Adding to Somsak, Piyabut Saengkanokkun (lecturer of public law at Thammasat University) recently took up the dominant constitutional construction by the Thai elite about the relationship between the monarchy and democracy by stating,
“Naturally, in a democratic system a monarch is an adulteration. However, if a liberal-democratic state agrees to preserve the monarchy for some reason, be it to preserve its customs or to have it as the [symbolic] center of the nation, then this state creates a way to combine the ‘monarchy’ with ‘democracy’ by making the king the head of state without him having any political power. It can thus be said that, in a democratic system, it is ‘democracy’ that allows the king to be head [of state]; it is not the king who is the head [of state] with ‘democracy’ as a supplement.”
Reporting like this is crucial for people wanting to make sense beyond the occasional newsflashes – thank you to the guest contributor for the report. What is significant is the unpacking of terms like ‘Karen’, which so often are encoded with essentialist, unwarranted meanings in the mainstream media or advocacy circuits – ie they are ‘oppressed’, ‘victims’ etc… Yes, there is of course a sense in which this is the case. But there’s another side to the story… In fact, there is a dynamic agency within the Karen, in terms of different groups, factions, ideologies, strategies and the like. And, as the author notes, and perhaps most importantly, there are all kinds of business and commercial elements to the various groups – ie they each have their own political economy concerns, in turn linked to and protected by armed groups.
Any other comments / reports providing insights in the political agency and commercial dynamics of the Karen or other Burmese ethnic groups would be most welcome.
The notion of “unwrittern constitution” was popularized by Nidhi Eawsriwong many years ago, in a widely read and cited article, “Cultural version of the Constitution” (р╕гр╕▒р╕Рр╕Шр╕гр╕гр╕бр╕Щр╕╣р╕Нр╕Йр╕Ър╕▒р╕Ър╕зр╕▒р╕Тр╕Щр╕Шр╕гр╕гр╕б). This article strongly reminds me ot Nidhi’s.
While I admire the metaphorical mode of argument of both article, I would rather suggest that there are some significant limitations to such mode that could even make certain point misleading. Take a look at this passage:
While the argument have been framed as republican or royalist, this has masked the real issue–how did the unwritten constitution permit the absolute monarchy structure to remain largely in place when the 1932 revolution replaced it with a constitutional monarchy?
Actually, it’s not the “unwrtten” constitution that permited that structure, or at least not all (perhaps not even the majority parts) of its component were made by any “unwritten” constitution. On the contrary, articles after articles in the constitions since 1932, especially since 1947, are in fact derived from or based on the principle of absolute monarchy. From the article on the sacrosant of the person of the King (article 8 in the current one, based on Japanese Absolutist constitution) to the ones that gave the King absolute power to form an unaccountable Privy Council and the so-called “royal servants” (р╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╣Ир╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕Юр╕▓р╕гр╣Гр╕Щр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕нр╕Зр╕Др╣М) to the ones on the succession which in effect made the Succession Law (р╕Бр╕Ор╕бр╕Ур╣Ар╕Ср╕╡р╕вр╕гр╕Ър╕▓р╕ер╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╕Фр╣Йр╕зр╕вр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕кр╕╖р╕Ър╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕кр╕▒р╕Щр╕Хр╕Хр╕┤р╕зр╕Зр╕ир╣М) a law above the constitution itself (it could be amended, annuled by the King himself without having to pass through parliamentary consideration whatsoever, in other words, an absolute monarchy-type power totally outside of parliamnetary democracy, etc.
All these are highly significant, in my view. To say that all such absolute monarchy-type powers are just results of “unwritten” constittutions runs the risk of missing this issue.
For more on the failure of the ’32 revolution, Federico Ferrara has a great new paper, available on his Khi Kwai blog, “The Legend of King Prajadhipok.”
“Now your question seems to be: should one mass murder be able to accuse someone else of mass murder?”
I’m kind of wondering, if Thaksin does make a return to Thailand and office, I think this whole ordeal will actually have a positive effect on his character. I doubt you’d see the same old Thaksin as before.
