Chris,
Unless you can find a way of coding the party identities of the victors for constituencies together with percentage of victory, the map will not have too much clarity. Then again, it may look a little cluttered. For visual purposes, I suggest to keep the map simple, perhaps by sticking to a Pheu Thai vs Democrat representation of degrees of victory at national scale, then producing separate maps highlighting key contested regions/subregions, such as Bkk, Lower northest, and 3 border provs where other parties were key players and victors/runners-up.
The results for the 3 bdr provs appear decicive on the victory map, but as you note, there were some very close contests. Eg The sitting PT member Sukharno Matta lost to the Democrat candidate in Yala Constituency 2 by 575 votes (I correct my earlier erronious figure of 28 here), with the Democrat victor winning with 28,636 votes. In Pattani Constituency 1, centred on the town of Pattani with a large concentration of Thai Buddhists traditionally voting Democrat, DP sitting member Arnwar Sarlae won by under 5,000 votes (with 28,740) against a strong Bhumjai Thai competitor. As you mentioned, the DP party strongholds of the Thai-speaking south won decisive victories: so eg., Pattalung, Songkhla, and Nakhon Srithammarat saw wins by DP candiates (both standing members and new faces) of around 60,000 votes, way ahead of the runners-up. Clearly the border provinces remain exceptional in their much lower overall support for Democrats.
To get things in perspective one should consider the following;
1. TRT won election #1 and #2 and #3
2. TRT dissolved, first line leaders decimated. TRT2 won election # 4
3. TRT2 dissolved, second line leaders decimated
4. TRT3 won election #5 with third line leaders!!!
Just proves one thing, the majority of Thais want TRT type and style, regardless of what the “farang” , army, yellow shirts, democrats etc etc claim.
In the next round – TRT4 would probably still win with “monkeys” as candidates. My take? just shut up and listen to the people, isn’t that what democracy is all about?
Nick, your translation of equivalent impact of “р╣Др╕нр╣Йр╣Ар╕лр╕╡р╣Йр╕в” as a term of abuse in english is a little too tame. Perhaps “arsehole” might be closer to the mark, or better still “f…ing animal.” As for the matter of naming culprits of killings of red shirt demonstrators during April-May last, well, there hasn’t been much reticence over naming the Democrat leadership by the red shirts. On that point the most powerful and humourous image is that of the cartoonist “Siah” in Thai Rath, whose cartoons feature regularly on page 3. He portrays the Abhisit-led Democrat government as a grim reaper with skulls at his feet and on the end of his sickle. Note how after May 2010 Siah’s portrayal changed from the manupulated puppet Pinnochio (representing Abhisit) to the hooded grim reaper. Yesterday’s page 3 cartoon shows a pretty Yingluck standing over a heap of defeated enemies, including the grim reaper!
It is likely that Thaksin has learned from the Samak/PPP days. The PTP will almost certainly set about governing the country and normal legislation before anything more controversial. The Thai economy isnt that bad and government popularity could quickly increase if running of the country and avoiding conflict happens.
The problems for this approach are the PTP have some of their own supporters who will want to see instant action/revenge and that their extreme opponents will be looking for any excuse to grasp at conflict especially that which can be spun or seen to come from the new government. However, with so many of the population wanting to move away from conflict it is likely the PTP will try to avoid it and increase their own popularity initially. Once they do then the big amnesty move becomes a lot easier, and lets be honest, it is going to come but probably only at the height of popularity and with the coalition allies and any cobras well sown into the government and after a round of rotations or two. It is very difficult to just be elected and then go straight for the jugular without first building a firm foundation from which to launch things. Yingluck has so far stressed the country, reconcilliation and governance and that no doubt indicates the initial direction and a politically astute one it is.
It will be interesting to see how the realtionship between the PTP government and certain red groups develops over the coming months. Also the whole handover, coalition formation and everyones reactions seem very smooth almost choreographed so far where everyone knows their role
The astuteness of the Thaksin PR machine is the wonder of Thailand’s political education. It really does force Thailand into the Twenty-first Century. Then again of course it should be, it probably costs enough.
We saw it fine-tuning the PT campaign and as they found that the amnesty issue was losing more potential votes than winning them, it was pushed to the back burner. Now we see the formation of the new coalition and leaks suggesting this will help in eventually pushing an amnesty bill through parliament with a reduced opposition.
