Nick – if rumours in Thailand are such “utter rubbish”, then how do you explain that the WikiLeaks cables prove many of them true ?
And if the elites were not desperate for super profits, how do you explain the massive upswing in drug taking, between the 1997 financial crash, and 2003, which you yourself describe ??
Chris Beale never fails to amuse; particularly his comment about the Thai elites (could somebody be able to give names or numbers or distinguishing birthmarks that could define a Thai elite, I wonder) fighting over the Thai illicit trade (which again I presume is more than yaa baa) at the root of Thailand’s ongoing divisiveness.
Could I then presume that Chris Beale’s call for the secession of the Isaan from the rest of Thailand at its essence is merely the Isaan narco elites (suggesting Thaksin as the default narco Don) seething at Bangkok’s narco elites encroaching on their turf?
In this Thai movie Chris Beale, is Prayuth the default Ness or the Thai Escobar?
Those were and are the rumors about the drug war, and they are, as most rumors and conspiracy theories, utter rubbish.
The simple truth is that before the drug war the drug situation became simply intolerable. Many communities both in urban and rural areas were infested with cheap drugs to a degree that in many villages an overwhelming portion of the adult population was either addicted to amphetamines or regular users. Some members of state authorities were deeply involved in the drug trade on all levels.
For the moneys of the populalist programs, especially the microloan schemes, not to disappear into the drug economy, the drug economy had to be destroyed, hence the drug war.
In the drug war all parts of the state co-operated in a degree that never happened afterwards anymore.
Many people claim that the drug war did not substantially decrease the amounts of drugs available. This again is not true. In many rural areas, such as in my wife’s village, and many other villages i know people from, drugs were simply not available anymore after the drug war, for any amount of money, where before one could get in 5 minutes any amount for not much money. Also in many urban areas the availability of drugs was massively decreased. At the time, both before, during and after the drug war i accompanied several addicts for a long time with my camera, and have seen these developments. Also my own family was affected by the situation, with several members just before and during the drug war stopping drugs.
The drug war did also not solely consist of the killings, which many people believe. The killings were one quite horrific aspect, but there were also quite a few positive policies, such as for the first time a legal separation between user and dealer, the former to be sent into re-education camps, the latter into jail (or killed). For Heroin addicts state and NGO sponsored methadone programs were made available. I had several friends in those programs, both Thai and Farang, who got cards issued that exempted them from urine tests, who would otherwise have gotten positive results.
For these reasons the drug war was under the majority of the population enormously popular, regardless the killings, and critical voices at the time were few. If it would have been just a territorial fight to increase and re-arrange profits it would hardly have been so popular, as it would not have had the effect.
Drugs began returning when the political problems increased, as many intelligence units in both police and military have been re-assigned from drugs to cover politics. However, even though the drugs returned to some degree, it (so far) never reached the severity of situation between the ’97 crisis and 2003.
Did the drugs war REALLY have an “elite consensus” – or was it really about dividing up drug trade super profits, and networks, among factions of the elite, and the whole way down among their numerous phuak ??
Any mention in the book about overlap between members of royal families and UMNO elites? Malaysia’s first PM is of royal descent and so do many other UMNO elites such as Tengku Razaleigh, etc. But yes, the position of the monarchy within the Malaysian constitutional democratic framework is iffy and easily manipulable to serve the interests of UMNO. Remember the constant bashing of the monarchy during Mahathir’s years? Like you said, the REAL monarch is UMNOputra since ultimately the royal families are highly dependent on the federal government for businesses especially after Mahathir severely cut their annual allowances.
“The drug war killings, as the killings in 2010, and almost every atrocity committed by the state in Thai modern history were the result of an elite consensus of which Thaksin and TRT at the time were part of.”
i wanted to say that in the drug war killings Thaksin and TRT were part of the elite consensus, of course not in 2010 or in previous atrocities committed by the state.
