Thank you Andrew. Many years ago when it was quite unusual to see farangs in the northeast following the exit of the Americans from Udon, I had the chance to watch a hard fought election of a village headman. I must admit I was impressed by the operation and by the closeness of the result. Although there were probably all sorts of underhand tricks going on, I thought at the time that it was an example that elections to parliament could follow rather than the money politics at the time. (This was long before Thaksin joined the Phalang Dharma so I’m not attacking him this time.)
Pending on who their parents are – I know the ones you mentioned and all of those type have good contacts and good connections. Or the handful wily enough to toady up to join the “right” crowd.
I know some of lower ranking soldiers who made a small fortune robbing poor vulnerable villagers across the borders in Laos and Cambodia (why do you think why some of those villagers hated the Thai soldiers?) and boasted about it splashing their ill gotten gains in beers and parties.
The higher ups of course had other forms of corruption money – you really dont want to get into all those – that hierachical system.
—
The ones I cared about had no friends in high places, and no skills to toady to them, or are handicap and no longer “perfect” enough for them.
A number of them were the ones who happened to step on mines on the border 15-20 years back, lost their limbs, and had no access to affordable medical care and they struggle from day to day, sometimes on charity. All from that group are dead now, and not even any where close to old age yet.
I know a mom who lost her son in training because the officers did not believe that the boy was sick. They thought that that poor boy was only pretending and pushed him even harder – he died on the training field and that was covered up because the murderer had “connections”. The mom was even threatened if she dared talk – and yes, she once worked for us.
I know from a number of country recruits some ten years back how they were given old rusty outdated weapons. I know they forked out money they could barely afford to buy little “branded” buddhas to protect them from backfiring weapon, which happened to a friend of theirs.
I knew of how those hard party officers drinking all over Thailand, when in a bad mood, how they booted and kicked their men – in rare instances even kill them in drunken rage. Stories I heard, yes – but one I knew was permanently handicapped from a vicious boot and lack of medical care, now walk with a limp (because he worked for us for a while)
My aunt watched, white-faced, one of the soldiers getting booted by his superior officer -an unmentionable in that case. She was not only horrified, but also disgusted given the rank and file of that man. She has no information as to whether that punching bag lives or died.
I may not have spent much time in Thailand recently, but I was once there – and very much a part of that society. And my view is – if you are in that “party boys connected” crowd, then yes, life is very very good. Abuses of privilege are common – and it is not uncommon to travel on army planes and ships like on a holiday – like cruise around Sattahip on a naval ship landing on a really isolated island for tea and a swim. It was really cool.
So Collin, I can see why a white collar worker and Sydney graduate might be envious of such privileges and lifestyle. But do not fool yourself – the darker side must exist to support such frivolity. I hope you never get to see it.
Cheers, Nuomi
PS on a sidenote, Australia drew with Ghana – darn! Now have to win last match to get into next round!!! Grrr…
Thanks LesAbbey – no need to apologise. This is about discussion after all. The intention of my one village case study was to suggest that things may not be as simple as people often suggest. But it is certainly not a comprehensive study of the implementation of impact of the village fund scheme. I have no doubt that in some places people like headmen and kamnan were able to manipulate the sheme in ways that served their political interests. However, based on my experience, I am very skeptical about the notion that headmen can readily swing votes one way or the other in national elections. I think the political power of headmen has greatly declined as economic, social and political connections in rural Thailand have proliferated.
I’ve only had short trips into BKK recently, and have not been outside of BKK for 18 years. Its always good to read from those actually based out there or have been out there.
Thanks for the link. I will read the document over the week in BKK. I’d love to be able to catch up while I am there. Sadly, I think I’ll be gritting my teeth again in the anti-Red crowd.
While Thonghai’s analysis on collective memory was insightful regarding the power of popular discourse and hegemony, I wondered how he missed the elephant in the room from San Kamphaeng, the opportunist who funded the political and economic disparities of the Northeast, or the power of the negative, and often violent media of the UDD heard throughout the markets of Thailand.
This will be a fascinating issue to come back to in a year to see how it is remembered. Could the king have done more and should he have? Isn’t sublime guidance enough? Will the former prime minister re-emerge as a power, and if so, will there be a monarchy left if he does? Will the government attempt to return to the status quo of ignoring the social issues leading to the crisis? Will the politics of patronage, so extreme in the northeast and the rampant corruption that goes with it, change with the arrests of the UDD leadership? Will the power of English media press releases further empower the “red-shirt” cause? Will the majority of Thai people tolerate the use of street thugs to support democratic causes?
