Before I get slamed for this, I’d like to clarify that when Thai’s speak of pancasila–the Buddhist concept–they say “sin ha”, mixing the Thai for five (Ha) with the sanskrit for morality (sila–doing the Thai phonetic transform of dropping the final “a” and pronouncing the final “l” as “n”).
Sorry to keep posting. I’ve just been trying to have a clarifying conversation.
You are incorrect about “Pattani” and “Panchasila” as the “C” in Bahasa is pronounced “CH”. Nobody spells “Panchasila”.
You do not know perfectly well, as your statements indicate you lack knowledge of the region. PULO uses “Pattani” in Bahasa Melayu and Jawi. Your pedantic ripostes are just that. You now make some statements you did not before. As I was born in this region and spent about 44 years here, I should think I know a bit about Indonesia (and Malaysia). In particular, my Malaysian wife who would know exactly how Pattani is spelled by Malays and non-Malays and is knowledgable about Malay and Pattani Malay history.
Quite right.
I’m not sure how relevant Sumatra and East Malaysia have to Patani–they seem pretty insular. That’s not a refutation–I simply don’t know and would appreciate correction.
My impression is that much of the “gang related”, i.e. non-political often disguised as political violence, is a result of decades of neglect by the Thai state, with patronage and/or criminal networks filling the power vacuum.
“Patani” is the spelling used by the PULO and is becoming prefered by many southern Malays to refer to the region rather than the Province (“Pattani”). The history is well known among scholars of the region, but not otherwise–even by ethnic Thais who live there or by Westerners who live in SE Asia.
Dr. Abuza may be aware of non-Malay muslims throughout Thailand who feel quite comfortable as Thai citizens (ethnic Thai or otherwise), yet he cites religion as a reason the “Malay do not see any space for them in the construct of the Thai state”. That misleadingly casts the conflict in an overly religious light.
I defer on the attitude of Malays to the King–yet I very much doubt that his being a “Hindu god king” plays any role whatsoever. That’s an ancient mythology that many/most ethnic Thais don’t even know.
I know very well where “panchsila” comes from. It’s Sanscrit for “five rules of morality”, as far as I know it’s not a part of Thai “political litergy” at all, though its well known in Thailand as the Buddhist rules of morality for laity. Indonesia’s version is five political principles/ideals, the third of which is, indeed, unity (nothing about diversity). If as you write it was driving force for Indonesianization, then Dr. A’s taking it as some sort of model by which Thailand could learn to include Southern Malays without forced assimilation is mistaken.
I never suggested that panchasila in the political sense originated in Thailand. “Unity in Diversity” however is a part of the official discourse (fairly recently and mostly meaningless).
I know perfectly well that Romanizing Thai is difficult. I’m a professional Thai-to-English translator. There are standard Romanizations for Thai place names as well as a standard for Romanization generally–which it is my business to know.
“Issarn” first, allowing for the fact that “ar” is an archaic, non-standard (and confusing) way to Romanize long “a” (ahh), the double “s” would force a pronounciation of “itsan”.
Emphasizing here that I think Dr. A’s thesis about the schools is valid and valuable.
Vichai may be right and there are more details that will be found for all kinds of people in Thailand.
However, the data is now available, and searches so far do not tell us more about the Shinawatra clan. That’s a surprise. But then this is one legal firm’s records and there are many other entities still keeping secrets.
“The leak contains more than 11.5 million internal files of the company. It includes nearly 40 years of data, from 1977 through the end of 2015. The data contains a few incorporations before 1977, but they are sporadic and represent less than 1% of the companies. Although the data within the leak stretches back to 1977, Mossack Fonseca only came into being under its current name and structure in 1986, when Ramón Fonseca merged his small, one-secretary law firm in Panama with another local firm headed by Jürgen Mossack, a Panamanian of German origin.”
“Patani†is customarily spelled “Pattaniâ€. The term “Issarnâ€, like many phonetic translations of Thai, is as reputable as “Isanâ€. Thai does not translate well into standard Roman script. The history of the Pattani Kingdom is well known, as is the overrepresentation of Pattani culture in historical Malay writing and the arts. In my experience, the Malays are indifferent to HRH King Bhumibol in large part, as they do not see themselves as Thai. Malay activism is not to democratize Thailand, it is to ensure Malay purity in the south. It is Thai Leftist who stamp on photos of the King; Malays don’t care. Dr. Abuza I am sure is familiar with ethnic Thai Muslims who are as common as geese. I have a Halal Thai restaurant one block from my house and who hasn’t heard of former FM Surin Pitsuwan. I think he is probably known in Greenland.
