First time I see this discussion. Most interesting were the contributions from CT, Tarrin and, once more, Nick. Really appreciated, and Andrew M, I finally found out what your upcoming article is based upon. Just before press time!
About Paul Handley, CT: Once he left for a new career in Washington (and fund a family), he had no intention to go back to Thailand or “be able to”, of course. I suspect that it is because he had made that choice that he felt totally at ease to write and publish his book.
Perhaps we have all missed the point of why the election was called in the first place?
And there was me thinking it was Abhisit keeping to his promise on having an election this year which was given under pressure from the red shirt protest. Now I know it was to avoid facing such vote winners as Sudarat, and …, and …. Ah well let’s say he called the election early so as not to lose a Bangkok seat to Sudarat.
Come on Roger and Nich, a bit of thought rather than more conspiracy theories please. That almost matches the “When will the next election be?” post.
Roger: Good point. Maybe Thaksin also favors the election timing because he can more easily control the less influential PT MPs than his own old guard? Can’t prove it but I likt to think Thaksin loses more sleep over his own people than over his known enemies.
Thanks everyone, some seriously interesting discussion here already!
Roger:
This is a particularly useful comment. I’m inclined to agree that the various clocks that are ticking all help determine the electoral (and other) calculations. The fact that within a year the old Thai Rak Thai warhorses can get back in (official) business must weigh heavily on some minds.
I think there are other clocks that are also ticking increasingly loudly. Some are obvious. Some less so. Perhaps this will be a topic for a future post.
I think things have changed a lot since the coup and subsequent machinations of 2007-08. There was no substantive Red Shirt movement at that point in time threatening to take to the streets and raise the international profile of the peoples’ grievances to something paralleling that of the Arab spring. The risks involved in any kind of action stifling the peoples’ will – be it judicial, military or whatever – are far greater now than before simply due to the presence (and experiences) of the Red Shirt movement.
Much more likely is for a PT win to be followed by a range of elite-level compromises: an ‘acceptable’ defense minister, Prayut staying on as army chief, amnesties on both sides, broader divvying up of govt contracts, suitable PT obeisance to the monarchy and so on.
But, as Nich says, nothing is predictable, and it may just be that the ‘powerful forces’ are simply far more obstinate and intractable in their singular terror of Thaksin than any more reasonable positions can account for. The wildcard for me is the US – and from what we know about emerging US strategy in bunkering down in ‘friendly’ SEA states like Thailand to balance China’s regional influence, not to mention the silence to date on brother Joe Gordon – the signs are not positive.
Perhaps we have all missed the point of why the election was called in the first place?
Consider when the banned executive of the old TRT become eligible to run for office again because their 5 years is nearly up?
Would the Democrats stand a chance then?
The Democrats just might scrape home with the help of Newin Chidchob and the smaller parties this time, but if the old TRT executives were running they wouldn’t have a hope.
Perhaps one of the academics would like to explore this angle?
Let’s not forget the old rule that there are no permanent enemies in Thai politics.
Backroom deal: Thaksin and the army agree to let PT rule as long as Thaksin waits one year before returning, doesn’t meddle in military appointments, lets them run the South as before, and increases their budget 25%.
As for “keeping Thaksin out during the transition” — wait, didn’t Thaksin support the CP? If the army wants him out when the king dies, does that mean they don’t support the CP? If the army wants a strong monarchy under the CP/Rama X, then how is Thaksin a threat to that?
Maybe add “stay away from the CP” to that backroom deal list.
Surely this kind of deal is better for both the army and Thaksin than a war of attrition?
How to defeat a PT victory? Read Bangkok Post 7th June – perjury charges are bring considered against Yingluck, it is said she gave false evidence and was holding shares on behalf of Thaksin during his asset enquiry. Redcards being prepared!
BTW your comment “Thaksin Shinawatra has many failings” must win first prize for the understatement of the year.
The priority desire of certain forces to keep Thaksin out during transition has not changed.
The consequences of their actions, as expressed by the reds, has changed completely.
During the 2006 coup, civil protest was limited to what — a lone kamikaze taxi driver charging a tank?
By May 2010, well, you know.
The court dissolution of PT nullifying a clear election victory on selective, capricious legal charges will be effectively a challenge to the reds/PT/Thaskin that they’re bluffing. I can’t believe the generals would be that stupid. In the event of civil war, they lose a lot.