This is a pessimistic analysis and since pessimism leads to inaction here are a few counter arguments.
Recent industrial unrest in China shows that activity can suddenly spring up when unexpected. Spontaneous means of worker organisation independent of official state unions exhibited strong leanings to democracy. Unrest sparked off in key sections of industry inspired workers in less prominent areas to protest against their own conditions.
Trades unionism is international or it is nothing. Links can be forged with other countries. Chinese workers can be invited to address Thai trades unionists, officially if possible, unofficially if necessary. The same goes for European trades unions which are relatively strong from a global perspective. In addition European and other established trades unions should be showing solidarity by inviting Thai workers to address their members. Expenses should be paid. Translators should be provided.
Trade unions are a key element to any transformation of society in the direction of democracy. Those forces arguing for change in Thailand would do well to put the issue of building trade unions high on their agenda.
Having read Andrew’s 2006 piece on the one million Baht village fund operation in the North I find I was wrong to link this fund with village headmen, the kamnans. For that I apologise and thank Andrew for having this source of information on New Mandala.
Thank you Nuomi for even referring to my name, I didn’t quite expect that. Regarding how the headman get hold of the village fund, I really have no idea how that works since from my own experience I never quite come across such situation.
Anyway, a bit of background, I have spend about couple of months from July to early September in 2005 in Srisaket and many of the Southern Isan provinces including Ubon and Surin from an invitation of my police friends who stationed there during that time. I had a chance observed some of the government projects such as the plan for new dam to help preventing flood and provide water during drought and of cause the village fund, since Andrew pretty much provide the detail on how the fund run I think I need not to explain any further as his research suppose to be much more intense than my superficial observation.
I think what I want to address Les Abbey’s accusation on village headman can take control of the fund. This accusation hold very little possibility if you really know how the fund is set up. If you already read Andrew’s post, you should know that the Fund administrator is the District Office and the Custodian of the Fund is the Bank of Agriculture (or the GSB for urban communities), and the fund manager is the locally elected committee. This set up gave the fund manager some autonomy in how to lend out the money but not full freedom like many other had suspected. If there’s any abnormality in lending, say a person get hold of one time lending of 50% of the total fund (500,000 baht) this indicated abnormal activity and the District Office will have the authority to stop the lending activity by coordinating the Bank of Agriculture. Now, under this set up, even if the headman really get hold of the committee, he can not do much anyway in term of leading money to himself and what not because there is a system for checking for fund movement in place. If the headman really want to succeed in pocking the fund money he would have to bribe both the District office and the Bank of Agriculture (or the GSB) so believe me, that’s a very hard task to do, I don’t think it worth the measly 1 million baht.
Moreover, I want to point out the success of the fund that you has risen in your post.
This is a “draft” research done by NSOT with coordination with the World Bank and Suffolk University. This is a draft version so don’t get too serious about their conclusion, but I just want you to take note with some of the number they provided.
In 2nd para of introduction, by the end of May 2005 the total program had lent out 259 B baht, the repayment principle was 168 B (64.86%) and debt outstanding was 91 B (35.31%). Now if we compare this to say, big back like Bangkok Bank where they will not tolerate 10% NPL then yes this project seems like a failure, but if we look at the economic and social implication, we are talking about 64.83% of the 17.8 million borrower who were actually benefit from the scheme, that’s 11 million people. I think its a very successful project if you asked me. Furthermore, the core principle of this program is to find that 1 success that can repay the rest of the 9 failure. I would say 6 success that repaid 4 failure grossly exceed that target right?
Anyhow, there are many interesting figure that you can actually take a look such as where the borrower actually “spend” the money and so on, but as I say before, this is a draft version so you should take it with a grain of salt.
I think Thailand should move toward the Presidential System like Indonesia, the Philippines, and the United States because the existing Thai system is not working. Even the former king, Ananda, was murdered when he planned to change the country towards the Presidential System.
The public’s desire for liberty and freedom is exponentially increasing across every regions. Yet the military and the monarchy prefer to keep the status quo. I think it is in the interests of every group (economic elites, political elites, network monarchy, the military, general public, and international community) to accommodate the needed change.
Thailand can no longer afford the increasing costs (financial, social, political and psychological, etc.) of the oppressive measures e.g. emergency law, political computer law, lese majeste law, sniper operation, etc.). Creating “FEAR” does not work in the Thai culture context, it only moves the country further towards costly conflict.