Just adding my 25 satang’s worth but hoping this royal project, (I’m guessing which one), doesn’t become a ideological clash. The test should be, is life better for the inhabitants than it was before?
There are faults in the project and I suspect they tend to be because of Thai nationalism and the view that the hill tribes aren’t really Thai. This is a shame because most of the tribes belong to the tai ethnic group along with the Laos, Shans and Thais.
But let’s look at what the project set out to achieve. It could have been put as “Sex, Drugs and Trees”.
Sex because young hill tribe girls were going into prostitution, and the increased danger this posed after HIV/AIDS.
Drugs because the opium was not only being grown in the border areas, but because it was being used by the inhabitants. (By the way for a change the Brits were not responsible for the introduction of opium cultivation in this area. The glory of that goes to the French. Then again the legalizing of opium use in 19th. Century Bangkok does belong to a Brit, John Bowring I think.)
Trees because the hillsides were being stripped for slash and burn farming, including opium cultivation.
In all three of these aims there has been some success and some failures, but overall you would have to say the lot of the hilltribes involved in the project has improved. With better and more regular income the pressure for young girls to work in the sex trade has diminished.
As far as opium is concerned, not just because of projects like this, but also because of law enforcement, certainly under American pressure, the Golden Triangle is no longer the major supplier of heroin to the world. Afghanistan now has that dubious title. The downside is that the region is a transit route for amphetamines being produced just across the border.
To argue that a change in farming techniques wasn’t needed among the hill tribes is to pretend they were living an ideal life before. This just doesn’t really ring any more true with subsistence farming than it does with peasant farming. It’s living on the edge of disaster. As far as reforesting goes, this has been a big success. Some of the aerial photos of the Burmese border and royal project land show trees on one side and bare hillside on the other. That there were problems finding opium substitute cash crops, there can be no doubt. The crash in the price of coffee, which grows at the same altitude as the opium poppies, hurt badly, but it should be remembered that even the UN agencies didn’t see that coming and that over production played into the hands of the likes of Starbucks and the commodity traders.
So just wind up this overlong comment, it would be wrong to look at the projects as exploitation of the hill tribes as one thing they are not is profitable. In many ways the projects are a success story, and Sai Latt’s criticisms only work if you ignore the situation that these areas were in before the projects started. I think Thaksin’s OTOP project drew much of its inspiration from the hill tribe projects, and I have little criticism of this project either.
Actually, the ICC has become little more than a court to try African warlords. Their entire judicial docket consists of cases referred by African governments against insurgent leaders. This would change of course if President Bashir of Sudan were ever extradited to the ICC, but that appears unlikely. The UDD would have better luck with AICHR.
Ralph:
Besides the fallacy of the theoretical surmise of how big the universe is, I wanted to underscore that same point that you did – what Thais have is not so much a result of ability to compromise as it is an inability to make ethical decisions. The inability in inculcated by elites perhaps, but still occupies the majority of the decision making process. Procrastination and least-evil (for vested interests) conclusions are really what Thai indecisiveness is all about.
A really interesting and insightful article, thanks. I just want to emphasize a point that gets de-emphasized when you say “The Thai ability at compromise created a constitutional world with both a written constitutional in place–the one that is shown to foreigners, students, the man in the street–and the unwritten constitution where power over force and violence is exercised as under the absolute monarchy model.”
I want to emphasize the point you make earlier. It is not an ability to compromise but the ability of the palace, military and police to repress.
Dan @ 29: “To me, this is a case of the pot calling the kettle black, of one mass-murderer accusing another of mass-murder. So my question is, if you don’t think this is worth drawing attention to, what would be?” Well, yes, but I doubt anyone at NM would have found the claim that Thaksin had people killed on his watch news. Likewise, I don’t think that many would disagree that the other mass murderer – I presume you mean Abhisit and his co-accused in the Amsterdam document – is culpable also.
Now your question seems to be: should one mass murder be able to accuse someone else of mass murder? I am sure that there is a literature on this that is deep that I am unaware of, but it seems to me that there is no reason why one bad guy can’t point the finger at another.
