Thanks very much for the reply, and for the posting to the TLC list. Your long-term research in Mahasarakham puts you in a position to approach some of these issues with exceptional clarity. And I am not going to take issue, directly, with what you say. Nevertheless, a number of observations.
First, I would argue that Bunchu’s approach to rural poverty was a comprehensive one, with firm ideological foundations and a coherent design. In this regard, it differed considerably from Thaksin’s. This point relates to two others. While the Bunchu-Khuekrit programs are most commonly understood to consist essentially of “ngoen phan”, they were in fact far more extensive. To use ngoen phan and its successors, all of which were just as top-down as you state, to represent the entire Bunchu-Khuekrit agenda is not to do it justice. And, while in the event political turmoil in Bangkok meant that neither the Bunchu nor the Thaksin programs ever really had a fair chance to prove its long-term value, one does have to wonder whether the former may not have proved more sustainable than the latter.
A fourth observation relates to the BAAC. To be sure by 2001 many BAAC borrowers needed debt relief very badly. But their indebtedness related above all to rather abrupt changes in the structure of Thai agriculture, not least in the context of international competition, and to the failure of the BAAC to keep up with these changes. Again, however, the post-1975 BAAC and its use of borrowers’ groups were long and justifiably seen by students of rural financial markets as a relative success. And in the first decade or so of that success, Bunchu’s design for the channeling of commercial-bank funds into the rural sector was the key factor.
Fifth, these observations notwithstanding, rural people’s sense of “ownership” of programs intended for their benefit is a phenomenon of great political importance. The stress that you place on it is important for any understanding of recent events in Thailand.
Patiwat you were not asked to submit a confession; you were just asked a simple question why you still love Thaksin so? But in your place sounding embarrased and apologetic, but not contrite, to profess love for Thaksin must be about the best we should expect.
Patiwat’s no. 41 poster is typical. Patiwat is telling us that Thaksin already escaped judicial prosecution in 2003 for his extrajudicial killings. He repeats the same argument that Thaksin’s brother in-law Banphot aso passed Revenue Dept. scrutiny 9 years ago for his tax-evasion. So bingo, Thaksin & brother-in-law Banphot should instead be congratulated, not prosecuted, for their Houdini-ability to commit crimes and avoid detection at that time.
Pinochet must have felt the same way but murder is a crime and mass murder committed as state policy even more so and there is no statute of limitations thereof. Too bad Pinochet died before he could be jailed. But Thaksin will NOT be that lucky Patiwat . . unless he suicides before incarceration.
And Thaksin’s brother-in-law Banphot also almost made it past the statute of limitations for tax evasion and had he succeeded Patiwat would have cheered and explained to us why he love Thaksin sooo much . . . particularly his tax finagling skills AND getting away with it too. Not this time Banphot!
Patiwat the Thaksin you love is an extrajudicial murderer, a tax evader, a conflicted ruler, a Machiavellian divider, a subverter of the Thai constitution, a poisonous corrupter who will suborn anybody or anyone for personal interest and to perpetuate his illegitimate rule. Thaksin was a liar, a thief and a murderer. He was also a dismally inept crisis manager (Southern unrest).
Yes certain people do find exciting romance with scoundrels and rogues. Patiwat is one such people.
Well this is pretty near the bottom of the barrel for obsequious journalism. We have to thank you Andrew for highlighting it here, because this kind of Western support is essential for the mythology that justifies coups and royalist dictatorships.
After the statement, “….King Bhumiphon seems to exert a special kind of influence in Thailand. Not overtly political, but there’s power there, and a special kind of moral authority….” did Tony happen to mention lese majeste? or the monarchy’s control of the media? or the incessant, daily propaganda? or the monarchy’s endorsement of the miltary overthrow of a democratically elected government last September 19? What kind or “morality” justifies the disenfranchisement of the Thai electorate? And as for living a self-sufficient life, why doesn’t the royal family practise what it preaches?
As for the farmers being the King’s “poor children” why didn’t Tony ask why, after 60 years of effort, the farmers are still poor, and meanwhile the monarchy is super-rich? On the yellow shirt phenomenon, does Tony realise that the bureaucracy has been campaigning for months to force people to wear their yellow shirts?
And what about the budget spent on these celebrations. The birthday/jubilee celebrations of Queen of England, who presides over the remnants of one of the largest empires in the history of the world, last for no more than a couple of days at most in Britain, one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Why does a poor, developing country like Thailand, need to celebrate all year? Would not that budget be better spent on providing some real alternatives for the king’s “poor children”?
With all due respect, the point is not whether such programs for the rural poor are merely of interest to well-meaning social scientists. The original debate was whether the Thaksin government’s rural development programs were qualitatively new and effective, or just old wine in new bottles. Prof. Keyes presented rather convincing evidence (while pointing out the need for further research) that these programs were indeed relatively effective and therefore popular. They were particularly significant for the much greater degree of localparticipation involved in them (esp. via the new localgovernment bodies established under the now abrogated 1997Constitution), as opposed to the paternalistic, top-down,corruption-mired, ratchakan-style projects of earlier governments (and indeed which continue today) that pay no heed to the real needs of local communities, and in many cases are merely a source of patronage for crony contractors with links to the bureaucracy or the politician that administers that ministry.
For Thais (though not for Thai Studies programs in Western countries, perhaps) this debate is not a mere academic exercise – especially in the context of the politicalsituation in Thailand today. Prof. Keyes’ view would seem to run counter to the argument that the apologists for the coup put forward, that Thaksin’s “populism” was just a cynicalpolitical exercise to win power (in fact, I think the criticism of Thaksin’s so-called “populism” by many political commentators, both Thai and Western, was in many cases highly irresponsible and even irrational: if one buys votes and does nothing one is condemned; if one buys votes and then delivers on promised local development policies one is also condemned as a “populist”. It is very difficult to win against this elitist, paternalistic mindset of many academics and politicalcommentators – in many cases the same ones who have been crucial to building intellectual legitimacy for the coup).