Today I read an interesting article in the ThaiE-News about the changes in various other countries, e.g. USA (1776), France (1789), Russia (1918), Nepal (2008), India (1942), South Africa (1994), etc.
A conclusion from Andrew’s 2 graphs of government spending on ag. and as a % of value of ag. products – the first flat in the Thaksin period and the second plummeting – is that the value of farm production soared. This should have made for happy and pro-government farmers. But as I remember the price of rubber from the south rose and so did the insurrection.
Perhaps Andrew could comment on the present government’s handing out of money to farmers based on the extent of their land holdings.
Also one way of viewing the issue of declining rural secondary employment and government transfers to the rural provinces is that these provinces send their boys and girls to work in Bangkok or the “Detroit of the East” where they are underpaid and that the families are compensated by the tax system and the capitalists can continue to underpay and Thailand can be competitive for international capital.
Thanks for sharing your views, Nuomi. I’d propose your comment is more an addition to, not a correction of, my point.
One may rebut (if only as a trial balloon), that the 2008 PAD mob was simply mopping up what the 2006 military coup never got quite ‘right’.
The change desired by the coup was to remove Thaksin; but when it became apparent that Thaksin’s ‘tentacles’ were too deeply rooted within the political body, the 2008 mob came to the rescue. The military support for the PAD suggests this was the case.
Regardless of how one chooses to characterize the events, we certainly do live in interesting times.
My reading of Thaksin in Thailand in comparison with Chavez in Venezuela is that Thailand has a monarchy that blinded the people to the repressive activities of the amnart/military.
When the coup against Thaksin took place the smoke and mirrors story of “protection of the monarchy” was still strong.
Now, the people have commenced their understanding of the real feudal nature of Thai society and like the Europeans 500 to 200 years ago are wanting to shake off the yokes
The actions of the royals themselves, the PAD and the government have weakened the smoke and mirrors story of the monarchy. It is so weak, the government has had to use the new Bush/US inspired story of terrorism to keep themselves intact. This wont work long. The claim that your own people are terrorists is a bit far-fetched for anyone to accept seriously for long, it has not been used down south and it was only the extreme actions of the Yellows at the airports that raised the idea at all.
Many in Bangkok as well as the regions are awake to the malign forces in Thai society. It will take only a small flame to ignite a major rebellion that the military generals will not be able to contain. The amnart will then recognise that democratic governments must be accepted.
I wonder how much money was transacted by the democrats and the “yellow” shirts. I suppose we will never know. Given that the “yellows” and democrats are the “richer” class. I hazard to guess that it will be a whole lot more than…….
Thanks very much for the actual numbers and description of how the money is being managed from one whole village. The figures you have look very optimistic indeed – very different from figures the people I know from NIDA throw at me which indicate increasing household debt, no increase in income, and very high default rates. For example, Wichai’s study broadbased study covers 19 provinces and indicate that household debt increase from approx 76,000 baht in 2000 (before village fund) to just over 80,000 baht in 2005.
The few Northern Thais I know who took loans mostly managed to repay. Some have re-borrowed to expand or upgrade, but I have no basis on which to defend whether the village fund works on a “national” basis. Now I also see what they mean by co-op approach – though from your description, it sounded very well organized and more financially advanced than I expected.
I am interested to know where that village stand today? Is the fund still doing well?
I never like the way the local media call all these “cheap loans”. I prefer the use of the word “affordable”, because that is what 5% is.
I also dislike the constant reference to micro-lending and Grameen Bank targeting women being a better scheme and empowering them – at 50rupee in the morning and repaying 52rupee at night daily for the poor women, we are talking about a 4% interest a day – or well over 1400% per annum. That is practically loan-shark rate! I supposed compared to that, the village fund loan rate at 5% is very “cheap”.
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Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
Tarrin – 18
The majority of the people will never get the pie in any country or state…
Oh, but they may get a pie in the sky when they die, or at least that’s what Joe Hill sung.
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Thank you Andrew. Many years ago when it was quite unusual to see farangs in the northeast following the exit of the Americans from Udon, I had the chance to watch a hard fought election of a village headman. I must admit I was impressed by the operation and by the closeness of the result. Although there were probably all sorts of underhand tricks going on, I thought at the time that it was an example that elections to parliament could follow rather than the money politics at the time. (This was long before Thaksin joined the Phalang Dharma so I’m not attacking him this time.)