And, in fact, Amsterdam makes the case, he says, for the “UDD and others”, who are not necessarily equal to Thaksin, and a point missed which probably either suggests political location or not having read the report. The cover pieces state: “Presented by Amsterdam & Peroff LLP On Behalf of The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship and Others.” He does work for Thaksin, but this is not necessarily who is lodging a preliminary report.
Finally, it is an exaggeration to say that comments are dominated by red shirt ideologues. There are plenty of others who seem to say a lot (LesAbbey, Vichai N, the not lamented StanG, and your good self, just to mention a few.
Excellent, extremely insightful and likely (imho) to be right on the button. Certainly it helps to understand some of the more obvious anomalies and stupidities of Thailand.
“As physicist tell us the visible universe wouldn’t exist without dark matter and dark energy.“.
Hmmm. Well, I for one would be happy to take the risk and I think Thailand would be a much better place if Thais were to get rid of the useless ‘unwritten constitution’ bludgers who bleed them dry. And that means ALL of them.
The only other thing Thais would need to do before joining the ranks of the developed world, would be to gain some rudimentay understanding of the meaning of the word ‘integrity’, because the glaring lack of this at all levels of Thai society is what (again imho) lies at the root of 90% of Thailand’s very considerable shortcomings as a nation.
And it has been deliberately engineered and maintained to ensure it stays that way. By the aforementioned useless ‘unwritten constitution’ bludgers.
Really interesting way to explain Thailand constitution as an incomprehensible universe, one thing that I want to add regarding this phase
how did the unwritten constitution permit the absolute monarchy structure to remain largely in place when the 1932 revolution replaced it with a constitutional monarchy?
After the revolution of 1932, the People Assembly didn’t exactly agree with each other, Predi was exile due to his reform being branded as communist and Phibun was fascist align. The power struggle of the People Assembly throughout 1940s until early 1950s largely diminish the power of the People Assembly. Pridi is partly to blame because after seizing power he insisted on retaining the old structure. His intention of preserving “the old” way has paved way for his own downfall and the raise of Sarit, who stage a coup of 1957 and who brought back those that lost from the 1932 back.
R.N. England,
In case you haven’t noticed, there has been plenty of fighting all during military rule in Burma. Civilian rule, particularly civilian rule that honestly took in to consideration minority concerns is precisely what has been missing in Burma. The only way the military acts as a unifying force is that everybody hates them.
Oh, and I seem to have missed the steady stream of refugees from Laos in to Thailand. I’d talk to some Karen civilians. I suspect they’d see Laos and Nepal as a step up. If Burma does split up and become worse, it will be because the 40+ years of military rule.
Let me make myself clear a bit, I’m not defending Thaksin for the extra-jurisdiction killing, but I just want to point out that the drug trafficking network and the relationship between people who are running this business makes this issue a very sensitive and complex one.
Tarrin you are falling into the same trap that Weng fell into and you do end up defending Thaksin by spreading the blame. I’m surprised because a couple of months ago you seemed far more open minded. If you try to remove the major blame from Thaksin of a policy that ended with many small-time dealers and users being killed by the police, you do yourself an injustice. You can rightly argue that many in positions of high power supported this policy but it was initiated by Thaksin and was probably designed as a populist policy aimed at Thailand’s middle-classes.
By the way I suspect that most of the killings were carried out by the police. It wasn’t a policy designed to find information about the kingpins in the barracks or the police stations. It was intended to strike terror into the lower levels of the business by either executions or long prison sentences for minor users.
“‘If he (Amsterdam) presents stupid and nonsense statements, he would risk being rejected and ridiculed because those attending the meeting have their own judgement and follow the situation in Thailand,’ Noppadon said.”
becomes
“…..Amsterdam is full of nonsense (to which Thaksin’s personal lawyer seconded)”
It’s a treat to be in at the birth of another new Vichai “fact” – primed and ready to drop into all manner of posts (four so far – and that’s just in this discussion). And so easy, too; just ignore that silly little word “if” and – hey presto, folks – you’ve got Amsterdam lined up by Noppadon as making “stupid and nonsense statements”.
