I’m surprised as to your overly-defensive tone. You’ve placed your article in a public forum – expect it to be robustly tackled and for it to be picked over. Try laughing off the ad hom and engaging the more pertinent stuff.
I personally don’t think you’ve really offered much of a “way out” but just repeated reactionary views, nuanced with vague platitudes and embellished with terms you don’t adequately or precisely explain. These are very big flaws.
Your opening analysis is certainly thorough but your “suggestions” lack any credibility for the reasons given above.
As for thinking you are “the one” to show the “potential benefits of a new approach” – come on, Marc, please get off your high horse.
Plenty of Thais have worked things out for themselves. What they need, as I pointed out earlier, is support for their democracy. Not lectures.
There are three functions of ad hominem attacks in Thailand (and elsewhere):
1. Use as a red herring to distract from the actual issues.
2. Use suggestive questions about hidden agendas to undermine the credibility of the speaker (in the kafkaeske double structure of the patronage system a deadly technique)
3. Coded xenophobia to deflect criticism from the outside
This thread is proof how well it works.
As for my motivation, it should be more than obvious why someone who does not “hail from a Western country”(another coded nationalist term) but works inside the Thai political system, red lines must be observed if you do not want to endanger your colleagues and organization.
I beg you to respect these constraints and stop refrain from doing the nationalist bidding by giving legitimacy to baseless attacks.
[…] that not only was the crackdown on migrant workers a junta order, but that it was also in line with The Dictator’s view of foreigners as a major security threat for Thailand. Now there is more evidence that General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s personal views of the foreign […]
Some important points here. Especially the necessity of defining the “elite”.
It may be better to use terms like “royal patronage system”, and “Shinawatra patronage system”. These are feudal entities, and in their very nature, corrupt.
Thank you for your balanced and thorough reading, unlike others here. Your arguments are indeed to be taken serious.
In the “omissions” some commentators mentioned: Unlike others, I do not “hail from a Western country”, but work inside the Thai political system. It should be obvious to any sensible observers that this requires awareness of certain red lines. In fact, I wrote this article directly after the coup, but felt it would be unwise to publish it then. For the same reason, I feel uncomfortable being more specific about the “elites”. I hope for your kind understanding. This is brw the reason why I left out my credentials, as I am responsible for the safety of my colleagues. Constructing an ad hominem attack out of this as some have done is either naive or mischievous, thereby constructing a red herring and undermining my credibility by suggestive questions about hidden motives. Unfortunately this is in line with comments to previous articles on New Mandala.
About your comments:
I did -here in paragraph 2, as well as in all of my other publications- mention the power struggle. I believe it is the key to the political conflict. However, I feel others have written on the political conflict as the tip of the iceberg extensively, including the question of succession. My work concentrates on the underlying transformation crisis, and the opportunity structures created by it for political maneuvering.
My objective is not merely to criticize, but to show ways out of this mess. As others have noted, I am skeptical about the actual chances to make this happen in the near future, as opening this window would require a turnaround in the attitudes and approaches of Thai intellectuals, activists and opinion leaders. It seems unlikely that this could happen anytime soon, but I see it as my role to show the potential benefits of a new approach. Currently writing a book in Thai which will hopefully address many questions a short essay cannot tackle comprehensively.
@sam deedes, what happened to those retired Generals in jokowi camp? If i’m not mistaken the ex director of National Intelligence Agency retired Gen. Hendropriyono is still head of jkw campaign team, right?
[…] 3Perdebatan cukup hangat terjadi dalam bentuk tulisan-tulisan di website ‘New Mandala’ yang dikelola oleh the Australian National University (ANU) College of Asia and the Pacific. Lihat misalnya: http://www.newmandala.org/2014/05/16/a-lesson-for-researchers/ […]
It is often said that the best strategists are to be found in the camp with the closest ties to the military. Hardly surprising. In Thailand, for example, some argue that the PDRC tactics were more varied than those of the UDD.