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
Dear Collin:
Pending on who their parents are – I know the ones you mentioned and all of those type have good contacts and good connections. Or the handful wily enough to toady up to join the “right” crowd.
I know some of lower ranking soldiers who made a small fortune robbing poor vulnerable villagers across the borders in Laos and Cambodia (why do you think why some of those villagers hated the Thai soldiers?) and boasted about it splashing their ill gotten gains in beers and parties.
The higher ups of course had other forms of corruption money – you really dont want to get into all those – that hierachical system.
—
The ones I cared about had no friends in high places, and no skills to toady to them, or are handicap and no longer “perfect” enough for them.
A number of them were the ones who happened to step on mines on the border 15-20 years back, lost their limbs, and had no access to affordable medical care and they struggle from day to day, sometimes on charity. All from that group are dead now, and not even any where close to old age yet.
I know a mom who lost her son in training because the officers did not believe that the boy was sick. They thought that that poor boy was only pretending and pushed him even harder – he died on the training field and that was covered up because the murderer had “connections”. The mom was even threatened if she dared talk – and yes, she once worked for us.
I know from a number of country recruits some ten years back how they were given old rusty outdated weapons. I know they forked out money they could barely afford to buy little “branded” buddhas to protect them from backfiring weapon, which happened to a friend of theirs.
I knew of how those hard party officers drinking all over Thailand, when in a bad mood, how they booted and kicked their men – in rare instances even kill them in drunken rage. Stories I heard, yes – but one I knew was permanently handicapped from a vicious boot and lack of medical care, now walk with a limp (because he worked for us for a while)
My aunt watched, white-faced, one of the soldiers getting booted by his superior officer -an unmentionable in that case. She was not only horrified, but also disgusted given the rank and file of that man. She has no information as to whether that punching bag lives or died.
I may not have spent much time in Thailand recently, but I was once there – and very much a part of that society. And my view is – if you are in that “party boys connected” crowd, then yes, life is very very good. Abuses of privilege are common – and it is not uncommon to travel on army planes and ships like on a holiday – like cruise around Sattahip on a naval ship landing on a really isolated island for tea and a swim. It was really cool.
So Collin, I can see why a white collar worker and Sydney graduate might be envious of such privileges and lifestyle. But do not fool yourself – the darker side must exist to support such frivolity. I hope you never get to see it.
Cheers, Nuomi
PS on a sidenote, Australia drew with Ghana – darn! Now have to win last match to get into next round!!! Grrr…
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Thanks LesAbbey – no need to apologise. This is about discussion after all. The intention of my one village case study was to suggest that things may not be as simple as people often suggest. But it is certainly not a comprehensive study of the implementation of impact of the village fund scheme. I have no doubt that in some places people like headmen and kamnan were able to manipulate the sheme in ways that served their political interests. However, based on my experience, I am very skeptical about the notion that headmen can readily swing votes one way or the other in national elections. I think the political power of headmen has greatly declined as economic, social and political connections in rural Thailand have proliferated.
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Tarrin:
I’ve only had short trips into BKK recently, and have not been outside of BKK for 18 years. Its always good to read from those actually based out there or have been out there.
Thanks for the link. I will read the document over the week in BKK. I’d love to be able to catch up while I am there. Sadly, I think I’ll be gritting my teeth again in the anti-Red crowd.
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
While Thonghai’s analysis on collective memory was insightful regarding the power of popular discourse and hegemony, I wondered how he missed the elephant in the room from San Kamphaeng, the opportunist who funded the political and economic disparities of the Northeast, or the power of the negative, and often violent media of the UDD heard throughout the markets of Thailand.
This will be a fascinating issue to come back to in a year to see how it is remembered. Could the king have done more and should he have? Isn’t sublime guidance enough? Will the former prime minister re-emerge as a power, and if so, will there be a monarchy left if he does? Will the government attempt to return to the status quo of ignoring the social issues leading to the crisis? Will the politics of patronage, so extreme in the northeast and the rampant corruption that goes with it, change with the arrests of the UDD leadership? Will the power of English media press releases further empower the “red-shirt” cause? Will the majority of Thai people tolerate the use of street thugs to support democratic causes?
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
Colin – 14
The majority of the people will never get the pie in any country or state, dont be naive. The more aggressive will always step on the meak.
Well, isn’t the statement in itself naive? to assume thing something will never happen?
Thai institutions: Unions
This is a pessimistic analysis and since pessimism leads to inaction here are a few counter arguments.