Mr. Muscat’s argument on the benefits of state-directed local development, however, would be music to the ears of the royalist-military regime that has seized power in Thailand, which believes ratchakan knows best. Is this the sort of support that we should be giving this regime?
I wonder what the Han attitude towards lowland Laotians is? Certainly (as documented in other posts) China is making a big diplomatic effort to bring Laos into its orbit, but is there discrimination against them across the diplomatic table nevertheless?
Nganadirek asks me to categorically state whether I am pro-Thaksin or anti-Thaksin.
Sorry, but you\’re not going to get a black and white answer on that question. Gods and devils are deserving of unquestionable and unshaking love or hate – but not mortals. There is no such thing as true love in politics. My views on Thaksin have changed a lot over the years.
While he was just the head of AIS, I was anti-Thaksin, because AIS locked their SIMs so that only expensive Telewiz-sold handsets could be used on the AIS network. Thaksin also had a weird concession that gave him sole right to operate online services. Smart for him, but bad for consumers. This was during the BBS/NECTEC/IPIED/proto-internet days, so I was very frustrated at a concession that made those growing services illegal. Thank goodness he never exercised the exclusivity clauses in his concession.
During the Phalang Dharma years, I supported PDP, which meant that outwardly I was also wincingly pro-Thaksin (internally, I supported a different PDP faction). After the PDP collapsed, I felt a lot of bitterness to the man, and was very open about my anti-Thaksin views.
During 1997-2000, I was pro-constitution/political reform. Which meant that I desperately wanted the 2001 election to produce a stable government. Even if that meant making myself pro-Thaksin during the Supreme Court\’s decision to acquit him. Even though it was clear that he was guilty. I\’ve been saying for the past 12 years that Thaksin should sell off Shin Corp if he wants to play politics.
Microcredit, the War on Drugs, universal healthcare, and OTOP didn\’t really affect my wellbeing, so from 2001-2005, I was largely Thaksin-neutral. But if you forced me into a political conversation during that period, I would have told you that Thailand has had royalism for centuries and elitism/militarism for decades, and neither did very much for Thailand. So if the electorate wanted to experiment with populism for a couple of years, then we might as well give it a try. A part of me could appreciate the novelty and effectiveness of some of the TRT\’s signature policies. And I discounted any accusations of corruption, because in Thailand, everybody is accused of corruption, and I needed clear and compelling evidence to convince me that any of that slander is true.
When my uncle was killed by terrorists in Yala, I became ferociously anti-Thaksin for a while, because although I didn\’t blame him for the insurrection, I blamed him for not being able to stop it. But when the Democrats, academics, Anand, and Prem weren\’t able to propose any better alternative policies, I decided that I hated all of those ivory castle Bangkokians – I became anti-everybody (with regards to the South).
I feel that only rascals drag the King into their personal battles, so I was sympathetically pro-Thaksin when Sondhi started his whole \”royal powers\” slander in 2005. Plus, I had enough experience with Sondhi to realize that there wasn’t anything he wouldn’t lie about in order to further his personal goals.
When Thaksin finally sold Shin Corp, I applauded. And when Sondhi and his rascals claimed that people should pay capital gains taxes when they sell stocks on the stock market, I looked at my own personal stock portfolio and said \”What The F***?!?\” That made me sympathetically pro-Thaksin.
When Thaksin dissolved Parliament, I stupidly believed that the Democrats could propose a better alternative. So I became, for a very short-time, anti-Thaksin and pro-Democrat. But when the Democrats got defeatist and decided that it would be better not to bother competing in the April elections, I became vehemently anti-Democrat, which I guess made me pro-Thaksin (since there wasn’t anybody else competing in that election).
The Democrats\’ decision to contest the October election, even though they boycotted the April election, struck me as hypocritical. Which made me anti-Democrat, Thaksin-neutral, and pro-fringe party in the months before the election. The point is, I still believed in the power of the elections and on the ongoing health of the constitutional mechanism. We could have taken him down! We were so close.
So of course, I was anti-coup. When the junta used the shotgun approach to say that everything about Thaksin was not only bad, but inherently evil, I defended the parts of his legacy that I thought deserved defending. I guess that made me pro-Thaksin.
I wish we could move the debate away from whether you love Thaksin or hate him. As you can see, it’s not so simple. And besides, it’s not relevant – the Thaksin era is over.
The hard questions that should be debated today aren’t about Thaksin, but about the future of microcredit, the future of universal healthcare, the future of populism, the future of electoral democracy, the future of rural empowerment, the future of constitutionalism, the future of human rights, the future of media reform, the future of telecom/energy reform, the future of military/palace intervention, and whether future governments should be stable monoliths or shaky coalitions. This debate would be much more constructive if we would just move on and stop dragging a dinosaur like Thaksin into things.
p.s., Whenever I start to get convinced that The Nation is full of blind zealots, I remember that they still have Chang Noi. Read the editorial; it’ll do everybody some good.
I gather that (according to Ausaid’s recent white paper) Ausaid is planning on expanding its research division dramatically. What’s the point if they’re just going to follow the ADB & WB’s lead? Is it to provide an in-house cheer squad?
Another contribution to this discussion from the TLC List:
It is important not to lose sight of large-scale programs that did not have a “rural development” or “tambon” label, but yielded substantial benefits over wide areas populated mostly by the “rural poor.” I refer to the major highway construction, feeder road building, water-sealed privies, malaria spraying, regional agricultural and vocational schools, education generally, health facilities, etc. some of which date back to the 1950s. In most countries with large rural hinterlands, the sine qua non for raising incomes has been the ground transportation facilities. Irrigation and agricultural research and extension have also been helpful, not to mention the marketing role of the private sector. Local control over local expenditure budgets is no doubt important politically and for the sense of some local empowerment. But the contribution such mini-budgets can make to long-run economic improvement is small and must be kept in perspective, interesting though such programs are to social
scientists.