As i stated before – just because the Democrat Party and the traditional elites were less democratic and less liberal than Thaksin does not make him a liberal.
Thaksin and his government was absolved of any wrong doing in the drug war killings the same way Abhisit, Suthep and the military leadership was absolved (or, is in the process of) from any wrong doing in 2010. Thaksin was not a powerless puppet of the traditional elites when he was PM, he was part of the system, until the system turned against him in 2005. The drug war killings, as the killings in 2010, and almost every atrocity committed by the state in Thai modern history were the result of an elite consensus of which Thaksin and TRT at the time were part of.
The dichotomy which you try to present here is quite similar to the Yellow moralistic discourse, which more or less consists solely of a static eternal conflict between the evil corrupt people, as personified by Thaksin, and the moral people, as personified by them, leaving no space for a more nuanced analyses. You just turn it around, but basically your entire discourse is equally moralistic based and completely ignores the fluid nature and the process of evolution in the conflict.
Just because i do acknowledge the complex nature of Thaksin’s government – on the one hand being authoritarian, and on the other more beneficial to the economically disadvantaged sectors of society that maybe any other government in recent history – does not make me a puppet of the Democrat Party or their allies.
It somewhat astonishes me that what you present here is more “linientreu” than even high ranked members of the former Thaksin government, and the subsequent Yingluck government. People such as Chaturon Chaisaeng or Suranand Vejjajiva, for example, have been, also in public, far more reflective and partially critical of Thaksin’s shortcomings and mistakes than you are. The Red Shirt discourse is far more nuanced in its analyses of Thaksin than you are. That is why i call what you present here as nothing but propaganda, and as typical for propaganda – lacking nuance and factual integrity.
Hyperbole? err, here is a few brief facts. I worked in Thailand at the time as an advisor to the govt’s Min of Interior, so I know a few things and how the amaat-media-military compact discredited Thaksin so as to bring him down. In this, as we know, the well orchestrated plot was successful. The palace and establishment elite need its DP puppets to maintain the facade of democracy for their interests and power, to ensure status quo ante. As for the drug wars! everyone (even today!) keeps mentioning this as justification for Thaksin’s “wrongdoings”! what a beat up. He was not even responsible directly for this, everyone was keen as the directive to clean up Thailand came from a higher authority and acted out (clearly not always well conceived) by the police and military. But as head of Govt as least he apologised and did the right thing. I have not heard that from Abhisit for the many extra-judicial killings and disappearances under his watch; even as its leaders Suthep and Abhisit who directly ordered the killing of so many unarmed protesters were acquitted for their action by their own people in the judiciary. No one wishes to mention this fact. As for the south, because of the insurgency this was run in part directly under military command, it was and remains in fact DP and local southern mafia country. It was clear who was behind the fiasco there. So history is selective and convenient, a means of projecting ideology (–and bias) into the past.
Jim: Even when I was a total Red Farang I would never have gone as far as you do in your somewhat ridiculous journeys into fantasy and denial.
Television programs forced off the air, journalists removed from their jobs, constant threats against media critics from trumped up investigations by the corrupted NACC to withdrawal of government advertising: Thaksin stopped short of “attitude adjustment” because for quite a while his bullying tactics worked quite well.
The hundreds upon hundreds killed in the drug war have yet to be matched by any subsequent government.
No “liberal” in his right mind would ever say “The UN is not my father” as a justification for human rights abuses and neither would she claim that having been elected put her and her administration above the law as Thaksin did on a number of occasions.
My view of TRT 1 & 2 is drawn from contemporary news reports and more substantially from Baker & Phasuk and McCargo & Ukrist, excellent books that were not written as “yellow amaat” anything.
In spite of acknowledging his authoritarianism, I still suspect that Thailand and rural Thais would be better off if he had managed to curb his egoism and greed sufficiently (haha) to stay in power.
But I would never and have never mistaken his successful tactics and the clever team he surrounded himself with for anything remotely like liberal-democracy.