Recent industrial unrest in China shows that activity can suddenly spring up when unexpected. Spontaneous means of worker organisation independent of official state unions exhibited strong leanings to democracy. Unrest sparked off in key sections of industry inspired workers in less prominent areas to protest against their own conditions.
Trades unionism is international or it is nothing. Links can be forged with other countries. Chinese workers can be invited to address Thai trades unionists, officially if possible, unofficially if necessary. The same goes for European trades unions which are relatively strong from a global perspective. In addition European and other established trades unions should be showing solidarity by inviting Thai workers to address their members. Expenses should be paid. Translators should be provided.
Trade unions are a key element to any transformation of society in the direction of democracy. Those forces arguing for change in Thailand would do well to put the issue of building trade unions high on their agenda.
Anyone wanting to follow up these ideas might be interested in the following blog: http://timeupthailand.blogspot.com/2009/08/critical-report-on-solidarity-building.html
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Having read Andrew’s 2006 piece on the one million Baht village fund operation in the North I find I was wrong to link this fund with village headmen, the kamnans. For that I apologise and thank Andrew for having this source of information on New Mandala.
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Thank you Nuomi for even referring to my name, I didn’t quite expect that. Regarding how the headman get hold of the village fund, I really have no idea how that works since from my own experience I never quite come across such situation.
Anyway, a bit of background, I have spend about couple of months from July to early September in 2005 in Srisaket and many of the Southern Isan provinces including Ubon and Surin from an invitation of my police friends who stationed there during that time. I had a chance observed some of the government projects such as the plan for new dam to help preventing flood and provide water during drought and of cause the village fund, since Andrew pretty much provide the detail on how the fund run I think I need not to explain any further as his research suppose to be much more intense than my superficial observation.
I think what I want to address Les Abbey’s accusation on village headman can take control of the fund. This accusation hold very little possibility if you really know how the fund is set up. If you already read Andrew’s post, you should know that the Fund administrator is the District Office and the Custodian of the Fund is the Bank of Agriculture (or the GSB for urban communities), and the fund manager is the locally elected committee. This set up gave the fund manager some autonomy in how to lend out the money but not full freedom like many other had suspected. If there’s any abnormality in lending, say a person get hold of one time lending of 50% of the total fund (500,000 baht) this indicated abnormal activity and the District Office will have the authority to stop the lending activity by coordinating the Bank of Agriculture. Now, under this set up, even if the headman really get hold of the committee, he can not do much anyway in term of leading money to himself and what not because there is a system for checking for fund movement in place. If the headman really want to succeed in pocking the fund money he would have to bribe both the District office and the Bank of Agriculture (or the GSB) so believe me, that’s a very hard task to do, I don’t think it worth the measly 1 million baht.
Moreover, I want to point out the success of the fund that you has risen in your post.
This is a “draft” research done by NSOT with coordination with the World Bank and Suffolk University. This is a draft version so don’t get too serious about their conclusion, but I just want you to take note with some of the number they provided.
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/neudc07/docs/neudc07_s3_p08_boonperm.pdf
In 2nd para of introduction, by the end of May 2005 the total program had lent out 259 B baht, the repayment principle was 168 B (64.86%) and debt outstanding was 91 B (35.31%). Now if we compare this to say, big back like Bangkok Bank where they will not tolerate 10% NPL then yes this project seems like a failure, but if we look at the economic and social implication, we are talking about 64.83% of the 17.8 million borrower who were actually benefit from the scheme, that’s 11 million people. I think its a very successful project if you asked me. Furthermore, the core principle of this program is to find that 1 success that can repay the rest of the 9 failure. I would say 6 success that repaid 4 failure grossly exceed that target right?
Anyhow, there are many interesting figure that you can actually take a look such as where the borrower actually “spend” the money and so on, but as I say before, this is a draft version so you should take it with a grain of salt.
