Comments

  1. Jon: “Is not Nakarin a real modern historian willing to buck official versions of events and recast them as what really happened, even if it mght offend some in the palace? If so, what does his presence mean here?”

    They all bring some expertise useful in the drafting of a constitution, I suppose, right?

    I wonder what their prior political experience has been, whether they were involved in the drafting of the 1997 constitution? I guess a lot of the research that goes on at the King Prajadhipok Institute (PKI) influenced the drafting of the constitution and politics under the constitution?

    Editorial: “Although hailed as one of the best charters ever written, the 1997 Constitution has proved to be no match for tricky politicians of the Thaksin administration.”

    I know the appointments for some key commissions were never even made and the NHRC was completely ignored, but the history of 1997 constitution and how it succeeded and failed, I guess no one has written anything about it yet?

  2. nganadeeleg says:

    Q: What is good for the country?
    A: Most important in my opinion is the eliminination of all forms of corruption, but particularly in the police.

    Q: Where or what do I put my faith in?
    A: Education, and an inner sense of what is right.
    Doing what is right, even if it might be at the expense of personal gain.

    If the best that ‘democracy’ can serve up is a Thaksin, then yes, I want another system.

  3. On the definition of “reserve forest” and “conservation forest” this extract (apologies for the length) from something I have written may offer some clarification. Note that what I have written here relates primarily to northern Thailand, though the classifications are national classifications and the issues are similar in other regions. As you will see, if Surayud’s resort is in conservation forest he is far from being alone! The interesting question is – how will such a senior forest encroacher be treated?

    Through a series of legislative measures in the early 1900s, the central government asserted and consolidated its power over the collection of royalties and the issuing of concessions to foreign logging firms who were active in the region up until the 1960s. In 1941 the Forest Act declared 40 percent of the land area of Thailand as “forest,” though the primary objective of the act was to manage forest exploitation rather than conservation. The 1964 Forest Reserve Act, however, emphasized conservation by gazetting so-called permanent forests as forest reserve land by royal decree. And in 1985, the National Forest Policy reinforced the aim of maintaining at least 40 percent national forest cover by setting aside 25 percent of Thailand’s land mass as economic forest and 15 percent as conservation forest. This policy was modified after the national logging ban imposed in 1989, following disastrous floods and landslides in the south of the country. The effect of this change, formally adopted in 1992, was to reduce the area of economic forest to 15 percent and increase the conservation forest to 25 percent. Given the relatively high level of remaining forest cover, this policy has a particularly heavy impact in the north, with about 50 percent of the total northern region classified as conservation forest. In some highly forested provinces the disproportionate impact is even greater. In Nan, for example, conservation forest covers 80 percent of the provincial area (Ewers 2003).

    “Conservation forest” is a broad administrative category that refers to a wide range of areas where land-use restrictions are applied. One of the main ways the state has sought to control land use in these areas is through the declaration of national parks. Since the National Park Act of 1964 over 110 national parks have been declared in Thailand, with over twenty located in the nine far northern provinces where they take up over 15 percent of the total land area (RFD 2004c; and see figure 2.6). There are also some substantial areas of the north classified as wildlife conservation areas. Another crucially important regulatory tool is the declaration of upland areas as Class 1 watershed. In the mid-1980s a nationwide system of watershed classification was adopted–on the basis of physical and biological criteria–to provide a framework for the management and protection of forested upland areas. In this classic system of “state simplification” (Scott 1998), five watershed “classes” were introduced throughout Thailand, ranging from Class 1 headwater areas that are identified as the highest priority for protection, to Class 5 areas on gently sloping or flat land where intensive agriculture is considered appropriate. These formal categories have been criticized by other researchers who have used different data sources (including data at much finer resolution) and who have attempted to include locally relevant socioeconomic variables (for example Pandee and Maathuis 1990).

