The fix is in and the ‘electoral solution’ only results in total victory for Thaksin (eventually).
If you have any doubts, just look at PPP’s unwavering actions since coming to power.
On the other hand, the PAD leaders can never be in a position of total victory, and all their victories will be short term.
Dr Connors seems to have a clearer view than some other academics of the ultimate implications of criticizing only the PAD, glossing over the Thaksin excesses, and understating the deficiencies of the electorate and it’s inability to restrict the elite’s plundering.
Sidh: I went to your Thai Rath link. It seems to be a summary, including taking stuff from Western news agencies. Sidh’s confidence in the judgment based on these reports seems unwarranted. Is the full judgment available anywhere yet?
[…] amidst all the whispering and reading between the lines that you find in other places, one individual called Somsak Jeamiteerasakul on the very intelligent New Mandala site has been all but screaming his opinion out in the comments […]
But I wonder what assets have actually been seized? Indeed, are there any at all in Australia? If there are none, and the authoritities know there are none, what is the point of it all, except political posturing?
The issue of a closed public space indeed needs to be operationalized and located in time more precisely. Anyway, I am happy to see that the importance of informal political structures in Thailand gets some attention.
I don’t think Dr. Connors can claim to have been totally misrepresented by AW or even decontextualized. A reader could easily take this impression from his Bangkok Post article. As I have said in another thread, the problem is that Dr. Connors makes points that are simply not clear in the final wash-up in his writing. Here I am referring to his commentary to the press; in his academic writings he tends to be clearer. In his press material, he invites mis-readings by not stating his position clearly.
On this particular piece – I attempted to read it with his follow-up explanations in mind – I have to agree with Fonzi. In total, it does not seem to me that the international press is any more or less at fault now than when they were condemning Thaksin early in his period in power. And, as I have said on another thread, I don’t see the point of having to re-state, time and again, that Thaksin has a murky history and that he engaged in some anti-democratic acts. There’s plenty of literature on this in the academic and press record.
That the unnamed international commentators are not analysing the murkier aspects of Thailand’s politics is a better point, but one has to allow for the fact that this current period is exceptionally difficult to understand. Then again, some are doing this very well. Currently international reporting for Bloomberg and Asia Times Online seem to be doing their best. But, I am not sure if Dr. Connors is criticising reporters as commentators or just some unnamed commentators who don’t regularly report. He refers to the media generally and to commentators in particular thus muddying the waters. Names or links would help.
Based on his earlier academic work, Dr. Connors sees parliamentary representation-style democracy as a form of subjection/control. It seems to me that, in his final paragraph to this article, is making a call for parliamentary cretinism in Thailand and feeling that a lack of this is a problem. If so, then he needs to explain if democratic subjection is preferable to the current stalemate of limited/no parliamentary cretinism. But because he is not clear, I am not entirely sure if this is what he’s getting at.
On Marx, it seems to me that Dr. Connors tells only part of the story. He makes the good point that parliamentarianism offered an opportunity for a royalist coup. That point is one that should probably not need restating in Thailand. However, he gives the impression that Marx saw no value in parliamentary representation or dismissed it entirely as simply a tool of the bourgeoisie. That’s not the whole story.
Marx’s conception of representative democracy is nuanced, but the Connors article provides an impression that Marx simply rejected it as cretinism (and probably gives succour to the old leftists associated with PAD to continue to believe that they remain leftists). For sure, Marx does not idealise parliamentary democracy and notes that class struggle goes well beyond parliament.
At the same time, recall that the parliaments he writes about came into being following the republican revolutions of the first half of the 19th century and were decidedly not representative in the way we understand it today.
Marx saw that parliamentary representation could be against the interests of the exploited classes in particular class circumstances. But he also saw wider parliamentary representation for the exploited classes, through universal suffrage, as potentially a political emancipation. He saw the potential for the working class to make use of parliamentary representation to wring concessions in a capitalist society. This approach also bears on the debate over a peaceful road to socialism.
I always look forward to Dr. Connors’ pieces, because they are well-informed and contrarian. But I am a bit puzzled by this latest article and his explanation in the comments.
I can’t help but think he is setting up a straw man, especially when he tosses around such phrases as “pro-Thaksin commentariat” to describe (apparently) Western editorial writers. (Talk about reductionist! — Perhaps Connors has been watching too much Fox News?)
