The point is that fascism can certainly be expressed through Buddhism (or any religion for that matter). If Buddhism and fascism where incompatible then 969 or MaBaTha would not exist! Certainly not the same as saying all Buddhism is inherently fascist (which I certainly don’t suggest)
That is very true indeed. I have read the description of how the Yellow-shirt monarchists want to kill Thai red-shirts by torturing the person in various and cruel methods. One such method involves cutting open the body of the victim and applying salt to the open wounds for a slow and painful death. This killing methods was used in the past for disloyalty. As a Thai political observer, I can agree with the author that this is what is happening in Thailand. I have seen people are dissatisfied with the monarchy. Aliases are being given to each member of the monarchy. Insulting words are being used by even the highest officials.
Good thing Keith Barney has it all figured out, and Edward Said and the entire field of postcolonial studies are apparently irrelevant. There’s no need to be vigilant or continue to deconstruct colonial ideas, because in a maneuver that could only be made from the vantage point of white male privilege, colonialism is rendered a thing of the past that’s been “flogged” to death, rather than a continually unfolding discourse with profound material effects on the lives of millions right here in the present. Let’s just go back to imperialism as usual, apparently that’s a “more interesting and productive conversation”. Thankfully Keith assured us that he’s open to other viewpoints by telling us what we shouldn’t be thinking and writing about. One has to wonder of course why Keith bothered posting at all, given the profound boredom he must have experienced in reading this article. Oh wait, he said thanks for an interesting article at the end. Now I’m confused, unless of course his point was just to take a shot at someone else. But never mind, I’m not a “serious analyst or scholar” anyway. What was that about being “fundamentally insulting” again?
Seems that ten months after the coup, the “benefit of the doubt for the military as a neutral mediator to put in the necessary reforms” community has collapsed, as predicted.
The “Red Threat” (“there would have been violence”) community, on the contrary, seems to be alive and kicking. The bomb threats cater to this constitutency.
Surprisingly, the “Red Corruption” community seems to be rather unaffected by the corruption and nepotism of the junta. This would indicate, as I had analysed in my “Fighting corruption” paper, that “corruption” is indeed a code for the “legitimacy to rule” as defined within the Buddhist moralist political discourse. And morality is still attributed only to the “good people”.
This means that 10 months on, the narrow support base of the junta is shrinking, but has not yet fully collapsed.
On the other side of the aisle, the student protests and calls to restore democracy and human rights are only preaching to the already convinced (Democracy Backlash) and do little to build a narrative for change or even a platform for a broad societal coalition for change. This is also the reason why the gaffes and the growing middle class opposition against the charter do not hurt the junta core support base.
This means as long as the traditional elites do not move firmly against the junta, inertia will creep and Thailands decline will continue.
tfrhoden, interesting comments on the satire shared by Dean Walker (take that, Verconica!) But part of what is so objectional about the Yanks’ piece is this insistence on “Thainess”. Even to take the term seriously is to concede the game to the reactionaries. Bill Klausner in particular has been in Thailand long enough to know this; he ought to commune with the ghost of Kukrit for an hour or so. As for the comparisons with the ROK and Spain, well, in the first case it was due to pressures from below that the era of “tutelage” came to an end. Yet the Yanks have not a word of encouragement for similar forces in today’s Thailand. In the second case, well, we had the courageous Adolfo Suarez. You will, I think, be familiar with and understand the significance of this picture: http://www.eldiariodetenerife.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/23f-3.png. Where among the Yanks’ fancy friends in Bangkok might one find such a man or woman today? Certainly not Mark Vedge or “Phra Suthep” or “Khun” (where is the body of Thanong Pho-an anyway?) Anand . . .
Appreciate Mr Eisel Mazard take and report on the Kokang region.
A border region area next to China.
The regions in the west Yakhine bordering Bangladesh, in contrast can not be more different.
Even the refugees plight from Kokhang conflict do not attract any NGO, especially the biggest being UN and other western democracies with neither complaint nor alligator tears.