Bob Muscat
Those whining about the coup (or hankering for a Thaksin return), would be better served to focus their attention to the new constitution and not let the process be a whitewash.
Taxi Driver: I was trying to show that I am anti-Thaksin and I accept the coup, now that it has happened (I was not pro-coup before it ocurred, but I have yet to see any other way the situation was going to be resolved)
Call me elitist if you like, but I still believe the electorate was not politically sophisticated enough to kick Thaksin out, and Thaksin had proven he was unfit to govern – I won’t repeat all the reasons:)
As for the other forces at play, I have already stated on this site that I do not place credence in many of the nonsensical claims by Sondhi L.
Other forces at play – well there is no need to comment on the usual political suspects because it is well known why they are involved – self interest.
As for the palace – I believe the King acts to provide stability, as a last resort ‘white knight’, and is not the the political mover and shaker (manipulator) that some on this site maintain.
That is not to say there are not some people with connections to the palace who wished to restore some of their old privileges that were being eroded (taken over) by Thaksin & his cronies.
I have said before that some good may come from the rise & fall of Thaksin, in that the rural poor cannot be ignored from now on.
Would you care to comment on any other forces that I may have missed?
patiwat: To help interpret your comments, would you please categorically state whether you are pro-Thaksin or anti-Thaksin
I have also noticed your banter with Bangkok Pundit on his blog, a site which has a definite pro Thaksin tone.
(We already know you are anti-coup, and it will be pretty lame if you just come back and say you are pro-democracy)
Taxi Driver’s comments are important and should be taken on board by those currently in power.
However, the country can only move forward again once the coup is accepted, and Thaksin is history.
Vichai, finally, it seems we agree on something! Let’s celebrate the small victories 🙂
But let me ask you this then. You’ve often repeated the junta’s accusation that Thaksin insulted the King. That was one of their reasons for the coup.
So are you saying that it’s wrong to put a man in jail for 6 years for insulting the King, but it’s OK for the military to abrogate the constitution and seize power for the same reason?
That’s a hypothetical question – don’t think of the other reasons why Thaksin-in-particular justified a coup. What would happen if lese majesty were removed from the legal code (not that I ever expect that to ever happen – it’s too useful a tool for the establishment). So anybody could criticize or insult the King.
If a government politician insulted the King or the Crown Prince (which is exactly what Veera did), and it weren’t illegal, would that alone justify a coup?
p.s., I believe that in the future (after “you know what”), a lese majesty law will be more useful than it is right now.
Vichai, I think it’s silly to say that the coup was caused by tax evasion, Southern violence, and the War on Drugs. The military itself has to bear a lot of blame for the southern violence, and the war on drugs might have justified a coup in 2003, but not 2006. I’ll give more weight to Taxi Driver’s comments.
1) I think corruption, incompetence, and “usurping its powers” (whatever that means) are debatable. Was it really incompetent? In some areas yes, in some areas no. But no government is ever perfect (witness the junta) – yet voters liked how the government set its priorities. That’s why they voted him back in 2005. As for corruption, well, judicial and parliamentary due process during the Thaksin government didn’t find anything. I’m still waiting to see if the junta’s committees find anything of substance. That’s not rhetorical – I really am eager to see what the junta finds. If it’s silly stuff like Bhanapot’s alleged tax evasion (which occured during the Chuan government!), then I know that the junta is desperate.
2) I strongly disagree that the constitutional process wasn’t working. If the democratic process wasn’t working, then why were so many political parties established prior to the October election? Why were so many parties actively campaigning, rather than boycotting? Why did the Democrat party dramatically revise it’s election platform? Why were there so many high-level defections from TRT? Why were so many senators blatantly anti-Thaksin? Because people seriously expected TRT to take a significant hit in the October elections. The electoral process set out in the constitition was working, and it was working to weaken Thaksin.
Besides, the coup happened a month before elections, not a month after elections. If it happened after elections, it would be fair to say that the coup happened because elections didn’t work (which was Sarit’s reasoning). The fact that it happened before elections means that the military was afraid of the constitutional process working – not afraid that it wouldn’t work.
3) Who knows whether the country was headed towards violence. The junta has made some claims, backed up with no evidence, and it has not arrested anybody or charged anybody with preparing for violence. So I really don’t believe the junta’s claims that the country was headed to violence. But we’ll never know, because the junta has stopped mentioning this and has swept it under the carpet.
Ngargadeeleg you agree that not all the political crisis was caused by Thaksin. But the rest of your comment seemed to again concentrate on what he did wrong or should have done right. I don’t disagree with you on these points about Thaksin, but what I’m more interested in is a discussion on “(2) and (3). Why did these conditions exist leading up to Sept 19th? Who caused them? Was it only Thaksin? Or were there other forces that worked to ensure that (2) and (3) existed which forced the King to intervene?”
There is already ample public debate and discussion in Thailand (and on this blogsite) on the rights/wrongs of Thaksin. But there is very little public discussion on “the Other Forces” that co-conspired to drive the crisis to breaking point. Come on, you did not let Thaksin get away with it, so don’t let “the Other Forces” think they can get away with it now, otherwise the next elected government will still face the same threat from these people.
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Pro-poor programs
Further comment from Mike Montesano:
Dear Biff [Charles Keyes],
Thanks very much for the reply, and for the posting to the TLC list. Your long-term research in Mahasarakham puts you in a position to approach some of these issues with exceptional clarity. And I am not going to take issue, directly, with what you say. Nevertheless, a number of observations.