Where I think he truly misunderstands or misrepresents the situation is when he talks about “downplaying, overlooking and rationalising the anti-democratic behaviour of the side you implicitly or explicitly support…”
While democracy is certainly an issue, what concerns serious critics of the PAD – and what has highlighted the crisis – is the anti-social behavior of the mobs, most egregious in the hate-mongering and bully-boy tactics of the PAD.
A good (translated) English-language critique can be found in a Prachathai article from early September by Kasian Techapira:
Dr. Connors is on to something – his article if differently focused could go part of the way in explaining, for example, The Nation’s daily editorial excursions into cloud-cuckoo land.
And that would also be a more useful exercise. Beating up on the simplifying, sanctimonious Western press isn’t very difficult, and seems more like a venting of frustrations than a scholarly pursuit.
BTW, it’s sort of discouraging that a scholar would be dismissive of this blog and its readers with the comment – mistaken, in my opinion- that “I’m not sure that my views on this are of interest to the NM audience, but here goes.”
The author dare to show what’s going on in this country, whiel our media dare not to say about. I am surprise to see our beloved Queen aciting like that. I have long wonder who is supportin this PAD, and I got the answer once she went to the funeral. She decide to expose what she is, supporting PAD. The cost is so high in selecting this political conflict.
Chris #2, maybe I am paranoid and I have admitted that PMThaksin is the last person I politically trust (well, as much as President Bush). Jim#3, you can go on polishing Thaksin’s “shiny side” and maybe you are just OK with government and business with their hands in each others pockets in general. I am not. I’d like to hear what you think about PMThaksin’s War on Drugs, Krue-sae, Takbai, Sabai-Yoi etc. – for me, Thaksin’s darkest side (Blood for Votes).
Fonzi#5 “Also, this notion that Thaksin closed the public space post-2003 is pure bunk…” Were you really living in Thailand mate? I will not waste time with the very long list of specific issues concerning government, army and Maleenond owned media outlets – mainly TV and radio that reaches the majority of the Thai population (Jonfernquest also mentioned how Thaksin manipulates private media). As the blog raises the effectiveness of parliament, I will mention one that still riles me – one of the first censure debate against TRT ministers by the Democrats. PMThaksin declared that week he will use government money to buy Liverpool FC which totally drowned the parliament debate and made it irrelevant in all medias.
As a Thai, I am not only angry because I am a Liverpool fan. I am very angry because PMThaksin had no respect for parliament, for the 1997 Constitution, for democracy. He gave democracy such a bad name that many Thais are willing to consider the less democratic form of election/selection. They flock in droves to Sondhi’s and then PAD rallies and ASTV because they feel that the much more accessible mainstream media does not tell them the truth.
Bangkok Pundit, I’m not sure about details myself – and I just learnt that the Burmese Junta used the Thai government loan to buy services from ShinSat, a subsidiary of ShinCorp – and not ShinCorp. It surely would be another case of the Master drowning in shallow water if his company was specified in the contract – but remember, technically, it is not his company, but his children’s. Did he run ShinCorp through his children as he is running the Thai government through his nominees in PPP? That will be hard to prove in court, hence the court did not accept cases that accused Thaksin of not strictly following his ban from political activities (impossible to enforce?). The next question is whether there was a tender for the contract or the Burmese Junta just chose ShinSat (wink wink with PMThaksin?)… And that could be the big loophole here.
For me this is the same old story. Godfathers are only convicted of much lesser crimes and the same goes to Capitalist Mafias who flees their crimes and live life of luxury…
Talking about Halliburton in Iraq, I also did a quick search and found this interesting article – the EXIM Bank loan to Myanmar gets more complex and compelling!
I think the Supreme Administrative Court’s Criminal Division for Political Office Holders is to be commended for a very sound and just judgement yesterday. Clearly it was a serious conflict of interests for a prime minister’s wife to buy land from the FIDF and the the court cut straight through the flabby technical arguments put forward by Thaksin’s defence. Nevertheless the court was very fair in not convicting Thaksin of corruption and giving him a relatively light sentence. He could be out in less than a year for good behaviour. The court was also very fair in acquitting Potjaman and not confiscating the land or the funds used to purchase it.
Let’s hope the Thai government will procede quickly to lodge a cogent case for extradition with the British authorities in respect of this case and Potjaman’s tax fraud conviction, in spite of the current premier’s conflict of loyalties.