The only different being the refugee population being with Chinese ancestry as opposed to Islamic.
I will take a stab at why this doesn’t work so well as satire and why the piece by the Americans has some sense to it.
1) The heart of the last piece was the idea that in Thailand not “everyone [is] equal before the law”. No society on earth does this perfectly, but many do better than Thailand. Any liberal democracy must have this “rule of law” aspect in it to function as a liberal democracy. Can some kind of equality before the law be possible and still keep “Thai-ness” is the question at hand. I understood the four writers to mean that the two can go together…but, that, alas, such things take time…
2) This piece, though written by four Americans, never made a comparison to the American case. Nor did it argue that Thailand should copy the American system. The satire piece jokes as if this were the case and has “Nuat Namman” try to reverse it to illustrate the folly of a Thai commenting on the American case so that an American can feel sheepish about commenting on the Thai case. Again, this misses the point completely.
3) The Americans made a not-so-subtle comparison to “South Korea, Taiwan, Portugal and Spain” in the penultimate paragraph. The idea is that one can still be culturally S.Korean, Taiwanese, Portuguese, and Spanish whilst at the same time also having a society that is more politically liberal and democratic than what those societies used to be half a century ago. Again, these regimes are not perfect, but are they more liberal and more democratic than they used to be? Yes, they are. Can this be extended to the Thai case whilst also keeping that bit of “Thai-ness”?
4) The Americans obviously wrote something that is the epitome of moderation–maybe even oppressively moderate it that classically boring liberal democratic kind of way. No one will want to run out into the streets and scream “revolution” and “down with the dictator” and the like (even as much fun/liberating as that might be to do).
No, in the case they made, they argued for the most boring (and hence, “moderate”) thing that one can in politics: time.
Mahathir was elected by UMNO cronyism and his damage to Malaysia was hardly any less severe than Ne Win’s. So what if U Nu declared Burma a Buddhist nation ? I don’t hear you complaining about Pakistan declaring itself a Muslim nation, and the high likelihood that the radical Malays will declare Malaysia, an Islamic nation. I never said U Nu was perfect, and he never said that about himself, yet he was a democrat, and Burma was better for his leadership. The comparison between Ne Win and Mahathir is apt, and your suggestion that it is not, is questionable. There was a war in Malaysia on 13/5/69 and who is to say, at this rate, there won’t be. I do not share you sanguine view of Malaysia, which is unjustified.
Excellent article. It also needs to be mentioned that direct mechanisms are put in place to restrict discussion. For instance, on any story with even the faintest whiff of controversy, The Bangkok Post locks the discussion board with this: “The discussion board on this article has been turned off, because commenting on the above issue may cause legal dispute. More information in our terms of use. ”
And the popular farang forum, ThaiVisa has these words of warning: “Please use discretion in your references to the government. Phrases which can be considered as anti-coup will be removed. Referring to Thailand or the government as a dictatorship, military dictatorship or other such terms will be removed.
Any posts which can be construed as rumor mongering are not allowed.
Posters violating these rules, and the forum rules will receive a warning, a possible suspension of posting privileges or a ban from the site.”
I prefer Walker’s satire to that of notdisappointed. “No one in Thailand is affected by martial law”? 555 Waiting for his satirical treatment of intellectuals’ being summoned to army bases . . .
Love the satire. Especially as regard to going to the Amphur for ‘happiness seminar”. Lovely!
But let’s be serious for a bit.
No one is Thailand is was affected by martial law, and no one is affected by this Article 44. Only thaksin and his cronies and foreigners are affected. With 44, thaksin isn’t able to overtly through his surrogates (although they’re doing so covertly) instigate dissension. There is no real urban-based elite blah blah vs poor mentality that the Western press tries so hard to convince foreign readers of. The so-called “majority rural poor” are just being used as tools to create a a facade that thaksin is the upholder of democracy.
