Regarding the personality cult of the opposition leader, see Gustaaf Houtman’s account “Sacrilizing or Demonizing Democracy? Aung San Suu Kyi’s Personality Cult” in Burma at the turn of the 21st Century.
On the idiocy of Burma’s generals I think that we need to look beyond the simple fact of their continuance in power. True, they have played the Suu Kyi card so continually, so predictably and so effectively over the past 15+ years that it appears as though they’ve figured out how to manipulate their “obtuse, gullible or incompetent” diplomatic adversaries. However, the considerable tension within the country in the form of ‘everyday resistance’ by ordinary folk and low morality, dissent and desertion from within the Tatmadaw points to their incompetence in pursuing those aims which they themselves have defined (i.e. national unity and Tatmadaw unity, economic development and the military’s long-term political dominance). If they actually fed their frontline soldiers and tried to address the livelihood concerns of rural people, they could likely go a long way in reducing internal opposition to military rule. However, in their arrogance and unwillingness to listen and respond to criticism (even from within the armed forces) they have demonstrated their idiocy and ensured that prosperity will never come about for the majority of people in the country and widespread support for the military will never occur. Thus, their long-term staying power will remain shaky.
I the German language forum nittaya.de a member reported that the Crown Prince was at a town festival in the Munich suburb Erding. In a later posting was a link to this photo of his plane parked at Munich airport.
[…] details but I expect many readers will be keen to learn more. Last year there was word (reported here on New Mandala) that the prince was receiving flight training in Sweden. Is this the same […]
1.)If a soldier is charged with insubordination, the soldier is open to all other charges – so at worse, they’re open to being charged with murder.
I think you and Srithanonchai are taking a small part of what I said and misinterpreting it. I don’t deny that soldiers acting in wartime can be charged with murder, if the circumstances of the act are deemed unlawful. What I was trying to do is point out that, from a legal standpoint, there is a difference is culpability between a homocide that resulted from a purposeful and knowing act and one that resulted from recklessness and negligence. I’m not trying to predict any outcome, just trying to construct a metaphor to frame my arguments.
I brought up the example of Krue Sae to highlight a difference between what happened there and what happened at Thammasat and Tak Bai. That is, the victims of Oct. 6th and of Tak Bai were civilians, whereas, the victims of Krue Sae were combatants. Also, you are a bit confused in your second and third points. The terms “enemy combatant” and “non-combatant” were used in both the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions; however the term “unprivileged combatant” or “unlawful combatant,” which I think you are referring to, in American law, dates back to a Supreme Court decision in 1942, recent as far as the Hague and Geneva Conventions go.
As for whether the victims of Krue Sae where unlawful combatants or non-combatants, and whether your fourth and fifth points, which I agree with, apply to the events at Krue Sae, that is a valid mode of debate; however, I would like to reiterate that was not the main point of my previous argument. I think there is a good amount of evidence to support classifying the victims of Krue Sae as some sort of combatant, due to the fact that they were armed and were fleeing after having just performed an act of guerilla warfare.
Points six and seven reek of argumentum ad hominem terpem americensis, or the “Ugly American Fallacy,” i.e. “You’re American, therefore your argument is invalid.” Nor, do I assert that the raid on the mosque was the only option available. Indeed, I said the commanders of the raid could be charged with insubordination as the Defence Minister ordered them not to raid the mosque. However, I do feel some sympathy for the commanders, as they were conducting the seige, they were being surrounded by a hostile crowd, growing even more hostile by the minute. All in all, the whole incident is filled with the messiness and legal uncertanity that characterize these kinds of conflicts. If this ever did went to court or court-martial, I wouldn’t envy any lawyer in this case.
Anyway, thanks for the link to the podcast. I look forward to listening to it when I get the chance.
Behaving and demanding absolute allegiance and obedience like an autocrat does not equate to a personality cult any more than Ne Win had managed in his time. He at least enjoyed the aura of being a senior member of the legendary Thirty Comrades that formed the nucleus of the modern Burmese military during the fight for independence. Than Shwe has no standing outside the army, and the USDA is made up of people bought, bribed and compelled to join if they want to keep their jobs.