Never mind the sheer implausibility of one Thaksin lawyer publicly dissing another; on planet Vichai, agenda-driven tunnel vision takes care of that and usefully blinds one to anything that exposes the latest pseudo-QED non sequitur. There’s a term to describe this: wishful reading.
Quite what term describes cherry-picking just the helpful facts to merge with a mess of agenda-driven conjecture (to the embarrassing point where the writer plainly sees no difference at all between them) and cite all of the resultant soup as “fact”? That escapes me.
I mention quite a bit about Anuvongse in my book, and encourage readers who are really interested in not just the Thai version in detailed native English, but also contradictory witness statements made at the time, et. al, to contact me to order a copy of Lady Mo and Heroism at Tung Samrit. 120 Baht nationwide delivery in Thailand.
The book puts a lot of information together in one place, and contains plenty of illustrations, citations and references.
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The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
Adding to Somsak, Piyabut Saengkanokkun (lecturer of public law at Thammasat University) recently took up the dominant constitutional construction by the Thai elite about the relationship between the monarchy and democracy by stating,
“Naturally, in a democratic system a monarch is an adulteration. However, if a liberal-democratic state agrees to preserve the monarchy for some reason, be it to preserve its customs or to have it as the [symbolic] center of the nation, then this state creates a way to combine the ‘monarchy’ with ‘democracy’ by making the king the head of state without him having any political power. It can thus be said that, in a democratic system, it is ‘democracy’ that allows the king to be head [of state]; it is not the king who is the head [of state] with ‘democracy’ as a supplement.”
р╕Ыр╕┤р╕вр╕Ър╕╕р╕Хр╕г р╣Бр╕кр╕Зр╕Бр╕Щр╕Бр╕Бр╕╕р╕е. 2553. “р╣Ф р╕Ыр╕╡р╕гр╕▒р╕Рр╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕лр╕▓р╕г р╣Ф р╣Ар╕Фр╕╖р╕нр╕Щр╕Юр╕др╕йр╕ар╕▓р╕нр╕│р╕бр╕лр╕┤р╕Хр╕п р╕нр╕Щр╕▓р╕Др╕Хр╕кр╕▒р╕Зр╕Др╕бр╣Др╕Чр╕в.” http://www.enlightened-jurists.com/page/140
Report from the Thailand-Burma border
Reporting like this is crucial for people wanting to make sense beyond the occasional newsflashes – thank you to the guest contributor for the report. What is significant is the unpacking of terms like ‘Karen’, which so often are encoded with essentialist, unwarranted meanings in the mainstream media or advocacy circuits – ie they are ‘oppressed’, ‘victims’ etc… Yes, there is of course a sense in which this is the case. But there’s another side to the story… In fact, there is a dynamic agency within the Karen, in terms of different groups, factions, ideologies, strategies and the like. And, as the author notes, and perhaps most importantly, there are all kinds of business and commercial elements to the various groups – ie they each have their own political economy concerns, in turn linked to and protected by armed groups.
Any other comments / reports providing insights in the political agency and commercial dynamics of the Karen or other Burmese ethnic groups would be most welcome.
Why is a case with the ICC so frightening?
Let’s hope the ICC will broaden its scope to include Thai warlords.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
The notion of “unwrittern constitution” was popularized by Nidhi Eawsriwong many years ago, in a widely read and cited article, “Cultural version of the Constitution” (р╕гр╕▒р╕Рр╕Шр╕гр╕гр╕бр╕Щр╕╣р╕Нр╕Йр╕Ър╕▒р╕Ър╕зр╕▒р╕Тр╕Щр╕Шр╕гр╕гр╕б). This article strongly reminds me ot Nidhi’s.
While I admire the metaphorical mode of argument of both article, I would rather suggest that there are some significant limitations to such mode that could even make certain point misleading. Take a look at this passage:
While the argument have been framed as republican or royalist, this has masked the real issue–how did the unwritten constitution permit the absolute monarchy structure to remain largely in place when the 1932 revolution replaced it with a constitutional monarchy?