*NB The name on this post is my “real name”. My moral courage juices must be overflowing today.
I am very sorry, but lets not whitewash history here. I have lived here when Thaksin was Prime Minister (and before). It is true that Thaksin’s government has improved the livelihood of people substantially, especially compared to the almost inactivity towards the rural sectors under the Chuan 2 government. He was a catalyst for getting large sectors of society interested and involved in politics. These achievements cannot be taken away from him.
However – the drug war and its killings have taken place under Thaksin’s government (and i know and have often argued that it was not solely Thaksin, but the result of an elite consensus between Thaksin and all sectors of power), which is strong enough evidence of Thaksin’s authoritarianism. And please – do not try to tell me that i imagined the drug war killings – i have worked here and taken pictures during the drug war. A police officer executed a suspected drug dealer in front of my wife and other witnesses upcountry. I have talked with many people involved in the drug war killings about its mechanics. While to some degree things went out of hand, and the drug situation before was intolerable, killings were nevertheless policy. And that is not liberal by any means.
While Thaksin has in 2011 apologized for his heavy handed policies in the 3 southern provinces, his policies nevertheless were rather authoritarian there.
His media policies were nicer than what we have now (though back then we thought it was quite bad, but then we did not know what was to come), or when the odious Sathit Wongnongtoey ran the state media under Abhisit. However, he has filed many libel cases against critical media, and made sure that critical local media outlets had much less advertisement revenue.
When you look for example at Thaksin’s closest partner in Germany, the very conservative CSU, you can see in which political direction he is at home most.
Thaksin was not a rebel against the system, he worked with the system as a part of the system, and for years with the support of the traditional elites, for whom he was beneficial, especially financially. Only after the 2005 elections the traditional elites turned against him.
Just because his opposition was more authoritarian and far less democratic does not make Thaksin a liberal democrat when he was PM, though not a dictator, as Yellow hyperbole claims.
33.1, 33.1.1: An “anthoritarian” or “authoritarian populist”? — the negative military-amaat-driven propaganda against Thaksin MUST have been really effective!! Even many yellow academic colleagues (as noted 33.1/ some always fall back on Connors work!) fell foul of this, consciously or unconsciously joining in the rancour (anti-democracy supporters or deniers — if you read their early work noted by its absence of criticism against the killings of unarmed protesters 2009-11). Importantly, views aside, where is the evidence of Thaksin being “authoritarian” gentlemen? There is simply none. As an example, the media could & did say what they wanted during his government; it was Ok to abuse or (often groundlessly) accuse Thaksin, but not Ok to abuse the current fascists or their DP royal lackeys if there were a unbiased media outlet to do that (you get sent to prison for doing that as PTP’s Prompong Nopparit and others). On the contrary he was the first PM to actually improve the livelihoods & opportunities of ordinary Thais, decentralise power and actually focus on the concerns of the poor. Those are facts that cannot be hidden or denied, however hard they are (ideologically) for some people to swallow.
Interesting. A Thai scholar (anon) pointed out that ma farang (farang dogs) escaped the cultural associations of Thai dogs, that royals featuring dogs represents the embourgeoisation of royal and middle class culture — when it is not utterly insulting to Thai subjects, of course.
But the could have been tongue in cheek, since no one can say what they mean in the Land of the Free. Ergo the embedding of sarcasm and satire early on in the Thai courts … at the time of the Chinese Opium Wars a.k.a. the British in Rabid Search of Opium Wars.
Slight disagreement there. I find also a bit outlandish to call Thaksin a liberal – he was authoritarian, however *somewhat* within the larger democratic framework. His opposition however was/is a lot less democratic than he was.
While the elite level of this conflict may revolve around the phuak system, on grass roots level the discourse especially under Red Shirts and sympathizers is increasingly evolving in genuine political ideologies and demands for structural changes, not just towards the system in general, but also towards their own leadership and political party. This debate does not just take place anymore in the ivory towers of a few academics. Both PT Party and Red Shirt leadership have begun to adapt to this evolution of the discourse under their supporters. The future will show if they are successful or not.