    Protected Class 1 areas cover approximately 18 percent of the entire country (RFD 2004e) and perhaps as much as 30 percent of the total area of the upper northern provinces (derived from Yanuar 2004: table 5). In fact in some districts the impact is even greater. In Mae Chaem district–the largest district in Chiang Mai province–the Class 1 protection category applies to about 60 percent of the total land area. The Royal Forest Department’s Watershed Management Division states that Class 1 areas must be “strictly kept permanently as head water sources” and “immediate reforestation programs must be undertaken on the abundant shifting [cultivation] area” (RFD 2004e). An array of watershed management units assist in the regulation of these environmentally sensitive upland zones, and the majority of the country’s 189 watershed units are located in the northern region (RFD 2005). Watershed management units have been active in various forms of land-use regulation and, in particular, forest planting. It is estimated that up until 1996 over 1,500 square kilometers of forest had been “restored” in northern watersheds, primarily through reforestation. This represented over 70 percent of the national effort in forest rehabilitation undertaken by the Watershed Management Division (Prasong and Gilmour 1999).

    A crucially important point to note–and this is an ever-present issue in much of the discussion of environmental management in northern Thailand–is that “conservation forest,” “national park,” and “Class 1 watershed” are administrative categories that do not necessarily equate with forest cover. This ongoing problem has bedeviled various systems of forest classification throughout Thailand. While there is, of course, a broad correspondence between areas with substantial forest cover and areas with high proportions of “conservation forest,” there is certainly not a perfect match between actual land cover and administrative classification. This is evident even from the most general data where the area of conservation forest in northern Thailand exceeds the area of actual forest cover by almost 800,000 hectares (Yanuar 2004: table 5). The “grossly unrealistic” (Ammar et al. 1991:12) administrative goal of 25 percent conservation forest has generated a massive mismatch between official land classification and actual land use, creating large swathes of “ambiguous lands” (Sato 2000) in which agricultural activities are rendered illegal.

    This ambiguity of land classification, coupled with the illegality of certain land uses, has had long-term implications for many settlers within these regions. The impact is particularly intense in the far northern provinces where, in 1990, one-third of villages were found to be located inside forest reserves (Sopin et al. 1990:11). The Land Development Department’s land-use plan for upland areas in Chiang Mai province indicates that of 1,400 villages surveyed almost 1,300 were located in some form of forest reserve (Bandith et al. 1993). Farmers living in these areas have uncertain rights over their land and many lack formal tenure documents. Many upland farmers have found their agricultural or fallow fields taken over for plantation forestry or other activities designed to protect watersheds. The Land Development Department’s plan for Chiang Mai province classified almost 600 upland villages as “communities which do not have the potential to become permanent villages and which should be evacuated to more suitable areas” (Bandith et al. 1993).

  4. Vichai N. says:

    What is the point of this thread Andrew Walker.? The educated Thais possess a much deeper understanding of democracy whereas Andrew Walker remains fixated on election alone being enough to define democracy.

    Educated Thais are no fools Andrew. Same as educated Aussies — there is more to democracy than a simple ballot and Andrew and majority of the Aussies understand this, but Andrew Walker will choose to weave his deception as a favour to his master Thaksin.

  5. polo says:

    Ngana might be right, I can’t recall which is more strenuously protected (in the law at least), conservation or reserve forest. But I thought conservation forest was the lesser of the two, areas where on certain types of land (vertical, often), clearing the area of tree cover it is essentailly discouraged to protect the watershed, but lesser uses are allowed. (That can permit, though, cutting all the trees to plant eucalyptus or orange trees .)

    Anyway, if I take all the directions to Surayuth’s place right, it is just east of the Pakchong reservoir and barely off the Friendship highway to Korat. That’s a heavily farmed and resort-deveoped region but, in my understanding, also has lots of land where certificates are in question because a lot of the land was supposed to be protected watershed zone. (As is much land around reservoirs). From there to the borders of Khao Yai, most of the vertical land, the rock outcroppings etc, is still claimed by the Royal Forestry Dept and the National Parks, but they have long ceded control of flat lands to the influential, for farms, resorts, horse racers (is Sorayuth cavalry?) and golf courses, like the famous Jack Nicklaus course that got too close to Khao Yai proper.