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
р╕Хр╕▒р╣Йр╕Зр╣Бр╕Хр╣Ир╕нр╕Фр╕╡р╕Х р╕Бр╕гр╕░р╕Чр╕▒р╣Ир╕Зр╕Ыр╕▒р╕Ир╕Ир╕╕р╕Ър╕▒р╕Щ р╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╕Ир╕░р╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕Чр╕ир╣Гр╕Фр╕Хр╣Ир╕▓р╕Зр╕Бр╣Зр╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╕Ыр╕гр╕▓р╕Бр╕Пр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ур╣Мр╕Чр╕▓р╕Зр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╣Ар╕бр╕╖р╕нр╕З р╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕ер╣Йр╕зр╕Щр╣Бр╕Хр╣Ир╕бр╕╡ “р╕Ьр╕╣р╣Йр╕Щр╕│р╕Чр╕▓р╕Зр╕Др╕зр╕▓р╕бр╕Др╕┤р╕Ф” р╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╣Вр╕Фр╕Фр╣Ар╕Фр╣Ир╕Щ р╕Чр╕▒р╣Йр╕Зр╕Щр╕▒р╣Йр╕Щ
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤р╕нр╣Ар╕бр╕гр╕┤р╕Бр╕▓ р╕Д.р╕и.1776 р╕бр╕╡ р╕нр╕┤р╕Чр╕Шр╕┤р╕Юр╕ер╕Чр╕▓р╕Зр╕Др╕зр╕▓р╕бр╕Др╕┤р╕Фр╕Вр╕нр╕З р╕Ир╕нр╕лр╣Мр╕Щ р╕ер╣Зр╕нр╕Д
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤р╕Эр╕гр╕▒р╣Ир╕Зр╣Ар╕ир╕к р╕Д.р╕и.1789 р╕бр╕╡ р╕зр╕нр╕ер╣Бр╕Хр╕гр╣М
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤р╕гр╕▒р╕кр╣Ар╕Лр╕╡р╕в р╕Д.р╕и.1918 р╕бр╕╡ р╣Ар╕ер╕Щр╕┤р╕Щ
– р╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕вр╕╕р╕Бр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╣Ар╕Ыр╕ер╕╡р╣Ир╕вр╕Щр╣Бр╕Ыр╕ер╕Зр╣Гр╕Щр╣Ар╕Щр╕Ыр╕▓р╕е р╕Д.р╕и.2008 р╕бр╕╡ р╕Юр╕╕р╕Кр╕Ыр╕▓ р╕ор╕▓р╕бр╕▓р╕е р╕Фр╕▓р╕ор╕▓р╕е р╕лр╕гр╕╖р╕н
р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕Ир╕▒р╕Щр╕Фр╕▓р╕Хр╣Мр╣Бр╕Щр╕зр╕Др╕┤р╕Фр╕Вр╕нр╕Зр╕бр╕▓р╕гр╣Мр╕Бр╕бр╕▓р╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕Бр╕▓р╕ир╕нр╕┤р╕кр╕гр╕ар╕▓р╕Юр╕Вр╕нр╕Зр╕нр╕┤р╕Щр╣Ар╕Фр╕╡р╕в р╕Д.р╕и.1942 р╕бр╕╡ р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Хр╕бр╕░ р╕Др╕▓р╕Щр╕Шр╕╡
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤р╕Ир╕╡р╕Щ р╕Д.р╕и.1949 р╕бр╕╡ р╣Ар╕лр╕бр╕▓ р╣Ар╕Ир╣Лр╕н р╕Хр╕╕р╕З
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤р╕Др╕┤р╕зр╕Ър╕▓ р╕Д.р╕и.1959 р╕бр╕╡ р╕Яр╕┤р╣Ар╕Фр╕е р╕Др╕▓р╕кр╣Вр╕Хр╕г р╣Бр╕ер╕░ р╣Ар╕К р╕Бр╕╣р╕зр╕▓р╕гр╕▓
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Ыр╕Пр╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Хр╕┤р╕нр╕┤р╕лр╕гр╣Ир╕▓р╕Щ р╕Д.р╕и.1979 р╕бр╕╡ р╕нр╕┤р╕лр╕бр╣Ир╕▓р╕б р╣Вр╕Др╣Др╕бр╕Щр╕╡
– р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╣Ар╕Ыр╕ер╕╡р╣Ир╕вр╕Щр╣Бр╕Ыр╕ер╕Зр╣Гр╕Щр╕нр╕▒р╕Яр╕гр╕┤р╕Бр╕▓р╣Гр╕Хр╣Й р╕Д.р╕и.1994 р╕бр╕╡ р╣Ар╕Щр╕ер╕кр╕▒р╕Щ р╣Ар╕бр╕Щр╣Ар╕Фр╕ер╕▓
р╣Ар╕Ыр╣Йр╕▓р╕лр╕бр╕▓р╕вр╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╕Кр╕▒р╕Фр╣Ар╕Ир╕Щр╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Хр╣Ир╕нр╕кр╕╣р╣Йр╕Щр╕╡р╣Йр╕бр╕╡р╣Ар╕Ыр╣Йр╕▓р╕лр╕бр╕▓р╕вр╕Вр╕Щр╕▓р╕Фр╣Др╕лр╕Щр╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╕нр╕╡р╕Бр╕Др╕Щр╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╕нр╕╡р╕Бр╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╕Зр╕лр╕Щр╕╢р╣Ир╕З