The moral, though, is for progressive forces to study and learn from the military, adopt and adapt and absorb their tactics in a nonviolent fashion into their overall strategy.
For too long there has been an element of disdain for the military and all its works from the moral high ground of the so called left.
I cannot imagine that anybody here who is seriously interested in the politics of Thailand doesn’t regularly read Bangkok Pundit’s often wry commentaries. Nonetheless I felt that this piece serves to set the current junta firmly in its all too repetitive historical cycle.
This post by Mr. Saxer provides useful and systematic analysis of the complex struggle that has plagued us for nearly a decade, but has roots that extend back to the incomplete revolution of 1932. Like all efforts to simplify this struggle into something understandable, it has its weaknesses.
However, Mr. Saxer notes some key issues that are often overlooked by journalists and even knowledgeable academics in efforts to make sense of the conflicts.
Unlike many who resort to a simplistic class analysis of the conflict, Mr. Saxer provides a more nuanced description of role of middle class in Bangkok. He notes that middle class students have long called for respect for the vote and that much of the public protest against the coup has not come from the Red Shirts, but from middle class people, especially academic people in Bangkok.
He also notes that much of the urban middle class opposition to the Pheua Thai government came not from “Thaksin regime’s” electoral success, but from its efforts to monopolize power. Going back to 2005 election, we can see that there was acceptance of Thaksin as the dominant force in Parliament, but opposition grew rapidly when he was seen to use Parliamentary dominance and vast financial resources made available by his sale of Shin Corp to try to monopolize other centers of power — supposedly independent organizations such as the Senate, Palace, Auditor General, Election Commission, Ombudsmen, courts, media, and even the military. I suspect main reason for the 2006 coup was Thaksin’s growing support in military and police (partly through his classmates, but also through high-ranking Shinawatra family members) and his pressure on the leadership to promote his favorites.
Importantly, Mr. Saxer notes that the return to democracy will probably not succeed unless the middle class (worth defining, given various comments with different meanings for it) feels included. Unlike analysts who feel that this is completely a class struggle with the rural poor pitted against the urban elite and middle class, Mr. Saxer sees the possibility of people with democratic mindsets from all classes working together.
This is particularly important as some analysts see the growing wealth and sophistication of the rural population as moving them into the middle class or at least some variant of a middle class. So, there are indeed, many points on which Bangkok people (including many who moved to the capital from the countryside) and rural people already agree, and, given economic and democratic trends, that agreement is likely to increase over time. Maybe common dislike for military junta will be one, if military continue to suppress peaceful expression of opinion.
Mr. Saxer’s suggestions to the junta and the Red Shirts are worthy of attention, so it is hoped that his essay can be translated into Thai for wider readership among those who matter.
However, Mr. Saxer’s analysis also has weak points. Like many, he talks about “the all-powerful elites” without defining the term elite or explaining who are the elites and who are not. By what definition is the Shinawatra family with its wealth and senior positions in non-elected government service not part of the elite? By what definition are Plodprasob (with declared assets of nearly a billion baht) or Police General Pracha Promnok or General Yuthasak Sasiprapha or the many wealthy people of provincial influence in the Red Shirt and Pheua Thai network not members of the elite? Where would Chuan Likpai or Surin Pitsuwan be placed, coming from poor,rural backgrounds and, in Surin’s case, from a religious minority?
This leads to the main problem with Mr. Saxer’s schematic of the contesting “discourses”: it overlooks the raw, underlying struggle for power. This struggle for individual political and financial power is what further complicates the social, political, economic, geographic and yes, class issues in the struggle. Our political mess clearly pits some members of elite against other members; some members of the middle class against others and even some members of the rural population against others. The struggle seems to have the South and Bangkok on one side and the North and Northeast on the other – yet many key leaders of the Red Shirts are from the South. Mr. Saxer’s schematic fails to explain the geographic elements in the struggle. Why are so many of the rural poor in the south so opposed to Thaksin while so many in the north and northeast are strongly behind him? Hopefully, we will hear more from Mr. Saxer in future.