Jim Taylor: “Corruption accusations against Thaksin are just that: politically motivated “accusations”. If it is not clear now as to what is going on – you never will get the picture.”
No Jim. All I can say is get back in your archaeology pit and stop being so arrogant.
Thaksin pushed the media around. If they didn’t publish the news he wanted, no more advertising revenues. Lost livelihoods. Angry people….
Accentuate the rural-urban divides to gain votes. Angry people. ..
Sue people for defamation. Angry people….etc
As for the Thai telecoms industry, you should really read the article in Pasuk and Baker’s Thai capital because this is exactly what you are going to see in a case that is coming up. The article on rent-seeking in the same volume documents how Thaksin rearranged the chairs as far as rent-seeking goes. What do you get when you realign the rents? You become the master, the patron, with a whole new set of clients, and a whole lot of disenfranchised people who are your blood enemies, who collectively want to see you hung out to dry. What is this?
A recipe for a divided society.
Sidh is right. Western academics and media are biased and do not foster objective enquiry and debate. They ignore the blaring examples of two very successful Asian non-democracies to the north: China and South Korea. I am glad I am not a part of their charade.
I have the highest respect for Professor Connors, and I have read most everything he has written regarding Thai politics, including his book.
In this case, I think he is misrepresenting the situation.
I have scoured so much foreign media concerning this conflict and I have yet to read one piece that brings it all down to Thaksin was only legitimate because of an election or he should be forgiven his excesses because he had a majority in parliament. Normally, Connor’s academic pieces are well-documented. Here, the documentation is sorely lacking.
From where I sit, the crux of foreign criticism concerning this conflict doesn’t so fit so neatly into Connor’s “Thaksin good, PAD bad” paradigm but rather they argue that this conflict should be resolved within the realm of the rule of law, politics and liberal democratic values. I see nothing sanctimonious about that. Further, I don’t find it so contemptible for the foreign press to point out that the PAD side completely rejects liberal democracy and the rule of law and embraces military rule and has overt fascist tendencies.
Further, almost every single piece that describes this conflict in the foreign media is prefaced with a laundry list of Thaksin’s alleged crimes.
I have not documented every single foreign article/column on this Thai crisis, but I have certainly documented many of them, and anybody can go to my website, go to Bangkok Pundit, go to The Economist, Wall Street Journal, the Australian papers, the English papers, the European papers, the regional papers and the BBC and read for themselves that Thaksin has not been given a free pass. You can even go back before the coup and read articles that were extremely critical of Thaksin in the foreign press.
Also, this notion that Thaksin closed the public space post-2003 is pure bunk. At this point in time, much of the mainstream Thai media, the conventional wisdom academics and social activists were turning against him and making their voices well-known in the public sphere. There were anti-Thaksin teach-ins and seminars all over the country.
I remember the weekly SondhiLimfests in Lumpini Park during this time. I lived right to down the street. The police weren’t shutting him down. The PAD had almost as much a free reign before the coup as they do now.
Dozens of anti-Thaksin books were written during this time as well.
So I don’t know what evidence Professor Connors has to support the premise of his column. Whatever it is, I’d like to see it.
Thanks to Andrew for drawing attention to my piece on “parliamentary cretinism”. I’m not sure that my views on this are of interest to the NM audience, but here goes.
It is unfortunate that Andrew has chosen to fully decontextualise the argument I make, and to draw mistaken generalisations about my political position regarding parliaments and the electoral process in general. It is the second time he’s written to question my support of democracy. I do have a critical position on democracy, but I do value the political space that is generated in open societies for political competition and debate. Such spaces are meaningful and need not only be the playthings of cynical elites – a view Andrew attributes to me as if that is all I have to say. Indeed it is the erosion of that space in Thailand from around 2003 that has resulted in a political divide that threatens to break into open violence.
My main point in the article was to highlight the dubious grounds on which commentators argue for a parliamentary solution to the current crisis when both sides are playing with the rules of the game. I was not specifically targeting New Mandala – although some of its commentary certainly fits the description. Does Andrew really think that his and other people’s calls for “government as usual” will settle a fundamental disquiet among actors in Thailand with the way state power is now being used for personal purposes (just as it was during the coup and pre-coup period).