Single-minded pursuit of power, cunning, scheming and plotting, and staying ahead of the game with a strong survival instinct are the main characteristics on top of their principal asset – control of the military. Perhaps it’s the other way round – perhaps it’s their diplomatic adversaries that have proved rather obtuse, gullible or incompetent. It really is a no-brainer.
Kurlantzick and Farrelly are correct in pointing out that the Tatdmadaw leadership might be a lot less stupid than most portrayals of them suggest. But it is important to focus on what may be behind this image of stupidity. The sheer callousness of the Tatmadaw regime towards the Burmese people (including regular Tatmadaw soldiers) is horrifying, but at the same time it has been and continues to be an effective strategy. This contributes to an image of them as brutes, both thuggish and stupid. Harping on their unsophistication is also a way of getting at the regime – not an actually effective one – for both exiles and people in Burma.
Despite the value of Kurlantzick pointing out that maybe the generals aren’t as stupid as they seem there are problems with some of the other points his analysis argues for. Namely, that Burma is becoming a totalitarian state and that there is a personality cult around Than Shwe.
These two concepts are linked in several articles Kurlantzick has put out (for example — http://tiny.cc/uZc1X or http://tiny.cc/cNOR0). Thus in he writes in the Boston Globe Sep 30 2007: ” Than Shwe has also begun dominating state-controlled television, which portrays him as a godlike figure blessing pagodas around the country. He has increased support for the Union Solidarity and Development Association, or USDA, a state-sponsored youth group reminiscent of Mussolini’s fascist youth organizations.” In the Washington Post of April 23 2006 he wrote: “Ten years ago, Burma was an authoritarian nation, but it lacked the strange personality cult of totalitarian states such as North Korea and Turkmenistan. At the time, Than Shwe was just one of three generals heading the ruling Burmese junta[.] …Than Shwe, 73, has pushed out rivals and consolidated power. Despite his shellacked hair, wide jowls and thick glasses, he has turned himself into an object of Dear Leader-like adoration.”
It might be debatable as to whether or not Burma is a totalitarian state. But TV coverage is not dominated by Than Shwe as an individual nor is there any personality cult around him. Sure, he and other Tatmadaw leaders are show “giving instructions” for irrigation projects, physic nut plantations and the like, as well as making donations to religious institutions. And Than Shwe’s picture hangs in the post office, but that is not a personality cult. And if a real sense of ideology, perhaps related to a personalization of leadership, is part of what makes up a totalitarian state, then Burma is not one. In fact, as unpopular as it may be to say it, the best know (and not undeserved) personality cult in Burma is that of the opposition leader.
The point being that the coverage of Burma is too often shallow and more intent of perpetuating a simplistic view of complex events. This is equally true in discussions of Burma’s foreign relations as it is in domestic politics.
I don’t think they ever left… A stark example is Bangkok where there are plenty of them! A few weeks ago one may even have spotted them surrounding the Government House…
I think that Jon’s, examples of the textile mills show very well the potential benefits to the regular folk in Burma of economic investment and the harmfulness of trade sanctions. However, two other cases of western investment are also relevant here to present a more complete picture. These are:
1. The buyout by Chevron (as Moe Aung mentioned above) of UniCal’s share of the Yadana gas pipeline. See the multiple Earthrights International reports including the most recent The Human Cost of Energy.
“Chevron and its consortium partners continue to rely on the Burmese army for pipeline security, and those forces continue to conscript thousands of villagers for forced labor, and to commit torture, rape, murder and other serious abuses in the course of their operations. Due to its involvement in the Yadana Project, Chevron remains vulnerable to liability in U.S. courts for the abuses committed by these security forces.”
2. The Monywa Copper Project under a joint venture between Canadian-based Ivanhoe Mines and the Burmese State-run Number One Mining Enterprise. See Environmental Governance of Mining in Burma.
“The human rights violations and environmental degradation around the mining industry in Burma are similar to those happening in other extractive industries in the country, and they are indicative of the state of environmental governance: unfair and inefficient.”
Also relevant are Sean Turnell’s words on the post-cyclone situation and the SPDC’s financial returns from (primarily) extractive industries.
“The Burmese regime is currently earning just over $100 million every single month. If we have a look at the public accounts, what we see is an incredible accounting trick–the regime has logged into the public accounts the gas revenue according to the official exchange rate, which undervalues it by 200 times. Effectively, that means that $3 billion is sitting somewhere. Now where it’s sitting is the interesting question, but what we do know is that it’s sitting somewhere where Burmese people can’t get access to it.