To credit Thaksin with “liberal ideology and governance” is as outlandish as those who claim the purpose of the latest coups has been to return Thailand to democracy.
Michael Connors is much nearer the mark when he suggests that the Bangkok middle classes and their elite masters have embraced “reactive liberalism” to keep an authoritarian populist out of power.
But, really, to attribute any ideological position to all but a very few academics working on either side of the divide is to be far too generous all round.
If Thai politics were really about ideologies– say fascism vs socialism vs liberal-democracy– the country would not be the political shambles that it is today.
Instead we have little more than a jazzed-up tribal system because the middle and upper classes in Thailand are incapable of submitting themselves to any sort of discipline, whether it be rule of law or strict adherence to the diktat of a less clownish Il Douche.
It is the refusal of Thai academics and lawyers and others in the professional classes to embrace genuine political ideologies rather than remaining content to suck up to whoever happens to rank higher in their particular phuak that is keeping Thailand as far from democracy as it has ever been, including while Thaksin was shredding the 97 Constitution that enabled his rise.
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Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia
[…] http://www.newmandala.org/2016/01/05/democratic-contraction-in-southeast-asia/ […]
Review of Palace, Political Party and Power
Hi Azmil,
Unfortunately, this was an area that Prof Kobkua did not engage with.
The very recent developments demonstrate how powerful the UMNO President is.
I am still exploring is it all UMNO are UMNOPuteras or only some.
Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia
Hi Bridget, depressing article, yet a necessary expose of “some” the many abuses of power.
Although not entirely unique to the present, (similar has happened before, with Thai Military Dictators) Section 44 is quite insidious.
Listing issues of course is one thing. I hope debate can offer solutions.
One never knows who is reading, hence solutions may be important.
A state of madness
Nick – if rumours in Thailand are such “utter rubbish”, then how do you explain that the WikiLeaks cables prove many of them true ?
And if the elites were not desperate for super profits, how do you explain the massive upswing in drug taking, between the 1997 financial crash, and 2003, which you yourself describe ??
A state of madness
Chris Beale never fails to amuse; particularly his comment about the Thai elites (could somebody be able to give names or numbers or distinguishing birthmarks that could define a Thai elite, I wonder) fighting over the Thai illicit trade (which again I presume is more than yaa baa) at the root of Thailand’s ongoing divisiveness.
Could I then presume that Chris Beale’s call for the secession of the Isaan from the rest of Thailand at its essence is merely the Isaan narco elites (suggesting Thaksin as the default narco Don) seething at Bangkok’s narco elites encroaching on their turf?
In this Thai movie Chris Beale, is Prayuth the default Ness or the Thai Escobar?
A state of madness
Those were and are the rumors about the drug war, and they are, as most rumors and conspiracy theories, utter rubbish.
The simple truth is that before the drug war the drug situation became simply intolerable. Many communities both in urban and rural areas were infested with cheap drugs to a degree that in many villages an overwhelming portion of the adult population was either addicted to amphetamines or regular users. Some members of state authorities were deeply involved in the drug trade on all levels.
For the moneys of the populalist programs, especially the microloan schemes, not to disappear into the drug economy, the drug economy had to be destroyed, hence the drug war.
In the drug war all parts of the state co-operated in a degree that never happened afterwards anymore.
Many people claim that the drug war did not substantially decrease the amounts of drugs available. This again is not true. In many rural areas, such as in my wife’s village, and many other villages i know people from, drugs were simply not available anymore after the drug war, for any amount of money, where before one could get in 5 minutes any amount for not much money. Also in many urban areas the availability of drugs was massively decreased. At the time, both before, during and after the drug war i accompanied several addicts for a long time with my camera, and have seen these developments. Also my own family was affected by the situation, with several members just before and during the drug war stopping drugs.