Wouldn’t it be a lot easier to hire some ex-Mossad agents to “disappear” Thaksin? Then let PT win and govern (thus avoiding a flashpoint for civil protest) and watch as their MPs slowly become like every other MP: petty, selfish, corrupt, bereft of ideals. Without Thaksin, PT becomes like BJT but bigger. Suddenly it’s 1999 again.
There could be a double whammy coming up. A big Pheua Thai victory, and an International Court of Justice decision generating a tsunami of international opinion repudiating the military/nationalist/monarchist/fascist aggression against Cambodia. The n/m/f faction in the military could lose enough face for the Thaksin faction to make a comeback. If the latter were to finally morph into a strong pro-parliament faction, the bad times could be over. A triple whammy might not be necessary.
We all greatly appreciate the update. New Mandala readers following Somsak’s case will want to know that it has recently been covered by a long article in The Chronicle of Higher Education.
By way of clarification, I post here and elsewhere as “SteveCM”. Previously, I posted on NM as “Steve” – until posts from another “Steve” appeared many months ago. From then on, to avoid confusion, I added the “CM” and explained as much at the time.
I didn’t write the “Steve of Chiang Mai” comment and I’ve no idea who did. Perhaps AW/NF might be able to check the e-mail address of that post?
As it happens, my subjective reaction to the first clutch of Abhisit placards I saw in Chiang Mai didn’t and still doesn’t include “sneering smirking” or “shifty”. Rather, they struck me as making him look distinctly awkward and distant – and actually just plain unattractive as a person (compared to other previous images of him and what could have been achieved). Any one of those factors is enough to raise the question of just how the Dem marketing team could have got it so badly wrong – without even moving on to considering the other “s” adjectives.
Like (but probably less than) Chris, I have some background in advertising/PR – mainly in commercials and corporate video. To put it bluntly, in my experience any team allowing the client to look that awkward/distant/unattractive would have been fired – and rightly so.
For whatever reason, the “Mark 2” image is strikingly bland and de-humanised – and anything but appealing. For that blunder, if I were in charge, they’d be fired too. Fortunately, I’m not and – given my low opinion of Abhisit & Co – I rather hope they’ll continue with their novel “truth in advertising” experiment right up to 3rd July.
If the decision was made back in 2006 to keep Thaksin out of government for the time when the king dies (and thus when the palace transition occurs) then a Pheua Thai win is likely to be, at best, a short term success.
This is very interesting, and perhaps a thought many of us have in the back of our minds.
“Claims of other countries on dual national U.S. citizens may conflict with U.S. law, and dual nationality may limit U.S. Government efforts to assist citizens abroad. The country where a dual national is located generally has a stronger claim to that person’s allegiance. However, dual nationals owe allegiance to both the United States and the foreign country. They are required to obey the laws of both countries. Either country has the right to enforce its laws, particularly if the person later travels there.”
from US State Department Website-http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html
Very good to see the election results in Peru where Keiko Fujimori, running in order to get an amnesty for her father, a convicted corrupt authoritarian leader known for his human rights abuses, lost.
Now let’s substitute brother for father. Remind you of anyone?
I think PT will get red card regardless of whether they did something wrong or not. Last time when PPP got dissolve the evidence was not even strong but the court took it anyway, that said a lot about Thailand jurisdiction.
Anyhow, I don’t think when PT got dissolve (again) it will turn the country into hell hole or anything, just the dem will take the power again and people who opt for election will understand that election under dictatorship wouldn’t bring any good.
Thank you Andrew, please keep on writing about Thailand, our media is hopeless and shamelessly joined hand with the establishment, there’s so little we can do from within.
Like to see Chris Baker give an analysis of Chuwit’s (No. 5) posters. they show more character that all the other candidates put together! I might just vote for him.
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Thai monarchy and Wikileaks
First time I see this discussion. Most interesting were the contributions from CT, Tarrin and, once more, Nick. Really appreciated, and Andrew M, I finally found out what your upcoming article is based upon. Just before press time!
About Paul Handley, CT: Once he left for a new career in Washington (and fund a family), he had no intention to go back to Thailand or “be able to”, of course. I suspect that it is because he had made that choice that he felt totally at ease to write and publish his book.