Pancasila is from Sanskrit (Panch is number “5†in Hindi) and means five principles. In effective use by Golkar and Suharto, it did mean “unity in diversity†and that is how it was promulgated and disseminated. It is not incorrect to state that was the intention of Pancasila in Indonesia. Pancasila hardly existed in Thai political liturgy before it was conceived in Indonesia. The origin is not Thai at all. Thailand, while not homogeneous, is more so that Indonesia.
“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”, an old Javanese motto, is the Indonesian National Symbol and translates to “Unity in Diversity” (mostly), but in effect, Pancasila was the ideological driving force for Golkar catalyzed State-sanctioned “Indonesianization” (some would argue “Javanization”).
I would repeat your statement, in response to your own comments, “There are some inaccuracies, howeverâ€.
Dr. Abuza is probably correct that schools like Samphan are both problem and solution. Problem in perpetuating a retrenched, insular Malay (or better: Patani)identity, solution in potentially preserving and honoring Malay/Patani identity in the context of the Thai state. The significance of “Patani” is that it was a kingdom covering Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia, that became a vassal/colony of the Thai crown, then, split by English colonialism integrated in to Malaysia and Thailand. The ethnic Malays identify with that ancient kingdom and consider the area occupied, as the author notes. The continued sense of occupation and recurrent insurgency may be in part attributed to cycles of malignant neglect and attempted forced assimilation from the Thai state.
There are some inaccuracies, however. “But the Malay do not see any space for them in the construct of the Thai state: the monarchy (a Hindu god king)” In my experience the Southern Malays are, in fact loyal to the Thai King–but not the State. “religion (Buddhism)” There are Muslims throughout Thailand and the “national pillar” “religion” is now “religions” explictly to include Islam (and others).
Indonesia’s “pancasila” does not mean “unity in diversity”. “Unity in diversity” is, in fact, a buzzword in official Thai discourse, meaning you can be different as long as you’re like Central Thais in all significant ways.
Last, and certainly least, The standard spelling of Northeast Thailand is “Isan”, of all the variant spellings I’ve seen, “Issarn” is new to me–as well as phonetically impossible for Thai.
There is no “Pancasila” in Malaysia, I certainly don’t expect any in Thailand. One should not skip the point that not all grievance among Pattani Malays is against Thais. Internal Malay grievances are common throughout the larger Ummah Melayu, from southern Thailand to Sumatra to East Malaysia. PULO is probably even more corrupt than PAS, and Malays may attend Khutbah Juma’ah every Friday in the south, but from Monday to Thursday, many engage in very non-Islamic activities. There will be no end to the insurgency, because Ketuanan Melayu is not just restricted to Malaysia, Islam is expanding and not all incendiary activity in the south is political, much is gang related and happens among the Thais as well. In the end, most Pattani Malays trust Hadi Awang and PAS more than they trust UMNO, who has shown little active interest in their cause, for political and financial reasons. Residents may proclaim their “Malayness”, but it is unclear if there are two Ketuanan Melayus here, or just one.
Identity politics is just that. Time national IDs only stated nationality and not ethnicity and religion. One can always guess from names even when Anglo names are widespread among coloured races Christian or no. Aung San Suu Kyi for instance must have known her BBC interviewer was a Muslim from the name Mishal Husain.
Nicholas Farrelly’s thoughtful article deserves better than two of the comments above. At least someone is trying to think ‘outside the box’ on Myanmar.
An underlying problem in Myanmar is that ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, or at least a claim to a ‘national’ homeland are linked, at least for those ethnic groups, such as the Shan, who have the right to their own state under the present administrative/electoral arrangements. While theoretically providing the basis for a functioning decentralised federal system, this linkage raises the hoary question of the status of the non-Bamar ethnic groups who do not have a territory to call their homeland/nation.
One suspects that the difficulty in acknowledging the Rohingya as an integral part of the Burmese nation is that this would potentially raise the pandora’s box of claims to a homeland.
Breaking the Gordian knot between ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ would potentially have the beneficial effect of weakening a Bamar sense of superiority as the exclusive custodians of the Myanmar nation. I would also contribute to providing a basis for the decentralisation – and empowerment at the local level – that Myanmar so desperately needs.