This seems a reasonable point to make, when most commentary whitewashes the so-called democratic pro-Thaksin forces. Andrew’s argument, and much of his commentary on New Mandala and elsewhere fails to engage with the issue of how a parliamentary opposition and an extra-parliamentary opposition is supposed to deal with an incumbent government that is using the powers of incumbency to change the rules of the game in a way that would permanently marginalise oppositional forces – I am speaking of the Thaksin period from about 2003 onwards. Andrew wants to insist on constitutional niceties in an analysis that has little regard for power play. The post-coup period is now so completely divided because of the politicised constitutional engineering of the anti-Thaksin camp and the fact that the power struggle of 2006 remains unresolved that both sides are now playing behind the scene, strategising outside of parliament.
My point is not that elections and parliament don’t matter, it is rather that contemporary commentary that refuses to engage with the murkier issues of political power in Thailand ends up being tendential and assumes that there is a workable system of institutional power in Thailand. When you hold that position in the current context you are placed squarely on one side of the debate, which also leaves you downplaying, overlooking and rationalising the anti-democratic behaviour of the side you implicitly or explicitly support, while all the while drawing attention to the anti-democratic behaviour of the opposition.
The use of the term parliamentary cretinism in this context is to point out just how little recognition pro-Thaksin commentary gives to the murkier side of its trumpeted democratic hero. Whether that is bad faith or political persuasion, who can say?
As to the idea that I find parliament ‘meaningless’. My own position on solutions to political struggle in Thailand – very irrelevant and marginal to the current debates – is one in which parliament would indeed be a meaningful arena of struggle, in which political leaders were subject to processes of accountability, which social forces outside the elite were organised around relevant interests and took parliamentary form, and in which there were no veto powers within the military or the palace, and where processes of law functioned in as impartial a way as possible. The emergence of that kind of parliamentary democracy will not come from supporting a bunch of reactionaries on both sides of the divide in the name of “law” or “democratic mandate”. The support for either side is to gloss over how each is positioning itself in a way that does not hold to the rules of the game. Those rules will become meaningful when there are important social forces outside of the elite who transform constitutional nominalism into something real.
Sidh said Here, PMThaksin has another comparable case pending when his government gave a loan to the Burmese Junta (through EXIM Bank) to buy telecommuncation equipments from his company ShinCorp. As with Halliburton, there’s no tender and ShinCorp, I understand, was specified.
I would be interested to see where you read that about Shin Corp being mentioned as I haven’t read anything which says that. Some 600 million of the 4 billion baht was used to purchase telecommunications equipment. If there is evidence of a quid pro quo and Shin Corp was specified then Thaksin should rightly be convicted.
Truth? or propaganda Boonchuay? sounds like Sondhi’s spin on truth. Just because Thaksin is rich does not mean he is guilty. He has legitimate concerns about the interpretation of truth in Thailand today by the amaat/Democrat Party/military alliance-against-democracy. I suggest you read other sources of information other than from the Manager Group or ASTV.
Nonsense Sidh S.: give us some hard evidence on that statement; especially PPP’s povocation! That is the last thing PPP would want to do and have nothing to gain and much to lose (even a coup which would not go in their favour). PPP is concerned about it’s continued and legitimate existence as a viable political party. Look what happened to TRT – & just because the old guard wanted to get Thaksin! Corruption accusations against Thaksin are just that: politically motivated “accusations”. If it is not clear now as to what is going on – you never will get the picture.
I have passed your article to the National Human Rights Commissioner Surasee Kosolnawin, who chaired the
agency’s fact-finding subcommittee on the 7/10.
He would appreciate if you please contact him and provide
the information you have to have a more complete fact
of the 7/10.
Thaksin has so much money that he can pay so many people to express their opinions to support him include British Government related agencies, such as British diplomats in Thailand, and BBC.
Besides many British companies are doing business in Thailand. So they have reasons to please Thaksin. Since Samuk, and Somchai’s governement are under his control.
Please read other sources of of information You ‘ll know the truth.
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More from a parliamentary cretin
To put it simply:
The fix is in and the ‘electoral solution’ only results in total victory for Thaksin (eventually).
If you have any doubts, just look at PPP’s unwavering actions since coming to power.
On the other hand, the PAD leaders can never be in a position of total victory, and all their victories will be short term.
Dr Connors seems to have a clearer view than some other academics of the ultimate implications of criticizing only the PAD, glossing over the Thaksin excesses, and understating the deficiencies of the electorate and it’s inability to restrict the elite’s plundering.