I also question Mr. Saxer’s statement that “the goal of the junta to restore the traditional order with its vertical social and moral hierarchies and exclusive top down decision-making processes.” This may be true, but unfortunately, he provides no evidence. The stated goals of the military are different and include a return to electoral democracy, but, of course, stated goals and real goals can differ. I suspect military leaders are still working out detailed goals and probably are not clear or unified on those goals – especially since the military depends on the obedience of troops (and some officers) that have rural and lower class origins and Shinawatra family connections.
So, unlike Mr. Saxer, I believe the military junta has at least some understanding that within the next two years they will have to allow the emergence of a political system that, as Mr. Saxer puts it, provides for the existence and expression of “a diversity of lifestyles and identities, and a plurality of values and interests.” Much more questionable is whether the junta leaders have the political and communication abilities to successfully manage a process that leads to such a goal. The early actions, especially silly crackdowns on peaceful expressions of opinion, do not augur well. Hopefully, the junta is moving on to more important actions of interim constitution, legislative assembly, end of political violence and better democratic system.
Maaf. Pendapat anda mungkin salah. Saya alumni Teknik Industri UI, ikut demo 98. IPK saat lulus 3.2. Mungkin anda termasuk mahasiswa tipikal oportunis ya 😉
Tapi saya setuju tidak boleh anarkis
Sepengetahuan yg saya baca, Pak Amien Rais minta Pak Prabowo di Mahmil kan supaya pimpinan yg memerintahkan penculikan bisa diseret juga. Saya lupa quote nya pak Amien persisnya.
Hem…. jelas sudah maksud dan tujuan dari Capre No 1 ini… dia ingin mengembalikan sistem pemerintahan ke ragim orde lama…. dengan begitu dia bisa memainkan rodah pemerintahan dengan sistem yang lama….. semoga niatmu tidak tercapai….
I liked the phrase, “He has modelled his oration on Indonesia’s charismatic first president Sukarno and imitates his slow and hypnotic cadence, building to a fiery crescendo as he rails against unnamed enemies who have sold out the country and stolen its wealth.” But Prabowo doesn’t pull it off. It’s always an imitation. Good piece overall, would have appreciated a bit more detail and texture from the campaign trail.
Yes, an apt comparison indeed, direct from one possey of self imposed, repressive and globally despised dictators to another. The Yellow shirts must be immensely proud that they have succeeded in dragging their once respected country into the same murky pit inhabited by the likes of Myanmar.
Congratulations yellow shirts, keep forcing your country in the same direction by repeatedly steam rolling the rights of the majority of the population and you may even succeed in creating even more pain and suffering than Burma’s generals. A hefty goal, but most certainly achievable if the current course is maintained.
Now if Bangkok middle-class is thriving but the middle-class of the rest of the country are shrinking, THAT is threatening!
Nah! The Bangkok middle-class possess that universal middle-class instinct of picking out dangerous rogue leaders (like Thaksin, Marcos and Suharto) who could do havoc to their aspirations under the guise of achieving/preserving ‘democracy or national greatness’.
Doesn’t this blog guy Hla Oo live in Australia? Is he an Australian citizen or a political refugee? What’s his motivation behind these rather radical views he writes about in his blog, full of graphic (current) photographs and a lot of “insider information” as it were. How does he know all these things and so quickly what’s going on in Burma?
I’m just curious!
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Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Marc
I’m surprised as to your overly-defensive tone. You’ve placed your article in a public forum – expect it to be robustly tackled and for it to be picked over. Try laughing off the ad hom and engaging the more pertinent stuff.
I personally don’t think you’ve really offered much of a “way out” but just repeated reactionary views, nuanced with vague platitudes and embellished with terms you don’t adequately or precisely explain. These are very big flaws.
Your opening analysis is certainly thorough but your “suggestions” lack any credibility for the reasons given above.