As the Indonesian experience of the last fifteen years has demonstrated a democratic consolidation requires nothing less.
Leading “a struggle against elite oppression, criminality, and corruption” is unlikely given Duterte’s past history.
Petty low-level criminals were the Davao death squad’s victims, not powerful elite political families.
If Duterte was president when the Maguindanao massacre happened would the outcome have been any different?
Six years after the massacre the case has not been resolved, last time I checked).
The Ampatuan political family has evaded justice. One could imagine intimidation, bribes of witnesses and judges. Lack of transparency likely means no one can be sure what went on or is going on, impunity for the powerful being a well-established pattern.
By what real mechanisms (not braggadocio stage rhetoric) is Duterte going to break this pattern?
The belief by real flesh and blood Filipinos who I talk to that the model “dictator” Marcos only killed “bad people” is just nausea-inducing. The actions of Marcos cronies on Negros precipitated an outright famine. Priests were tortured, killed and dumped by the side of the road. Can a person who casually brushes such things aside even call themselves a Christian? Bong Bong’s fake Oxford credentials bolstered by assertions that history is irrelevant for the future are enough to induce tears.
A continuing lack of transparency and real accountability is a much more likely outcome than bringing rich, powerful and violent clans like the Ampatuan’s to justice.
Prayut is no example either. He could not win an election if he tried, even before he alienated 99.9999% of the electorate with policies like taking away free education. Thailand is slowly but surely slipping into unelected, fascist dictatorship supported by mass apathy and a small lunatic right-wing fringe.
Besides rhetoric on the efficacy of statutes or fancy debates on details of the actual carrying out of the ruling, the high standard of national safety and security observed by this nation is something to be envied and admired by many other countries. Singapore’s well defined borders also somehow makes this State seem impenetrable.
I back my positions up while you bawl pathetically with no reasoning or evidence. But i expected little better from an incumbent apolpgist as yourself. Just so you know, I cpild have made your argument fifty times better than you did, and answered if fifty times as comprehensively.
If a million Bangladeshi migrants landed in Tasmania and tried to set up an independent Islamic republic, claiming that they were in fact indigenous Tasmanians, I am fairly sure that Canberra’s reaction would not be welcoming and multicultural.
Vichai, you have an odd sense of time; the earliest Panama Papers precede Thaksin’s first term by almost a quarter of a century. Since there is no good evidence that corruption in Thailand has actually increased in the last 15 years ( Transparency International’s figures show that it actually decreased significantly year-on-year during Thaksin’s term of office, only to shoot up again after the 2006 coup!) there are likely to be many more people quite unassociated with him who may have cause for concern.
Ethnicity. together with religious identification, have always created divisions and conflict, increasingly in some parts of the world, and decreasingly in others. In Australia, for example, there was a time when ethnicity was specifically barred from government documents, but this changed at some stage so that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island ethnicity became required items on government documents. The whole concept of multi-culturalism, as seen as a good and workeable concept in Australia, is based fundamentally on ethnicity. Relatively recently football clubs (soccer) in Australia were required to remove their nationalistic and presumably ethnic and religious identifiers from their names and from their banners and uniforms. The new ethnicity of Muslim versus the rest that is taking hold in social, political and economic discussion and commentary, wrongly referred to as being ‘racist’ if seen as being derogatory or even just comment, shows the resurgence of divisive ‘ethnicity’. BUT this cannot be eradicated, nor, probably, should it be eradicated, but positive relationships between different ethnic groups, or even indifference, should be encouraged. To do this, however, all sides of the conflict need to retreat from hardline positions.
Rohingya are illegal Bangladeshi Muslim migrants. My mitochondrial DNA is closer to tribal Mizo from Mizoram, NE India, than “Rohingya” is to Bamar people (who’s DNA is also close in homology to the [Jewish] Mizo). You will find the “Rohingya” much closer to Sri Lankan Muslims, Indian Muslims and even Arab Muslims. Ethnicity does need to be redefined, in the absence of archaic Leftist politics.
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The school in the middle
Before I get slamed for this, I’d like to clarify that when Thai’s speak of pancasila–the Buddhist concept–they say “sin ha”, mixing the Thai for five (Ha) with the sanskrit for morality (sila–doing the Thai phonetic transform of dropping the final “a” and pronouncing the final “l” as “n”).