The drug war did also not solely consist of the killings, which many people believe. The killings were one quite horrific aspect, but there were also quite a few positive policies, such as for the first time a legal separation between user and dealer, the former to be sent into re-education camps, the latter into jail (or killed). For Heroin addicts state and NGO sponsored methadone programs were made available. I had several friends in those programs, both Thai and Farang, who got cards issued that exempted them from urine tests, who would otherwise have gotten positive results.
For these reasons the drug war was under the majority of the population enormously popular, regardless the killings, and critical voices at the time were few. If it would have been just a territorial fight to increase and re-arrange profits it would hardly have been so popular, as it would not have had the effect.
Drugs began returning when the political problems increased, as many intelligence units in both police and military have been re-assigned from drugs to cover politics. However, even though the drugs returned to some degree, it (so far) never reached the severity of situation between the ’97 crisis and 2003.
A state of madness
Did the drugs war REALLY have an “elite consensus” – or was it really about dividing up drug trade super profits, and networks, among factions of the elite, and the whole way down among their numerous phuak ??
An ASEAN devoid of its community
[…] An ASEAN devoid of its community – New […]
Review of Palace, Political Party and Power
Any mention in the book about overlap between members of royal families and UMNO elites? Malaysia’s first PM is of royal descent and so do many other UMNO elites such as Tengku Razaleigh, etc. But yes, the position of the monarchy within the Malaysian constitutional democratic framework is iffy and easily manipulable to serve the interests of UMNO. Remember the constant bashing of the monarchy during Mahathir’s years? Like you said, the REAL monarch is UMNOputra since ultimately the royal families are highly dependent on the federal government for businesses especially after Mahathir severely cut their annual allowances.
A state of madness
One correction:
with the sentence
“The drug war killings, as the killings in 2010, and almost every atrocity committed by the state in Thai modern history were the result of an elite consensus of which Thaksin and TRT at the time were part of.”
i wanted to say that in the drug war killings Thaksin and TRT were part of the elite consensus, of course not in 2010 or in previous atrocities committed by the state.
A state of madness
As i stated before – just because the Democrat Party and the traditional elites were less democratic and less liberal than Thaksin does not make him a liberal.
Thaksin and his government was absolved of any wrong doing in the drug war killings the same way Abhisit, Suthep and the military leadership was absolved (or, is in the process of) from any wrong doing in 2010. Thaksin was not a powerless puppet of the traditional elites when he was PM, he was part of the system, until the system turned against him in 2005. The drug war killings, as the killings in 2010, and almost every atrocity committed by the state in Thai modern history were the result of an elite consensus of which Thaksin and TRT at the time were part of.
The dichotomy which you try to present here is quite similar to the Yellow moralistic discourse, which more or less consists solely of a static eternal conflict between the evil corrupt people, as personified by Thaksin, and the moral people, as personified by them, leaving no space for a more nuanced analyses. You just turn it around, but basically your entire discourse is equally moralistic based and completely ignores the fluid nature and the process of evolution in the conflict.
Just because i do acknowledge the complex nature of Thaksin’s government – on the one hand being authoritarian, and on the other more beneficial to the economically disadvantaged sectors of society that maybe any other government in recent history – does not make me a puppet of the Democrat Party or their allies.
It somewhat astonishes me that what you present here is more “linientreu” than even high ranked members of the former Thaksin government, and the subsequent Yingluck government. People such as Chaturon Chaisaeng or Suranand Vejjajiva, for example, have been, also in public, far more reflective and partially critical of Thaksin’s shortcomings and mistakes than you are. The Red Shirt discourse is far more nuanced in its analyses of Thaksin than you are. That is why i call what you present here as nothing but propaganda, and as typical for propaganda – lacking nuance and factual integrity.
Review of Blood, Dreams and Gold
If errors are inevitable, when you say “Pablo Naruda” do you mean “Pablo Neruda”?