The space between the two Shinawatras, which Nich hopes to see, will only be what the machine wishes us to see, and that will be as fake as any Polo shirt you can buy in the Patpong Night Market.
I do think there may be the beginnings of some second thoughts among the more progressive elements that were supporting the red shirts. See what Jon Ungpakorn has to say in today’s UK Guardian.
Activist and former senator Jon Ungpakorn, who voted Puea Thai largely due to his opposition to the crackdown on demonstrators, warned that people should “not allow Puea Thai to behave like the old Thaksin government, trying to stifle political opposition and criticism”.
I don’t think it was any coincidence that the day after the Yingluck/PT election victory was the first time I have ever seen an anti 112 T-shirt being worn on the street (by a middle aged lady selling fish balls from a street stall) .
I sense there will be a lot of disappointment if Thaksin/Yingluck/PT take the ‘appease the establishment’ route outlined above.
@chris baker: I can help you with creating a map of the percentage gap between first and second candidate. We have the table with the data, I just need the constituency boundaries, which you seem to have, based on the map you posted on 2nd July.
Per the recently released wikileaks cables released by Andrew McGregor Marshall, it wasn’t so much the “unabashed greed and dreams of grandeur were what got Thaksin kicked out five years ago” as the Queen and her minions, financiers and sponsors of PAD and all things Yellow.
Can someone please map out for me just how the various succession possibilities effect the various elite ‘players’? People talk about this all the time as if its obvious, but do we really know how the various possible ‘heirs to the throne’ will impact on other high-level actors?
And Nich, what do you mean by referring to Thaksin as a ‘king-maker’? As far as we all know, isn’t he in tight with the CP, the very heir to the throne and the one whom the King has consistently said will follow? So what ‘king-making’ is there when the issue already seems decided?
I haven’t seen a constituency ballot paper either, but the post from Bangkok Pundit tends to say point otherwise from what your friend said.
[UPDATE: The Thailand head of an international NGO who was observing the election in a province outside of Bangkok e-mails – confirmed they are who they say they are as they are using their work e-mail address – stating “[a]t the Polling Center we observed counting, a number of spoilt ballots was due to No. 5 being marked on the Constituency Ballot Papers. We were prohibited from taking photographs of the counting process”. Person has asked to remain anonymous as they don’t vote the information to be seen as a formal statement by their organization. So this confirms what BP had read elsewhere online].
@ Patrick:
Unabashed greed and dreams of grandeur were what got Thaksin kicked out five years ago.
It is not only democratic but absolutely legit and necessary to ask Thaksin to “limit his ambitions”. Democracy does – like the “free market” – not come with an inherent self-regulation mechanism that invariably delivers positive results (may I briefly recall Hitler).
A very quick response to some of these terrific comments:
I think the key component of my final sentence is “[f]or peace in Thailand”. I’m afraid that some don’t want peace in Thailand. Some would likely prefer to see a bloodbath, the end of the monarchy (and/or the end of Thaksin, or what have you) and the recriminations that would follow. I expect that if Thaksin moderates his immediate ambitions then useful compromise is possible. Of course there are also those who believe compromise is for political cowards.
Right now Prime Minister Yingluck enjoys a brief window where events could move in directions which are not just good for her, and for Thaksin, but also good for the country.
LesAbbey may argue that it is naive to suggest any space between Yingluck and Thaksin. Let’s wait-and-see. Many Thais, fed up with the violent merry-go-round, will be watching closely in the hope that Yingluck can help broker some kind of resolution — who could blame them for that?
But such a deal could, as Ajarn Somsak suggests, lead to the betrayal of what many Thaksin supporters thought they were voting for. I am alive to that possibility and share his concerns. Yingluck and Thaksin’s prospective indulgence of aggressive use of Article 112 would be one dangerous and problematic outcome.
More generally, and from the outset, I tilted this article to reflect on elite politics. Succession matters for the players. So it should also matter for us. But, obviously, as Ajarn Somsak points out there are a range of other factors to consider. For what it’s worth Thailand’s other social and political issues will get treatment in my next piece, currently underway.
And, finally, Patrick: I doubt you can lump me in with all of those you accuse of not stepping up to the plate to criticise Article 112, provide public commentary on the monarchy, etc.
As always, even when I don’t agree with him, lots of common sense from Professor Somsak.