One verdict on Thaksin
Sidh: I went to your Thai Rath link. It seems to be a summary, including taking stuff from Western news agencies. Sidh’s confidence in the judgment based on these reports seems unwarranted. Is the full judgment available anywhere yet?
The electorate and the “acute state of Thai politics”
[…] amidst all the whispering and reading between the lines that you find in other places, one individual called Somsak Jeamiteerasakul on the very intelligent New Mandala site has been all but screaming his opinion out in the comments […]
Australian sanctions against Burma’s elite
But I wonder what assets have actually been seized? Indeed, are there any at all in Australia? If there are none, and the authoritities know there are none, what is the point of it all, except political posturing?
More from a parliamentary cretin
The issue of a closed public space indeed needs to be operationalized and located in time more precisely. Anyway, I am happy to see that the importance of informal political structures in Thailand gets some attention.
More from a parliamentary cretin
I don’t think Dr. Connors can claim to have been totally misrepresented by AW or even decontextualized. A reader could easily take this impression from his Bangkok Post article. As I have said in another thread, the problem is that Dr. Connors makes points that are simply not clear in the final wash-up in his writing. Here I am referring to his commentary to the press; in his academic writings he tends to be clearer. In his press material, he invites mis-readings by not stating his position clearly.
On this particular piece – I attempted to read it with his follow-up explanations in mind – I have to agree with Fonzi. In total, it does not seem to me that the international press is any more or less at fault now than when they were condemning Thaksin early in his period in power. And, as I have said on another thread, I don’t see the point of having to re-state, time and again, that Thaksin has a murky history and that he engaged in some anti-democratic acts. There’s plenty of literature on this in the academic and press record.
That the unnamed international commentators are not analysing the murkier aspects of Thailand’s politics is a better point, but one has to allow for the fact that this current period is exceptionally difficult to understand. Then again, some are doing this very well. Currently international reporting for Bloomberg and Asia Times Online seem to be doing their best. But, I am not sure if Dr. Connors is criticising reporters as commentators or just some unnamed commentators who don’t regularly report. He refers to the media generally and to commentators in particular thus muddying the waters. Names or links would help.
Based on his earlier academic work, Dr. Connors sees parliamentary representation-style democracy as a form of subjection/control. It seems to me that, in his final paragraph to this article, is making a call for parliamentary cretinism in Thailand and feeling that a lack of this is a problem. If so, then he needs to explain if democratic subjection is preferable to the current stalemate of limited/no parliamentary cretinism. But because he is not clear, I am not entirely sure if this is what he’s getting at.
On Marx, it seems to me that Dr. Connors tells only part of the story. He makes the good point that parliamentarianism offered an opportunity for a royalist coup. That point is one that should probably not need restating in Thailand. However, he gives the impression that Marx saw no value in parliamentary representation or dismissed it entirely as simply a tool of the bourgeoisie. That’s not the whole story.
Marx’s conception of representative democracy is nuanced, but the Connors article provides an impression that Marx simply rejected it as cretinism (and probably gives succour to the old leftists associated with PAD to continue to believe that they remain leftists). For sure, Marx does not idealise parliamentary democracy and notes that class struggle goes well beyond parliament.
At the same time, recall that the parliaments he writes about came into being following the republican revolutions of the first half of the 19th century and were decidedly not representative in the way we understand it today.
Marx saw that parliamentary representation could be against the interests of the exploited classes in particular class circumstances. But he also saw wider parliamentary representation for the exploited classes, through universal suffrage, as potentially a political emancipation. He saw the potential for the working class to make use of parliamentary representation to wring concessions in a capitalist society. This approach also bears on the debate over a peaceful road to socialism.
More from a parliamentary cretin
I always look forward to Dr. Connors’ pieces, because they are well-informed and contrarian. But I am a bit puzzled by this latest article and his explanation in the comments.
I can’t help but think he is setting up a straw man, especially when he tosses around such phrases as “pro-Thaksin commentariat” to describe (apparently) Western editorial writers. (Talk about reductionist! — Perhaps Connors has been watching too much Fox News?)
Where I think he truly misunderstands or misrepresents the situation is when he talks about “downplaying, overlooking and rationalising the anti-democratic behaviour of the side you implicitly or explicitly support…”
While democracy is certainly an issue, what concerns serious critics of the PAD – and what has highlighted the crisis – is the anti-social behavior of the mobs, most egregious in the hate-mongering and bully-boy tactics of the PAD.