So either it’s sitting offshore or it’s sitting in the accounts of the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank or the Central Bank. But it looks like it’s only accessible by Than Shwe and perhaps one or two others; it’s not being used for the benefit of the Burmese people, which of course is critical at the moment. This sort of money can do an enormous amount with regard to the cyclone disaster, but it seems to be deliberately withheld.”
So, it does seem that there is a range of possible outcomes from economic investment from the clearly beneficial (as in the case of the textile mills) to the non-beneficial and outright harmful (in terms of human rights, the environment, and long term economic growth – primarily in extractive industries). So, while isolation is (as Jon has clearly shown) ‘bad’, not just any form of economic investment is necessarily ‘good’. But, as has been pointed out, perhaps I understand too little of 20th economic history, and so as some suggest “The only thing worse than being exploited, is not being exploited.”
& apologies for my poorly worded response, but my sentiment is the same. You cannot predict a ruling in a court of law, so I’m not sure what your trying to do by predicting an outcome.
1) If a soldier is charged with insubordination, the soldier is open to all other charges – so at worse, they’re open to being charged with murder.
2) Recognized by all conventions of international law? Enemy combatants … What? Is this law and order law?
3) ‘Enemy combatants’ has yet to be fully defined in international laws. It’s a term recently used and as you should have seen, not very effective in relation to it’s motive.
4) I can expect that state prompted murder is still murder, and that those in control of the state are dealt with accordingly for being murderers.
5) I cannot expect that soldiers who are being ordered to carry out the supposed will of the people, are burdened with more guilt than they already have.
6) The events at Krue Se were hardly the last resort and may have been given precedent by your government.
7) Maybe for you, the state is above the law? Is this American-international law we’re talking of?
As Srithanonchai says, this is well bellow your usual standard of commenting?
They are thugs, and they are none too bright, but having guns and being willing to use them without hesitation usually trumps brilliance and sophistication. It’s kind of like that ancient Greek(?) saying, “The fox knows many tricks, the hedgehog knows but one, but it is a very good trick.”
And while they aren’t bright, they do have a criminal cunning. If you want good account of what I think they’re like, read the section on Ceausescu in chapter “Transylvanian Voices” in Roberrt Kaplan’s book “Balkan Ghosts”.
Is relying on the chinese giant… a proof of “intelligence” and “sophistication” ?
We can doubt it.
As for the “survival skills” again… it’s dictator 101 if I may say.
Kim Jong Ill seems much smarter.. This little guy understood very well that… building the bomb was the best life insurance and bargaining tool… even against the direct interests of China…
Now this is serious business and stamina (and “vista”).
On a pure rational level, he did the right thing. The smart thing to do. Exactly like Iran by the way (the discussion about bomb or not bomb is surreal… From a deterrence point of view, the bomb is the only way to go… the denegations of the mollahs are laughable. If they are rational, they need the bomb, absolutly not to wipe out Israel, but just to protect their regime).
But the burmese generals ?
Those guys are here because China needs them… here. And they are much more obedient…
We can argue though : it might be the… ultimate proof of political intelligence… 😉
Jon, enlighten us how Western/US capital is different from Asian/Chinese capital. You’ve certainly invoked the imagery of the Satanic Mills of the Industrial Revolution there when you put yourself in the shoes of those workers, though I’m sure it’s not nearly as bad as in those Victorian mills.
Like many others in the same lobby you would want the US to engage rather than isolate the Burmese regime. Chevron’s continuing to do just that taking advantage of a loophole in the law, and we are not talking peanuts here. Also the isolation is nowhere near as bad as in Ne Win’s time 20 years ago either – you only have to look at the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis how connected to the outside world things are now – although I do agree it is far better for Burmese to be connected far and wide in trade and commerce and not limited to their own region. I’m no fan of the US but I think you are being a little unfair when you lay the blame at her door for Burma’s isolation since we all know that it was self-imposed until the SLORC/SPDC era.