As for thinking you are “the one” to show the “potential benefits of a new approach” – come on, Marc, please get off your high horse.
Plenty of Thais have worked things out for themselves. What they need, as I pointed out earlier, is support for their democracy. Not lectures.
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
There are three functions of ad hominem attacks in Thailand (and elsewhere):
1. Use as a red herring to distract from the actual issues.
2. Use suggestive questions about hidden agendas to undermine the credibility of the speaker (in the kafkaeske double structure of the patronage system a deadly technique)
3. Coded xenophobia to deflect criticism from the outside
This thread is proof how well it works.
As for my motivation, it should be more than obvious why someone who does not “hail from a Western country”(another coded nationalist term) but works inside the Thai political system, red lines must be observed if you do not want to endanger your colleagues and organization.
I beg you to respect these constraints and stop refrain from doing the nationalist bidding by giving legitimacy to baseless attacks.
Ominous signs for migrant workers in Thailand
[…] that not only was the crackdown on migrant workers a junta order, but that it was also in line with The Dictator’s view of foreigners as a major security threat for Thailand. Now there is more evidence that General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s personal views of the foreign […]
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Some important points here. Especially the necessity of defining the “elite”.
It may be better to use terms like “royal patronage system”, and “Shinawatra patronage system”. These are feudal entities, and in their very nature, corrupt.
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Thank you for your balanced and thorough reading, unlike others here. Your arguments are indeed to be taken serious.
In the “omissions” some commentators mentioned: Unlike others, I do not “hail from a Western country”, but work inside the Thai political system. It should be obvious to any sensible observers that this requires awareness of certain red lines. In fact, I wrote this article directly after the coup, but felt it would be unwise to publish it then. For the same reason, I feel uncomfortable being more specific about the “elites”. I hope for your kind understanding. This is brw the reason why I left out my credentials, as I am responsible for the safety of my colleagues. Constructing an ad hominem attack out of this as some have done is either naive or mischievous, thereby constructing a red herring and undermining my credibility by suggestive questions about hidden motives. Unfortunately this is in line with comments to previous articles on New Mandala.
About your comments:
I did -here in paragraph 2, as well as in all of my other publications- mention the power struggle. I believe it is the key to the political conflict. However, I feel others have written on the political conflict as the tip of the iceberg extensively, including the question of succession. My work concentrates on the underlying transformation crisis, and the opportunity structures created by it for political maneuvering.
My objective is not merely to criticize, but to show ways out of this mess. As others have noted, I am skeptical about the actual chances to make this happen in the near future, as opening this window would require a turnaround in the attitudes and approaches of Thai intellectuals, activists and opinion leaders. It seems unlikely that this could happen anytime soon, but I see it as my role to show the potential benefits of a new approach. Currently writing a book in Thai which will hopefully address many questions a short essay cannot tackle comprehensively.
Field notes on the Jokowi campaign
@sam deedes, what happened to those retired Generals in jokowi camp? If i’m not mistaken the ex director of National Intelligence Agency retired Gen. Hendropriyono is still head of jkw campaign team, right?
A lesson for researchers
[…] 3Perdebatan cukup hangat terjadi dalam bentuk tulisan-tulisan di website ‘New Mandala’ yang dikelola oleh the Australian National University (ANU) College of Asia and the Pacific. Lihat misalnya: http://www.newmandala.org/2014/05/16/a-lesson-for-researchers/ […]
Field notes on the Jokowi campaign
It is often said that the best strategists are to be found in the camp with the closest ties to the military. Hardly surprising. In Thailand, for example, some argue that the PDRC tactics were more varied than those of the UDD.
The moral, though, is for progressive forces to study and learn from the military, adopt and adapt and absorb their tactics in a nonviolent fashion into their overall strategy.
For too long there has been an element of disdain for the military and all its works from the moral high ground of the so called left.