Abhisit on the streets
Anyone see the code of number “25” on the Dem’s pledges?
25% wage raises, 250k Bt. of student loan, 2.5k additional officers on drug war, and 25% increase of profit on crops price.
Isn’t “84” an auspicious number for this year?
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
Roger – 9
Perhaps we have all missed the point of why the election was called in the first place?
And there was me thinking it was Abhisit keeping to his promise on having an election this year which was given under pressure from the red shirt protest. Now I know it was to avoid facing such vote winners as Sudarat, and …, and …. Ah well let’s say he called the election early so as not to lose a Bangkok seat to Sudarat.
Come on Roger and Nich, a bit of thought rather than more conspiracy theories please. That almost matches the “When will the next election be?” post.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
Roger: Good point. Maybe Thaksin also favors the election timing because he can more easily control the less influential PT MPs than his own old guard? Can’t prove it but I likt to think Thaksin loses more sleep over his own people than over his known enemies.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
Thanks everyone, some seriously interesting discussion here already!
Roger:
This is a particularly useful comment. I’m inclined to agree that the various clocks that are ticking all help determine the electoral (and other) calculations. The fact that within a year the old Thai Rak Thai warhorses can get back in (official) business must weigh heavily on some minds.
I think there are other clocks that are also ticking increasingly loudly. Some are obvious. Some less so. Perhaps this will be a topic for a future post.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
I think things have changed a lot since the coup and subsequent machinations of 2007-08. There was no substantive Red Shirt movement at that point in time threatening to take to the streets and raise the international profile of the peoples’ grievances to something paralleling that of the Arab spring. The risks involved in any kind of action stifling the peoples’ will – be it judicial, military or whatever – are far greater now than before simply due to the presence (and experiences) of the Red Shirt movement.
Much more likely is for a PT win to be followed by a range of elite-level compromises: an ‘acceptable’ defense minister, Prayut staying on as army chief, amnesties on both sides, broader divvying up of govt contracts, suitable PT obeisance to the monarchy and so on.
But, as Nich says, nothing is predictable, and it may just be that the ‘powerful forces’ are simply far more obstinate and intractable in their singular terror of Thaksin than any more reasonable positions can account for. The wildcard for me is the US – and from what we know about emerging US strategy in bunkering down in ‘friendly’ SEA states like Thailand to balance China’s regional influence, not to mention the silence to date on brother Joe Gordon – the signs are not positive.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
Perhaps we have all missed the point of why the election was called in the first place?
Consider when the banned executive of the old TRT become eligible to run for office again because their 5 years is nearly up?
Would the Democrats stand a chance then?
The Democrats just might scrape home with the help of Newin Chidchob and the smaller parties this time, but if the old TRT executives were running they wouldn’t have a hope.
Perhaps one of the academics would like to explore this angle?
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
Let’s not forget the old rule that there are no permanent enemies in Thai politics.
Backroom deal: Thaksin and the army agree to let PT rule as long as Thaksin waits one year before returning, doesn’t meddle in military appointments, lets them run the South as before, and increases their budget 25%.
As for “keeping Thaksin out during the transition” — wait, didn’t Thaksin support the CP? If the army wants him out when the king dies, does that mean they don’t support the CP? If the army wants a strong monarchy under the CP/Rama X, then how is Thaksin a threat to that?
Maybe add “stay away from the CP” to that backroom deal list.
Surely this kind of deal is better for both the army and Thaksin than a war of attrition?
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
How to defeat a PT victory? Read Bangkok Post 7th June – perjury charges are bring considered against Yingluck, it is said she gave false evidence and was holding shares on behalf of Thaksin during his asset enquiry. Redcards being prepared!
BTW your comment “Thaksin Shinawatra has many failings” must win first prize for the understatement of the year.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
The priority desire of certain forces to keep Thaksin out during transition has not changed.
The consequences of their actions, as expressed by the reds, has changed completely.
During the 2006 coup, civil protest was limited to what — a lone kamikaze taxi driver charging a tank?
By May 2010, well, you know.
The court dissolution of PT nullifying a clear election victory on selective, capricious legal charges will be effectively a challenge to the reds/PT/Thaskin that they’re bluffing. I can’t believe the generals would be that stupid. In the event of civil war, they lose a lot.