It’s what international capital regardless of its origin can do, it’s potential for both good and bad that you need to see through and have a healthy scepticism of, but you seem to believe in some kind of economic determinism with too rosy a view of US capital. I guess Burma could in time join the ranks of South Korea and Singapore going down that road if, and it’s a big if, the generals have the necessary intelligence, competence and vision, because as you yourself have pointed out often enough they’ll still be around for the foreseeable future. BTW are they not already filthy rich after opening up the country when they chose to?
So how a country’s leadership handles international capital, with its potential not only to do good but to hold a country to ransom and to subject its people to the vagaries of their own new world order by dint of its enormous financial and economic clout, is of paramount importance. As Mrs T would say, once you are in deep enough ‘you can’t buck the market’.
Socio-economic consequences of engagement or the lack of it are essential considerations but a political stand against blatant and relentless human rights abuses by the state had to be made. And yes, making a U turn, despite no sign of any real progress in the plight of a very high profile political prisoner such as Aung San Suu Kyi, is well nigh impossible. Being a hypocrite is one thing, to be exposed as one is quite another, isn’t it?
Like you said, Asians helping Asians may prove beneficial in more ways than one. Aung San sought help for military training and arms to fight the British from the Chinese communists but got it from the invading Japanese instead. He wasn’t too fussy so long as it served the purpose. Just depends how you manage it as a means to an end.
Sensationalism and spin doctoring (political economy?) aside, the Thai economy will succede or fail regardless of the political conflict, due in part to the government’s failure to address the real issues in the first place.
“Krue Sae, in case anyone was wondering, would be the totally justified, albeit unpopular, killing of enemy combatants by lawful combatants as recognized by all conventions of international law.” > This seems to be well below your usual level of reflexion.
I think you misunderstand; allow me to clarify. In my previous post, in my murder/manslaughter metaphor I was looking at the events from how they would be viewed in a strict legal sense. That is, if those involved in the events were tried in a court of law. I already stated that I agree with Sidh, that Oct. 6, Tak Bai, Krue Sae, and the War on Drugs are all examples of egregious abuse of state power.
All I was trying to get at is that the soliders involved in the attack on Krue Sae would, at worse, be charged with insubordination for violating a direct order from the Defence Minister. We cannot expect soliders attacking armed militants to be charged with murder or manslaughter.
Kuson: “I trust the PAD leaders much more than Thaksin. I remember Chamlong’s Integrity when he was governor. I remember Dr. Jermsak . I remember Sondhi.”
Thaksin might not deserve trust. But do the others? I leave aside “Jermsak” as he is not a key member of PAD. But what of Chamlong and Sondhi? Chamlong’s role in 1976 and as a mercenary soldier might be neglected in order to trust him. Sondhi as an opportunist and bankrupt might also need to be forgotten, along with the apparent reason for him turning against Thaksin…. Trustworthy? Maybe not. But your view seems to be relativist in that you have a preference for which scoundrels are less worthy than others. Just some thoughts on who we choose to bed down with….
That is a tough case to make, all most all of the Asian countries are facing the same problem. Vietnam and Indonesia don’t have a govermental crisis, yet are in worse shape than Thailand.
If there is a case to be made about a crisis in Thai government it is that the elected and their selecteds has the inability to run the country. A better group of bumblers and stumblers couldn’t be found with a world-wide talentless search.
Self preservation over national preservation is a one sided affair, which lacks a second party needed for a conflict.
Were the government capable of and were they to decide to address the economy, then a debate over whether the street demonstrations have or had an effect on the Thai economy might be a reasonable topic. But, until such time as the government tackles the country’s economy there is no way to access the political strife’s contribution.
Sensationalism and spin doctoring (political economy?) aside, the Thai economy will succede or fail regardless of the political conflict, due in part to the government’s failure to address the real issues in the first place.
12 July 2008
When you use words like “rubbish,” it kind of prejudices a response, but I will try.
Don’t now say that people who try to see Takbai realistically are being called apologists. That ignores the earlier comment. The thrust was that trying to rationalize the intended hatred and resultant violence at Takbai by commenting that a realistic look would somehow magically reveal that the intentions were not deadly is sticking your head in the sand.
I imagine Chalerm’s son didn’t mean to kill that cop in the club, either?
Death here in Thailand is an unfortunate price tag for legitimate protests, and strangely so in a nation that wrongfully prides itself on being Buddhist. While the country may claim to be Buddhist, its overall social practices are anything but.Lots of show and lip service, little real commitment on the streets, so to speak.