No one in Thailand has been harmed by the former martial law; and no one will be punished by Article 44. Only those who try and foster the need to return to murder and mayhem as seen by the actions of the red shirts will be affected by 44. The majority of the rural poor do not want dissension and do not want divisiveness; they just want to get on with their lives and get a piece of the pie. The pie that under thaksin and his surrogates was one of 90% for me and 10% for you. Pilfering the country’s tresury to line thaksin’s pockets and throwing scraps to the majority rural poor.
When will Westerners accept that the democracy that they have, is not a ‘one-size fits all’ and that what they perceive as democracy is not suitable at this time for Thailand. In the West, democracy is dominated by your oligarchs and the 1%. Democracy in the West is broken but Westerners are too complacent to see it. Don’t let media confused you about what’s happening within the country.
While praising the democratic credentials of U Nu, one should not forget that he alienated the Chin and Kachin and other minorities, when he introduced Buddhism as state religion and established Burmese superiority in Burma. As known, this lead to further civil war and facilitated the rise of Ne Win. I think that Ne Win should be looked at in a more differentiated perspective.
The comparision between Ne Win and Mahathir is rather far fledged! At least Mahathir was elected and there was no civl war in Malaysia.
Wonderful essay, above all the final quotation from Orwell. Dr Selth’s versatility is quite something. Perhaps he can also post a link to his CityU working paper here.
I think a bit too much is being made of this putative “‘violent orientalism’ thesis”. Does any serious analyst or scholar really still hold to such an opinion?
The citation in this New Mandala article is back to Springer (2009), who in turn, and in particular, critically cites David Roberts (2001) “Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99.”
In his critique, Springer (2009: 314) writes that:
“In perpetuating the ‘Great Dichotomy’ of modernisation theory, Roberts, for example, labels Cambodian culture ‘traditional’, wherein a ‘tradition of absolutism’ is said to find its origins in Angkorian times and thus,
“[violent] behavior can be connected to Cambodian cultural
heritage … in Khmer relationships there is no mechanism or system for managing disputes. Furthermore, the intolerance of others’ opinions characteristic of political, as well as social, culture aggravates the likelihood of confrontation … The absence of institutions to resolve conflicts that derive from intolerance of ‘other’ views leads to their settlement in more violent ways. (2001, 53–4)”
The endeavour to sew together violence throughout the ages by entangling its threads in a Gordian knot is tenuous at best.”
———
My reading of Roberts’ section from pages 52-57 is that he is making a more nuanced and complex argument than indicated by Springer’s short quotation.
For instance, Roberts mentions “…combinations of extremes of poverty, and a limited respect for human rights, has exacerbated and aggravated a culture of violence” [p. 53]
He mentions that this was “…underscored by the socialisation of brutality accruing from Cambodia’s experience of bombing, war and genocide and located within a closed and, sometimes self-serving political elite.” [p. 53]
Roberts mentions how some of these values and attitudes were “… combined with some of the Pol Pot experiences and an exceptionally harsh decade folioing the removal of the Khmer Rouge” [p. 54], which was then “…coupled to envy and surprise at the sudden and obvious flouting of enormous wealth after UNTAC arrived with its equipment, salaries and disproportionate per diems, to underscore and encourage an unsurprising and self-serving bonanza.” [p. 54]
Roberts writes that this combination of forces undermined ideas of community or the common good [p. 54]
Roberts writes that “…violence and crime became almost legitimised through socialisation and a corrupt police force. These circumstances were further aggravated by a lack of lawyers and a government hampered in its goals by an international embargo, elements of which were sometimes key sources of the marginalisation of human rights.” [p. 55].
Roberts continues: “These issues, in the context of a western interpretation of human rights, were further compounded by the organisational nature of socialist government, in which the separation of executive and judiciary is not necessarily given.” [p. 55].
Roberts continues in his laundry list of factors contributing to violence, writing that “Exacerbating this further was the extent of political corruption aggravated by the ruined economy that further legitimised and underscored corruption and nepotism.”
