According to Malay NGOS like Perkasa and Isma and Ketuanan Melayu devotees, Malays don’t kill people (threatening in the same breath that they might run ‘amok’ among the
non-Malays), that it is all “liberalism, Zionism, humanism, foreign influence on Islam, yadda, yadda, yadda. What we have here, ladies and gentlemen, is a failure to
self-reflect. Far too many Malays go for the easy fix and to spread the blame to everyone, but themselves, and that is where the problem begins….and ends.
When you give priority to freedom of expression, you inevitably let through posts that make assertions backed with little or no evidence.
As for liberal-minded Thai army officers, there are none who would admit it at the moment; perhaps none that feel that way at all. But if the present dictatorship becomes even more despised, there are always ambitious officers who will be prepared to put on a liberal coat if it helps them displace the junta. How long they would keep wearing it is not clear. Liberalism may also be a useful strategy for Vajiralongkorn to outflank his enemies.
The big ask is for those who take over the reins to back what is needed most in Thailand’s constitution: the power to appoint officials put firmly in the hands of the people’s elected representatives, with the latter to take responsibility at elections for the performance of those officials.
Agree Sam that it does seem likely that the army will have to be involved in a far more proactive way than the “retreat to the barracks” handwaving of the 90s.
I think there is a problem with many folks who are interested in Thai politics being very tunnel-vision when it comes to thinking about “democracy” in the Thai context.
The worst instance of this is the tendency to equate democracy with elections. And while the consent of the governed is central and necessary in any system that calls itself democratic, it is far from sufficient.
And of course the next most egregious example of the inability and/or refusal to “think outside the box” is the mistaken labeling of the UDD/PT condominium as a “pro-democratic” movement.
Where are the liberal-democratic “colonels”, frustrated with the old-boy network and convinced that in a professional military, appropriate to the Thai state and under its control, they would be doing much better and so would their country?
Far more likely for a liberal democratic system to grow from a coup mounted by such a group than from a congeries of factions led and funded by an authoritarian billionaire.
It’d be so refreashing and rejoiceful for all the Thai people, if Thailand is changed into a republican system. That’s when the barbaric lese majeste law will no longer be in the land. And that’s when Thai taxpayers will not have foot the roya’s household expenses at a tune of some US $500 million dollars a year. The average Thai laborer only earns about US $9 a day! Just commenting on this will land you in jail from 3-15 years! A republican Thailand is long overdue!
I am sorry that you have reached such opinion of me. I am not sure how. I never referred to voting rights and, in fact, do not at all agree with Dr. Seree and his often hysterical elitist nonsense. I am questioning the nature of New Mandala as an academic website that has people with the title of editor and yet does nothing to edit papers that are badly written and include “facts” without any support or even explanation. Since New Mandala is hosted by Australian National University and lists Dr. Nicholas Farelly as editor and Prof. Thorn Pitidol as country editor for Thailand, I had expectation that there would be some editing and academic quality control involved. Many articles are of good quality, but some are not. If New Mandala is intended to be simply bulletin board where anyone can post anything without editing for language or content, then Dr. Farrelly should make this clear.
“mom dynasty”??
You mean Mon dynasty, but Bayin-naung was not a “Mon” and Pegu is not Thaton. “Hintha” is also not quite a phoenix.
You also meant “Alaung-phaya”, I guess.
Anyway, I shouldn’t be nit-picking like an academic, except for the fact that this article is written by a graduate student!
True, I grew up in Burma during the 50’s and the 60’s and never tasted a Coke. I drank mainly water. The first time I had a Coca-Cola was in Calcutta, India, in the late 60’s (I actually didn’t like the taste!). Burma must have changed a lot since those days. A lot more pollution, contamination and all kinds of environmental damage (too bad for endangered species like me!)
Office friends tell me that the Thai Prince had promoted a number of women in the military to general rank over the years . . . and many of those lead the Thai Prince’s troop of bodyguards. And those same office friends giggle when asked why the Thai Prince had taken such interest in military women reaching the military top posts . . .