The disregard for life goes beyond being an apologist. An apologist is aware of the difference between right and wrong but feels some misdirected need to find an excuse for someone else’s mean streaks. When you aren’t even aware of the difference between right and wrong, being an apologist takes on quite a different connotation.
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Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”?
Regarding the personality cult of the opposition leader, see Gustaaf Houtman’s account “Sacrilizing or Demonizing Democracy? Aung San Suu Kyi’s Personality Cult” in Burma at the turn of the 21st Century.
On the idiocy of Burma’s generals I think that we need to look beyond the simple fact of their continuance in power. True, they have played the Suu Kyi card so continually, so predictably and so effectively over the past 15+ years that it appears as though they’ve figured out how to manipulate their “obtuse, gullible or incompetent” diplomatic adversaries. However, the considerable tension within the country in the form of ‘everyday resistance’ by ordinary folk and low morality, dissent and desertion from within the Tatmadaw points to their incompetence in pursuing those aims which they themselves have defined (i.e. national unity and Tatmadaw unity, economic development and the military’s long-term political dominance). If they actually fed their frontline soldiers and tried to address the livelihood concerns of rural people, they could likely go a long way in reducing internal opposition to military rule. However, in their arrogance and unwillingness to listen and respond to criticism (even from within the armed forces) they have demonstrated their idiocy and ensured that prosperity will never come about for the majority of people in the country and widespread support for the military will never occur. Thus, their long-term staying power will remain shaky.
Crown Prince scouting European airports
I the German language forum nittaya.de a member reported that the Crown Prince was at a town festival in the Munich suburb Erding. In a later posting was a link to this photo of his plane parked at Munich airport.
Thailand’s crown prince
[…] details but I expect many readers will be keen to learn more. Last year there was word (reported here on New Mandala) that the prince was receiving flight training in Sweden. Is this the same […]
Ji Ungpakorn on the “carnival of reaction”
re: Grasshopper
I think you and Srithanonchai are taking a small part of what I said and misinterpreting it. I don’t deny that soldiers acting in wartime can be charged with murder, if the circumstances of the act are deemed unlawful. What I was trying to do is point out that, from a legal standpoint, there is a difference is culpability between a homocide that resulted from a purposeful and knowing act and one that resulted from recklessness and negligence. I’m not trying to predict any outcome, just trying to construct a metaphor to frame my arguments.
I brought up the example of Krue Sae to highlight a difference between what happened there and what happened at Thammasat and Tak Bai. That is, the victims of Oct. 6th and of Tak Bai were civilians, whereas, the victims of Krue Sae were combatants. Also, you are a bit confused in your second and third points. The terms “enemy combatant” and “non-combatant” were used in both the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions; however the term “unprivileged combatant” or “unlawful combatant,” which I think you are referring to, in American law, dates back to a Supreme Court decision in 1942, recent as far as the Hague and Geneva Conventions go.
As for whether the victims of Krue Sae where unlawful combatants or non-combatants, and whether your fourth and fifth points, which I agree with, apply to the events at Krue Sae, that is a valid mode of debate; however, I would like to reiterate that was not the main point of my previous argument. I think there is a good amount of evidence to support classifying the victims of Krue Sae as some sort of combatant, due to the fact that they were armed and were fleeing after having just performed an act of guerilla warfare.
Points six and seven reek of argumentum ad hominem terpem americensis, or the “Ugly American Fallacy,” i.e. “You’re American, therefore your argument is invalid.” Nor, do I assert that the raid on the mosque was the only option available. Indeed, I said the commanders of the raid could be charged with insubordination as the Defence Minister ordered them not to raid the mosque. However, I do feel some sympathy for the commanders, as they were conducting the seige, they were being surrounded by a hostile crowd, growing even more hostile by the minute. All in all, the whole incident is filled with the messiness and legal uncertanity that characterize these kinds of conflicts. If this ever did went to court or court-martial, I wouldn’t envy any lawyer in this case.
Anyway, thanks for the link to the podcast. I look forward to listening to it when I get the chance.
Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”?
[…] XHTML ← Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”? […]
Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”?