Sorry to keep posting. I’ve just been trying to have a clarifying conversation.
The school in the middle
You are incorrect about “Pattani” and “Panchasila” as the “C” in Bahasa is pronounced “CH”. Nobody spells “Panchasila”.
You do not know perfectly well, as your statements indicate you lack knowledge of the region. PULO uses “Pattani” in Bahasa Melayu and Jawi. Your pedantic ripostes are just that. You now make some statements you did not before. As I was born in this region and spent about 44 years here, I should think I know a bit about Indonesia (and Malaysia). In particular, my Malaysian wife who would know exactly how Pattani is spelled by Malays and non-Malays and is knowledgable about Malay and Pattani Malay history.
The school in the middle
Quite right.
I’m not sure how relevant Sumatra and East Malaysia have to Patani–they seem pretty insular. That’s not a refutation–I simply don’t know and would appreciate correction.
My impression is that much of the “gang related”, i.e. non-political often disguised as political violence, is a result of decades of neglect by the Thai state, with patronage and/or criminal networks filling the power vacuum.
The school in the middle
“Patani” is the spelling used by the PULO and is becoming prefered by many southern Malays to refer to the region rather than the Province (“Pattani”). The history is well known among scholars of the region, but not otherwise–even by ethnic Thais who live there or by Westerners who live in SE Asia.
Dr. Abuza may be aware of non-Malay muslims throughout Thailand who feel quite comfortable as Thai citizens (ethnic Thai or otherwise), yet he cites religion as a reason the “Malay do not see any space for them in the construct of the Thai state”. That misleadingly casts the conflict in an overly religious light.
I defer on the attitude of Malays to the King–yet I very much doubt that his being a “Hindu god king” plays any role whatsoever. That’s an ancient mythology that many/most ethnic Thais don’t even know.
I know very well where “panchsila” comes from. It’s Sanscrit for “five rules of morality”, as far as I know it’s not a part of Thai “political litergy” at all, though its well known in Thailand as the Buddhist rules of morality for laity. Indonesia’s version is five political principles/ideals, the third of which is, indeed, unity (nothing about diversity). If as you write it was driving force for Indonesianization, then Dr. A’s taking it as some sort of model by which Thailand could learn to include Southern Malays without forced assimilation is mistaken.
I never suggested that panchasila in the political sense originated in Thailand. “Unity in Diversity” however is a part of the official discourse (fairly recently and mostly meaningless).
I know perfectly well that Romanizing Thai is difficult. I’m a professional Thai-to-English translator. There are standard Romanizations for Thai place names as well as a standard for Romanization generally–which it is my business to know.
“Issarn” first, allowing for the fact that “ar” is an archaic, non-standard (and confusing) way to Romanize long “a” (ahh), the double “s” would force a pronounciation of “itsan”.
Emphasizing here that I think Dr. A’s thesis about the schools is valid and valuable.
Thai junta to get its report card
Vichai may be right and there are more details that will be found for all kinds of people in Thailand.
However, the data is now available, and searches so far do not tell us more about the Shinawatra clan. That’s a surprise. But then this is one legal firm’s records and there are many other entities still keeping secrets.
And, to correct Vichai again, Mossack Fonseca wasn’t formed in 1977. As the ICIJ states it, the company was formed in 1986 (https://panamapapers.icij.org/graphs/methodology/):
“The leak contains more than 11.5 million internal files of the company. It includes nearly 40 years of data, from 1977 through the end of 2015. The data contains a few incorporations before 1977, but they are sporadic and represent less than 1% of the companies. Although the data within the leak stretches back to 1977, Mossack Fonseca only came into being under its current name and structure in 1986, when Ramón Fonseca merged his small, one-secretary law firm in Panama with another local firm headed by Jürgen Mossack, a Panamanian of German origin.”
The school in the middle
“Patani†is customarily spelled “Pattaniâ€. The term “Issarnâ€, like many phonetic translations of Thai, is as reputable as “Isanâ€. Thai does not translate well into standard Roman script. The history of the Pattani Kingdom is well known, as is the overrepresentation of Pattani culture in historical Malay writing and the arts. In my experience, the Malays are indifferent to HRH King Bhumibol in large part, as they do not see themselves as Thai. Malay activism is not to democratize Thailand, it is to ensure Malay purity in the south. It is Thai Leftist who stamp on photos of the King; Malays don’t care. Dr. Abuza I am sure is familiar with ethnic Thai Muslims who are as common as geese. I have a Halal Thai restaurant one block from my house and who hasn’t heard of former FM Surin Pitsuwan. I think he is probably known in Greenland.
