Re: Nicholas Farrelly
I have no particular dog in the fight. My editorial discretion is, as ever, indiscreet. All part of what makes New Mandala tick, I suppose.
*smiles* Fair enough. However, let me ask you this; do you think there is anything ideologically that would keep the southern insurgents from attacking the Bangkok metropolitan area if they had the opportunity? I think that it is obvious that, currently, it makes no strategic sense to attack Bangkok. The last thing the insurgency wants is the full force of the Royal Thai Army brought to bear on them, which would happen after an unprecedented attack on the ethnic Thai heartland.
Nevertheless, if the strategic situation changed, and the insurgency believed it would further their agenda to attack Thai targets outside of the current theater of operations, then I see no reason why they wouldn’t.
Re:NongChang
Personally, I dont [sic] see any alternatives than autonomy to the Patani question…
I agree with you; albeit for different reasons. However, I would like to ask you a question: if after autonomy, the violence doesn’t stop, then what?
The plight of the local populace in areas of conflict is often likened in Burmese to that of the grass under the hooves of two fighting buffaloes. It goes without saying that people want a peaceful life, never mind prosperity, wherever they happen to live.
The relevant questions have to be: Are people even left in peace? Is armed resistance justified? Has every means and mechanism been employed and exhausted for a peaceful political solution for legitimate grievances and issues that need to be addressed as a matter of urgency? Does political will for that really exist on either side?
Where different races are involved, the issue at least outwardly looks black and white, say chauvinists and separatists, or defenders of the union and proxies of the West depending on one’s point of view. This is compounded by the existence of minorities within minorities, or ironically even of a disenfranchised majority like the Buddhist Karen that became the undoing of the Christian dominated KNU.
What is not at all black and white, and a much tougher and a lot more ruthless struggle, is when each society becomes stratified into the haves and the have-nots as among the Burman majority, each therefore a microcosm of humanity on the way up the socio-economic evolutionary scale.
So we ain’t seen nothin’ yet of the story yet to unfold of the ethnic nationalities of Burma. Their fate however is more than ever inextricably intertwined with that of the Burman majority. We had all better realize that this fight is a common fight against a common enemy for all our freedoms. That it’s the only way towards the beginning of the end of the bad old days of unfairness and injustice.
Srithanonchai – ” learning process need not be assumed”.
Good point, though unlikely NOTHING was learned from the different outcomes.
Somsak – 1) there were of course, two failed coup attempts during those 14 years you cited. Both failed due to resistance from the Crown.
And not even one coup attempt during the 15 years after May ’92. Undoubtedly Palace anti-coup sentiment played an important, probably crucial, part in this : something Handley fails to acknowledge.
2) the central issue in May ’92 was whether or not the next Prime Minister should be elected. HMK could not oppose machinations on this by Suchinda’s unusually large Class 5,
UNTIL there was widespread popular opposition, backed by
important sections of the military (Chamlong’s and probably Prem’s). Handley washes over this balance of power, and the question of whether HMK had any other realistic choices prior
to the May uprising. HMK certainly backed Anand AFTER May,
with brutal consequences for 440 officers – a brave act indeed,
though Handley does n’t acknowledge the bravery.
Ralph – I would n’t be too impressed by Handley having worked for the FEER. At the time of May’92, FEER had just sacked
Philip Bowring – a born Asia expert of the highest calibre – to be replaced by a virtually unknown Chicago Republican, who had no Asia experience. FEER’s account of May’92, especially that by Handley, is pretty appalling with its’ wrongful portrayal of the uprising being almost purely a middle-class revolt.
Ralph – you keep acussing me of not citing facts, but cite none of your own. And how on earth can anyone remark that anything in relation to Thailand’s extremely draconian LM laws is “vacuous” ?
One might distinguish between intentions and effects. As former PM Seni Pramoj claimed after his downfall in October 1976, HM was mostly informed by a wish for law and order. His actions in 1973, 1976, and 1992, then, might be interpreted in this light. Obviously, the consequences were vastly different. A learning process need not be assumed simply because the circumstances of the decisions taken at all three times (and in April 2006) were very much different.
Hey nongchang, I hope I could get the message across to you this time.