And further…”Such circumstances were underpinned by dwindling external fiscal and physical aid, especially as the Soviet Union and Viet Nam had progressively extricated themselves, and their sponsorship, from the international dimension to the problem…. the civil service, as well as being understaffed in terms of expertise and bloated in terms of efficiency, was also paid at rates which would not feed a civil servants family… state police were also embroiled in the endemic corruption…”
One could continue going through these pages…
My point here is not to defend all of Roberts’ writing. I would certainly not have used Roberts’ sub-heading on page 52 called “Human Rights and A Culture of Violence.”
I think Roberts does have a number of unfortunate and problematic phrases in his text. The author can rightly be called on this. And one could certainly find and quote certain phrases that seem to show he was making a simplistic ‘culture of violence’ or ‘violent orientalism’ argument based on “the great dichotomy of modernization theory”. But when you read that section in context, I think his argument is quite a bit more complex.
In my reading, Roberts is not analysing violence as an ‘endogenous phenomena that can only be understood by a detailed analysis of the factors internal to a particular country.’
So why are we talking about a “violent orientalism thesis”, if just a few misguided writers seem to have used this idea, and if some of the primary examples of such thinking are actually making the specific point of contextualising the roots of violence in terms of political power relations, in nuanced and important ways?
I know the intentions behind this critique are good. But often I find the basic terminology of “violent orientalism” fundamentally insulting. Such ideas need to be dismantled of course. But if that critical work has been done (and that’s a judgment call….), then perhaps we might consider desisting from flogging such dead orientalist horses, and while certainly not forgetting these issues — by and large move on to more interesting and productive conversations.
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Fascist assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar
The point is that fascism can certainly be expressed through Buddhism (or any religion for that matter). If Buddhism and fascism where incompatible then 969 or MaBaTha would not exist! Certainly not the same as saying all Buddhism is inherently fascist (which I certainly don’t suggest)
Thailand’s social media battleground
That is very true indeed. I have read the description of how the Yellow-shirt monarchists want to kill Thai red-shirts by torturing the person in various and cruel methods. One such method involves cutting open the body of the victim and applying salt to the open wounds for a slow and painful death. This killing methods was used in the past for disloyalty. As a Thai political observer, I can agree with the author that this is what is happening in Thailand. I have seen people are dissatisfied with the monarchy. Aliases are being given to each member of the monarchy. Insulting words are being used by even the highest officials.
Singapore after Lee Kuan Yew
A refreshing view of post LKY.
Fascist assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar
Good thing Keith Barney has it all figured out, and Edward Said and the entire field of postcolonial studies are apparently irrelevant. There’s no need to be vigilant or continue to deconstruct colonial ideas, because in a maneuver that could only be made from the vantage point of white male privilege, colonialism is rendered a thing of the past that’s been “flogged” to death, rather than a continually unfolding discourse with profound material effects on the lives of millions right here in the present. Let’s just go back to imperialism as usual, apparently that’s a “more interesting and productive conversation”. Thankfully Keith assured us that he’s open to other viewpoints by telling us what we shouldn’t be thinking and writing about. One has to wonder of course why Keith bothered posting at all, given the profound boredom he must have experienced in reading this article. Oh wait, he said thanks for an interesting article at the end. Now I’m confused, unless of course his point was just to take a shot at someone else. But never mind, I’m not a “serious analyst or scholar” anyway. What was that about being “fundamentally insulting” again?
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Seems that ten months after the coup, the “benefit of the doubt for the military as a neutral mediator to put in the necessary reforms” community has collapsed, as predicted.
The “Red Threat” (“there would have been violence”) community, on the contrary, seems to be alive and kicking. The bomb threats cater to this constitutency.
Surprisingly, the “Red Corruption” community seems to be rather unaffected by the corruption and nepotism of the junta. This would indicate, as I had analysed in my “Fighting corruption” paper, that “corruption” is indeed a code for the “legitimacy to rule” as defined within the Buddhist moralist political discourse. And morality is still attributed only to the “good people”.
This means that 10 months on, the narrow support base of the junta is shrinking, but has not yet fully collapsed.