A state of madness
Hyperbole? err, here is a few brief facts. I worked in Thailand at the time as an advisor to the govt’s Min of Interior, so I know a few things and how the amaat-media-military compact discredited Thaksin so as to bring him down. In this, as we know, the well orchestrated plot was successful. The palace and establishment elite need its DP puppets to maintain the facade of democracy for their interests and power, to ensure status quo ante. As for the drug wars! everyone (even today!) keeps mentioning this as justification for Thaksin’s “wrongdoings”! what a beat up. He was not even responsible directly for this, everyone was keen as the directive to clean up Thailand came from a higher authority and acted out (clearly not always well conceived) by the police and military. But as head of Govt as least he apologised and did the right thing. I have not heard that from Abhisit for the many extra-judicial killings and disappearances under his watch; even as its leaders Suthep and Abhisit who directly ordered the killing of so many unarmed protesters were acquitted for their action by their own people in the judiciary. No one wishes to mention this fact. As for the south, because of the insurgency this was run in part directly under military command, it was and remains in fact DP and local southern mafia country. It was clear who was behind the fiasco there. So history is selective and convenient, a means of projecting ideology (–and bias) into the past.
A state of madness
Jim: Even when I was a total Red Farang I would never have gone as far as you do in your somewhat ridiculous journeys into fantasy and denial.
Television programs forced off the air, journalists removed from their jobs, constant threats against media critics from trumped up investigations by the corrupted NACC to withdrawal of government advertising: Thaksin stopped short of “attitude adjustment” because for quite a while his bullying tactics worked quite well.
The hundreds upon hundreds killed in the drug war have yet to be matched by any subsequent government.
No “liberal” in his right mind would ever say “The UN is not my father” as a justification for human rights abuses and neither would she claim that having been elected put her and her administration above the law as Thaksin did on a number of occasions.
My view of TRT 1 & 2 is drawn from contemporary news reports and more substantially from Baker & Phasuk and McCargo & Ukrist, excellent books that were not written as “yellow amaat” anything.
In spite of acknowledging his authoritarianism, I still suspect that Thailand and rural Thais would be better off if he had managed to curb his egoism and greed sufficiently (haha) to stay in power.
But I would never and have never mistaken his successful tactics and the clever team he surrounded himself with for anything remotely like liberal-democracy.
*NB The name on this post is my “real name”. My moral courage juices must be overflowing today.
Emjay
A state of madness
I am very sorry, but lets not whitewash history here. I have lived here when Thaksin was Prime Minister (and before). It is true that Thaksin’s government has improved the livelihood of people substantially, especially compared to the almost inactivity towards the rural sectors under the Chuan 2 government. He was a catalyst for getting large sectors of society interested and involved in politics. These achievements cannot be taken away from him.
However – the drug war and its killings have taken place under Thaksin’s government (and i know and have often argued that it was not solely Thaksin, but the result of an elite consensus between Thaksin and all sectors of power), which is strong enough evidence of Thaksin’s authoritarianism. And please – do not try to tell me that i imagined the drug war killings – i have worked here and taken pictures during the drug war. A police officer executed a suspected drug dealer in front of my wife and other witnesses upcountry. I have talked with many people involved in the drug war killings about its mechanics. While to some degree things went out of hand, and the drug situation before was intolerable, killings were nevertheless policy. And that is not liberal by any means.
While Thaksin has in 2011 apologized for his heavy handed policies in the 3 southern provinces, his policies nevertheless were rather authoritarian there.
His media policies were nicer than what we have now (though back then we thought it was quite bad, but then we did not know what was to come), or when the odious Sathit Wongnongtoey ran the state media under Abhisit. However, he has filed many libel cases against critical media, and made sure that critical local media outlets had much less advertisement revenue.
When you look for example at Thaksin’s closest partner in Germany, the very conservative CSU, you can see in which political direction he is at home most.