The 6th October 2009 bombing that Zachary Abuza mentioned in this article reflected that the southern militants also identified with the rest of the country about the sad political history of the 6 October, 1976 in Bangkok.
I would think it’s time to look at the Thai State of what should be the necessary reform.
Hey, since your “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” idea was introduced, the dynamics has changed from 1.2 death per day to 3.5 death per day. The targets are also up the scale to higher value-added targets, i.e. today with 3 marines death and 2 injured. The strategy works only when the State and the government are legitimate. Without legitimacy, the “divide and rule” strategy will only cost more soldiers and policemen their lives.
The plain truth is no one trusts Aphisit no matter how many propaganda pictures you produced. With Aphisit, both sides seem to follow the principles of conduct laid down by Machiavelli marked by cunning and duplicity which will end up with more and more bloodshed. There is no point in keeping Aphisit at the expense of the entire country. I would prefer a better alternative with less bloodshed such as new election to create a legitimate government, wouldn’t you?
Chris Beale: I WAS there during May ‘92, and without Royal intervention the pro-democracy uprising would undoubtedly have collapsed in an even worse bloodbath, possibly leading to civil war. It seems to me the Palace had learned from the mistakes of ‘76.
His Majesty’s intervention helped ensure 15 years of democracy ! Thailand’s longest ever. But Handley gives no acknowledgement of this.
Actually, you haven’t read Handley with sufficient care. Otherwise you’d have known that Handley has different – and in my view very, very good – explanation about the monarchy’s role in the May events. In fact I consider his chapters about the May events and the situations leading up, the best in the book (his chapters on 6 Tula are quite weak, I think). Before you look at what HMK seemed to have acted in May 92, you must first look at what he’d done in months (or years) leading up to it. Let’s me give just one example: in late 1991 when the justa put up its constitution, which allowed unelected PM, there’re a lot of opposition, from political parties (the Dem included), academics, etc. There were hunger strikes, for exmaple. But then HMK came out and gave his famous “Learn to Love Unity” speech (р╕гр╕╣р╣Йр╕гр╕▒р╕Бр╕кр╕▓р╕бр╕▒р╕Др╕Др╕╡) during his annual birthday celebration, and opposition to the junta’s Constitution was unable to continue. (Suwinai Paranawalai who is now a prominent PAD supporter but was one of the hunger strikers back then, recounted this to me in vivid details shortly after May. I just returned to Thailand in March 1992). But of course to stop opposing the Constitution was just like leaving a time-bomb ticking. … In short to assess the role of the moanrchy in the May 92 events, one has to have a wider, longer perspective, and Handley’s book recounts this with great details and argumentation.
P.S. That there wasn’t any coup for 15 years, and before that there was another break of 14 years (the last successful coup was in 1977, then 1991, then 2006), HMK’s role is definitely not a sufficient explanation. It’s a very important issue why there are these two long break to be sure, but you must seek explanation elsewhere.
Maria > Personally, I dont see any alternatives than autonomy to the Patani question as it results, bluntly speaking, from a historical mishap. For me it doesnt make much sense pushing Malay Muslims into the Buddhist hemisphere by any means as the Thai state tries since the late 1890s. (http://bit.ly/4x4MUm) And as hinted in the post, Islamophobia doesn’t make this world a safer place does it? So let’s what and see if someone will manage to clean up Thaksins mess.
It seems that the central question raised above remains unanswered:
Yes, many people are aware of the atrocities involved with the Four Cuts strategy (and the “live off the land” policy of civilian control and exploitation). However, to what extent, if any, is the armed resistance responsible for provoking violence and abuse by the Tatmadaw against civilians?
On a micro-level, one could point to the many cases of Tatmadaw (and DKBA) retaliation against Karen villagers in response to KNLA ambushes and landmines. In some cases, Karen villagers have explicitly asked the KNLA not to conduct attacks/deploy landmines nearby, as they do not want to face the inevitable retaliation. (For example, see here)
Yes, the KNLA serves a protection role. They provide armed escorts to columns of IDPs in hiding, defend the larger IDP hiding sites from Tatmadaw attacks/forced relocation and facilitate humanitarian access to communities in conflict areas.