A good (translated) English-language critique can be found in a Prachathai article from early September by Kasian Techapira:
Kasian Techapira on the PAD’s general uprising
Dr. Connors is on to something – his article if differently focused could go part of the way in explaining, for example, The Nation’s daily editorial excursions into cloud-cuckoo land.
And that would also be a more useful exercise. Beating up on the simplifying, sanctimonious Western press isn’t very difficult, and seems more like a venting of frustrations than a scholarly pursuit.
BTW, it’s sort of discouraging that a scholar would be dismissive of this blog and its readers with the comment – mistaken, in my opinion- that “I’m not sure that my views on this are of interest to the NM audience, but here goes.”
Whither Thai democracy?
The author dare to show what’s going on in this country, whiel our media dare not to say about. I am surprise to see our beloved Queen aciting like that. I have long wonder who is supportin this PAD, and I got the answer once she went to the funeral. She decide to expose what she is, supporting PAD. The cost is so high in selecting this political conflict.
More from a parliamentary cretin
Chris #2, maybe I am paranoid and I have admitted that PMThaksin is the last person I politically trust (well, as much as President Bush). Jim#3, you can go on polishing Thaksin’s “shiny side” and maybe you are just OK with government and business with their hands in each others pockets in general. I am not. I’d like to hear what you think about PMThaksin’s War on Drugs, Krue-sae, Takbai, Sabai-Yoi etc. – for me, Thaksin’s darkest side (Blood for Votes).
Fonzi#5 “Also, this notion that Thaksin closed the public space post-2003 is pure bunk…” Were you really living in Thailand mate? I will not waste time with the very long list of specific issues concerning government, army and Maleenond owned media outlets – mainly TV and radio that reaches the majority of the Thai population (Jonfernquest also mentioned how Thaksin manipulates private media). As the blog raises the effectiveness of parliament, I will mention one that still riles me – one of the first censure debate against TRT ministers by the Democrats. PMThaksin declared that week he will use government money to buy Liverpool FC which totally drowned the parliament debate and made it irrelevant in all medias.
As a Thai, I am not only angry because I am a Liverpool fan. I am very angry because PMThaksin had no respect for parliament, for the 1997 Constitution, for democracy. He gave democracy such a bad name that many Thais are willing to consider the less democratic form of election/selection. They flock in droves to Sondhi’s and then PAD rallies and ASTV because they feel that the much more accessible mainstream media does not tell them the truth.
One verdict on Thaksin
Bangkok Pundit, I’m not sure about details myself – and I just learnt that the Burmese Junta used the Thai government loan to buy services from ShinSat, a subsidiary of ShinCorp – and not ShinCorp. It surely would be another case of the Master drowning in shallow water if his company was specified in the contract – but remember, technically, it is not his company, but his children’s. Did he run ShinCorp through his children as he is running the Thai government through his nominees in PPP? That will be hard to prove in court, hence the court did not accept cases that accused Thaksin of not strictly following his ban from political activities (impossible to enforce?). The next question is whether there was a tender for the contract or the Burmese Junta just chose ShinSat (wink wink with PMThaksin?)… And that could be the big loophole here.
For me this is the same old story. Godfathers are only convicted of much lesser crimes and the same goes to Capitalist Mafias who flees their crimes and live life of luxury…
Talking about Halliburton in Iraq, I also did a quick search and found this interesting article – the EXIM Bank loan to Myanmar gets more complex and compelling!
“US twist to Thaksin court case”
in
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JH02Ae01.html
Southeast Asia
What happened on 7/10/2008?
I think the Supreme Administrative Court’s Criminal Division for Political Office Holders is to be commended for a very sound and just judgement yesterday. Clearly it was a serious conflict of interests for a prime minister’s wife to buy land from the FIDF and the the court cut straight through the flabby technical arguments put forward by Thaksin’s defence. Nevertheless the court was very fair in not convicting Thaksin of corruption and giving him a relatively light sentence. He could be out in less than a year for good behaviour. The court was also very fair in acquitting Potjaman and not confiscating the land or the funds used to purchase it.
Let’s hope the Thai government will procede quickly to lodge a cogent case for extradition with the British authorities in respect of this case and Potjaman’s tax fraud conviction, in spite of the current premier’s conflict of loyalties.