If the Thai Prince inherits the throne … the end of the Thai monarchy won’t be that far away, maybe within 1-3 years from the time of royal succession.
I’m not Joshua but I agree with his statement not because it can be proven in fact – like the notion that events are driven by a succession crisis, it’s just a theory – but because it makes sense in rational terms. Of course I’m making an assumption the CP is a rational actor and, if he is, then gaming out a scenario in which he’d stand to lose everything just to side with Thaksin seems completely and totally irrational.
In short, the CP would be much more likely to just take the role as the power play at that time dictates.
And the most powerful players in the room remain the military – that’s if the military remain relatively united, again a very likely scenario.
Furthermore, if there’s one thing histories of ANY monarchies teach us is that monarchs and their direct lineage are always replaceable. Rama 8’s ascent is a lesson in point – the Glorious Revolution in the UK is another.
If the CP doesn’t behave they’ll find a way to find another king – after all, all monarchies are essentially myths.
The real crisis for the elites and military in Thailand is the emergence of the masses seeking some form of agency via democracy. That is the REAL threat to their power – not what mannequin gets to sit in the palace going mad and counting their money.
I still don’t know why the obsession with the succession has replaced a hard-headed political analysis when people comment on Thailand’s situation. Maybe it feeds on and draws from the Western Orientalist fantasy of Asian mystery and inscrutability that only the correct anthropology can discern?
A split in the army – eg if a significant element came out supporting democracy and the sovereignty of an elected parliament – would be a far more interesting “crisis” for Thailand than which dull royal gets to sit on the throne. But that particular crisis seems very remote right now.
The following statements that can only come from intimate understanding of Myanmar lu myo make you a Bamar in spirit in I and my ilk book.
“The threats to their success will not, however, come from the headline-grabbing human rights challenges that have a habit of drawing megaphone attention.
In almost all cases it will be the ordinary threats – petty officialdom, selfish neighbours, workplace bullies and exploitative bosses – that will destroy chances for happiness for the tens of millions of people seeking to carve out better lives for themselves.”
Clean Walter ist essential, but that is a question of Infrastructure and canalisation, not global Brands, on the contrary: consider how Coca-Cola plants have contaminated Indian Walter sources through their effluents!
One fact that most overlook is the personal, private wealth of the king, who will inherit this, how will it be divided up amongst his children. This is not the same as the Crown Wealth which will presumably pass to the next monarch. I’m sure Vajiralongkorn is longing to get his hands on both.
Vajiralongkorn is the recognised heir to the throne and will take it upon the death of his father. He won’t risk his position by upsetting the existing order, and he certainly won’t provoke the old elite by welcoming Thaksin back. The new king won’t be very popular to begin with and will have his enemies in the establishment, just as his father did when he assumed the throne.
To leave out from the Srirasmi paragraph, the whole Pongpat saga is to seriously misrepresent events. The revelation that members of her extended family, including her uncle police Lieutenant Pongpat Chayapan head of Criminal Suppression Division (CSD) and other members of her family, had been involved in a continual stream of criminal activity using assertion of royal status to perpetrate crimes and that the LM law was used to punish these transgressions, throws an entirely different light on those events.
The best word to describe the current situation outlined here seems to be “double bind” namely “a situation in which a person is confronted with two irreconcilable demands or a choice between two undesirable courses of action” not some Manichean apocalyptic fight between the author’s imaginary bad guys the Amat or “ultra-royalists” and their always depicted as puppet-like, can’t think for themselves minions, and the author’s imaginary good guys, the billionaire ex-cop and his loyal never-can-do-wrong, always suppressed and oppressed, rural supporters, or Prai.
Stripping the drama out, the obvious implication is that Prayuth’s continued presence for however long it takes, and that might be a long time, together with a strong chain of command in the military, will be required for the continued health of “Thai democracy”, an institution that has done quite well for many decades and may, in fact, be: as good as it gets.
Not much new being said here – ordinary Thais have been discussing this kind of thing in private for years. And like other writing on the “succession” it’s based mainly on theory and little hard evidence.