Thaksin was not a rebel against the system, he worked with the system as a part of the system, and for years with the support of the traditional elites, for whom he was beneficial, especially financially. Only after the 2005 elections the traditional elites turned against him.
Just because his opposition was more authoritarian and far less democratic does not make Thaksin a liberal democrat when he was PM, though not a dictator, as Yellow hyperbole claims.
A state of madness
33.1, 33.1.1: An “anthoritarian” or “authoritarian populist”? — the negative military-amaat-driven propaganda against Thaksin MUST have been really effective!! Even many yellow academic colleagues (as noted 33.1/ some always fall back on Connors work!) fell foul of this, consciously or unconsciously joining in the rancour (anti-democracy supporters or deniers — if you read their early work noted by its absence of criticism against the killings of unarmed protesters 2009-11). Importantly, views aside, where is the evidence of Thaksin being “authoritarian” gentlemen? There is simply none. As an example, the media could & did say what they wanted during his government; it was Ok to abuse or (often groundlessly) accuse Thaksin, but not Ok to abuse the current fascists or their DP royal lackeys if there were a unbiased media outlet to do that (you get sent to prison for doing that as PTP’s Prompong Nopparit and others). On the contrary he was the first PM to actually improve the livelihoods & opportunities of ordinary Thais, decentralise power and actually focus on the concerns of the poor. Those are facts that cannot be hidden or denied, however hard they are (ideologically) for some people to swallow.
Dog v dog: Theatrics of the Thai interregnum
Interesting. A Thai scholar (anon) pointed out that ma farang (farang dogs) escaped the cultural associations of Thai dogs, that royals featuring dogs represents the embourgeoisation of royal and middle class culture — when it is not utterly insulting to Thai subjects, of course.
But the could have been tongue in cheek, since no one can say what they mean in the Land of the Free. Ergo the embedding of sarcasm and satire early on in the Thai courts … at the time of the Chinese Opium Wars a.k.a. the British in Rabid Search of Opium Wars.
New Mandala’s 2015 in review (and Christmas dance)
”We saw a major scandal in Malaysia….”
If it is referring to the RM 2.6 billion in 1MDB,it is only a minor scandal by any standard in Malaysia.
Nevertheless among others, they all need to be pursued and dealt with accordingly by the law and order of the country, of the people for the people.
A state of madness
Slight disagreement there. I find also a bit outlandish to call Thaksin a liberal – he was authoritarian, however *somewhat* within the larger democratic framework. His opposition however was/is a lot less democratic than he was.
While the elite level of this conflict may revolve around the phuak system, on grass roots level the discourse especially under Red Shirts and sympathizers is increasingly evolving in genuine political ideologies and demands for structural changes, not just towards the system in general, but also towards their own leadership and political party. This debate does not just take place anymore in the ivory towers of a few academics. Both PT Party and Red Shirt leadership have begun to adapt to this evolution of the discourse under their supporters. The future will show if they are successful or not.
A state of madness
To credit Thaksin with “liberal ideology and governance” is as outlandish as those who claim the purpose of the latest coups has been to return Thailand to democracy.
Michael Connors is much nearer the mark when he suggests that the Bangkok middle classes and their elite masters have embraced “reactive liberalism” to keep an authoritarian populist out of power.
But, really, to attribute any ideological position to all but a very few academics working on either side of the divide is to be far too generous all round.
If Thai politics were really about ideologies– say fascism vs socialism vs liberal-democracy– the country would not be the political shambles that it is today.
Instead we have little more than a jazzed-up tribal system because the middle and upper classes in Thailand are incapable of submitting themselves to any sort of discipline, whether it be rule of law or strict adherence to the diktat of a less clownish Il Douche.
It is the refusal of Thai academics and lawyers and others in the professional classes to embrace genuine political ideologies rather than remaining content to suck up to whoever happens to rank higher in their particular phuak that is keeping Thailand as far from democracy as it has ever been, including while Thaksin was shredding the 97 Constitution that enabled his rise.