Comments

  1. StanG says:

    Maybe young people don’t join because they don’t buy into red rhetoric and have only distant memories of Thaksin.

  2. Juan Carlos says:

    StanG – these reds must have eyes in the back of their heads and amazing organisational control because every time a Farang such as myself comes within 100m of them they stop doing all these Bad Things (e.g. ATM holdups).

    Just how much time have you spent around Rajaprasong in the last month?

    Right.

  3. Igor Christodoulou says:

    We shouldn’t forget to note that ALL Thais, regardless their origin, have been subjected to massive propaganda of the rulling classes for decades. Funnily enough, until recently they’ve been in an outside world info vacuum, similar to that as experienced by people beyond the Iron Curtain during the communist era. Just other side of the spectrum. Far left and far right will always find a common ground at the end.

  4. Srithanonchai says:

    StanG:

    “In many western countries candidates with Thai moral records wouldn’t even dream of joining the race.”

    I agree. However, in many western countries, people with your intellectual records would also never dream of joining any serious discussion. But then, the commentariat is not about serious discussion. So, by all means, continue with your contributions!

  5. Srithanonchai says:

    Irrespective of all the details concerning the hospital incident, it has made clear how much the UDD protest has degenerated from its original approach. When I placed my pictures (taken on March 15, 2010) of the UDD protest site on Ratchadamnoen Road on New Mandala, this was an impressive though not overwhelming peaceful anti-government protest. With the move to Rajaprasong Intersection, the UDD lost its non-violent innocence for it was clear that this move would not only prevent the government from making any concessions, but would also eventually (in the absence of a negotiated settlement) force it to take drastic action. Few governments are prepared to accept gross blackmail, and the Abhisit government is no exception. The UDD leaders thus clearly chose the option of potential violence. Still, at the beginning, the site at Rajaprasong was a very impressive gathering. At peak times, the crown seemed to be the biggest I had seen in Thailand so far (counting all preceding PAD and UDD protests); everybody could join, with no barriers. Later, some checkpoints were established, though I usually ignored them by just passing through.

    After the sad events of April 10, the UDD made a grave mistake. Instead of concentrating their protest at the Panh Fah Bridge, they moved all their people to the Rajaprasong Intersection. Instead of defusing the situation, the UDD willfully escalated it by signaling that they had adopted an all-or-nothing approach. Trucks were placed on the access roads to indicate that approaching state authorities would be blocked in any attempt to dispel the protesters. The next step of escalation was to erect massive barricades indicating that the UDD had re-defined the once non-violent protest into a potentially violent fight with the government forces–a fight for absolute victory. One of the UDD’s key leaders, Jaran Ditapichai, noted, “We are fighting a war” (Washington Post, May 1, 2010)–a “war” for the dissolution of Parliament a few months earlier rather than later…

    Since then, the UDD protest has survived solely on the threat of massive violence to be initiated by the protesters in case government forces would move in to disperse them. This high-risk game cynically speculates that casualties can be turned into political capital against the Abhisit government, and more broadly against the ammart. Obviously, violence from the government side will only be necessary if the UDD insists on provocation and violence as the main methods of their protests.

    It is one thing justifiably to think that Abhisit Vejjajiva had chosen the Suchinda-Kraprayoon approach of 1992 in assuming the position as prime minister illegitimately, knowing fully well in advance that important sections of the population would resist such a government. Only that this time the resistance would not come from the heroic anti-military middle class “mobile phone mob” of Bangkok (Anek Laothamatas) but from the “rural hordes” (Bangkok Post) or the “crazy rabble” (PAD’s Chai-anan Samudavanija) of Thailand’s lower-income classes. Thus, the Abhisit government had to anticipate the same reaction that Suchinda faced in May 1992–and the prime minister cannot really complain about what predictably happened, including 26 dead and 800 wounded (still some 20 short of Suchinda’s “achievement”). Yet, it is an entirely different thing having the UDD protesters deliberately embarking on an all-or-nothing violence-based power game, or “war,” that takes many more deaths in account as a means to strengthen the protest and the movement, and to increase the pressure on the Abhisit government. The UDD leaders will certainly not take any responsibility for their strategic and tactical decisions. However, they might well discuss their actions with the leaders of the PAD when, eventually, they will spend some years in prison together. Maybe, a new version of the “Prison Notebooks” will emerge with reflections of the leaders about what they had done, and why. Special attention should be paid to the character of as well as the relationships between problem definition, ends, and means in a country with a political system that, looking at the regional political context, had undergone a certain degree of democratization in the past few decades.