First, I would argue that Bunchu’s approach to rural poverty was a comprehensive one, with firm ideological foundations and a coherent design. In this regard, it differed considerably from Thaksin’s. This point relates to two others. While the Bunchu-Khuekrit programs are most commonly understood to consist essentially of “ngoen phan”, they were in fact far more extensive. To use ngoen phan and its successors, all of which were just as top-down as you state, to represent the entire Bunchu-Khuekrit agenda is not to do it justice. And, while in the event political turmoil in Bangkok meant that neither the Bunchu nor the Thaksin programs ever really had a fair chance to prove its long-term value, one does have to wonder whether the former may not have proved more sustainable than the latter.
A fourth observation relates to the BAAC. To be sure by 2001 many BAAC borrowers needed debt relief very badly. But their indebtedness related above all to rather abrupt changes in the structure of Thai agriculture, not least in the context of international competition, and to the failure of the BAAC to keep up with these changes. Again, however, the post-1975 BAAC and its use of borrowers’ groups were long and justifiably seen by students of rural financial markets as a relative success. And in the first decade or so of that success, Bunchu’s design for the channeling of commercial-bank funds into the rural sector was the key factor.
Fifth, these observations notwithstanding, rural people’s sense of “ownership” of programs intended for their benefit is a phenomenon of great political importance. The stress that you place on it is important for any understanding of recent events in Thailand.
For now, thanks again,
Mike Montesano
Against the grain?
Self Sufficient Royal Investments, Part 2
“Living it up: the self-sufficient li(f)e”.
from the Prachathai webboard (http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/board/showboard.php?QID=44680&TID=5)
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1 р╕кр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Бр╕Зр╕▓р╕Щр╕Чр╕гр╕▒р╕Юр╕вр╣Мр╕кр╕┤р╕Щр╕кр╣Ир╕зр╕Щр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Бр╕йр╕▒р╕Хр╕гр╕┤р╕вр╣М 360,000,000 30.00
2 р╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Ч р╣Др╕Чр╕вр╣Ар╕нр╣Зр╕Щр╕зр╕╡р╕Фр╕╡р╕нр╕▓р╕гр╣М р╕Ир╕│р╕Бр╕▒р╕Ф 111,287,182 9.27
3 CHASE NOMINEES LIMITED 42 30,993,933 2.58
4 LITTLEDOWN NOMINEES LIMITED 26,121,400 2.18
5 BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES SERVICES LUXEMBOURG 23,654,200 1.97
6 р╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Ч р╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╕ер╕Фр╕▓р╕зр╕▒р╕ер╕вр╣М р╕Ир╕│р╕Бр╕▒р╕Ф 23,202,000 1.93
7 CHASE NOMINEES LIMITED 1 16,601,700 1.38
8 р╕кр╕│р╕Щр╕▒р╕Бр╕Зр╕▓р╕Щр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕Др╕ер╕▒р╕Зр╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕Зр╕Чр╕╡р╣И 15,473,000 1.29
9 р╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Ч р╣Бр╕гр╕Щр╣Ар╕Фр╕нр╕гр╕╡р╣Ар╕Ър╕нр╕гр╕▓р╕бр╕▓р╕Бр╕▓р╕г р╕Ир╕│р╕Бр╕▒р╕Ф 14,810,400 1.23
10 HSBC (SINGAPORE) NOMINEES PTE LTD 14,251,264 1.19
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12 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щ р╕Ър╕│р╣Ар╕лр╕Щр╣Зр╕Ир╕Ър╕│р╕Щр╕▓р╕Нр╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕▓р╕г 12,132,550 1.01
13 NORTRUST NOMINEES LTD. 12,124,234 1.01
14 STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 11,356,511 0.95
15 LITTLEDOWN NOMINEES LIMITED 5 10,415,450 0.87
16 BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES SERVICES, LONDON BRANCH 9,808,500 0.82
17 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╕гр╕зр╕б р╕зр╕▓р╕вр╕╕р╕ар╕▒р╕Бр╕йр╣М р╕лр╕Щр╕╢р╣Ир╕З р╣Вр╕Фр╕в р╕Ър╕ер╕И.р╕Бр╕гр╕╕р╕Зр╣Др╕Чр╕в 9,675,850 0.81
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20 INVESTORS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 8,941,710 0.75
21 STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY FOR AUSTRALIA, 8,043,966 0.67
22 HSBC BANK PLC-CLIENTS GENERAL A/C 7,758,286 0.65
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25 MELLON BANK,N.A. 7,031,496 0.59
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27 STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, FOR LONDON 6,186,230 0.52
р╕Др╕Зр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕бр╕╡р╣Гр╕Др╕гр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕гр╕╣р╣Йр╕Ир╕▒р╕Бр╣Ар╕Др╕гр╕╖р╕нр╕Лр╕┤р╣Ар╕бр╕Щр╕Хр╣Мр╣Др╕Чр╕вр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕Др╕гр╕нр╕Ър╕Др╕ер╕╕р╕бр╣Др╕Ыр╣Бр╕Чр╕Ър╕Чр╕╕р╕Бр╕Шр╕╕р╕гр╕Бр╕┤р╕И р╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Чр╣Гр╕лр╕Нр╣Ир╕гр╕░р╕Фр╕▒р╕ЪGLOBAL500р╕лр╕гр╕нр╕Бр╕Щр╕░р╕Др╕гр╕▒р╕Ъ
“Politics is boring”
Patiwat you were not asked to submit a confession; you were just asked a simple question why you still love Thaksin so? But in your place sounding embarrased and apologetic, but not contrite, to profess love for Thaksin must be about the best we should expect.