Actually, it’s not the “unwrtten” constitution that permited that structure, or at least not all (perhaps not even the majority parts) of its component were made by any “unwritten” constitution. On the contrary, articles after articles in the constitions since 1932, especially since 1947, are in fact derived from or based on the principle of absolute monarchy. From the article on the sacrosant of the person of the King (article 8 in the current one, based on Japanese Absolutist constitution) to the ones that gave the King absolute power to form an unaccountable Privy Council and the so-called “royal servants” (р╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╣Ир╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕Юр╕▓р╕гр╣Гр╕Щр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕нр╕Зр╕Др╣М) to the ones on the succession which in effect made the Succession Law (р╕Бр╕Ор╕бр╕Ур╣Ар╕Ср╕╡р╕вр╕гр╕Ър╕▓р╕ер╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╕Фр╣Йр╕зр╕вр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕кр╕╖р╕Ър╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕кр╕▒р╕Щр╕Хр╕Хр╕┤р╕зр╕Зр╕ир╣М) a law above the constitution itself (it could be amended, annuled by the King himself without having to pass through parliamentary consideration whatsoever, in other words, an absolute monarchy-type power totally outside of parliamnetary democracy, etc.
All these are highly significant, in my view. To say that all such absolute monarchy-type powers are just results of “unwritten” constittutions runs the risk of missing this issue.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
Tarrin:
For more on the failure of the ’32 revolution, Federico Ferrara has a great new paper, available on his Khi Kwai blog, “The Legend of King Prajadhipok.”
http://khikwai.com/blog/2010/10/24/prapokklao/
Robert Amsterdam on Show Trials, Political Trials and Crimes Against Humanity
“Now your question seems to be: should one mass murder be able to accuse someone else of mass murder?”
I’m kind of wondering, if Thaksin does make a return to Thailand and office, I think this whole ordeal will actually have a positive effect on his character. I doubt you’d see the same old Thaksin as before.
Examining the “success” of a northern Thai Royal Project
Just adding my 25 satang’s worth but hoping this royal project, (I’m guessing which one), doesn’t become a ideological clash. The test should be, is life better for the inhabitants than it was before?
There are faults in the project and I suspect they tend to be because of Thai nationalism and the view that the hill tribes aren’t really Thai. This is a shame because most of the tribes belong to the tai ethnic group along with the Laos, Shans and Thais.
But let’s look at what the project set out to achieve. It could have been put as “Sex, Drugs and Trees”.
Sex because young hill tribe girls were going into prostitution, and the increased danger this posed after HIV/AIDS.
Drugs because the opium was not only being grown in the border areas, but because it was being used by the inhabitants. (By the way for a change the Brits were not responsible for the introduction of opium cultivation in this area. The glory of that goes to the French. Then again the legalizing of opium use in 19th. Century Bangkok does belong to a Brit, John Bowring I think.)
Trees because the hillsides were being stripped for slash and burn farming, including opium cultivation.
In all three of these aims there has been some success and some failures, but overall you would have to say the lot of the hilltribes involved in the project has improved. With better and more regular income the pressure for young girls to work in the sex trade has diminished.
As far as opium is concerned, not just because of projects like this, but also because of law enforcement, certainly under American pressure, the Golden Triangle is no longer the major supplier of heroin to the world. Afghanistan now has that dubious title. The downside is that the region is a transit route for amphetamines being produced just across the border.
To argue that a change in farming techniques wasn’t needed among the hill tribes is to pretend they were living an ideal life before. This just doesn’t really ring any more true with subsistence farming than it does with peasant farming. It’s living on the edge of disaster. As far as reforesting goes, this has been a big success. Some of the aerial photos of the Burmese border and royal project land show trees on one side and bare hillside on the other. That there were problems finding opium substitute cash crops, there can be no doubt. The crash in the price of coffee, which grows at the same altitude as the opium poppies, hurt badly, but it should be remembered that even the UN agencies didn’t see that coming and that over production played into the hands of the likes of Starbucks and the commodity traders.