    Even under these conditions, it is still possible to defend the UDD’s approach. After all, non-violence is not an eternal dogma. However, proponents must clearly accept that the protest leaders have long given up their peaceful approach. More importantly, supporters must come up with very good political reasons to justify the current state of affairs. It is not enough simply to say that the UDD leaders and their followers must not lose this “war” against an “evil” government at all cost.

  6. Farang says:

    Updates please ?

  7. StanG says:

    There WERE more than five red guards allowed to inspect the hospital. Some report a hundred, some two hundred getting inside. They were very real, not a hearsay for the staff.

    “The Reds are coming” was not an imaginary fear, the patient evacuation reported in the media that sparked public outrage happened a day AFTER the reds came.

    The refusal to treat policemen by some Chula doctors (from psychiatric dept, afaik), was officially condemned both by the hospital administration and medical council.

    On a related note, in my building, far away from Rajprasong, the management had to find a room for a staff from one of the companies at Amarin Tower. They had to close that office after red “nakleng” were seen wandering around freely and there were rumors of holdups for ATM cards.

    Maybe that is the better case of “red scare”.

    Finnish Embassy in the building closed on the first day, btw. Better safe than sorry, I guess.

    What is so peculiar about Thai democracy demand for moral integrity from the elected leaders?

    In many western countries candidates with Thai moral records wouldn’t even dream of joining the race.

  8. Pharris says:

    Dr. Winichakul:

    Very thoughtful and well-written essay! Your analysis focuses on how things are now, but I would be interested in your take on how you think the Red contagion will impact the Thai moral political body. My sense is that most Thais, whatever their spatial allegiance, will not give up very easily the idea that political authority rests with moral authority. And that moral authority will remain rooted in the monarchy unless there is something else to fill its place. Has there been a time in Thai history where the moral authority did not rest in the monarchy, perhaps in the monastery instead? Or if there was a vacuum of moral authority, how did the political body deal with that? I seem to recollect in my limited understanding of Thai history that before the current King, there was a bit of a vacuum in monarchical authority.

    Many Westerners are beginning to question whether real democracy, where all are subject to the law, can exist along monarchical prerogatives. Some say it can, others say it cannot. Do you think that the Thai political body can accommodate the demands of the Reds for equal and fair treatment? Or will the Reds be killed off? The human body is remarkably resilient in dealing with contagion. Sometimes it sends antibodies to kill off the invaders. Other times, it produces natural vaccines to innoculate the contagion without ever killing it completely. How do you think the Thai political body will deal with the Red contagion?

    Many thanks for your insights.

  9. Jim Taylor says:

    somsak-these are not nakleng by any definition just disempowered, frustrated, angry and disappointed ordinary folk (the opposite to nakleng who actually possess power & control): If Thongchai has intended or otherwise to depict this representation of certain Nor Por Chor then he is, in my view, quite wrong. Evidence has been presented to international human rights bodies of agents provocateurs placed by the state in the group of protestors (these are seen by hand pistols & other weapons). The state would like to see chaos because this would be the raison d’├кtre for their existence, and give reasons for armed assault against the masses and of course justification for the current unjust status quo. To see is to believe, not the other way round…

  10. Lalida says:

    @ “I’m Totally Thai”….I must agree with you that you are truly Thai. The Thais that blind themselves by the Clown Government Propagandas, the lies from ASTV telling you’re the educated ones, The ruler of the modern society…Yes, believe it as that’s the only thing your brain are good for…Storing rubbish.