Patiwat’s no. 41 poster is typical. Patiwat is telling us that Thaksin already escaped judicial prosecution in 2003 for his extrajudicial killings. He repeats the same argument that Thaksin’s brother in-law Banphot aso passed Revenue Dept. scrutiny 9 years ago for his tax-evasion. So bingo, Thaksin & brother-in-law Banphot should instead be congratulated, not prosecuted, for their Houdini-ability to commit crimes and avoid detection at that time.
Pinochet must have felt the same way but murder is a crime and mass murder committed as state policy even more so and there is no statute of limitations thereof. Too bad Pinochet died before he could be jailed. But Thaksin will NOT be that lucky Patiwat . . unless he suicides before incarceration.
And Thaksin’s brother-in-law Banphot also almost made it past the statute of limitations for tax evasion and had he succeeded Patiwat would have cheered and explained to us why he love Thaksin sooo much . . . particularly his tax finagling skills AND getting away with it too. Not this time Banphot!
Patiwat the Thaksin you love is an extrajudicial murderer, a tax evader, a conflicted ruler, a Machiavellian divider, a subverter of the Thai constitution, a poisonous corrupter who will suborn anybody or anyone for personal interest and to perpetuate his illegitimate rule. Thaksin was a liar, a thief and a murderer. He was also a dismally inept crisis manager (Southern unrest).
Yes certain people do find exciting romance with scoundrels and rogues. Patiwat is one such people.
Against the grain?
Self-sufficient royal investments, Part 1, from Prachathai webboard(http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/board/showboard.php?QID=44680&TID=5)
[If this is what Kwanjai means by saying that “the King is a typical Thai” then we have nothing to worry about!]
р╕бр╕╕р╕бр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕Др╕Щр╣Др╕бр╣Ир╕Др╣Ир╕нр╕вр╕гр╕╣р╣Йр╕Ир╕▒р╕Бр╣Бр╕ер╕░р╕Кр╕╖р╣Ир╕Щр╕Кр╕бр╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕Ър╕▓р╕гр╕бр╕╡р╕Ьр╕╣р╣Йр╕Цр╕╖р╕нр╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щр╕гр╕▓р╕вр╣Гр╕лр╕Нр╣И
SAMCO : р╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Ч р╕кр╕▒р╕бр╕бр╕▓р╕Бр╕г р╕Ир╕│р╕Бр╕▒р╕Ф (р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Кр╕Щ)
1 р╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕Ър╕▓р╕Чр╕кр╕бр╣Ар╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕Ыр╕гр╕бр╕┤р╕Щр╕Чр╕гр╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕ар╕╣р╕бр╕┤р╕Юр╕ер╕нр╕Фр╕╕р╕ер╕вр╣Ар╕Фр╕К 197,414,850 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 43.87%
2 р╕кр╕бр╣Ар╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Юр╕╡р╣Ир╕Щр╕▓р╕Зр╣Ар╕Шр╕н р╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Яр╣Йр╕▓р╕Бр╕▒р╕ер╕вр╕▓р╕Ур╕┤р╕зр╕▒р╕Т 45,847,050 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 10.19 %
3 р╕кр╕бр╣Ар╕Фр╣Зр╕Ир╕Юр╕гр╕░р╣Ар╕Чр╕Юр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕кр╕╕р╕Фр╕▓ р╕п р╕кр╕вр╕▓р╕бр╕Ър╕гр╕бр╕гр╕▓р╕Кр╕Бр╕╕р╕бр╕▓ 25,000,000р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 5.56%
4 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╣Ар╕Ыр╕┤р╕Ф р╕нр╣Ар╕Ър╕нр╕гр╣Мр╕Фр╕╡р╕Щр╣Вр╕Бр╕гр╕Ч 21,885,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 4.86%
5 STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, FOR20,000,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ4.44%
6 р╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Ч р╕ир╕гр╕╡р╕Ыр╕зр╕┤р╕Ш р╕Ир╕│р╕Бр╕▒р╕Ф 14,821,500 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ3.29%
7 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╕гр╕зр╕б р╣Ар╕Юр╕╖р╣Ир╕нр╕Шр╕Щр╕▓р╕Др╕▓р╕гр╣Др╕Чр╕в 11,768,600 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 2.62%
8 р╕Щр╕▓р╕вр╕ир╕┤р╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╣М р╕Шр╕│р╕гр╕Зр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╣М 11,700,000р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 2.60%
9 SOMERS (U.K.) LIMITED 7,000,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ1.56%
10 р╕Юр╕е.р╕Х.р╕н.р╣Ар╕ар╕▓ р╕кр╕▓р╕гр╕кр╕┤р╕Щ 6,330,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ1.41 %
11 р╕Щр╕▓р╕вр╕Юр╕гр╣Ар╕кр╕Б р╕Бр╕▓р╕Нр╕Ир╕Щр╕Ир╕▓р╕гр╕╡ 6,000,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 1.33%
12 р╕Щр╕▓р╕вр╕Кр╕╣р╕Кр╕▓р╕Хр╕┤ р╕Кр╕▒р╕вр╕Кр╕╣р╣Ар╕Бр╕╡р╕вр╕гр╕Хр╕┤ 5,058,500 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 1.12%
13 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╣Ар╕Ыр╕┤р╕Ф р╕нр╣Ар╕Ър╕нр╕гр╣Мр╕Фр╕╡р╕Щр╣Ар╕Яр╕ер╣Зр╕Бр╕Лр╕┤р╣Ар╕Ър╕┤р╣Йр╕ер╕нр╕┤р╕Щр╕Др╕▒р╕б 4,951,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 1.10%
14 р╕Юр╕е.р╕г.р╕Х. р╕б.р╕е.р╕нр╕▒р╕ир╕Щр╕╡ р╕Ыр╕гр╕▓р╣Вр╕бр╕К 4,707,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ1.05 %
15 р╕Др╕╕р╕Ур╕лр╕Нр╕┤р╕Зр╕бр╕▓р╕ер╕┤р╕Щр╕╡ р╕кр╕▓р╕гр╕кр╕┤р╕Щ 4,220,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 0.94%
16 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╣Ар╕Ыр╕┤р╕Ф р╕нр╣Ар╕Ър╕нр╕гр╣Мр╕Фр╕╡р╕Щр╕кр╕бр╕нр╕ер╣Бр╕Др╣Зр╕Ю 3,971,000р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 0.88%