Wouldn’t it be a lot easier to hire some ex-Mossad agents to “disappear” Thaksin? Then let PT win and govern (thus avoiding a flashpoint for civil protest) and watch as their MPs slowly become like every other MP: petty, selfish, corrupt, bereft of ideals. Without Thaksin, PT becomes like BJT but bigger. Suddenly it’s 1999 again.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
I also believe that the military and the elites are up to some dirty tricks. We certainly will know what they are if Puea Thai wins the election.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
There could be a double whammy coming up. A big Pheua Thai victory, and an International Court of Justice decision generating a tsunami of international opinion repudiating the military/nationalist/monarchist/fascist aggression against Cambodia. The n/m/f faction in the military could lose enough face for the Thaksin faction to make a comeback. If the latter were to finally morph into a strong pro-parliament faction, the bad times could be over. A triple whammy might not be necessary.
Support for Somsak at Nang Lerng
Thanks Ajarn Somsak,
We all greatly appreciate the update. New Mandala readers following Somsak’s case will want to know that it has recently been covered by a long article in The Chronicle of Higher Education.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Abhisit on the streets
c16 & c17
By way of clarification, I post here and elsewhere as “SteveCM”. Previously, I posted on NM as “Steve” – until posts from another “Steve” appeared many months ago. From then on, to avoid confusion, I added the “CM” and explained as much at the time.
I didn’t write the “Steve of Chiang Mai” comment and I’ve no idea who did. Perhaps AW/NF might be able to check the e-mail address of that post?
As it happens, my subjective reaction to the first clutch of Abhisit placards I saw in Chiang Mai didn’t and still doesn’t include “sneering smirking” or “shifty”. Rather, they struck me as making him look distinctly awkward and distant – and actually just plain unattractive as a person (compared to other previous images of him and what could have been achieved). Any one of those factors is enough to raise the question of just how the Dem marketing team could have got it so badly wrong – without even moving on to considering the other “s” adjectives.
Like (but probably less than) Chris, I have some background in advertising/PR – mainly in commercials and corporate video. To put it bluntly, in my experience any team allowing the client to look that awkward/distant/unattractive would have been fired – and rightly so.
For whatever reason, the “Mark 2” image is strikingly bland and de-humanised – and anything but appealing. For that blunder, if I were in charge, they’d be fired too. Fortunately, I’m not and – given my low opinion of Abhisit & Co – I rather hope they’ll continue with their novel “truth in advertising” experiment right up to 3rd July.
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
If the decision was made back in 2006 to keep Thaksin out of government for the time when the king dies (and thus when the palace transition occurs) then a Pheua Thai win is likely to be, at best, a short term success.
This is very interesting, and perhaps a thought many of us have in the back of our minds.
FACT’s plea for Joe Gordon
“Claims of other countries on dual national U.S. citizens may conflict with U.S. law, and dual nationality may limit U.S. Government efforts to assist citizens abroad. The country where a dual national is located generally has a stronger claim to that person’s allegiance. However, dual nationals owe allegiance to both the United States and the foreign country. They are required to obey the laws of both countries. Either country has the right to enforce its laws, particularly if the person later travels there.”
from US State Department Website-http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html
Scorecard on Abhisit and Yingluck
Very good to see the election results in Peru where Keiko Fujimori, running in order to get an amnesty for her father, a convicted corrupt authoritarian leader known for his human rights abuses, lost.
Now let’s substitute brother for father. Remind you of anyone?
A Pheua Thai win? But then what?
I think PT will get red card regardless of whether they did something wrong or not. Last time when PPP got dissolve the evidence was not even strong but the court took it anyway, that said a lot about Thailand jurisdiction.
Anyhow, I don’t think when PT got dissolve (again) it will turn the country into hell hole or anything, just the dem will take the power again and people who opt for election will understand that election under dictatorship wouldn’t bring any good.
Thai monarchy and Wikileaks
Thank you Andrew, please keep on writing about Thailand, our media is hopeless and shamelessly joined hand with the establishment, there’s so little we can do from within.
Abhisit on the streets
Like to see Chris Baker give an analysis of Chuwit’s (No. 5) posters. they show more character that all the other candidates put together! I might just vote for him.