He could also be thinking – and this is more important – of going out of his way to appear to be extra-loyal by not touching the issue of the 112 law at all, or even to appear to implement it vigorously, by reigning in some of his red-shirt supporters who show signs of being critical of the monarchy, or at least not doing anything at all to help those already in jail for LM.
It seems to me that rather than interfering in the succession Thaksin’s best course of action is to allow it to run its course. Of course it’s probably more proactive than that in that he needs to stop anyone else interfering with it. A weakening of the monarchy makes it easier to subvert the remaining checks and balances that the Wikileaks cables also point out he was doing last time.
And if this comment makes it through a quick question for the more academic Marxists out there. At what point are we able to call the Thaksin regime Bonapartist?
I must confess that I fell somewhat unease with certain possible (i.e. not necessarily actual) implications of Aj.Nich’s article, and especially the paragraph that was cut out.
First of all, I don’t think that the issue of succession (and Thaksin’s supposed ambition to play the so-called ‘kingmaker’ role) is the only issue of tension between him and the ‘palace-military elites’. It’s one important issue to be sure, but I think it should be seen as part of a wider issue of conflicts between him and what he represented (the growing power of electoral-based politics and political leaders) and the power of the ‘palace-military elites’ based on ‘tradition’.
Take, for instance, what we learn from the Wikileaks cables. In several of them, both Thaksin and the Americans mentioned or discussed the issue of his popularity among the rural population as being perceived by the ‘elites’ as a threat to the latter’s traditional status. Or, to take a more concrete example, in mid 2006, Piya is said to have printed out ‘hundred of pages’ from the notorious “Manusaya.com” websites and spent three days convincing ….. that Thaksin was behind them, in other words, Thaksin was being perceived as representing a republican threat to the throne.
So far Aj.Nich might agree. But here’s come the possible implications of his article and the paragraph cited above. Aj.Nich speaks of the need for Thaksin to convince the ‘elites’ to trust him (that he will “never threaten highly sensitive succession arrangements“). Now if the problem is confined to the succession issue, Aj.Nich’s recommendation would be quite, I think, achievable or even, from democratic standpoint, ‘un-problematic’, at least in the short run.
But what if we are talking about the wider issue I outlined above? What should or could Thaksin be doing to convince the ‘elites’ that he doesn’t represent the threat to their status and power? I can imagine that he could be thinking of showing how much he is loyal to the throne by, for one thing, throwing up a hugely ravish celebrations of the King’s 84th birthday (Yingluck actually talked about this as one of her government’s priorities yesterday). He could also be thinking – and this is more important – of going out of his way to appear to be extra-loyal by not touching the issue of the 112 law at all, or even to appear to implement it vigorously, by reigning in some of his red-shirt supporters who show signs of being critical of the monarchy, or at least not doing anything at all to help those already in jail for LM.
I know that Aj.Nich doesn’t say this in the article and I am quite sure that these are not the things he has in mind in recommending to Thaksin and Yingluck to limit his ‘ambitions’ and to convince the elites that he is no threat to them. But as I said at the beginning, these are also possible implications of such recommendation. (What possible actions on Thaksin and Yingluck’s part that could be “providing the palace and military elites with reason to trust her leadership“? – I wonder.) In fact what I’m concerned at this moment is that Thaksin is actually thinking of doing just the things I said in my previous paragraph, in order to provide “the palace and military elites with reason to trust” him.
Nich they maybe have had good reason to cut those lines.
For peace in Thailand she [Yingluck Shinawatra] will need to begin by limiting the ambitions of her brother and providing the palace and military elites with reason to trust her leadership.
Aren’t you showing some naivety. Have either Yingluck or her brother claimed at any point that she is independent of him? Maybe they have, but we have certainly heard both claim the exact opposite. So telling Yingluck to limit the ambitions of her brother has a bit of a credibility problem.
To put it crudely, it’s no good talking to the monkey when it’s the organ grinder that collects the money.
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Who ordered the killing?
Thanks Marc,
You’re right: I was offering the New Mandala day-time translation. It’s a potent insult — that’s for sure.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Regional voting
Chris,
Unless you can find a way of coding the party identities of the victors for constituencies together with percentage of victory, the map will not have too much clarity. Then again, it may look a little cluttered. For visual purposes, I suggest to keep the map simple, perhaps by sticking to a Pheu Thai vs Democrat representation of degrees of victory at national scale, then producing separate maps highlighting key contested regions/subregions, such as Bkk, Lower northest, and 3 border provs where other parties were key players and victors/runners-up.