р╣Бр╕ер╕░р╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕бр╕╡р╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╣Вр╕Хр╣Йр╣Ар╕Цр╕╡р╕вр╕Зр╕Вр╕▒р╕Фр╣Бр╕вр╣Йр╕Зр╕Бр╕▒р╕Щр╣Гр╕Щр╣Ар╕Ыр╣Йр╕▓р╕лр╕бр╕▓р╕вр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╣Др╕Фр╣Йр╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕Бр╕▓р╕ир╕Хр╣Ир╕нр╕бр╕зр╕ер╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Ыр╕гр╕░р╕Кр╕▓р╕Кр╕Щ р╣Др╕Ыр╣Бр╕ер╣Йр╕з р╕Фр╕▒р╕Зр╕Щр╕▒р╣Йр╕Щ р╣Ар╕гр╕╖р╣Ир╕нр╕Зр╕Щр╕╡р╣Йр╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╕Кр╕▒р╕Фр╣Ар╕Ир╕Щр╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╕Зр╕бр╕▓р╕Б р╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╕нр╕нр╕Бр╕бр╕▓р╕Ир╕▓р╕Бр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕ир╕╢р╕Бр╕йр╕▓р╕зр╕┤р╣Ар╕Др╕гр╕▓р╕░р╕лр╣Мр╕Фр╣Йр╕зр╕вр╕Вр╣Йр╕нр╕бр╕╣р╕е р╣Бр╕ер╕░р╕Чр╕др╕йр╕Ор╕╡р╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╣Бр╕бр╣Ир╕Щр╕вр╕│ р╕Ьр╣Ир╕▓р╕Щр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕Бр╕ер╕▒р╣Ир╕Щр╕Бр╕гр╕нр╕Зр╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╕Зр╕лр╕Щр╕▒р╕Б р╣Бр╕ер╕░р╣Др╕Фр╣Йр╕гр╕▒р╕Ър╕Др╕зр╕▓р╕бр╣Ар╕лр╣Зр╕Щр╕Юр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╕Хр╣Йр╕нр╕Зр╕Бр╕▒р╕Щр╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╕Зр╕Бр╕зр╣Йр╕▓р╕Зр╕Вр╕зр╕▓р╕Зр╕Щр╕│р╣Ар╕кр╕Щр╕нр╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╕Кр╕▒р╕Фр╣Ар╕Ир╕Щ р╣Др╕бр╣Ир╣Ар╕Ыр╕ер╕╡р╣Ир╕вр╕Щр╣Др╕Ыр╣Ар╕Ыр╕ер╕╡р╣Ир╕вр╕Щр╕бр╕▓ р╣Др╕бр╣Ир╣Гр╕лр╣Йр╣Бр╕Бр╕Щр╕Щр╕│р╕Др╕Щр╕лр╕Щр╕╢р╣Ир╕Зр╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╕нр╕вр╣Ир╕▓р╕Зр╕лр╕Щр╕╢р╣Ир╕З
ThaiE-N ews 6/19/2010
I think Thailand should move toward the Presidential System like Indonesia, the Philippines, and the United States because the existing Thai system is not working. Even the former king, Ananda, was murdered when he planned to change the country towards the Presidential System.
The public’s desire for liberty and freedom is exponentially increasing across every regions. Yet the military and the monarchy prefer to keep the status quo. I think it is in the interests of every group (economic elites, political elites, network monarchy, the military, general public, and international community) to accommodate the needed change.
Thailand can no longer afford the increasing costs (financial, social, political and psychological, etc.) of the oppressive measures e.g. emergency law, political computer law, lese majeste law, sniper operation, etc.). Creating “FEAR” does not work in the Thai culture context, it only moves the country further towards costly conflict.
Today I read an interesting article in the ThaiE-News about the changes in various other countries, e.g. USA (1776), France (1789), Russia (1918), Nepal (2008), India (1942), South Africa (1994), etc.
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
No, FredKorat, I am a retired school teacher, but thanks for asking.
Freedom is worth fighting for. Seh Daeng fought and died fighting for freedom.