  11. Somsak Jeamteerasakul says:

    A very fine essay in many ways. I particularly like the part that describes the ‘nakleng’ culture/politics of the Reds. However, while I agree that such culture/politics should not, generally speaking, be ‘troubled’ or ‘annoyed’ by Bangkok upper class and snobs, there are, in my view, certain aspects of it that are indeed troubling, from a standpoint of democratic political culture. Such things as ‘rarely care political correctness about homosexuals or ethnic people‘ or the ‘behavior of the Red leaders and the movement … the fact that they are prone to violent actions and reactions‘ are quite ‘troubling’ and really not just for ‘political correctness’ reason. One could imagine how such culture/politics and behavior (the kind the produced Chula Hospital incident in which ‘[w]ithout thinking over political repercussion, a few leaders led a group of “nakleng” straight to the hospital to find out the truth’) could also, in other circumstances, produce quite anti-democratic actions. Suppose, for instance, such ‘nakleng’ culture is confronted with story that someone have desecrated the monarchy or buddist symbols. One could think of the incident just before the coup, when the ‘Caravan Khonchon’ (caravan of the poors), arguably the predecessor of the Red Shirt movement, laid seized to the Nation Group compounds and at the same time initiated actions that led to the LM charge against Sulak Siwalak and the Fa Diew Kan editor.

    But what troubles me most at present is the fact that this kind of ‘nakleng’ culture/politics influences and explains certain tactical thinking of the Red leadership. I’m refering to the kind of nakleng’s ‘kla dai, kla sia’ (р╕Бр╕ер╣Йр╕▓р╣Др╕Фр╣Й р╕Бр╕ер╣Йр╕▓р╣Ар╕кр╕╡р╕в dare to win, dare to loose) culture which, I believe, translates into tactics that do not give enough care to possible lost of lives (or possible serious injuries) to the ‘nakleng’ ‘s own followers.

  12. StanG says:

    Don’t forget that after negotiations with the hospital director red leader agreed on only five guards to do the search yet hundreds of them poured in as soon as the door was opened.

    Would hospital admin trust red assurances now?

    Regardless, what right do reds have to search the hospital anyway?

    Another question – if they were so sure there were soldiers inside, what they did they go in for? Looking for a fight? In a hospital?

  13. Pharris says:

    Greg:
    You claim, “SABM is fast gaining traction on the ground,” but how do you account for this? A quick internet search does not turn up much about this organization or how it is “gaining traction.” I tried to look for reports of the organization, its size and its activities, and I see nary a mention of the movement that is of note. Most of the Google links are to blogs of what I suppose are Western-influenced individuals who yearn for racial and ethnic equality in Malaysia. Great idea but I don’t see evidence of ‘gaining traction” among the general populace. You later mention, “To date they [SABM] have covered the main cities of Malaysia and response have been tremendous.” How? Where? Details?

    I’d like to believe you that this movement will force social and political change in Malaysia but it sounds more like a movement of intellectuals who don’t have much influence in their own society or body politic.

    There doesn’t appear to be strong agreement on the concept of Bangsa Malaysia and SABM’s own website is very nebulous about what the term means to the movement. SABM talks about ‘spirit of unity’ and all races being equal but what does that translate to, politically? The movement seems ill-defined and still nascent. Good luck with it. The U.S. learned that righting past racial wrongs (through affirmative action and other racial-preference policies) carry a heavy price. Those policies serve a purpose for a time. But if you implement those policies forever, how can you also claim that all humans are created equal and have equal access to opportunities?

  14. Jim Taylor says:

    It is not about appearances but about social and economic injustice- something Thongchai did not mention; neither is it about class…It is about perceived unfairness among rural folk and urban poor since the people’s elected Thaksin Government was replaced by coercion through an illegal coup in 2006 and the subsequent parliamentary cunning which saw the DP in power. It is to do with power: some having it, and not wantingto lose it, others lacking it..and for the Hospital, Thongchai would best talk to those who were there and saw the commandos leaving the rear of the building and the total evacuation the day before of two strategic buildings. The problem is the massive amount of untruths circulating from the centre. People are confused when evidence points in another direction. Lets listen more to the people whose lives have been so badly affected by the last four plus years…

  15. christian says:

    Is it REALLY a surprise people panicked when the “Red Guards” forced their way into the hospital?
    They themselves said they were looking for soldiers. if I were there I would have asumed they were carrying AT LEAST knives. Is it really an overreaction to panick, with the latest weeks of grenades, sharpened bamboo sticks and guns on display anpng the reds?