Of course monarchy by its very nature has in-built “crises” at times of succession. The real issue is how determinative such moments are.
Yet the obsession by some Western commentators with Thailand’s “succession” seems more about a failure of those commentators to really understand the actual politics. For example some of those Western voices obsessed with succession continually stated there’d be “no coup” right up to the point there was one and that the Red Shirts had a vast armed wing to resist any moves by the Army – this imagined Red “Army” never materialized, of course, how ever much everyone dreamed it would.
What is certain is that real power in Thailand lies with the military – the monarchy has been tolerated by the military as long as it played it’s role in securing hegemonic dominance. Prior to Sarit the military were largely indifferent to the monarchy with significant elements – Phibun etc – being openly hostile.
Like in the 60s/70s when some generals (Surayud’s father for example) joined the communists, splits in the military are likely to have a far bigger impact on Thailand than a backroom bitchfight between this or that prince/princess whose power, ultimately, would rely on which direction the military blows.
At the end of the day, in Thailand’s real politik power plays it comes down to tank divisions not what some “theorist” believes is going to happen.
The monarchy will be spectators to most of this as much as anyone else but will, of course, take full advantage to the best of their ability of any situation.
I also think that much of this analysis also fails to understand that the “splits” in the monarchy would disappear quickly once they were genuinely threatened by outside forces or were ordered to “reconcile” at de facto gun point.
Malaysia’s deadly connection
According to Malay NGOS like Perkasa and Isma and Ketuanan Melayu devotees, Malays don’t kill people (threatening in the same breath that they might run ‘amok’ among the
non-Malays), that it is all “liberalism, Zionism, humanism, foreign influence on Islam, yadda, yadda, yadda. What we have here, ladies and gentlemen, is a failure to
self-reflect. Far too many Malays go for the easy fix and to spread the blame to everyone, but themselves, and that is where the problem begins….and ends.
Thailand will never have democracy unless…
When you give priority to freedom of expression, you inevitably let through posts that make assertions backed with little or no evidence.
As for liberal-minded Thai army officers, there are none who would admit it at the moment; perhaps none that feel that way at all. But if the present dictatorship becomes even more despised, there are always ambitious officers who will be prepared to put on a liberal coat if it helps them displace the junta. How long they would keep wearing it is not clear. Liberalism may also be a useful strategy for Vajiralongkorn to outflank his enemies.
The big ask is for those who take over the reins to back what is needed most in Thailand’s constitution: the power to appoint officials put firmly in the hands of the people’s elected representatives, with the latter to take responsibility at elections for the performance of those officials.
Thailand will never have democracy unless…
Agree Sam that it does seem likely that the army will have to be involved in a far more proactive way than the “retreat to the barracks” handwaving of the 90s.
I think there is a problem with many folks who are interested in Thai politics being very tunnel-vision when it comes to thinking about “democracy” in the Thai context.
The worst instance of this is the tendency to equate democracy with elections. And while the consent of the governed is central and necessary in any system that calls itself democratic, it is far from sufficient.
And of course the next most egregious example of the inability and/or refusal to “think outside the box” is the mistaken labeling of the UDD/PT condominium as a “pro-democratic” movement.
Where are the liberal-democratic “colonels”, frustrated with the old-boy network and convinced that in a professional military, appropriate to the Thai state and under its control, they would be doing much better and so would their country?
Far more likely for a liberal democratic system to grow from a coup mounted by such a group than from a congeries of factions led and funded by an authoritarian billionaire.
The Republic of Siam?
It’d be so refreashing and rejoiceful for all the Thai people, if Thailand is changed into a republican system. That’s when the barbaric lese majeste law will no longer be in the land. And that’s when Thai taxpayers will not have foot the roya’s household expenses at a tune of some US $500 million dollars a year. The average Thai laborer only earns about US $9 a day! Just commenting on this will land you in jail from 3-15 years! A republican Thailand is long overdue!