On the other side of the aisle, the student protests and calls to restore democracy and human rights are only preaching to the already convinced (Democracy Backlash) and do little to build a narrative for change or even a platform for a broad societal coalition for change. This is also the reason why the gaffes and the growing middle class opposition against the charter do not hurt the junta core support base.
This means as long as the traditional elites do not move firmly against the junta, inertia will creep and Thailands decline will continue.
Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust
Did LKY really meet Albert Einstein?
America needs Thai style democracy
tfrhoden, interesting comments on the satire shared by Dean Walker (take that, Verconica!) But part of what is so objectional about the Yanks’ piece is this insistence on “Thainess”. Even to take the term seriously is to concede the game to the reactionaries. Bill Klausner in particular has been in Thailand long enough to know this; he ought to commune with the ghost of Kukrit for an hour or so. As for the comparisons with the ROK and Spain, well, in the first case it was due to pressures from below that the era of “tutelage” came to an end. Yet the Yanks have not a word of encouragement for similar forces in today’s Thailand. In the second case, well, we had the courageous Adolfo Suarez. You will, I think, be familiar with and understand the significance of this picture: http://www.eldiariodetenerife.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/23f-3.png. Where among the Yanks’ fancy friends in Bangkok might one find such a man or woman today? Certainly not Mark Vedge or “Phra Suthep” or “Khun” (where is the body of Thanong Pho-an anyway?) Anand . . .
America needs Thai style democracy
NO DOUBT AT ALL, HILLARY AND YINGLUCK HAVE MUCH IN COMMON.
Kokang 2015: Unknown unknowns
Appreciate Mr Eisel Mazard take and report on the Kokang region.
A border region area next to China.
The regions in the west Yakhine bordering Bangladesh, in contrast can not be more different.
Even the refugees plight from Kokhang conflict do not attract any NGO, especially the biggest being UN and other western democracies with neither complaint nor alligator tears.
The only different being the refugee population being with Chinese ancestry as opposed to Islamic.
Is that the reason?
America needs Thai style democracy
I will take a stab at why this doesn’t work so well as satire and why the piece by the Americans has some sense to it.
1) The heart of the last piece was the idea that in Thailand not “everyone [is] equal before the law”. No society on earth does this perfectly, but many do better than Thailand. Any liberal democracy must have this “rule of law” aspect in it to function as a liberal democracy. Can some kind of equality before the law be possible and still keep “Thai-ness” is the question at hand. I understood the four writers to mean that the two can go together…but, that, alas, such things take time…
2) This piece, though written by four Americans, never made a comparison to the American case. Nor did it argue that Thailand should copy the American system. The satire piece jokes as if this were the case and has “Nuat Namman” try to reverse it to illustrate the folly of a Thai commenting on the American case so that an American can feel sheepish about commenting on the Thai case. Again, this misses the point completely.
3) The Americans made a not-so-subtle comparison to “South Korea, Taiwan, Portugal and Spain” in the penultimate paragraph. The idea is that one can still be culturally S.Korean, Taiwanese, Portuguese, and Spanish whilst at the same time also having a society that is more politically liberal and democratic than what those societies used to be half a century ago. Again, these regimes are not perfect, but are they more liberal and more democratic than they used to be? Yes, they are. Can this be extended to the Thai case whilst also keeping that bit of “Thai-ness”?
4) The Americans obviously wrote something that is the epitome of moderation–maybe even oppressively moderate it that classically boring liberal democratic kind of way. No one will want to run out into the streets and scream “revolution” and “down with the dictator” and the like (even as much fun/liberating as that might be to do).
No, in the case they made, they argued for the most boring (and hence, “moderate”) thing that one can in politics: time.
A hopeful moment for civil society in Myanmar
Mahathir was elected by UMNO cronyism and his damage to Malaysia was hardly any less severe than Ne Win’s. So what if U Nu declared Burma a Buddhist nation ? I don’t hear you complaining about Pakistan declaring itself a Muslim nation, and the high likelihood that the radical Malays will declare Malaysia, an Islamic nation. I never said U Nu was perfect, and he never said that about himself, yet he was a democrat, and Burma was better for his leadership. The comparison between Ne Win and Mahathir is apt, and your suggestion that it is not, is questionable. There was a war in Malaysia on 13/5/69 and who is to say, at this rate, there won’t be. I do not share you sanguine view of Malaysia, which is unjustified.