Pancasila is from Sanskrit (Panch is number “5†in Hindi) and means five principles. In effective use by Golkar and Suharto, it did mean “unity in diversity†and that is how it was promulgated and disseminated. It is not incorrect to state that was the intention of Pancasila in Indonesia. Pancasila hardly existed in Thai political liturgy before it was conceived in Indonesia. The origin is not Thai at all. Thailand, while not homogeneous, is more so that Indonesia.
“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika”, an old Javanese motto, is the Indonesian National Symbol and translates to “Unity in Diversity” (mostly), but in effect, Pancasila was the ideological driving force for Golkar catalyzed State-sanctioned “Indonesianization” (some would argue “Javanization”).
I would repeat your statement, in response to your own comments, “There are some inaccuracies, howeverâ€.
The school in the middle
Dr. Abuza is probably correct that schools like Samphan are both problem and solution. Problem in perpetuating a retrenched, insular Malay (or better: Patani)identity, solution in potentially preserving and honoring Malay/Patani identity in the context of the Thai state. The significance of “Patani” is that it was a kingdom covering Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia, that became a vassal/colony of the Thai crown, then, split by English colonialism integrated in to Malaysia and Thailand. The ethnic Malays identify with that ancient kingdom and consider the area occupied, as the author notes. The continued sense of occupation and recurrent insurgency may be in part attributed to cycles of malignant neglect and attempted forced assimilation from the Thai state.
There are some inaccuracies, however. “But the Malay do not see any space for them in the construct of the Thai state: the monarchy (a Hindu god king)” In my experience the Southern Malays are, in fact loyal to the Thai King–but not the State. “religion (Buddhism)” There are Muslims throughout Thailand and the “national pillar” “religion” is now “religions” explictly to include Islam (and others).
Indonesia’s “pancasila” does not mean “unity in diversity”. “Unity in diversity” is, in fact, a buzzword in official Thai discourse, meaning you can be different as long as you’re like Central Thais in all significant ways.
Last, and certainly least, The standard spelling of Northeast Thailand is “Isan”, of all the variant spellings I’ve seen, “Issarn” is new to me–as well as phonetically impossible for Thai.
The school in the middle
There is no “Pancasila” in Malaysia, I certainly don’t expect any in Thailand. One should not skip the point that not all grievance among Pattani Malays is against Thais. Internal Malay grievances are common throughout the larger Ummah Melayu, from southern Thailand to Sumatra to East Malaysia. PULO is probably even more corrupt than PAS, and Malays may attend Khutbah Juma’ah every Friday in the south, but from Monday to Thursday, many engage in very non-Islamic activities. There will be no end to the insurgency, because Ketuanan Melayu is not just restricted to Malaysia, Islam is expanding and not all incendiary activity in the south is political, much is gang related and happens among the Thais as well. In the end, most Pattani Malays trust Hadi Awang and PAS more than they trust UMNO, who has shown little active interest in their cause, for political and financial reasons. Residents may proclaim their “Malayness”, but it is unclear if there are two Ketuanan Melayus here, or just one.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
Identity politics is just that. Time national IDs only stated nationality and not ethnicity and religion. One can always guess from names even when Anglo names are widespread among coloured races Christian or no. Aung San Suu Kyi for instance must have known her BBC interviewer was a Muslim from the name Mishal Husain.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
Cohen’s back spouting his usual racist lines.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
I am fairly sure Mr Smith is correct.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
Nicholas Farrelly’s thoughtful article deserves better than two of the comments above. At least someone is trying to think ‘outside the box’ on Myanmar.
An underlying problem in Myanmar is that ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, or at least a claim to a ‘national’ homeland are linked, at least for those ethnic groups, such as the Shan, who have the right to their own state under the present administrative/electoral arrangements. While theoretically providing the basis for a functioning decentralised federal system, this linkage raises the hoary question of the status of the non-Bamar ethnic groups who do not have a territory to call their homeland/nation.
One suspects that the difficulty in acknowledging the Rohingya as an integral part of the Burmese nation is that this would potentially raise the pandora’s box of claims to a homeland.