However, the SPDC justifies the continued application of counter-insurgency (Four Cuts) tactics on the grounds of ongoing armed resistance. Furthermore, the SPDC restricts international humanitarian access to these areas on the grounds of ongoing armed conflict.
Furthermore, the KNLA is more than simply a ‘protection’ force. They are also the armed wing of a political organisation, whose means and objectives not all Karen agree with. (See here).
And as a Karen villager from Dooplaya District explained: “As we are villagers, we have to suffer under every army… We want both armies, KNU and SPDC, to stay peacefully,” (from here, p. 167)
I am not proposing an answer here, nor suggesting that it is an easy question. But it does seem in need of response.
However laudable individual efforts are, be it Dave E and Charles F’s backing of the Karen’s armed struggle or planB’s work in health and education on the ground, not to mention their vocal support in their chosen areas, states do need to be involved in working towards regime change in Burma, both China and the West.
Whilst ethnic minorities badly need concrete and material help, leaving out the Burman majority would be a grave mistake as they alone can topple the regime given the right leadership and resources whereas the nationalities cannot achieve it on their own. At this juncture they must join hands with the mainstream opposition above and underground, even the Tatmadaw rank and file, in order to defeat the junta.
Diplomatic efforts, either engagement or sanctions, have not changed the status quo. There’s no point in fudging the issue about what really needs to be done.
UnFaithfulReader – no : I’m not livid about Handley on the ’76
massacre.
His conclusion – that it was ruling class “panic”, and counter-productive, seems correct as far as I know, simply from reading his and numerous other accounts.
I was n’t there, so can not judge these from first-hand experience.
What made me angry about Handley’s account of Black May ’92
was the rigid way Handley tries to slot Bumiphol’s role into Handley’s pre-conceived picture of Bumiphol.
I WAS there during May ’92, and without Royal intervention the pro-democracy uprising would undoubtedly have collapsed in an even worse bloodbath, possibly leading to civil war. It seems to me the Palace had learned from the mistakes of ’76.
His Majesty’s intervention helped ensure 15 years of democracy ! Thailand’s longest ever. But Handley gives no acknowledgement of this.
Chris: You haven’t yet given us any facts and we can look at them. Your comments about LM and Handley are totally vacuous. Where you tell us anything of substance it has to do with your perception that Prem and his economic management has been distorted in some unstated way.
Given that Handley covered the events for the FEER and that he spoke with hundreds of officials and business people about this period and as the book is actually about the king, I think I’ll go with Handley rather than your memories of the period.
That Sungai Kolok explosion was terrifying. Of course, I didn’t realize how terrifying until a few days after, when I saw the pictures and calculated that I was right there at the immigration office a bare 15 minutes earlier. (No, I don’t read the news. Now you know why.)
Also, I’m bitter about the dual-PM visit to the south, but that’s just a personal grudge about folks who make plans to visit certain places and don’t carry through with them. 🙂
There seems to be a consensus here in Narathiwat that something will be happening in about four or five years. Who knows?
(And thanks for the links. I need to stay on top of this more, as the American embassy now seems to think that I’m Their Woman in the South. Oh dear.)
Srithanonchai: Good point, and I think that’s another reason these articles were pushed: to damp the speculation and uncertainty that’s been swirling around about who the successor will be.
Ajarn Somsak: My only theory, after discussing with friends, is that this two-page piece was pushed from high places, as the start of an effort to prepare the people. It is indeed surprising that such topics would be discussed in the Post without official sanction. There has been criticism of the lack of official preparation of the people. Perhaps that’s been taken to heart, and perhaps it’s because preparation has suddenly become an urgent necessity.
I also have searched the Post’s online edition and cannot find this series. I went and bought the hard copy because I think it’s going to be a historic issue.
I also noticed both the print edition and the missing piece on the web site. Anyway, all those foreigners fond about speculating about the succession should know without doubt now who the future monarch will be. This will put the political part of economic risk analyses on a firmer footing, I guess.
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Bangkok Post on the crown prince
Do we have choice?
Utusan Malaysia – A Messenger of Hate?
[…] […]
What happens in Yala…
Re: Nicholas Farrelly
I have no particular dog in the fight. My editorial discretion is, as ever, indiscreet. All part of what makes New Mandala tick, I suppose.