17 р╕Бр╕нр╕Зр╕Чр╕╕р╕Щр╣Ар╕Ыр╕┤р╕Ф р╕нр╣Ар╕Ър╕нр╕гр╣Мр╕Фр╕╡р╕Щр╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щр╕гр╕░р╕вр╕░р╕вр╕▓р╕з 2,810,800 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 0.62%
18 р╕Чр╣Ир╕▓р╕Щр╕Ьр╕╣р╣Йр╕лр╕Нр╕┤р╕Зр╕Бр╕╕р╕Ур╕Ср╕╡ р╣Др╕Бр╕гр╕др╕Бр╕йр╣М 2,800,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 0.62%
19 р╕Щр╕▓р╕Зр╕нр╕▓р╕гр╕вр╕▓ р╕зр╕▒р╕Тр╕Щр╕ир╕┤р╕гр╕┤р╕кр╕╕р╕В 2,500,000 р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ0.56%
20 р╕Щр╕▓р╕вр╕ир╕гр╕▒р╕Ур╕вр╣М р╕Шр╕│р╕гр╕Зр╕гр╕▒р╕Хр╕Щр╣М 2,268,800р╕лр╕╕р╣Йр╕Щ 0.50%
http://www.set.or.th/set/companyinfo.do
р╕Ър╕гр╕┤р╕йр╕▒р╕Чр╕Щр╕╡р╣Йр╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╣Ар╕Ир╣Йр╕▓р╕Вр╕нр╕Зр╣Вр╕Др╕гр╕Зр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕лр╕бр╕╣р╣Ир╕Ър╣Йр╕▓р╕Щр╕кр╕▒р╕бр╕бр╕▓р╕Бр╕г р╕Лр╕╢р╣Ир╕Зр╣Др╕Фр╣Йр╕Кр╕╖р╣Ир╕нр╕зр╣Ир╕▓р╣Ар╕Ыр╣Зр╕Щр╣Вр╕Др╕гр╕Зр╕Бр╕▓р╕гр╕лр╕бр╕╣р╣Ир╕Ър╣Йр╕▓р╕Щр╕гр╕░р╕Фр╕▒р╕Ър╕Др╕╕р╕Ур╕ар╕▓р╕Ю
Against the grain?
Well this is pretty near the bottom of the barrel for obsequious journalism. We have to thank you Andrew for highlighting it here, because this kind of Western support is essential for the mythology that justifies coups and royalist dictatorships.
After the statement, “….King Bhumiphon seems to exert a special kind of influence in Thailand. Not overtly political, but there’s power there, and a special kind of moral authority….” did Tony happen to mention lese majeste? or the monarchy’s control of the media? or the incessant, daily propaganda? or the monarchy’s endorsement of the miltary overthrow of a democratically elected government last September 19? What kind or “morality” justifies the disenfranchisement of the Thai electorate? And as for living a self-sufficient life, why doesn’t the royal family practise what it preaches?
As for the farmers being the King’s “poor children” why didn’t Tony ask why, after 60 years of effort, the farmers are still poor, and meanwhile the monarchy is super-rich? On the yellow shirt phenomenon, does Tony realise that the bureaucracy has been campaigning for months to force people to wear their yellow shirts?
And what about the budget spent on these celebrations. The birthday/jubilee celebrations of Queen of England, who presides over the remnants of one of the largest empires in the history of the world, last for no more than a couple of days at most in Britain, one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Why does a poor, developing country like Thailand, need to celebrate all year? Would not that budget be better spent on providing some real alternatives for the king’s “poor children”?
Pro-poor programs
A further contribution from the TLC list:
With all due respect, the point is not whether such programs for the rural poor are merely of interest to well-meaning social scientists. The original debate was whether the Thaksin government’s rural development programs were qualitatively new and effective, or just old wine in new bottles. Prof. Keyes presented rather convincing evidence (while pointing out the need for further research) that these programs were indeed relatively effective and therefore popular. They were particularly significant for the much greater degree of localparticipation involved in them (esp. via the new localgovernment bodies established under the now abrogated 1997Constitution), as opposed to the paternalistic, top-down,corruption-mired, ratchakan-style projects of earlier governments (and indeed which continue today) that pay no heed to the real needs of local communities, and in many cases are merely a source of patronage for crony contractors with links to the bureaucracy or the politician that administers that ministry.
For Thais (though not for Thai Studies programs in Western countries, perhaps) this debate is not a mere academic exercise – especially in the context of the politicalsituation in Thailand today. Prof. Keyes’ view would seem to run counter to the argument that the apologists for the coup put forward, that Thaksin’s “populism” was just a cynicalpolitical exercise to win power (in fact, I think the criticism of Thaksin’s so-called “populism” by many political commentators, both Thai and Western, was in many cases highly irresponsible and even irrational: if one buys votes and does nothing one is condemned; if one buys votes and then delivers on promised local development policies one is also condemned as a “populist”. It is very difficult to win against this elitist, paternalistic mindset of many academics and politicalcommentators – in many cases the same ones who have been crucial to building intellectual legitimacy for the coup).
Mr. Muscat’s argument on the benefits of state-directed local development, however, would be music to the ears of the royalist-military regime that has seized power in Thailand, which believes ratchakan knows best. Is this the sort of support that we should be giving this regime?
Patrick Jory.
Civility and savagery at the borderline
I wonder what the Han attitude towards lowland Laotians is? Certainly (as documented in other posts) China is making a big diplomatic effort to bring Laos into its orbit, but is there discrimination against them across the diplomatic table nevertheless?