So just wind up this overlong comment, it would be wrong to look at the projects as exploitation of the hill tribes as one thing they are not is profitable. In many ways the projects are a success story, and Sai Latt’s criticisms only work if you ignore the situation that these areas were in before the projects started. I think Thaksin’s OTOP project drew much of its inspiration from the hill tribe projects, and I have little criticism of this project either.
Why is a case with the ICC so frightening?
[…] […]
Why is a case with the ICC so frightening?
DOM
good try but … wonder if AICHR will ever take a case, on anything?
at least the ICC has the “major flaw” .. that … requires the court to “seriously” consider “even this wild allegation”
AICHR will turn a blind eye to anything not supported by the relevant government at the time, as ASEAN itself continues to do with all such issues
Why is a case with the ICC so frightening?
Actually, the ICC has become little more than a court to try African warlords. Their entire judicial docket consists of cases referred by African governments against insurgent leaders. This would change of course if President Bashir of Sudan were ever extradited to the ICC, but that appears unlikely. The UDD would have better luck with AICHR.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
Ralph:
Besides the fallacy of the theoretical surmise of how big the universe is, I wanted to underscore that same point that you did – what Thais have is not so much a result of ability to compromise as it is an inability to make ethical decisions. The inability in inculcated by elites perhaps, but still occupies the majority of the decision making process. Procrastination and least-evil (for vested interests) conclusions are really what Thai indecisiveness is all about.
Examining the “success” of a northern Thai Royal Project
Yes, please provide the details of the thesis. This is important material.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
A really interesting and insightful article, thanks. I just want to emphasize a point that gets de-emphasized when you say “The Thai ability at compromise created a constitutional world with both a written constitutional in place–the one that is shown to foreigners, students, the man in the street–and the unwritten constitution where power over force and violence is exercised as under the absolute monarchy model.”
I want to emphasize the point you make earlier. It is not an ability to compromise but the ability of the palace, military and police to repress.
Robert Amsterdam on Show Trials, Political Trials and Crimes Against Humanity
Dan @ 29: “To me, this is a case of the pot calling the kettle black, of one mass-murderer accusing another of mass-murder. So my question is, if you don’t think this is worth drawing attention to, what would be?” Well, yes, but I doubt anyone at NM would have found the claim that Thaksin had people killed on his watch news. Likewise, I don’t think that many would disagree that the other mass murderer – I presume you mean Abhisit and his co-accused in the Amsterdam document – is culpable also.
Now your question seems to be: should one mass murder be able to accuse someone else of mass murder? I am sure that there is a literature on this that is deep that I am unaware of, but it seems to me that there is no reason why one bad guy can’t point the finger at another.
And, in fact, Amsterdam makes the case, he says, for the “UDD and others”, who are not necessarily equal to Thaksin, and a point missed which probably either suggests political location or not having read the report. The cover pieces state: “Presented by Amsterdam & Peroff LLP On Behalf of The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship and Others.” He does work for Thaksin, but this is not necessarily who is lodging a preliminary report.
Finally, it is an exaggeration to say that comments are dominated by red shirt ideologues. There are plenty of others who seem to say a lot (LesAbbey, Vichai N, the not lamented StanG, and your good self, just to mention a few.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
Excellent, extremely insightful and likely (imho) to be right on the button. Certainly it helps to understand some of the more obvious anomalies and stupidities of Thailand.
“As physicist tell us the visible universe wouldn’t exist without dark matter and dark energy.“.
Hmmm. Well, I for one would be happy to take the risk and I think Thailand would be a much better place if Thais were to get rid of the useless ‘unwritten constitution’ bludgers who bleed them dry. And that means ALL of them.
The only other thing Thais would need to do before joining the ranks of the developed world, would be to gain some rudimentay understanding of the meaning of the word ‘integrity’, because the glaring lack of this at all levels of Thai society is what (again imho) lies at the root of 90% of Thailand’s very considerable shortcomings as a nation.
