky ones who did not put too much confident on his influences as “р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╣Ир╕н” and moved to Bhum Jai Thai with his friends who later “р╕кр╕нр╕Ър╕Хр╕Б”.
I think this proves well that patron-clients system is declining in many parts of the country. If patron-client system is still prominent, such phenomenon would not be possible. Nevertheless, I am not suggesting in the other hand that this has become a stereotype of Thai rural politics and that Thailand has overcame this tradition.
For example, “Silapa-archa province” (Supanburi) or even Wang Nam Yen that John mentioned of is still stong in its patron-client tradition. I think this could be said to be an “uneven development” of Thai rural politics that some areas made a great progress while some areas are still strong in old style patron-client system.
However, the point is I suggest we should not feel hopeless at all that Thai people could overcome patron-clients system someday, in the other hand, we should not overlook such a tradition that it could be overcome easily.