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Plus ├зa change…
I cannot imagine that anybody here who is seriously interested in the politics of Thailand doesn’t regularly read Bangkok Pundit’s often wry commentaries. Nonetheless I felt that this piece serves to set the current junta firmly in its all too repetitive historical cycle.
http://asiancorrespondent.com/124122/how-little-things-change/
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
This post by Mr. Saxer provides useful and systematic analysis of the complex struggle that has plagued us for nearly a decade, but has roots that extend back to the incomplete revolution of 1932. Like all efforts to simplify this struggle into something understandable, it has its weaknesses.
However, Mr. Saxer notes some key issues that are often overlooked by journalists and even knowledgeable academics in efforts to make sense of the conflicts.
Unlike many who resort to a simplistic class analysis of the conflict, Mr. Saxer provides a more nuanced description of role of middle class in Bangkok. He notes that middle class students have long called for respect for the vote and that much of the public protest against the coup has not come from the Red Shirts, but from middle class people, especially academic people in Bangkok.
He also notes that much of the urban middle class opposition to the Pheua Thai government came not from “Thaksin regime’s” electoral success, but from its efforts to monopolize power. Going back to 2005 election, we can see that there was acceptance of Thaksin as the dominant force in Parliament, but opposition grew rapidly when he was seen to use Parliamentary dominance and vast financial resources made available by his sale of Shin Corp to try to monopolize other centers of power — supposedly independent organizations such as the Senate, Palace, Auditor General, Election Commission, Ombudsmen, courts, media, and even the military. I suspect main reason for the 2006 coup was Thaksin’s growing support in military and police (partly through his classmates, but also through high-ranking Shinawatra family members) and his pressure on the leadership to promote his favorites.
Importantly, Mr. Saxer notes that the return to democracy will probably not succeed unless the middle class (worth defining, given various comments with different meanings for it) feels included. Unlike analysts who feel that this is completely a class struggle with the rural poor pitted against the urban elite and middle class, Mr. Saxer sees the possibility of people with democratic mindsets from all classes working together.
This is particularly important as some analysts see the growing wealth and sophistication of the rural population as moving them into the middle class or at least some variant of a middle class. So, there are indeed, many points on which Bangkok people (including many who moved to the capital from the countryside) and rural people already agree, and, given economic and democratic trends, that agreement is likely to increase over time. Maybe common dislike for military junta will be one, if military continue to suppress peaceful expression of opinion.
Mr. Saxer’s suggestions to the junta and the Red Shirts are worthy of attention, so it is hoped that his essay can be translated into Thai for wider readership among those who matter.
However, Mr. Saxer’s analysis also has weak points. Like many, he talks about “the all-powerful elites” without defining the term elite or explaining who are the elites and who are not. By what definition is the Shinawatra family with its wealth and senior positions in non-elected government service not part of the elite? By what definition are Plodprasob (with declared assets of nearly a billion baht) or Police General Pracha Promnok or General Yuthasak Sasiprapha or the many wealthy people of provincial influence in the Red Shirt and Pheua Thai network not members of the elite? Where would Chuan Likpai or Surin Pitsuwan be placed, coming from poor,rural backgrounds and, in Surin’s case, from a religious minority?
This leads to the main problem with Mr. Saxer’s schematic of the contesting “discourses”: it overlooks the raw, underlying struggle for power. This struggle for individual political and financial power is what further complicates the social, political, economic, geographic and yes, class issues in the struggle. Our political mess clearly pits some members of elite against other members; some members of the middle class against others and even some members of the rural population against others. The struggle seems to have the South and Bangkok on one side and the North and Northeast on the other – yet many key leaders of the Red Shirts are from the South. Mr. Saxer’s schematic fails to explain the geographic elements in the struggle. Why are so many of the rural poor in the south so opposed to Thaksin while so many in the north and northeast are strongly behind him? Hopefully, we will hear more from Mr. Saxer in future.