  6. polo says:

    Is not Nakarin a real modern historian willing to buck official versions of events and recast them as what really happened, even if it mght offend some in the palace? If so, what does his presence mean here?

  7. jeplang says:

    During the Tiananmen Square protest as broadcast on Australian Tv,I remember a student protester being asked if democracy was for the [Chinese] peasants.He said “No”.

  8. Srithanonchai says:

    I’am not sure whether the Thai middle class actually is against democracy, or merely against the current shape of Thailand’s political system. I’m also not sure whether the middle class as a unified collective with a homogenous set of political preferences exist at all. Who were the voters of Bangkok who gave TRT an overwhelming victory in 2005? Only BKK’s slum people? At that time, the Democrats complained that their election campaign had been “too sophisticated” for the voters of Bangkok. Why does the BP finds “especially” the voters at fault? They have to cast their ballot for the candidates who actually run in their constituencies, not any ideally “good” candidates. It is most unfortunate that elite publications such as the BP still could not manage to develop a better understanding of Thai political structures.

  9. chris white says:

    ‘Elements of the junta’ means exactly what it says.

    Yes I did run into a fortune telling monk who runs a temple near the Cambodian boarder that gets used as a type of reform school for wayward youth. He did give me some numbers to use in the lottery – but, alas, I didnt buy a ticket. I didnt ask so he didnt give me any insight about the political situation. I’ll make sure to ask he next time we meet.

  10. Frustrated says:

    I’m not sure if our educated people are sophisticated voters. They have shown the world times and times again that they too fall for gullible propaganda.

  11. Frustrated says:

    Questions to nganadeeleg,

    Your words “(or will voters continue to put personal gain ahead of the good of the country?)” What is the good of the country? What is your definition of “what is good for the country”? If the majority of Thai people see or share the same benefit that one political party can deliver to them and they vote for that. Would you classify this as personal gain, personal gain as oppose to your “the good of the country”?. You do not have faith in democracy, the system which allows you to speak out. May I ask, where or what do you put your faith in? Guns and tanks loaded with propagunda?

  12. Fascinating read. It takes someone with decades of experience in Thailand and local knowledge like Keyes to comprehend what is going on beneath the surface. This is certainly an antidote to all those short pat explanations in the western media of what is going on in what, after all, is a very complicated and ancient culture.

  13. nganadeeleg says:

    What does ‘elements of the junta’ mean ?
    From everything I have read, I have no idea who organised the bombings – that’s a big call to say the junta was obviously involved – did you see a fortune teller while you were in the north east?

    Pro democracy!
    I’m sorry, but I don’t have your blind faith in democracy if all it can do is serve up someone like Thaksin, and allow him to entrench himself in power for the next 20 years.
    Lets hope the people have learn’t something the next time round, so a mess like this can be avoided in future.
    (or will voters continue to put personal gain ahead of the good of the country?)

  14. chris white says:

    New Mandala – pro democracy bolg more like it!

    That’s so true fall – mud sticks. Elements of the junta were involved – even blind Freddy can see that!!!

    What I think this blog is missing is some analysis of the types of opposition to the junta – it is just plain naive to say that there is none,

    I was up in the northeast again in December and felt the ‘undercurrent’. The junta is definitely on the nose and there was anger and disappointment. However, the reaction was one of disengagement rather than action.

    For instance, the loudspeakers that would normally wake us up with the early morning news – curtsey of the military controlled radio network – at 5am were turned off (thank god) and the amount of messages being broadcast by the village head (normally at least one a day) were substantially reduced – there was only 3 that I can remember over a month or so.