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
A conclusion from Andrew’s 2 graphs of government spending on ag. and as a % of value of ag. products – the first flat in the Thaksin period and the second plummeting – is that the value of farm production soared. This should have made for happy and pro-government farmers. But as I remember the price of rubber from the south rose and so did the insurrection.
Perhaps Andrew could comment on the present government’s handing out of money to farmers based on the extent of their land holdings.
Also one way of viewing the issue of declining rural secondary employment and government transfers to the rural provinces is that these provinces send their boys and girls to work in Bangkok or the “Detroit of the East” where they are underpaid and that the families are compensated by the tax system and the capitalists can continue to underpay and Thailand can be competitive for international capital.
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
Thanks for sharing your views, Nuomi. I’d propose your comment is more an addition to, not a correction of, my point.
One may rebut (if only as a trial balloon), that the 2008 PAD mob was simply mopping up what the 2006 military coup never got quite ‘right’.
The change desired by the coup was to remove Thaksin; but when it became apparent that Thaksin’s ‘tentacles’ were too deeply rooted within the political body, the 2008 mob came to the rescue. The military support for the PAD suggests this was the case.
Regardless of how one chooses to characterize the events, we certainly do live in interesting times.
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
igbymac #12
My reading of Thaksin in Thailand in comparison with Chavez in Venezuela is that Thailand has a monarchy that blinded the people to the repressive activities of the amnart/military.
When the coup against Thaksin took place the smoke and mirrors story of “protection of the monarchy” was still strong.
Now, the people have commenced their understanding of the real feudal nature of Thai society and like the Europeans 500 to 200 years ago are wanting to shake off the yokes
The actions of the royals themselves, the PAD and the government have weakened the smoke and mirrors story of the monarchy. It is so weak, the government has had to use the new Bush/US inspired story of terrorism to keep themselves intact. This wont work long. The claim that your own people are terrorists is a bit far-fetched for anyone to accept seriously for long, it has not been used down south and it was only the extreme actions of the Yellows at the airports that raised the idea at all.
Many in Bangkok as well as the regions are awake to the malign forces in Thai society. It will take only a small flame to ignite a major rebellion that the military generals will not be able to contain. The amnart will then recognise that democratic governments must be accepted.
Thaksin’s greatest reform ever!
I wonder how much money was transacted by the democrats and the “yellow” shirts. I suppose we will never know. Given that the “yellows” and democrats are the “richer” class. I hazard to guess that it will be a whole lot more than…….
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Andrew:
Thanks very much for the actual numbers and description of how the money is being managed from one whole village. The figures you have look very optimistic indeed – very different from figures the people I know from NIDA throw at me which indicate increasing household debt, no increase in income, and very high default rates. For example, Wichai’s study broadbased study covers 19 provinces and indicate that household debt increase from approx 76,000 baht in 2000 (before village fund) to just over 80,000 baht in 2005.
The few Northern Thais I know who took loans mostly managed to repay. Some have re-borrowed to expand or upgrade, but I have no basis on which to defend whether the village fund works on a “national” basis. Now I also see what they mean by co-op approach – though from your description, it sounded very well organized and more financially advanced than I expected.
I am interested to know where that village stand today? Is the fund still doing well?
I never like the way the local media call all these “cheap loans”. I prefer the use of the word “affordable”, because that is what 5% is.
I also dislike the constant reference to micro-lending and Grameen Bank targeting women being a better scheme and empowering them – at 50rupee in the morning and repaying 52rupee at night daily for the poor women, we are talking about a 4% interest a day – or well over 1400% per annum. That is practically loan-shark rate! I supposed compared to that, the village fund loan rate at 5% is very “cheap”.
Translation of interview with Sae Daeng
Tarrin,
Some say this is the reason Anupong was to aggressive with the reds.
Find it hard to believe, ask them yourself.
The majority of the people will never get the pie in any country or state, dont be naive. The more aggressive will always step on the meak.
Nuomi,
How do you know they are so badly treated? Is that what they tell you?
Some soldiers I know are better off in Thailand than I am here in Sydney in a white collar job, which I spent 4 years in uni for!
They have brand new pick-ups, drink plenty of booze and are famous for knowing the best places to eat all over the country!
“The poor only know they are poor when some do-gooder tells them”
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
No podcast available? Why not?
[There is, I have just added the link. AW]
Thailand in crisis: Episode 4
Thanks Nuomi. For my previous description of the operation of a village fund in northern Thailand see this post from 19 September 2006!
http://www.newmandala.org/2006/09/19/thai-village-fund-hysteria/