I also question Mr. Saxer’s statement that “the goal of the junta to restore the traditional order with its vertical social and moral hierarchies and exclusive top down decision-making processes.” This may be true, but unfortunately, he provides no evidence. The stated goals of the military are different and include a return to electoral democracy, but, of course, stated goals and real goals can differ. I suspect military leaders are still working out detailed goals and probably are not clear or unified on those goals – especially since the military depends on the obedience of troops (and some officers) that have rural and lower class origins and Shinawatra family connections.
So, unlike Mr. Saxer, I believe the military junta has at least some understanding that within the next two years they will have to allow the emergence of a political system that, as Mr. Saxer puts it, provides for the existence and expression of “a diversity of lifestyles and identities, and a plurality of values and interests.” Much more questionable is whether the junta leaders have the political and communication abilities to successfully manage a process that leads to such a goal. The early actions, especially silly crackdowns on peaceful expressions of opinion, do not augur well. Hopefully, the junta is moving on to more important actions of interim constitution, legislative assembly, end of political violence and better democratic system.
Demokrasi Indonesia Dalam Bahaya
Maaf. Pendapat anda mungkin salah. Saya alumni Teknik Industri UI, ikut demo 98. IPK saat lulus 3.2. Mungkin anda termasuk mahasiswa tipikal oportunis ya 😉
Tapi saya setuju tidak boleh anarkis
Demokrasi Indonesia Dalam Bahaya
Sepengetahuan yg saya baca, Pak Amien Rais minta Pak Prabowo di Mahmil kan supaya pimpinan yg memerintahkan penculikan bisa diseret juga. Saya lupa quote nya pak Amien persisnya.
Prabowo Subianto: pilihlah aku, tetapi sekali saja
Hem…. jelas sudah maksud dan tujuan dari Capre No 1 ini… dia ingin mengembalikan sistem pemerintahan ke ragim orde lama…. dengan begitu dia bisa memainkan rodah pemerintahan dengan sistem yang lama….. semoga niatmu tidak tercapai….
Return to autocracy in Indonesia?
I liked the phrase, “He has modelled his oration on Indonesia’s charismatic first president Sukarno and imitates his slow and hypnotic cadence, building to a fiery crescendo as he rails against unnamed enemies who have sold out the country and stolen its wealth.” But Prabowo doesn’t pull it off. It’s always an imitation. Good piece overall, would have appreciated a bit more detail and texture from the campaign trail.
Anti-democratic? Prabowo’s response
Well done New Mandala!
Jokowi and Prabowo reflect a decade of frustrations with SBY
Excellent analysis. When one considers the huge number of un/under- employed, SBY’s government look pretty unspectacular.
Field notes on the Jokowi campaign
Excellent piece, helped me understand the recent shift in the polls.
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Yes, an apt comparison indeed, direct from one possey of self imposed, repressive and globally despised dictators to another. The Yellow shirts must be immensely proud that they have succeeded in dragging their once respected country into the same murky pit inhabited by the likes of Myanmar.
Congratulations yellow shirts, keep forcing your country in the same direction by repeatedly steam rolling the rights of the majority of the population and you may even succeed in creating even more pain and suffering than Burma’s generals. A hefty goal, but most certainly achievable if the current course is maintained.
Siamese dreams in the time of the junta
Now if Bangkok middle-class is thriving but the middle-class of the rest of the country are shrinking, THAT is threatening!
Nah! The Bangkok middle-class possess that universal middle-class instinct of picking out dangerous rogue leaders (like Thaksin, Marcos and Suharto) who could do havoc to their aspirations under the guise of achieving/preserving ‘democracy or national greatness’.
Rumour, religion and riots in Mandalay
Doesn’t this blog guy Hla Oo live in Australia? Is he an Australian citizen or a political refugee? What’s his motivation behind these rather radical views he writes about in his blog, full of graphic (current) photographs and a lot of “insider information” as it were. How does he know all these things and so quickly what’s going on in Burma?
I’m just curious!