Thailand’s social media battleground
Excellent article. It also needs to be mentioned that direct mechanisms are put in place to restrict discussion. For instance, on any story with even the faintest whiff of controversy, The Bangkok Post locks the discussion board with this: “The discussion board on this article has been turned off, because commenting on the above issue may cause legal dispute. More information in our terms of use. ”
And the popular farang forum, ThaiVisa has these words of warning: “Please use discretion in your references to the government. Phrases which can be considered as anti-coup will be removed. Referring to Thailand or the government as a dictatorship, military dictatorship or other such terms will be removed.
Any posts which can be construed as rumor mongering are not allowed.
Posters violating these rules, and the forum rules will receive a warning, a possible suspension of posting privileges or a ban from the site.”
America needs Thai style democracy
I prefer Walker’s satire to that of notdisappointed. “No one in Thailand is affected by martial law”? 555 Waiting for his satirical treatment of intellectuals’ being summoned to army bases . . .
America needs Thai style democracy
Love the satire. Especially as regard to going to the Amphur for ‘happiness seminar”. Lovely!
But let’s be serious for a bit.
No one is Thailand is was affected by martial law, and no one is affected by this Article 44. Only thaksin and his cronies and foreigners are affected. With 44, thaksin isn’t able to overtly through his surrogates (although they’re doing so covertly) instigate dissension. There is no real urban-based elite blah blah vs poor mentality that the Western press tries so hard to convince foreign readers of. The so-called “majority rural poor” are just being used as tools to create a a facade that thaksin is the upholder of democracy.
No one in Thailand has been harmed by the former martial law; and no one will be punished by Article 44. Only those who try and foster the need to return to murder and mayhem as seen by the actions of the red shirts will be affected by 44. The majority of the rural poor do not want dissension and do not want divisiveness; they just want to get on with their lives and get a piece of the pie. The pie that under thaksin and his surrogates was one of 90% for me and 10% for you. Pilfering the country’s tresury to line thaksin’s pockets and throwing scraps to the majority rural poor.
When will Westerners accept that the democracy that they have, is not a ‘one-size fits all’ and that what they perceive as democracy is not suitable at this time for Thailand. In the West, democracy is dominated by your oligarchs and the 1%. Democracy in the West is broken but Westerners are too complacent to see it. Don’t let media confused you about what’s happening within the country.
No one is affected – just your sensitivities.
A hopeful moment for civil society in Myanmar
While praising the democratic credentials of U Nu, one should not forget that he alienated the Chin and Kachin and other minorities, when he introduced Buddhism as state religion and established Burmese superiority in Burma. As known, this lead to further civil war and facilitated the rise of Ne Win. I think that Ne Win should be looked at in a more differentiated perspective.
The comparision between Ne Win and Mahathir is rather far fledged! At least Mahathir was elected and there was no civl war in Malaysia.
Counting Thailand’s coups
It gets very hot in Thailand. The coups are entertainment for the generals
Burma and the Kipling mystique
The poem certainly Grips you, but the sad thing is that today’s mandalay has has Little left of the enchantment conjured up by kipling.
Burma and the Kipling mystique
Wonderful essay, above all the final quotation from Orwell. Dr Selth’s versatility is quite something. Perhaps he can also post a link to his CityU working paper here.
Jokowi: modern man of the people or divine clown?
Hassan Wirajuda and Retno Marsudi
Downer and Bishop? Monas and Taman Mini
Fascist assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar
I think a bit too much is being made of this putative “‘violent orientalism’ thesis”. Does any serious analyst or scholar really still hold to such an opinion?
The citation in this New Mandala article is back to Springer (2009), who in turn, and in particular, critically cites David Roberts (2001) “Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99.”