Behaving and demanding absolute allegiance and obedience like an autocrat does not equate to a personality cult any more than Ne Win had managed in his time. He at least enjoyed the aura of being a senior member of the legendary Thirty Comrades that formed the nucleus of the modern Burmese military during the fight for independence. Than Shwe has no standing outside the army, and the USDA is made up of people bought, bribed and compelled to join if they want to keep their jobs.
Single-minded pursuit of power, cunning, scheming and plotting, and staying ahead of the game with a strong survival instinct are the main characteristics on top of their principal asset – control of the military. Perhaps it’s the other way round – perhaps it’s their diplomatic adversaries that have proved rather obtuse, gullible or incompetent. It really is a no-brainer.
Ji Ungpakorn on the “carnival of reaction”
SSM: Ok. Sorry, I did not read the entire thread.
FGA: I’m lovin’ it!
Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”?
Kurlantzick and Farrelly are correct in pointing out that the Tatdmadaw leadership might be a lot less stupid than most portrayals of them suggest. But it is important to focus on what may be behind this image of stupidity. The sheer callousness of the Tatmadaw regime towards the Burmese people (including regular Tatmadaw soldiers) is horrifying, but at the same time it has been and continues to be an effective strategy. This contributes to an image of them as brutes, both thuggish and stupid. Harping on their unsophistication is also a way of getting at the regime – not an actually effective one – for both exiles and people in Burma.
Despite the value of Kurlantzick pointing out that maybe the generals aren’t as stupid as they seem there are problems with some of the other points his analysis argues for. Namely, that Burma is becoming a totalitarian state and that there is a personality cult around Than Shwe.
These two concepts are linked in several articles Kurlantzick has put out (for example — http://tiny.cc/uZc1X or http://tiny.cc/cNOR0). Thus in he writes in the Boston Globe Sep 30 2007: ” Than Shwe has also begun dominating state-controlled television, which portrays him as a godlike figure blessing pagodas around the country. He has increased support for the Union Solidarity and Development Association, or USDA, a state-sponsored youth group reminiscent of Mussolini’s fascist youth organizations.” In the Washington Post of April 23 2006 he wrote: “Ten years ago, Burma was an authoritarian nation, but it lacked the strange personality cult of totalitarian states such as North Korea and Turkmenistan. At the time, Than Shwe was just one of three generals heading the ruling Burmese junta[.] …Than Shwe, 73, has pushed out rivals and consolidated power. Despite his shellacked hair, wide jowls and thick glasses, he has turned himself into an object of Dear Leader-like adoration.”
It might be debatable as to whether or not Burma is a totalitarian state. But TV coverage is not dominated by Than Shwe as an individual nor is there any personality cult around him. Sure, he and other Tatmadaw leaders are show “giving instructions” for irrigation projects, physic nut plantations and the like, as well as making donations to religious institutions. And Than Shwe’s picture hangs in the post office, but that is not a personality cult. And if a real sense of ideology, perhaps related to a personalization of leadership, is part of what makes up a totalitarian state, then Burma is not one. In fact, as unpopular as it may be to say it, the best know (and not undeserved) personality cult in Burma is that of the opposition leader.
The point being that the coverage of Burma is too often shallow and more intent of perpetuating a simplistic view of complex events. This is equally true in discussions of Burma’s foreign relations as it is in domestic politics.
A buffalo come-back?
“A buffalo come-back?”
I don’t think they ever left… A stark example is Bangkok where there are plenty of them! A few weeks ago one may even have spotted them surrounding the Government House…
Ashley South on post-cyclone Burma
I think that Jon’s, examples of the textile mills show very well the potential benefits to the regular folk in Burma of economic investment and the harmfulness of trade sanctions. However, two other cases of western investment are also relevant here to present a more complete picture. These are:
1. The buyout by Chevron (as Moe Aung mentioned above) of UniCal’s share of the Yadana gas pipeline. See the multiple Earthrights International reports including the most recent The Human Cost of Energy.
2. The Monywa Copper Project under a joint venture between Canadian-based Ivanhoe Mines and the Burmese State-run Number One Mining Enterprise. See Environmental Governance of Mining in Burma.
Also relevant are Sean Turnell’s words on the post-cyclone situation and the SPDC’s financial returns from (primarily) extractive industries.