More from a parliamentary cretin
South Korea a non-democracy?
More from a parliamentary cretin
Jim Taylor: “Corruption accusations against Thaksin are just that: politically motivated “accusations”. If it is not clear now as to what is going on – you never will get the picture.”
No Jim. All I can say is get back in your archaeology pit and stop being so arrogant.
Thaksin pushed the media around. If they didn’t publish the news he wanted, no more advertising revenues. Lost livelihoods. Angry people….
Accentuate the rural-urban divides to gain votes. Angry people. ..
Sue people for defamation. Angry people….etc
As for the Thai telecoms industry, you should really read the article in Pasuk and Baker’s Thai capital because this is exactly what you are going to see in a case that is coming up. The article on rent-seeking in the same volume documents how Thaksin rearranged the chairs as far as rent-seeking goes. What do you get when you realign the rents? You become the master, the patron, with a whole new set of clients, and a whole lot of disenfranchised people who are your blood enemies, who collectively want to see you hung out to dry. What is this?
A recipe for a divided society.
Sidh is right. Western academics and media are biased and do not foster objective enquiry and debate. They ignore the blaring examples of two very successful Asian non-democracies to the north: China and South Korea. I am glad I am not a part of their charade.
More from a parliamentary cretin
I have the highest respect for Professor Connors, and I have read most everything he has written regarding Thai politics, including his book.
In this case, I think he is misrepresenting the situation.
I have scoured so much foreign media concerning this conflict and I have yet to read one piece that brings it all down to Thaksin was only legitimate because of an election or he should be forgiven his excesses because he had a majority in parliament. Normally, Connor’s academic pieces are well-documented. Here, the documentation is sorely lacking.
From where I sit, the crux of foreign criticism concerning this conflict doesn’t so fit so neatly into Connor’s “Thaksin good, PAD bad” paradigm but rather they argue that this conflict should be resolved within the realm of the rule of law, politics and liberal democratic values. I see nothing sanctimonious about that. Further, I don’t find it so contemptible for the foreign press to point out that the PAD side completely rejects liberal democracy and the rule of law and embraces military rule and has overt fascist tendencies.
Further, almost every single piece that describes this conflict in the foreign media is prefaced with a laundry list of Thaksin’s alleged crimes.
I have not documented every single foreign article/column on this Thai crisis, but I have certainly documented many of them, and anybody can go to my website, go to Bangkok Pundit, go to The Economist, Wall Street Journal, the Australian papers, the English papers, the European papers, the regional papers and the BBC and read for themselves that Thaksin has not been given a free pass. You can even go back before the coup and read articles that were extremely critical of Thaksin in the foreign press.
Also, this notion that Thaksin closed the public space post-2003 is pure bunk. At this point in time, much of the mainstream Thai media, the conventional wisdom academics and social activists were turning against him and making their voices well-known in the public sphere. There were anti-Thaksin teach-ins and seminars all over the country.
I remember the weekly SondhiLimfests in Lumpini Park during this time. I lived right to down the street. The police weren’t shutting him down. The PAD had almost as much a free reign before the coup as they do now.
Dozens of anti-Thaksin books were written during this time as well.
So I don’t know what evidence Professor Connors has to support the premise of his column. Whatever it is, I’d like to see it.
More from a parliamentary cretin
Thanks to Andrew for drawing attention to my piece on “parliamentary cretinism”. I’m not sure that my views on this are of interest to the NM audience, but here goes.
It is unfortunate that Andrew has chosen to fully decontextualise the argument I make, and to draw mistaken generalisations about my political position regarding parliaments and the electoral process in general. It is the second time he’s written to question my support of democracy. I do have a critical position on democracy, but I do value the political space that is generated in open societies for political competition and debate. Such spaces are meaningful and need not only be the playthings of cynical elites – a view Andrew attributes to me as if that is all I have to say. Indeed it is the erosion of that space in Thailand from around 2003 that has resulted in a political divide that threatens to break into open violence.
My main point in the article was to highlight the dubious grounds on which commentators argue for a parliamentary solution to the current crisis when both sides are playing with the rules of the game. I was not specifically targeting New Mandala – although some of its commentary certainly fits the description. Does Andrew really think that his and other people’s calls for “government as usual” will settle a fundamental disquiet among actors in Thailand with the way state power is now being used for personal purposes (just as it was during the coup and pre-coup period).