Borders of rubber
Thanks for the detailed descriptions of what you’ve seen, Antonella and Oliver.
Oliver do you have a link to the article you mention?
Reminder: Thongchai in London
Where’s the report?
“Politics is boring”
Nganadirek asks me to categorically state whether I am pro-Thaksin or anti-Thaksin.
Sorry, but you\’re not going to get a black and white answer on that question. Gods and devils are deserving of unquestionable and unshaking love or hate – but not mortals. There is no such thing as true love in politics. My views on Thaksin have changed a lot over the years.
While he was just the head of AIS, I was anti-Thaksin, because AIS locked their SIMs so that only expensive Telewiz-sold handsets could be used on the AIS network. Thaksin also had a weird concession that gave him sole right to operate online services. Smart for him, but bad for consumers. This was during the BBS/NECTEC/IPIED/proto-internet days, so I was very frustrated at a concession that made those growing services illegal. Thank goodness he never exercised the exclusivity clauses in his concession.
During the Phalang Dharma years, I supported PDP, which meant that outwardly I was also wincingly pro-Thaksin (internally, I supported a different PDP faction). After the PDP collapsed, I felt a lot of bitterness to the man, and was very open about my anti-Thaksin views.
During 1997-2000, I was pro-constitution/political reform. Which meant that I desperately wanted the 2001 election to produce a stable government. Even if that meant making myself pro-Thaksin during the Supreme Court\’s decision to acquit him. Even though it was clear that he was guilty. I\’ve been saying for the past 12 years that Thaksin should sell off Shin Corp if he wants to play politics.
Microcredit, the War on Drugs, universal healthcare, and OTOP didn\’t really affect my wellbeing, so from 2001-2005, I was largely Thaksin-neutral. But if you forced me into a political conversation during that period, I would have told you that Thailand has had royalism for centuries and elitism/militarism for decades, and neither did very much for Thailand. So if the electorate wanted to experiment with populism for a couple of years, then we might as well give it a try. A part of me could appreciate the novelty and effectiveness of some of the TRT\’s signature policies. And I discounted any accusations of corruption, because in Thailand, everybody is accused of corruption, and I needed clear and compelling evidence to convince me that any of that slander is true.
When my uncle was killed by terrorists in Yala, I became ferociously anti-Thaksin for a while, because although I didn\’t blame him for the insurrection, I blamed him for not being able to stop it. But when the Democrats, academics, Anand, and Prem weren\’t able to propose any better alternative policies, I decided that I hated all of those ivory castle Bangkokians – I became anti-everybody (with regards to the South).
I feel that only rascals drag the King into their personal battles, so I was sympathetically pro-Thaksin when Sondhi started his whole \”royal powers\” slander in 2005. Plus, I had enough experience with Sondhi to realize that there wasn’t anything he wouldn’t lie about in order to further his personal goals.
When Thaksin finally sold Shin Corp, I applauded. And when Sondhi and his rascals claimed that people should pay capital gains taxes when they sell stocks on the stock market, I looked at my own personal stock portfolio and said \”What The F***?!?\” That made me sympathetically pro-Thaksin.
When Thaksin dissolved Parliament, I stupidly believed that the Democrats could propose a better alternative. So I became, for a very short-time, anti-Thaksin and pro-Democrat. But when the Democrats got defeatist and decided that it would be better not to bother competing in the April elections, I became vehemently anti-Democrat, which I guess made me pro-Thaksin (since there wasn’t anybody else competing in that election).
The Democrats\’ decision to contest the October election, even though they boycotted the April election, struck me as hypocritical. Which made me anti-Democrat, Thaksin-neutral, and pro-fringe party in the months before the election. The point is, I still believed in the power of the elections and on the ongoing health of the constitutional mechanism. We could have taken him down! We were so close.
So of course, I was anti-coup. When the junta used the shotgun approach to say that everything about Thaksin was not only bad, but inherently evil, I defended the parts of his legacy that I thought deserved defending. I guess that made me pro-Thaksin.
I wish we could move the debate away from whether you love Thaksin or hate him. As you can see, it’s not so simple. And besides, it’s not relevant – the Thaksin era is over.
The hard questions that should be debated today aren’t about Thaksin, but about the future of microcredit, the future of universal healthcare, the future of populism, the future of electoral democracy, the future of rural empowerment, the future of constitutionalism, the future of human rights, the future of media reform, the future of telecom/energy reform, the future of military/palace intervention, and whether future governments should be stable monoliths or shaky coalitions. This debate would be much more constructive if we would just move on and stop dragging a dinosaur like Thaksin into things.
p.s., Whenever I start to get convinced that The Nation is full of blind zealots, I remember that they still have Chang Noi. Read the editorial; it’ll do everybody some good.
On the GMS bandwagon. Australians and Laos – Part II
I gather that (according to Ausaid’s recent white paper) Ausaid is planning on expanding its research division dramatically. What’s the point if they’re just going to follow the ADB & WB’s lead? Is it to provide an in-house cheer squad?
Pro-poor programs
Don’t forget rural electrification and the 1990’s/2000’s reforms that increased rural teledensity.
Access to information and communication play an important role in improving rural livelihoods.
Pro-poor programs
Another contribution to this discussion from the TLC List:
It is important not to lose sight of large-scale programs that did not have a “rural development” or “tambon” label, but yielded substantial benefits over wide areas populated mostly by the “rural poor.” I refer to the major highway construction, feeder road building, water-sealed privies, malaria spraying, regional agricultural and vocational schools, education generally, health facilities, etc. some of which date back to the 1950s. In most countries with large rural hinterlands, the sine qua non for raising incomes has been the ground transportation facilities. Irrigation and agricultural research and extension have also been helpful, not to mention the marketing role of the private sector. Local control over local expenditure budgets is no doubt important politically and for the sense of some local empowerment. But the contribution such mini-budgets can make to long-run economic improvement is small and must be kept in perspective, interesting though such programs are to social
scientists.