So, it does seem that there is a range of possible outcomes from economic investment from the clearly beneficial (as in the case of the textile mills) to the non-beneficial and outright harmful (in terms of human rights, the environment, and long term economic growth – primarily in extractive industries). So, while isolation is (as Jon has clearly shown) ‘bad’, not just any form of economic investment is necessarily ‘good’. But, as has been pointed out, perhaps I understand too little of 20th economic history, and so as some suggest “The only thing worse than being exploited, is not being exploited.”
Ji Ungpakorn on the “carnival of reaction”
LSS, http://www.anu.edu.au/discoveranu/content/podcasts/us_military_commissions/
& apologies for my poorly worded response, but my sentiment is the same. You cannot predict a ruling in a court of law, so I’m not sure what your trying to do by predicting an outcome.
Ji Ungpakorn on the “carnival of reaction”
1) If a soldier is charged with insubordination, the soldier is open to all other charges – so at worse, they’re open to being charged with murder.
2) Recognized by all conventions of international law? Enemy combatants … What? Is this law and order law?
3) ‘Enemy combatants’ has yet to be fully defined in international laws. It’s a term recently used and as you should have seen, not very effective in relation to it’s motive.
4) I can expect that state prompted murder is still murder, and that those in control of the state are dealt with accordingly for being murderers.
5) I cannot expect that soldiers who are being ordered to carry out the supposed will of the people, are burdened with more guilt than they already have.
6) The events at Krue Se were hardly the last resort and may have been given precedent by your government.
7) Maybe for you, the state is above the law? Is this American-international law we’re talking of?
As Srithanonchai says, this is well bellow your usual standard of commenting?
Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”?
They are thugs, and they are none too bright, but having guns and being willing to use them without hesitation usually trumps brilliance and sophistication. It’s kind of like that ancient Greek(?) saying, “The fox knows many tricks, the hedgehog knows but one, but it is a very good trick.”
And while they aren’t bright, they do have a criminal cunning. If you want good account of what I think they’re like, read the section on Ceausescu in chapter “Transylvanian Voices” in Roberrt Kaplan’s book “Balkan Ghosts”.
Are today’s Burmese generals simply “ignorant” and “unsophisticated”?
Is relying on the chinese giant… a proof of “intelligence” and “sophistication” ?
We can doubt it.
As for the “survival skills” again… it’s dictator 101 if I may say.
Kim Jong Ill seems much smarter.. This little guy understood very well that… building the bomb was the best life insurance and bargaining tool… even against the direct interests of China…
Now this is serious business and stamina (and “vista”).
On a pure rational level, he did the right thing. The smart thing to do. Exactly like Iran by the way (the discussion about bomb or not bomb is surreal… From a deterrence point of view, the bomb is the only way to go… the denegations of the mollahs are laughable. If they are rational, they need the bomb, absolutly not to wipe out Israel, but just to protect their regime).
But the burmese generals ?
Those guys are here because China needs them… here. And they are much more obedient…
We can argue though : it might be the… ultimate proof of political intelligence… 😉
Ashley South on post-cyclone Burma
Jon, enlighten us how Western/US capital is different from Asian/Chinese capital. You’ve certainly invoked the imagery of the Satanic Mills of the Industrial Revolution there when you put yourself in the shoes of those workers, though I’m sure it’s not nearly as bad as in those Victorian mills.
Like many others in the same lobby you would want the US to engage rather than isolate the Burmese regime. Chevron’s continuing to do just that taking advantage of a loophole in the law, and we are not talking peanuts here. Also the isolation is nowhere near as bad as in Ne Win’s time 20 years ago either – you only have to look at the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis how connected to the outside world things are now – although I do agree it is far better for Burmese to be connected far and wide in trade and commerce and not limited to their own region. I’m no fan of the US but I think you are being a little unfair when you lay the blame at her door for Burma’s isolation since we all know that it was self-imposed until the SLORC/SPDC era.
It’s what international capital regardless of its origin can do, it’s potential for both good and bad that you need to see through and have a healthy scepticism of, but you seem to believe in some kind of economic determinism with too rosy a view of US capital. I guess Burma could in time join the ranks of South Korea and Singapore going down that road if, and it’s a big if, the generals have the necessary intelligence, competence and vision, because as you yourself have pointed out often enough they’ll still be around for the foreseeable future. BTW are they not already filthy rich after opening up the country when they chose to?