And it has been deliberately engineered and maintained to ensure it stays that way. By the aforementioned useless ‘unwritten constitution’ bludgers.
The quantum physics of the Thai constitutional universe
Really interesting way to explain Thailand constitution as an incomprehensible universe, one thing that I want to add regarding this phase
how did the unwritten constitution permit the absolute monarchy structure to remain largely in place when the 1932 revolution replaced it with a constitutional monarchy?
After the revolution of 1932, the People Assembly didn’t exactly agree with each other, Predi was exile due to his reform being branded as communist and Phibun was fascist align. The power struggle of the People Assembly throughout 1940s until early 1950s largely diminish the power of the People Assembly. Pridi is partly to blame because after seizing power he insisted on retaining the old structure. His intention of preserving “the old” way has paved way for his own downfall and the raise of Sarit, who stage a coup of 1957 and who brought back those that lost from the 1932 back.
What will happen in Burma after the election?
R.N. England,
In case you haven’t noticed, there has been plenty of fighting all during military rule in Burma. Civilian rule, particularly civilian rule that honestly took in to consideration minority concerns is precisely what has been missing in Burma. The only way the military acts as a unifying force is that everybody hates them.
Oh, and I seem to have missed the steady stream of refugees from Laos in to Thailand. I’d talk to some Karen civilians. I suspect they’d see Laos and Nepal as a step up. If Burma does split up and become worse, it will be because the 40+ years of military rule.
Robert Amsterdam on Show Trials, Political Trials and Crimes Against Humanity
Tarrin – 30
Let me make myself clear a bit, I’m not defending Thaksin for the extra-jurisdiction killing, but I just want to point out that the drug trafficking network and the relationship between people who are running this business makes this issue a very sensitive and complex one.
Tarrin you are falling into the same trap that Weng fell into and you do end up defending Thaksin by spreading the blame. I’m surprised because a couple of months ago you seemed far more open minded. If you try to remove the major blame from Thaksin of a policy that ended with many small-time dealers and users being killed by the police, you do yourself an injustice. You can rightly argue that many in positions of high power supported this policy but it was initiated by Thaksin and was probably designed as a populist policy aimed at Thailand’s middle-classes.
By the way I suspect that most of the killings were carried out by the police. It wasn’t a policy designed to find information about the kingpins in the barracks or the police stations. It was intended to strike terror into the lower levels of the business by either executions or long prison sentences for minor users.
Robert Amsterdam on Show Trials, Political Trials and Crimes Against Humanity
c27 (+ c24 + c22 + c19….. and counting)
“‘If he (Amsterdam) presents stupid and nonsense statements, he would risk being rejected and ridiculed because those attending the meeting have their own judgement and follow the situation in Thailand,’ Noppadon said.”
becomes
“…..Amsterdam is full of nonsense (to which Thaksin’s personal lawyer seconded)”
It’s a treat to be in at the birth of another new Vichai “fact” – primed and ready to drop into all manner of posts (four so far – and that’s just in this discussion). And so easy, too; just ignore that silly little word “if” and – hey presto, folks – you’ve got Amsterdam lined up by Noppadon as making “stupid and nonsense statements”.
Never mind the sheer implausibility of one Thaksin lawyer publicly dissing another; on planet Vichai, agenda-driven tunnel vision takes care of that and usefully blinds one to anything that exposes the latest pseudo-QED non sequitur. There’s a term to describe this: wishful reading.
Quite what term describes cherry-picking just the helpful facts to merge with a mess of agenda-driven conjecture (to the embarrassing point where the writer plainly sees no difference at all between them) and cite all of the resultant soup as “fact”? That escapes me.
Size matters
I mention quite a bit about Anuvongse in my book, and encourage readers who are really interested in not just the Thai version in detailed native English, but also contradictory witness statements made at the time, et. al, to contact me to order a copy of Lady Mo and Heroism at Tung Samrit. 120 Baht nationwide delivery in Thailand.
The book puts a lot of information together in one place, and contains plenty of illustrations, citations and references.