Breaking the Gordian knot between ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ would potentially have the beneficial effect of weakening a Bamar sense of superiority as the exclusive custodians of the Myanmar nation. I would also contribute to providing a basis for the decentralisation – and empowerment at the local level – that Myanmar so desperately needs.
As the Indonesian experience of the last fifteen years has demonstrated a democratic consolidation requires nothing less.
How to introduce Duterte in Southeast Asia
Leading “a struggle against elite oppression, criminality, and corruption” is unlikely given Duterte’s past history.
Petty low-level criminals were the Davao death squad’s victims, not powerful elite political families.
If Duterte was president when the Maguindanao massacre happened would the outcome have been any different?
Six years after the massacre the case has not been resolved, last time I checked).
The Ampatuan political family has evaded justice. One could imagine intimidation, bribes of witnesses and judges. Lack of transparency likely means no one can be sure what went on or is going on, impunity for the powerful being a well-established pattern.
By what real mechanisms (not braggadocio stage rhetoric) is Duterte going to break this pattern?
The belief by real flesh and blood Filipinos who I talk to that the model “dictator” Marcos only killed “bad people” is just nausea-inducing. The actions of Marcos cronies on Negros precipitated an outright famine. Priests were tortured, killed and dumped by the side of the road. Can a person who casually brushes such things aside even call themselves a Christian? Bong Bong’s fake Oxford credentials bolstered by assertions that history is irrelevant for the future are enough to induce tears.
A continuing lack of transparency and real accountability is a much more likely outcome than bringing rich, powerful and violent clans like the Ampatuan’s to justice.
Prayut is no example either. He could not win an election if he tried, even before he alienated 99.9999% of the electorate with policies like taking away free education. Thailand is slowly but surely slipping into unelected, fascist dictatorship supported by mass apathy and a small lunatic right-wing fringe.
Out of sight, out of mind
Which government would not consolidate its own power.
Out of sight, out of mind
Besides rhetoric on the efficacy of statutes or fancy debates on details of the actual carrying out of the ruling, the high standard of national safety and security observed by this nation is something to be envied and admired by many other countries. Singapore’s well defined borders also somehow makes this State seem impenetrable.
Out of sight, out of mind
I back my positions up while you bawl pathetically with no reasoning or evidence. But i expected little better from an incumbent apolpgist as yourself. Just so you know, I cpild have made your argument fifty times better than you did, and answered if fifty times as comprehensively.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
If a million Bangladeshi migrants landed in Tasmania and tried to set up an independent Islamic republic, claiming that they were in fact indigenous Tasmanians, I am fairly sure that Canberra’s reaction would not be welcoming and multicultural.
Thai junta to get its report card
Vichai, you have an odd sense of time; the earliest Panama Papers precede Thaksin’s first term by almost a quarter of a century. Since there is no good evidence that corruption in Thailand has actually increased in the last 15 years ( Transparency International’s figures show that it actually decreased significantly year-on-year during Thaksin’s term of office, only to shoot up again after the 2006 coup!) there are likely to be many more people quite unassociated with him who may have cause for concern.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
Ethnicity. together with religious identification, have always created divisions and conflict, increasingly in some parts of the world, and decreasingly in others. In Australia, for example, there was a time when ethnicity was specifically barred from government documents, but this changed at some stage so that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island ethnicity became required items on government documents. The whole concept of multi-culturalism, as seen as a good and workeable concept in Australia, is based fundamentally on ethnicity. Relatively recently football clubs (soccer) in Australia were required to remove their nationalistic and presumably ethnic and religious identifiers from their names and from their banners and uniforms. The new ethnicity of Muslim versus the rest that is taking hold in social, political and economic discussion and commentary, wrongly referred to as being ‘racist’ if seen as being derogatory or even just comment, shows the resurgence of divisive ‘ethnicity’. BUT this cannot be eradicated, nor, probably, should it be eradicated, but positive relationships between different ethnic groups, or even indifference, should be encouraged. To do this, however, all sides of the conflict need to retreat from hardline positions.
Should ethnicity be reconsidered?
Rohingya are illegal Bangladeshi Muslim migrants. My mitochondrial DNA is closer to tribal Mizo from Mizoram, NE India, than “Rohingya” is to Bamar people (who’s DNA is also close in homology to the [Jewish] Mizo). You will find the “Rohingya” much closer to Sri Lankan Muslims, Indian Muslims and even Arab Muslims. Ethnicity does need to be redefined, in the absence of archaic Leftist politics.