In his critique, Springer (2009: 314) writes that:
“In perpetuating the ‘Great Dichotomy’ of modernisation theory, Roberts, for example, labels Cambodian culture ‘traditional’, wherein a ‘tradition of absolutism’ is said to find its origins in Angkorian times and thus,
“[violent] behavior can be connected to Cambodian cultural
heritage … in Khmer relationships there is no mechanism or system for managing disputes. Furthermore, the intolerance of others’ opinions characteristic of political, as well as social, culture aggravates the likelihood of confrontation … The absence of institutions to resolve conflicts that derive from intolerance of ‘other’ views leads to their settlement in more violent ways. (2001, 53–4)”
The endeavour to sew together violence throughout the ages by entangling its threads in a Gordian knot is tenuous at best.”
———
My reading of Roberts’ section from pages 52-57 is that he is making a more nuanced and complex argument than indicated by Springer’s short quotation.
For instance, Roberts mentions “…combinations of extremes of poverty, and a limited respect for human rights, has exacerbated and aggravated a culture of violence” [p. 53]
He mentions that this was “…underscored by the socialisation of brutality accruing from Cambodia’s experience of bombing, war and genocide and located within a closed and, sometimes self-serving political elite.” [p. 53]
Roberts mentions how some of these values and attitudes were “… combined with some of the Pol Pot experiences and an exceptionally harsh decade folioing the removal of the Khmer Rouge” [p. 54], which was then “…coupled to envy and surprise at the sudden and obvious flouting of enormous wealth after UNTAC arrived with its equipment, salaries and disproportionate per diems, to underscore and encourage an unsurprising and self-serving bonanza.” [p. 54]
Roberts writes that this combination of forces undermined ideas of community or the common good [p. 54]
Roberts writes that “…violence and crime became almost legitimised through socialisation and a corrupt police force. These circumstances were further aggravated by a lack of lawyers and a government hampered in its goals by an international embargo, elements of which were sometimes key sources of the marginalisation of human rights.” [p. 55].
Roberts continues: “These issues, in the context of a western interpretation of human rights, were further compounded by the organisational nature of socialist government, in which the separation of executive and judiciary is not necessarily given.” [p. 55].
Roberts continues in his laundry list of factors contributing to violence, writing that “Exacerbating this further was the extent of political corruption aggravated by the ruined economy that further legitimised and underscored corruption and nepotism.”
And further…”Such circumstances were underpinned by dwindling external fiscal and physical aid, especially as the Soviet Union and Viet Nam had progressively extricated themselves, and their sponsorship, from the international dimension to the problem…. the civil service, as well as being understaffed in terms of expertise and bloated in terms of efficiency, was also paid at rates which would not feed a civil servants family… state police were also embroiled in the endemic corruption…”
One could continue going through these pages…
My point here is not to defend all of Roberts’ writing. I would certainly not have used Roberts’ sub-heading on page 52 called “Human Rights and A Culture of Violence.”
I think Roberts does have a number of unfortunate and problematic phrases in his text. The author can rightly be called on this. And one could certainly find and quote certain phrases that seem to show he was making a simplistic ‘culture of violence’ or ‘violent orientalism’ argument based on “the great dichotomy of modernization theory”. But when you read that section in context, I think his argument is quite a bit more complex.
In my reading, Roberts is not analysing violence as an ‘endogenous phenomena that can only be understood by a detailed analysis of the factors internal to a particular country.’
So why are we talking about a “violent orientalism thesis”, if just a few misguided writers seem to have used this idea, and if some of the primary examples of such thinking are actually making the specific point of contextualising the roots of violence in terms of political power relations, in nuanced and important ways?
I know the intentions behind this critique are good. But often I find the basic terminology of “violent orientalism” fundamentally insulting. Such ideas need to be dismantled of course. But if that critical work has been done (and that’s a judgment call….), then perhaps we might consider desisting from flogging such dead orientalist horses, and while certainly not forgetting these issues — by and large move on to more interesting and productive conversations.
Just my opinion, I’m open to other’s viewpoints.
[Thanks for the interesting article too].