The results for the 3 bdr provs appear decicive on the victory map, but as you note, there were some very close contests. Eg The sitting PT member Sukharno Matta lost to the Democrat candidate in Yala Constituency 2 by 575 votes (I correct my earlier erronious figure of 28 here), with the Democrat victor winning with 28,636 votes. In Pattani Constituency 1, centred on the town of Pattani with a large concentration of Thai Buddhists traditionally voting Democrat, DP sitting member Arnwar Sarlae won by under 5,000 votes (with 28,740) against a strong Bhumjai Thai competitor. As you mentioned, the DP party strongholds of the Thai-speaking south won decisive victories: so eg., Pattalung, Songkhla, and Nakhon Srithammarat saw wins by DP candiates (both standing members and new faces) of around 60,000 votes, way ahead of the runners-up. Clearly the border provinces remain exceptional in their much lower overall support for Democrats.
Thailand’s precarious politics
To get things in perspective one should consider the following;
1. TRT won election #1 and #2 and #3
2. TRT dissolved, first line leaders decimated. TRT2 won election # 4
3. TRT2 dissolved, second line leaders decimated
4. TRT3 won election #5 with third line leaders!!!
Just proves one thing, the majority of Thais want TRT type and style, regardless of what the “farang” , army, yellow shirts, democrats etc etc claim.
In the next round – TRT4 would probably still win with “monkeys” as candidates. My take? just shut up and listen to the people, isn’t that what democracy is all about?
Who ordered the killing?
Nick, your translation of equivalent impact of “р╣Др╕нр╣Йр╣Ар╕лр╕╡р╣Йр╕в” as a term of abuse in english is a little too tame. Perhaps “arsehole” might be closer to the mark, or better still “f…ing animal.” As for the matter of naming culprits of killings of red shirt demonstrators during April-May last, well, there hasn’t been much reticence over naming the Democrat leadership by the red shirts. On that point the most powerful and humourous image is that of the cartoonist “Siah” in Thai Rath, whose cartoons feature regularly on page 3. He portrays the Abhisit-led Democrat government as a grim reaper with skulls at his feet and on the end of his sickle. Note how after May 2010 Siah’s portrayal changed from the manupulated puppet Pinnochio (representing Abhisit) to the hooded grim reaper. Yesterday’s page 3 cartoon shows a pretty Yingluck standing over a heap of defeated enemies, including the grim reaper!
Thailand’s precarious politics
It is likely that Thaksin has learned from the Samak/PPP days. The PTP will almost certainly set about governing the country and normal legislation before anything more controversial. The Thai economy isnt that bad and government popularity could quickly increase if running of the country and avoiding conflict happens.
The problems for this approach are the PTP have some of their own supporters who will want to see instant action/revenge and that their extreme opponents will be looking for any excuse to grasp at conflict especially that which can be spun or seen to come from the new government. However, with so many of the population wanting to move away from conflict it is likely the PTP will try to avoid it and increase their own popularity initially. Once they do then the big amnesty move becomes a lot easier, and lets be honest, it is going to come but probably only at the height of popularity and with the coalition allies and any cobras well sown into the government and after a round of rotations or two. It is very difficult to just be elected and then go straight for the jugular without first building a firm foundation from which to launch things. Yingluck has so far stressed the country, reconcilliation and governance and that no doubt indicates the initial direction and a politically astute one it is.
It will be interesting to see how the realtionship between the PTP government and certain red groups develops over the coming months. Also the whole handover, coalition formation and everyones reactions seem very smooth almost choreographed so far where everyone knows their role
Thailand’s precarious politics
The astuteness of the Thaksin PR machine is the wonder of Thailand’s political education. It really does force Thailand into the Twenty-first Century. Then again of course it should be, it probably costs enough.
We saw it fine-tuning the PT campaign and as they found that the amnesty issue was losing more potential votes than winning them, it was pushed to the back burner. Now we see the formation of the new coalition and leaks suggesting this will help in eventually pushing an amnesty bill through parliament with a reduced opposition.
The space between the two Shinawatras, which Nich hopes to see, will only be what the machine wishes us to see, and that will be as fake as any Polo shirt you can buy in the Patpong Night Market.
I do think there may be the beginnings of some second thoughts among the more progressive elements that were supporting the red shirts. See what Jon Ungpakorn has to say in today’s UK Guardian.