Thailand will never have democracy unless…
I am sorry that you have reached such opinion of me. I am not sure how. I never referred to voting rights and, in fact, do not at all agree with Dr. Seree and his often hysterical elitist nonsense. I am questioning the nature of New Mandala as an academic website that has people with the title of editor and yet does nothing to edit papers that are badly written and include “facts” without any support or even explanation. Since New Mandala is hosted by Australian National University and lists Dr. Nicholas Farelly as editor and Prof. Thorn Pitidol as country editor for Thailand, I had expectation that there would be some editing and academic quality control involved. Many articles are of good quality, but some are not. If New Mandala is intended to be simply bulletin board where anyone can post anything without editing for language or content, then Dr. Farrelly should make this clear.
A tale of two cities in Myanmar
“mom dynasty”??
You mean Mon dynasty, but Bayin-naung was not a “Mon” and Pegu is not Thaton. “Hintha” is also not quite a phoenix.
You also meant “Alaung-phaya”, I guess.
Anyway, I shouldn’t be nit-picking like an academic, except for the fact that this article is written by a graduate student!
A tale of two cities in Myanmar
True, I grew up in Burma during the 50’s and the 60’s and never tasted a Coke. I drank mainly water. The first time I had a Coca-Cola was in Calcutta, India, in the late 60’s (I actually didn’t like the taste!). Burma must have changed a lot since those days. A lot more pollution, contamination and all kinds of environmental damage (too bad for endangered species like me!)
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
Office friends tell me that the Thai Prince had promoted a number of women in the military to general rank over the years . . . and many of those lead the Thai Prince’s troop of bodyguards. And those same office friends giggle when asked why the Thai Prince had taken such interest in military women reaching the military top posts . . .
If the Thai Prince inherits the throne … the end of the Thai monarchy won’t be that far away, maybe within 1-3 years from the time of royal succession.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
Tom
I’m not Joshua but I agree with his statement not because it can be proven in fact – like the notion that events are driven by a succession crisis, it’s just a theory – but because it makes sense in rational terms. Of course I’m making an assumption the CP is a rational actor and, if he is, then gaming out a scenario in which he’d stand to lose everything just to side with Thaksin seems completely and totally irrational.
In short, the CP would be much more likely to just take the role as the power play at that time dictates.
And the most powerful players in the room remain the military – that’s if the military remain relatively united, again a very likely scenario.
Furthermore, if there’s one thing histories of ANY monarchies teach us is that monarchs and their direct lineage are always replaceable. Rama 8’s ascent is a lesson in point – the Glorious Revolution in the UK is another.
If the CP doesn’t behave they’ll find a way to find another king – after all, all monarchies are essentially myths.
The real crisis for the elites and military in Thailand is the emergence of the masses seeking some form of agency via democracy. That is the REAL threat to their power – not what mannequin gets to sit in the palace going mad and counting their money.
I still don’t know why the obsession with the succession has replaced a hard-headed political analysis when people comment on Thailand’s situation. Maybe it feeds on and draws from the Western Orientalist fantasy of Asian mystery and inscrutability that only the correct anthropology can discern?
A split in the army – eg if a significant element came out supporting democracy and the sovereignty of an elected parliament – would be a far more interesting “crisis” for Thailand than which dull royal gets to sit on the throne. But that particular crisis seems very remote right now.
A tale of two cities in Myanmar
Like every cities in Myanmar Naypyidaw WILL be seen as purely Bamar when history is written.
Yangon: Alaupaya name the city as “end of opposition”.
Pago?Pegu: Founded by the mom dynasty due to the phoenix myth.
Mandalay: The 2nd last monarch Mindone after consulting Buddhists Monks.
Naypyidaw: Will be a forever reminder to the Tamadaw as triumph over west useless careless policy that lasted over one generation.
A sobering example to future that a calculating mind can counter any adversity that is useless carelessly carried out.
The sunny side of ordinary life
Nich
The following statements that can only come from intimate understanding of Myanmar lu myo make you a Bamar in spirit in I and my ilk book.
“The threats to their success will not, however, come from the headline-grabbing human rights challenges that have a habit of drawing megaphone attention.