*smiles* Fair enough. However, let me ask you this; do you think there is anything ideologically that would keep the southern insurgents from attacking the Bangkok metropolitan area if they had the opportunity? I think that it is obvious that, currently, it makes no strategic sense to attack Bangkok. The last thing the insurgency wants is the full force of the Royal Thai Army brought to bear on them, which would happen after an unprecedented attack on the ethnic Thai heartland.
Nevertheless, if the strategic situation changed, and the insurgency believed it would further their agenda to attack Thai targets outside of the current theater of operations, then I see no reason why they wouldn’t.
Re:NongChang
Personally, I dont [sic] see any alternatives than autonomy to the Patani question…
I agree with you; albeit for different reasons. However, I would like to ask you a question: if after autonomy, the violence doesn’t stop, then what?
Bangkok Post on the crown prince
Nice…
But this should be compared with the story from the same publisher on 6 Oct 1976!
Dave Everett and fighting for the KNLA
The plight of the local populace in areas of conflict is often likened in Burmese to that of the grass under the hooves of two fighting buffaloes. It goes without saying that people want a peaceful life, never mind prosperity, wherever they happen to live.
The relevant questions have to be: Are people even left in peace? Is armed resistance justified? Has every means and mechanism been employed and exhausted for a peaceful political solution for legitimate grievances and issues that need to be addressed as a matter of urgency? Does political will for that really exist on either side?
Where different races are involved, the issue at least outwardly looks black and white, say chauvinists and separatists, or defenders of the union and proxies of the West depending on one’s point of view. This is compounded by the existence of minorities within minorities, or ironically even of a disenfranchised majority like the Buddhist Karen that became the undoing of the Christian dominated KNU.
What is not at all black and white, and a much tougher and a lot more ruthless struggle, is when each society becomes stratified into the haves and the have-nots as among the Burman majority, each therefore a microcosm of humanity on the way up the socio-economic evolutionary scale.
So we ain’t seen nothin’ yet of the story yet to unfold of the ethnic nationalities of Burma. Their fate however is more than ever inextricably intertwined with that of the Burman majority. We had all better realize that this fight is a common fight against a common enemy for all our freedoms. That it’s the only way towards the beginning of the end of the bad old days of unfairness and injustice.
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
Srithanonchai – ” learning process need not be assumed”.
Good point, though unlikely NOTHING was learned from the different outcomes.
Somsak – 1) there were of course, two failed coup attempts during those 14 years you cited. Both failed due to resistance from the Crown.
And not even one coup attempt during the 15 years after May ’92. Undoubtedly Palace anti-coup sentiment played an important, probably crucial, part in this : something Handley fails to acknowledge.
2) the central issue in May ’92 was whether or not the next Prime Minister should be elected. HMK could not oppose machinations on this by Suchinda’s unusually large Class 5,
UNTIL there was widespread popular opposition, backed by
important sections of the military (Chamlong’s and probably Prem’s). Handley washes over this balance of power, and the question of whether HMK had any other realistic choices prior
to the May uprising. HMK certainly backed Anand AFTER May,
with brutal consequences for 440 officers – a brave act indeed,
though Handley does n’t acknowledge the bravery.
Ralph – I would n’t be too impressed by Handley having worked for the FEER. At the time of May’92, FEER had just sacked
Philip Bowring – a born Asia expert of the highest calibre – to be replaced by a virtually unknown Chicago Republican, who had no Asia experience. FEER’s account of May’92, especially that by Handley, is pretty appalling with its’ wrongful portrayal of the uprising being almost purely a middle-class revolt.
Ralph – you keep acussing me of not citing facts, but cite none of your own. And how on earth can anyone remark that anything in relation to Thailand’s extremely draconian LM laws is “vacuous” ?
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
One might distinguish between intentions and effects. As former PM Seni Pramoj claimed after his downfall in October 1976, HM was mostly informed by a wish for law and order. His actions in 1973, 1976, and 1992, then, might be interpreted in this light. Obviously, the consequences were vastly different. A learning process need not be assumed simply because the circumstances of the decisions taken at all three times (and in April 2006) were very much different.
What happens in Yala…
Hey nongchang, I hope I could get the message across to you this time.