Activist and former senator Jon Ungpakorn, who voted Puea Thai largely due to his opposition to the crackdown on demonstrators, warned that people should “not allow Puea Thai to behave like the old Thaksin government, trying to stifle political opposition and criticism”.
Regional voting
The friend may be wrong Les. I am asking because I don’t know. Anyone know for sure?
Thailand’s precarious politics
What’s going on? For the first time in a long time, Prachatai/English was blocked by the MICT!
Thailand’s precarious politics
I don’t think it was any coincidence that the day after the Yingluck/PT election victory was the first time I have ever seen an anti 112 T-shirt being worn on the street (by a middle aged lady selling fish balls from a street stall) .
I sense there will be a lot of disappointment if Thaksin/Yingluck/PT take the ‘appease the establishment’ route outlined above.
Regional voting
@chris baker: I can help you with creating a map of the percentage gap between first and second candidate. We have the table with the data, I just need the constituency boundaries, which you seem to have, based on the map you posted on 2nd July.
Drop me a line at paul [at] mangmap.com
Thailand’s precarious politics
I do agree with Professor Somsak.that Yingluk’s government will not touch about the issue of the 112 law at all.” long live article 112 !!!!
Thailand’s precarious politics
Per the recently released wikileaks cables released by Andrew McGregor Marshall, it wasn’t so much the “unabashed greed and dreams of grandeur were what got Thaksin kicked out five years ago” as the Queen and her minions, financiers and sponsors of PAD and all things Yellow.
Thailand’s precarious politics
Can someone please map out for me just how the various succession possibilities effect the various elite ‘players’? People talk about this all the time as if its obvious, but do we really know how the various possible ‘heirs to the throne’ will impact on other high-level actors?
And Nich, what do you mean by referring to Thaksin as a ‘king-maker’? As far as we all know, isn’t he in tight with the CP, the very heir to the throne and the one whom the King has consistently said will follow? So what ‘king-making’ is there when the issue already seems decided?
Regional voting
Interactive map of preliminary election results in Bangkok can be found here:
http://mangomap.com/map/user/bangkok%20election%20results%202011
Regional voting
Ralph Kramden – 12
I haven’t seen a constituency ballot paper either, but the post from Bangkok Pundit tends to say point otherwise from what your friend said.
[UPDATE: The Thailand head of an international NGO who was observing the election in a province outside of Bangkok e-mails – confirmed they are who they say they are as they are using their work e-mail address – stating “[a]t the Polling Center we observed counting, a number of spoilt ballots was due to No. 5 being marked on the Constituency Ballot Papers. We were prohibited from taking photographs of the counting process”. Person has asked to remain anonymous as they don’t vote the information to be seen as a formal statement by their organization. So this confirms what BP had read elsewhere online].
Thailand’s precarious politics
@ Patrick:
Unabashed greed and dreams of grandeur were what got Thaksin kicked out five years ago.
It is not only democratic but absolutely legit and necessary to ask Thaksin to “limit his ambitions”. Democracy does – like the “free market” – not come with an inherent self-regulation mechanism that invariably delivers positive results (may I briefly recall Hitler).
Thailand’s precarious politics
Thanks Patrick and everyone,
A very quick response to some of these terrific comments:
I think the key component of my final sentence is “[f]or peace in Thailand”. I’m afraid that some don’t want peace in Thailand. Some would likely prefer to see a bloodbath, the end of the monarchy (and/or the end of Thaksin, or what have you) and the recriminations that would follow. I expect that if Thaksin moderates his immediate ambitions then useful compromise is possible. Of course there are also those who believe compromise is for political cowards.
Right now Prime Minister Yingluck enjoys a brief window where events could move in directions which are not just good for her, and for Thaksin, but also good for the country.
LesAbbey may argue that it is naive to suggest any space between Yingluck and Thaksin. Let’s wait-and-see. Many Thais, fed up with the violent merry-go-round, will be watching closely in the hope that Yingluck can help broker some kind of resolution — who could blame them for that?
But such a deal could, as Ajarn Somsak suggests, lead to the betrayal of what many Thaksin supporters thought they were voting for. I am alive to that possibility and share his concerns. Yingluck and Thaksin’s prospective indulgence of aggressive use of Article 112 would be one dangerous and problematic outcome.
More generally, and from the outset, I tilted this article to reflect on elite politics. Succession matters for the players. So it should also matter for us. But, obviously, as Ajarn Somsak points out there are a range of other factors to consider. For what it’s worth Thailand’s other social and political issues will get treatment in my next piece, currently underway.