  16. Luecha Na Malai says:

    Thailand’s basic economic problem is not difficult to detect at all. It stems from the neglect by the Bangkok ruling class of the underprivileged upcountry. It has long been a tradition in Thailand that if the masses outside Bangkok do not cry out, then everything must be all right, and the leaders in Bangkok can go on enjoying themselves with life’s frivolities. There are no long-range plans, no vision about anything in life. Everything comes about on the spur of a moment. As an American friend of mine once remarked: “I keep wondering how Thailand can remain a country at all.” And I cannot but agree.

  17. Luecha Na Malai says:

    It always amuses me that Kasit and his cohorts like Jumlong, Pipop, and Suriyasai, among others, keep harping about the Reds being engaged in lawlessness, while they themselves not so long ago performed despicably lawless acts, notably the one at Suwannabhumi Airport.

  18. Juan Carlos says:

    Pace Jon Fernquest there *is* a qualitative difference in the anger/distaste displayed against reds.

    It’s not just a Thai phenomenon: see East Java and Bali 1966.

    Killings per capita during the chaos surrounding Sukarno’s ouster were highest in the supposedly idyllic (somewhat jungly variant thereof) Hindu garden of the world paradise of Bali. Next came the Abangan (GIYF – but in a nutshell the rather more mystical Javanese-syncretic version of Islam – as opposed to dry Santri literalist) heartland of East Java.

    i.e. there exists some evidence that the more mystical a people is, the greater the tendency to descend rapidly into an orgy of ‘purifying violence’. The danger of this happening soonish in Thailand is very real, and bears little relation at all to what would happen if there were some kind of medium sized Campo Santo event in (say) Times Square.

    The only good thing to be said for these orgies of mystical violence is that they don’t last long. You don’t want to be around whilst one is going down, of course.

    In short, I do not detect any false notes in K. Thongchai’s exposition. Quite the opposite. It’s masterful.

    [ Self-justificatory digression:

    Lest you think I am some kind of leftist academic – although my less than measured prose should convince otherwise :), nothing could be further from the truth. I can state with no qualm of conscience that the 1976 killings were a MUCH lesser evil than that perpetrated by communists on the population of Cambodia. If one had to consciously choose to sacrifice several thousand idealistic students to save 3M people, the correct moral response would be to do just that. Samak would still be a vile sack of excrement, but a useful tool nonetheless.

    And to the extent that the monarchy and its associated hangers on and fellow travellers helped hold the line against the likes of Pol Pot, good for them.

    But all this is history. Democracy deserves another go in Thailand. True democracy – not the present ‘fix’. It will almost certainly throw up other forms of ugliness and evil and never really succeed, but that’s life. Trying to keep the status quo lid on legitimate yearnings of the populace will just mean even more bloodshed later.

    In the purely pragmatic interests of minimising the future body count, Thailand needs more political freedom, more chances for all, and obviously full freedom of expression -> repeal of LM.
    ]

  19. Igor Christodoulou says:

    Brilliant commentary, and equally upliftiting comments on all sides. Thank you to all. Just wish the Thais who’re being prompted by Thai Tv and printed media woke up to this new reality.

  20. Luecha Na Malai says:

    It goes to show how the citizens of Bangkok, especially those from the middle class upward, regard their fellow countrymen from the far-out provinces. This is quite characteristic of the Bangkokians, even those economically needy. It is in their blood that the people from upcountry are necessarily inferior to residents of Bangkok. After all, Bangkok is a city of angels, as you can tell from the Thai name of Bangkok. Take my case. I am from the far South. I remember when I went to Bangkok many years ago to take an entrance exam for Triam Udom School. I heard my fellow testtakers boast about their big-name schools in Bangkok and appeared excessively confident of themselves. I was admitted to the school along with some of them, and soon took a delight in helping them with class assignments. So wherever you come from is not so important as your ability to get things done. I can see that those “hill-billy” folks among the Reds have shown themselves capable of getting things done. Let’s not put a wrong tag price on them.