The 6th October 2009 bombing that Zachary Abuza mentioned in this article reflected that the southern militants also identified with the rest of the country about the sad political history of the 6 October, 1976 in Bangkok.
I would think it’s time to look at the Thai State of what should be the necessary reform.
What happens in Yala…
Hey, since your “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” idea was introduced, the dynamics has changed from 1.2 death per day to 3.5 death per day. The targets are also up the scale to higher value-added targets, i.e. today with 3 marines death and 2 injured. The strategy works only when the State and the government are legitimate. Without legitimacy, the “divide and rule” strategy will only cost more soldiers and policemen their lives.
The plain truth is no one trusts Aphisit no matter how many propaganda pictures you produced. With Aphisit, both sides seem to follow the principles of conduct laid down by Machiavelli marked by cunning and duplicity which will end up with more and more bloodshed. There is no point in keeping Aphisit at the expense of the entire country. I would prefer a better alternative with less bloodshed such as new election to create a legitimate government, wouldn’t you?
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
Chris Beale:
I WAS there during May ‘92, and without Royal intervention the pro-democracy uprising would undoubtedly have collapsed in an even worse bloodbath, possibly leading to civil war. It seems to me the Palace had learned from the mistakes of ‘76.
His Majesty’s intervention helped ensure 15 years of democracy ! Thailand’s longest ever. But Handley gives no acknowledgement of this.
Actually, you haven’t read Handley with sufficient care. Otherwise you’d have known that Handley has different – and in my view very, very good – explanation about the monarchy’s role in the May events. In fact I consider his chapters about the May events and the situations leading up, the best in the book (his chapters on 6 Tula are quite weak, I think). Before you look at what HMK seemed to have acted in May 92, you must first look at what he’d done in months (or years) leading up to it. Let’s me give just one example: in late 1991 when the justa put up its constitution, which allowed unelected PM, there’re a lot of opposition, from political parties (the Dem included), academics, etc. There were hunger strikes, for exmaple. But then HMK came out and gave his famous “Learn to Love Unity” speech (р╕гр╕╣р╣Йр╕гр╕▒р╕Бр╕кр╕▓р╕бр╕▒р╕Др╕Др╕╡) during his annual birthday celebration, and opposition to the junta’s Constitution was unable to continue. (Suwinai Paranawalai who is now a prominent PAD supporter but was one of the hunger strikers back then, recounted this to me in vivid details shortly after May. I just returned to Thailand in March 1992). But of course to stop opposing the Constitution was just like leaving a time-bomb ticking. … In short to assess the role of the moanrchy in the May 92 events, one has to have a wider, longer perspective, and Handley’s book recounts this with great details and argumentation.
P.S. That there wasn’t any coup for 15 years, and before that there was another break of 14 years (the last successful coup was in 1977, then 1991, then 2006), HMK’s role is definitely not a sufficient explanation. It’s a very important issue why there are these two long break to be sure, but you must seek explanation elsewhere.
What happens in Yala…
Maria > Personally, I dont see any alternatives than autonomy to the Patani question as it results, bluntly speaking, from a historical mishap. For me it doesnt make much sense pushing Malay Muslims into the Buddhist hemisphere by any means as the Thai state tries since the late 1890s. (http://bit.ly/4x4MUm) And as hinted in the post, Islamophobia doesn’t make this world a safer place does it? So let’s what and see if someone will manage to clean up Thaksins mess.
Dave Everett and fighting for the KNLA
It seems that the central question raised above remains unanswered:
Yes, many people are aware of the atrocities involved with the Four Cuts strategy (and the “live off the land” policy of civilian control and exploitation). However, to what extent, if any, is the armed resistance responsible for provoking violence and abuse by the Tatmadaw against civilians?
On a micro-level, one could point to the many cases of Tatmadaw (and DKBA) retaliation against Karen villagers in response to KNLA ambushes and landmines. In some cases, Karen villagers have explicitly asked the KNLA not to conduct attacks/deploy landmines nearby, as they do not want to face the inevitable retaliation. (For example, see here)
Yes, the KNLA serves a protection role. They provide armed escorts to columns of IDPs in hiding, defend the larger IDP hiding sites from Tatmadaw attacks/forced relocation and facilitate humanitarian access to communities in conflict areas.