This seems a reasonable point to make, when most commentary whitewashes the so-called democratic pro-Thaksin forces. Andrew’s argument, and much of his commentary on New Mandala and elsewhere fails to engage with the issue of how a parliamentary opposition and an extra-parliamentary opposition is supposed to deal with an incumbent government that is using the powers of incumbency to change the rules of the game in a way that would permanently marginalise oppositional forces – I am speaking of the Thaksin period from about 2003 onwards. Andrew wants to insist on constitutional niceties in an analysis that has little regard for power play. The post-coup period is now so completely divided because of the politicised constitutional engineering of the anti-Thaksin camp and the fact that the power struggle of 2006 remains unresolved that both sides are now playing behind the scene, strategising outside of parliament.
My point is not that elections and parliament don’t matter, it is rather that contemporary commentary that refuses to engage with the murkier issues of political power in Thailand ends up being tendential and assumes that there is a workable system of institutional power in Thailand. When you hold that position in the current context you are placed squarely on one side of the debate, which also leaves you downplaying, overlooking and rationalising the anti-democratic behaviour of the side you implicitly or explicitly support, while all the while drawing attention to the anti-democratic behaviour of the opposition.
The use of the term parliamentary cretinism in this context is to point out just how little recognition pro-Thaksin commentary gives to the murkier side of its trumpeted democratic hero. Whether that is bad faith or political persuasion, who can say?
As to the idea that I find parliament ‘meaningless’. My own position on solutions to political struggle in Thailand – very irrelevant and marginal to the current debates – is one in which parliament would indeed be a meaningful arena of struggle, in which political leaders were subject to processes of accountability, which social forces outside the elite were organised around relevant interests and took parliamentary form, and in which there were no veto powers within the military or the palace, and where processes of law functioned in as impartial a way as possible. The emergence of that kind of parliamentary democracy will not come from supporting a bunch of reactionaries on both sides of the divide in the name of “law” or “democratic mandate”. The support for either side is to gloss over how each is positioning itself in a way that does not hold to the rules of the game. Those rules will become meaningful when there are important social forces outside of the elite who transform constitutional nominalism into something real.
One verdict on Thaksin
Sidh said Here, PMThaksin has another comparable case pending when his government gave a loan to the Burmese Junta (through EXIM Bank) to buy telecommuncation equipments from his company ShinCorp. As with Halliburton, there’s no tender and ShinCorp, I understand, was specified.
I would be interested to see where you read that about Shin Corp being mentioned as I haven’t read anything which says that. Some 600 million of the 4 billion baht was used to purchase telecommunications equipment. If there is evidence of a quid pro quo and Shin Corp was specified then Thaksin should rightly be convicted.
One verdict on Thaksin
Truth? or propaganda Boonchuay? sounds like Sondhi’s spin on truth. Just because Thaksin is rich does not mean he is guilty. He has legitimate concerns about the interpretation of truth in Thailand today by the amaat/Democrat Party/military alliance-against-democracy. I suggest you read other sources of information other than from the Manager Group or ASTV.
More from a parliamentary cretin
Nonsense Sidh S.: give us some hard evidence on that statement; especially PPP’s povocation! That is the last thing PPP would want to do and have nothing to gain and much to lose (even a coup which would not go in their favour). PPP is concerned about it’s continued and legitimate existence as a viable political party. Look what happened to TRT – & just because the old guard wanted to get Thaksin! Corruption accusations against Thaksin are just that: politically motivated “accusations”. If it is not clear now as to what is going on – you never will get the picture.
What happened on 7/10/2008?
Dear Mr. Nick Nostitz
I have passed your article to the National Human Rights Commissioner Surasee Kosolnawin, who chaired the
agency’s fact-finding subcommittee on the 7/10.
He would appreciate if you please contact him and provide
the information you have to have a more complete fact
of the 7/10.
His contact email is: [email protected]
Hope to hear your response.
jongrak kittiworakarn
One verdict on Thaksin
Thaksin has so much money that he can pay so many people to express their opinions to support him include British Government related agencies, such as British diplomats in Thailand, and BBC.
Besides many British companies are doing business in Thailand. So they have reasons to please Thaksin. Since Samuk, and Somchai’s governement are under his control.
Please read other sources of of information You ‘ll know the truth.