So how a country’s leadership handles international capital, with its potential not only to do good but to hold a country to ransom and to subject its people to the vagaries of their own new world order by dint of its enormous financial and economic clout, is of paramount importance. As Mrs T would say, once you are in deep enough ‘you can’t buck the market’.
Socio-economic consequences of engagement or the lack of it are essential considerations but a political stand against blatant and relentless human rights abuses by the state had to be made. And yes, making a U turn, despite no sign of any real progress in the plight of a very high profile political prisoner such as Aung San Suu Kyi, is well nigh impossible. Being a hypocrite is one thing, to be exposed as one is quite another, isn’t it?
Like you said, Asians helping Asians may prove beneficial in more ways than one. Aung San sought help for military training and arms to fight the British from the Chinese communists but got it from the invading Japanese instead. He wasn’t too fussy so long as it served the purpose. Just depends how you manage it as a means to an end.
A line on political economy and conflict in Thailand
Sensationalism and spin doctoring (political economy?) aside, the Thai economy will succede or fail regardless of the political conflict, due in part to the government’s failure to address the real issues in the first place.
What does that mean?
Ji Ungpakorn on the “carnival of reaction”
re: Srithanonchai
I think you misunderstand; allow me to clarify. In my previous post, in my murder/manslaughter metaphor I was looking at the events from how they would be viewed in a strict legal sense. That is, if those involved in the events were tried in a court of law. I already stated that I agree with Sidh, that Oct. 6, Tak Bai, Krue Sae, and the War on Drugs are all examples of egregious abuse of state power.
All I was trying to get at is that the soliders involved in the attack on Krue Sae would, at worse, be charged with insubordination for violating a direct order from the Defence Minister. We cannot expect soliders attacking armed militants to be charged with murder or manslaughter.
Time to go home
Kuson: “I trust the PAD leaders much more than Thaksin. I remember Chamlong’s Integrity when he was governor. I remember Dr. Jermsak . I remember Sondhi.”
Thaksin might not deserve trust. But do the others? I leave aside “Jermsak” as he is not a key member of PAD. But what of Chamlong and Sondhi? Chamlong’s role in 1976 and as a mercenary soldier might be neglected in order to trust him. Sondhi as an opportunist and bankrupt might also need to be forgotten, along with the apparent reason for him turning against Thaksin…. Trustworthy? Maybe not. But your view seems to be relativist in that you have a preference for which scoundrels are less worthy than others. Just some thoughts on who we choose to bed down with….
A line on political economy and conflict in Thailand
That is a tough case to make, all most all of the Asian countries are facing the same problem. Vietnam and Indonesia don’t have a govermental crisis, yet are in worse shape than Thailand.
If there is a case to be made about a crisis in Thai government it is that the elected and their selecteds has the inability to run the country. A better group of bumblers and stumblers couldn’t be found with a world-wide talentless search.
Self preservation over national preservation is a one sided affair, which lacks a second party needed for a conflict.
Were the government capable of and were they to decide to address the economy, then a debate over whether the street demonstrations have or had an effect on the Thai economy might be a reasonable topic. But, until such time as the government tackles the country’s economy there is no way to access the political strife’s contribution.
Sensationalism and spin doctoring (political economy?) aside, the Thai economy will succede or fail regardless of the political conflict, due in part to the government’s failure to address the real issues in the first place.
Ji Ungpakorn on the “carnival of reaction”
12 July 2008
When you use words like “rubbish,” it kind of prejudices a response, but I will try.
Don’t now say that people who try to see Takbai realistically are being called apologists. That ignores the earlier comment. The thrust was that trying to rationalize the intended hatred and resultant violence at Takbai by commenting that a realistic look would somehow magically reveal that the intentions were not deadly is sticking your head in the sand.
I imagine Chalerm’s son didn’t mean to kill that cop in the club, either?
Death here in Thailand is an unfortunate price tag for legitimate protests, and strangely so in a nation that wrongfully prides itself on being Buddhist. While the country may claim to be Buddhist, its overall social practices are anything but.Lots of show and lip service, little real commitment on the streets, so to speak.
The disregard for life goes beyond being an apologist. An apologist is aware of the difference between right and wrong but feels some misdirected need to find an excuse for someone else’s mean streaks. When you aren’t even aware of the difference between right and wrong, being an apologist takes on quite a different connotation.