However, the SPDC justifies the continued application of counter-insurgency (Four Cuts) tactics on the grounds of ongoing armed resistance. Furthermore, the SPDC restricts international humanitarian access to these areas on the grounds of ongoing armed conflict.
Furthermore, the KNLA is more than simply a ‘protection’ force. They are also the armed wing of a political organisation, whose means and objectives not all Karen agree with. (See here).
And as a Karen villager from Dooplaya District explained: “As we are villagers, we have to suffer under every army… We want both armies, KNU and SPDC, to stay peacefully,” (from here, p. 167)
I am not proposing an answer here, nor suggesting that it is an easy question. But it does seem in need of response.
Dave Everett and fighting for the KNLA
However laudable individual efforts are, be it Dave E and Charles F’s backing of the Karen’s armed struggle or planB’s work in health and education on the ground, not to mention their vocal support in their chosen areas, states do need to be involved in working towards regime change in Burma, both China and the West.
Whilst ethnic minorities badly need concrete and material help, leaving out the Burman majority would be a grave mistake as they alone can topple the regime given the right leadership and resources whereas the nationalities cannot achieve it on their own. At this juncture they must join hands with the mainstream opposition above and underground, even the Tatmadaw rank and file, in order to defeat the junta.
Diplomatic efforts, either engagement or sanctions, have not changed the status quo. There’s no point in fudging the issue about what really needs to be done.
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
UnFaithfulReader – no : I’m not livid about Handley on the ’76
massacre.
His conclusion – that it was ruling class “panic”, and counter-productive, seems correct as far as I know, simply from reading his and numerous other accounts.
I was n’t there, so can not judge these from first-hand experience.
What made me angry about Handley’s account of Black May ’92
was the rigid way Handley tries to slot Bumiphol’s role into Handley’s pre-conceived picture of Bumiphol.
I WAS there during May ’92, and without Royal intervention the pro-democracy uprising would undoubtedly have collapsed in an even worse bloodbath, possibly leading to civil war. It seems to me the Palace had learned from the mistakes of ’76.
His Majesty’s intervention helped ensure 15 years of democracy ! Thailand’s longest ever. But Handley gives no acknowledgement of this.
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
Chris: You haven’t yet given us any facts and we can look at them. Your comments about LM and Handley are totally vacuous. Where you tell us anything of substance it has to do with your perception that Prem and his economic management has been distorted in some unstated way.
Given that Handley covered the events for the FEER and that he spoke with hundreds of officials and business people about this period and as the book is actually about the king, I think I’ll go with Handley rather than your memories of the period.
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
How about scanning it and posting via New Mandala?
[AW: I’m trying to get a scan. If anyone has one please email to me and I will post it.]
What happens in Yala…
That Sungai Kolok explosion was terrifying. Of course, I didn’t realize how terrifying until a few days after, when I saw the pictures and calculated that I was right there at the immigration office a bare 15 minutes earlier. (No, I don’t read the news. Now you know why.)
Also, I’m bitter about the dual-PM visit to the south, but that’s just a personal grudge about folks who make plans to visit certain places and don’t carry through with them. 🙂
There seems to be a consensus here in Narathiwat that something will be happening in about four or five years. Who knows?
(And thanks for the links. I need to stay on top of this more, as the American embassy now seems to think that I’m Their Woman in the South. Oh dear.)
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
Srithanonchai: Good point, and I think that’s another reason these articles were pushed: to damp the speculation and uncertainty that’s been swirling around about who the successor will be.
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
Ajarn Somsak: My only theory, after discussing with friends, is that this two-page piece was pushed from high places, as the start of an effort to prepare the people. It is indeed surprising that such topics would be discussed in the Post without official sanction. There has been criticism of the lack of official preparation of the people. Perhaps that’s been taken to heart, and perhaps it’s because preparation has suddenly become an urgent necessity.
I also have searched the Post’s online edition and cannot find this series. I went and bought the hard copy because I think it’s going to be a historic issue.
Thaksin on Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn
I also noticed both the print edition and the missing piece on the web site. Anyway, all those foreigners fond about speculating about the succession should know without doubt now who the future monarch will be. This will put the political part of economic risk analyses on a firmer footing, I guess.