And, finally, Patrick: I doubt you can lump me in with all of those you accuse of not stepping up to the plate to criticise Article 112, provide public commentary on the monarchy, etc.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Thailand’s precarious politics
Somsak Jeamteerasakul – 6
As always, even when I don’t agree with him, lots of common sense from Professor Somsak.
He could also be thinking – and this is more important – of going out of his way to appear to be extra-loyal by not touching the issue of the 112 law at all, or even to appear to implement it vigorously, by reigning in some of his red-shirt supporters who show signs of being critical of the monarchy, or at least not doing anything at all to help those already in jail for LM.
It seems to me that rather than interfering in the succession Thaksin’s best course of action is to allow it to run its course. Of course it’s probably more proactive than that in that he needs to stop anyone else interfering with it. A weakening of the monarchy makes it easier to subvert the remaining checks and balances that the Wikileaks cables also point out he was doing last time.
And if this comment makes it through a quick question for the more academic Marxists out there. At what point are we able to call the Thaksin regime Bonapartist?
Thailand’s precarious politics
I must confess that I fell somewhat unease with certain possible (i.e. not necessarily actual) implications of Aj.Nich’s article, and especially the paragraph that was cut out.
First of all, I don’t think that the issue of succession (and Thaksin’s supposed ambition to play the so-called ‘kingmaker’ role) is the only issue of tension between him and the ‘palace-military elites’. It’s one important issue to be sure, but I think it should be seen as part of a wider issue of conflicts between him and what he represented (the growing power of electoral-based politics and political leaders) and the power of the ‘palace-military elites’ based on ‘tradition’.
Take, for instance, what we learn from the Wikileaks cables. In several of them, both Thaksin and the Americans mentioned or discussed the issue of his popularity among the rural population as being perceived by the ‘elites’ as a threat to the latter’s traditional status. Or, to take a more concrete example, in mid 2006, Piya is said to have printed out ‘hundred of pages’ from the notorious “Manusaya.com” websites and spent three days convincing ….. that Thaksin was behind them, in other words, Thaksin was being perceived as representing a republican threat to the throne.
So far Aj.Nich might agree. But here’s come the possible implications of his article and the paragraph cited above. Aj.Nich speaks of the need for Thaksin to convince the ‘elites’ to trust him (that he will “never threaten highly sensitive succession arrangements“). Now if the problem is confined to the succession issue, Aj.Nich’s recommendation would be quite, I think, achievable or even, from democratic standpoint, ‘un-problematic’, at least in the short run.
But what if we are talking about the wider issue I outlined above? What should or could Thaksin be doing to convince the ‘elites’ that he doesn’t represent the threat to their status and power? I can imagine that he could be thinking of showing how much he is loyal to the throne by, for one thing, throwing up a hugely ravish celebrations of the King’s 84th birthday (Yingluck actually talked about this as one of her government’s priorities yesterday). He could also be thinking – and this is more important – of going out of his way to appear to be extra-loyal by not touching the issue of the 112 law at all, or even to appear to implement it vigorously, by reigning in some of his red-shirt supporters who show signs of being critical of the monarchy, or at least not doing anything at all to help those already in jail for LM.
I know that Aj.Nich doesn’t say this in the article and I am quite sure that these are not the things he has in mind in recommending to Thaksin and Yingluck to limit his ‘ambitions’ and to convince the elites that he is no threat to them. But as I said at the beginning, these are also possible implications of such recommendation. (What possible actions on Thaksin and Yingluck’s part that could be “providing the palace and military elites with reason to trust her leadership“? – I wonder.) In fact what I’m concerned at this moment is that Thaksin is actually thinking of doing just the things I said in my previous paragraph, in order to provide “the palace and military elites with reason to trust” him.
Thailand’s precarious politics
Nich they maybe have had good reason to cut those lines.
For peace in Thailand she [Yingluck Shinawatra] will need to begin by limiting the ambitions of her brother and providing the palace and military elites with reason to trust her leadership.
Aren’t you showing some naivety. Have either Yingluck or her brother claimed at any point that she is independent of him? Maybe they have, but we have certainly heard both claim the exact opposite. So telling Yingluck to limit the ambitions of her brother has a bit of a credibility problem.
To put it crudely, it’s no good talking to the monkey when it’s the organ grinder that collects the money.