In almost all cases it will be the ordinary threats – petty officialdom, selfish neighbours, workplace bullies and exploitative bosses – that will destroy chances for happiness for the tens of millions of people seeking to carve out better lives for themselves.”
Keep on with your great exposée.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
You may be right, Joshua. But how do you know all that with such certainty?
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
[…] la succession royale en question – New Mandala – Quelles sont les implications de la succession royale en Tha├пlande – décès ou […]
A tale of two cities in Myanmar
Clean Walter ist essential, but that is a question of Infrastructure and canalisation, not global Brands, on the contrary: consider how Coca-Cola plants have contaminated Indian Walter sources through their effluents!
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
Relax. Thailand will muddle through.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
One fact that most overlook is the personal, private wealth of the king, who will inherit this, how will it be divided up amongst his children. This is not the same as the Crown Wealth which will presumably pass to the next monarch. I’m sure Vajiralongkorn is longing to get his hands on both.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
Vajiralongkorn is the recognised heir to the throne and will take it upon the death of his father. He won’t risk his position by upsetting the existing order, and he certainly won’t provoke the old elite by welcoming Thaksin back. The new king won’t be very popular to begin with and will have his enemies in the establishment, just as his father did when he assumed the throne.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
To leave out from the Srirasmi paragraph, the whole Pongpat saga is to seriously misrepresent events. The revelation that members of her extended family, including her uncle police Lieutenant Pongpat Chayapan head of Criminal Suppression Division (CSD) and other members of her family, had been involved in a continual stream of criminal activity using assertion of royal status to perpetrate crimes and that the LM law was used to punish these transgressions, throws an entirely different light on those events.
The best word to describe the current situation outlined here seems to be “double bind” namely “a situation in which a person is confronted with two irreconcilable demands or a choice between two undesirable courses of action” not some Manichean apocalyptic fight between the author’s imaginary bad guys the Amat or “ultra-royalists” and their always depicted as puppet-like, can’t think for themselves minions, and the author’s imaginary good guys, the billionaire ex-cop and his loyal never-can-do-wrong, always suppressed and oppressed, rural supporters, or Prai.
Stripping the drama out, the obvious implication is that Prayuth’s continued presence for however long it takes, and that might be a long time, together with a strong chain of command in the military, will be required for the continued health of “Thai democracy”, an institution that has done quite well for many decades and may, in fact, be: as good as it gets.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
Not much new being said here – ordinary Thais have been discussing this kind of thing in private for years. And like other writing on the “succession” it’s based mainly on theory and little hard evidence.
Of course monarchy by its very nature has in-built “crises” at times of succession. The real issue is how determinative such moments are.
Yet the obsession by some Western commentators with Thailand’s “succession” seems more about a failure of those commentators to really understand the actual politics. For example some of those Western voices obsessed with succession continually stated there’d be “no coup” right up to the point there was one and that the Red Shirts had a vast armed wing to resist any moves by the Army – this imagined Red “Army” never materialized, of course, how ever much everyone dreamed it would.
What is certain is that real power in Thailand lies with the military – the monarchy has been tolerated by the military as long as it played it’s role in securing hegemonic dominance. Prior to Sarit the military were largely indifferent to the monarchy with significant elements – Phibun etc – being openly hostile.
Like in the 60s/70s when some generals (Surayud’s father for example) joined the communists, splits in the military are likely to have a far bigger impact on Thailand than a backroom bitchfight between this or that prince/princess whose power, ultimately, would rely on which direction the military blows.
At the end of the day, in Thailand’s real politik power plays it comes down to tank divisions not what some “theorist” believes is going to happen.
The monarchy will be spectators to most of this as much as anyone else but will, of course, take full advantage to the best of their ability of any situation.
I also think that much of this analysis also fails to understand that the “splits” in the monarchy would disappear quickly once they were genuinely threatened by outside forces or were ordered to “reconcile” at de facto gun point.
Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession
How does the writer know the real reason the reds have been so subdued post-coup is due to Thaksins orders?