    1: The call for everyone to participate in the on fathers day activities (normally a big event with a lot of people involved). We were asked to put on yellow t-shirts and join the working bee to clean up the village. It was a real fizzer – only 4 or 5 people turned up. Nobody wore yellow and no work was done.

    2: The call to balance the revolving village fund. All the money that was loaned out the previous year was paid back in full and applications were being taken for a new round of loans.

    3: The call to donate rice to the flood victims in the central province. I really thought that everyone would smell a rat and see it as a propaganda ploy from the junta attempting to promote unity. However, I was so, so wrong. Everyone responded to this call and about 30 fertiliser bags of rice were collected. Not bad for a small village of only 200 or so people hey!

  15. fall says:

    Aside from that Surayud do not dare point to insurgent.
    One of other benefit could be the first impression effect on both domestic and foreign news.

    Without further official announce, the accusation would serve well enough.

  16. fall says:

    Polo, good point.

  17. nganadeeleg says:

    Puppet PM – interesting label – I searched the Nation article but could not see them referring to Surayud in that way, so obviously that is Andrew’s label.

    So we know who deserves the real blame(or credit) for his actions, would you please enlighten us as to who is pulling the strings?

    Who is he a puppet for?
    – the country?,
    – one person?,
    – several people?
    – an organisation?

    Personally, I would have preferred if Surayud handled the matter differently, and merely said they were investigating all possibilities.

    In times of danger, the people (via the media) look to the government to provide answers and reassurances of safety etc, and it is possible that Surayud fell into a trap of trying to comfort the people.

    Whilst Thaksin is obviously a very dangerous person with the money to buy a lot of trouble, the thought that the bombings came from him or his supporters is probably less worrying than if they came from the southern insurgents or from within the interim government itself.

    My biggest concern is why the Porntip forensic team was obstructed by the police, and therefore I do not have much hope for the real culprits being discovered, let alone prosecuted.

    Returning to the subject of labels, what do you think of the following:
    New Mandala, a pro Thaksin blog.

  18. nganadeeleg says:

    Interesting opinion piece in today’s Bangkok Post:
    http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/04Jan2007_news15.php

    I particularly like the last paragraph:
    “Although hailed as one of the best charters ever written, the 1997 Constitution has proved to be no match for tricky politicians of the Thaksin administration. One particular area the charter drafters need to take a serious look at and to rectify is the check-and-balance mechanisms, which include all the independent organisations that were originally thought capable of coping with political abuses or excesses, but instead proved to be ineffective. But, in the end, a constitution no matter how good, is not the ultimate answer to political reform. It is just the tool by which a nation like Thailand fulfils its political aspirations _ the success of which depends largely on the users of the charter. Which, in this case, means the politicians and, especially, the voters. If most of our voters continue to vote with their hearts rather than their minds, or continue to vote for whoever offers them the highest price, we will continue to have the same kind of unscrupulous politicians in parliament. And all the effort spent on writing the best ever constitution would have been a complete waste.”

    Democracy has a long way to go in Thailand, as evidenced by the fact that someone as flawed and discredited as Thaksin continued to receive electoral support.

  19. patiwat says:

    A recent case of occultism in Thailand: Occultist sentenced to 100 yrs

  20. polo says:

    Two paras from Asia Times article:

    “Yet a thorough and independent investigation into the bombings should also include a probe into the possibility that renegade elements inside the CNS itself may have masterminded the crude attacks to discredit new Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and provide Byzantine justification for a counter coup action that ousts Surayud’s interim civilian administration and ushers in a period of total military control.”

    (….)

    “The New Year’s Eve bombings will also provide strong new justification for the establishment of the CNS’s 14,000-strong “Special Operations Force”, a new secretive security force comprised of army and police officials aimed nominally at maintaining peace, law and order across the country, but which critics fear will be mobilized to ferret out and crush political dissent against military rule. Notably, the 556 million baht (US$15.3 million) earmarked last week by the cabinet for the controversial new security force came under strong media criticism just days before the bombings.”