Bob Muscat
Pro-poor programs
I will see if Keyes has written any of this up.
“Politics is boring”
Good article by Chang Noi in today’s The Nation:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/12/12/opinion/opinion_30021310.php
Those whining about the coup (or hankering for a Thaksin return), would be better served to focus their attention to the new constitution and not let the process be a whitewash.
“Politics is boring”
Taxi Driver: I was trying to show that I am anti-Thaksin and I accept the coup, now that it has happened (I was not pro-coup before it ocurred, but I have yet to see any other way the situation was going to be resolved)
Call me elitist if you like, but I still believe the electorate was not politically sophisticated enough to kick Thaksin out, and Thaksin had proven he was unfit to govern – I won’t repeat all the reasons:)
As for the other forces at play, I have already stated on this site that I do not place credence in many of the nonsensical claims by Sondhi L.
Other forces at play – well there is no need to comment on the usual political suspects because it is well known why they are involved – self interest.
As for the palace – I believe the King acts to provide stability, as a last resort ‘white knight’, and is not the the political mover and shaker (manipulator) that some on this site maintain.
That is not to say there are not some people with connections to the palace who wished to restore some of their old privileges that were being eroded (taken over) by Thaksin & his cronies.
I have said before that some good may come from the rise & fall of Thaksin, in that the rural poor cannot be ignored from now on.
Would you care to comment on any other forces that I may have missed?
patiwat: To help interpret your comments, would you please categorically state whether you are pro-Thaksin or anti-Thaksin
I have also noticed your banter with Bangkok Pundit on his blog, a site which has a definite pro Thaksin tone.
(We already know you are anti-coup, and it will be pretty lame if you just come back and say you are pro-democracy)
Taxi Driver’s comments are important and should be taken on board by those currently in power.
However, the country can only move forward again once the coup is accepted, and Thaksin is history.
Pro-poor programs
Andrew, could you post some links to Keyes’ 1963-64 work as well as his 2005-06 restudy?
New species of military democracy discovered in the Pacific!
Vichai, finally, it seems we agree on something! Let’s celebrate the small victories 🙂
But let me ask you this then. You’ve often repeated the junta’s accusation that Thaksin insulted the King. That was one of their reasons for the coup.
So are you saying that it’s wrong to put a man in jail for 6 years for insulting the King, but it’s OK for the military to abrogate the constitution and seize power for the same reason?
That’s a hypothetical question – don’t think of the other reasons why Thaksin-in-particular justified a coup. What would happen if lese majesty were removed from the legal code (not that I ever expect that to ever happen – it’s too useful a tool for the establishment). So anybody could criticize or insult the King.
If a government politician insulted the King or the Crown Prince (which is exactly what Veera did), and it weren’t illegal, would that alone justify a coup?
p.s., I believe that in the future (after “you know what”), a lese majesty law will be more useful than it is right now.
“Politics is boring”
Vichai, I think it’s silly to say that the coup was caused by tax evasion, Southern violence, and the War on Drugs. The military itself has to bear a lot of blame for the southern violence, and the war on drugs might have justified a coup in 2003, but not 2006. I’ll give more weight to Taxi Driver’s comments.
1) I think corruption, incompetence, and “usurping its powers” (whatever that means) are debatable. Was it really incompetent? In some areas yes, in some areas no. But no government is ever perfect (witness the junta) – yet voters liked how the government set its priorities. That’s why they voted him back in 2005. As for corruption, well, judicial and parliamentary due process during the Thaksin government didn’t find anything. I’m still waiting to see if the junta’s committees find anything of substance. That’s not rhetorical – I really am eager to see what the junta finds. If it’s silly stuff like Bhanapot’s alleged tax evasion (which occured during the Chuan government!), then I know that the junta is desperate.
2) I strongly disagree that the constitutional process wasn’t working. If the democratic process wasn’t working, then why were so many political parties established prior to the October election? Why were so many parties actively campaigning, rather than boycotting? Why did the Democrat party dramatically revise it’s election platform? Why were there so many high-level defections from TRT? Why were so many senators blatantly anti-Thaksin? Because people seriously expected TRT to take a significant hit in the October elections. The electoral process set out in the constitition was working, and it was working to weaken Thaksin.
Besides, the coup happened a month before elections, not a month after elections. If it happened after elections, it would be fair to say that the coup happened because elections didn’t work (which was Sarit’s reasoning). The fact that it happened before elections means that the military was afraid of the constitutional process working – not afraid that it wouldn’t work.
3) Who knows whether the country was headed towards violence. The junta has made some claims, backed up with no evidence, and it has not arrested anybody or charged anybody with preparing for violence. So I really don’t believe the junta’s claims that the country was headed to violence. But we’ll never know, because the junta has stopped mentioning this and has swept it under the carpet.
“Politics is boring”
Ngargadeeleg you agree that not all the political crisis was caused by Thaksin. But the rest of your comment seemed to again concentrate on what he did wrong or should have done right. I don’t disagree with you on these points about Thaksin, but what I’m more interested in is a discussion on “(2) and (3). Why did these conditions exist leading up to Sept 19th? Who caused them? Was it only Thaksin? Or were there other forces that worked to ensure that (2) and (3) existed which forced the King to intervene?”
There is already ample public debate and discussion in Thailand (and on this blogsite) on the rights/wrongs of Thaksin. But there is very little public discussion on “the Other Forces” that co-conspired to drive the crisis to breaking point. Come on, you did not let Thaksin get away with it, so don’t let “the Other Forces” think they can get away with it now, otherwise the next elected government will still face the same threat from these people.