“Santa Cruz or even the earlier reprisal executions at Kraras have not been conclusively pinned on him. If he ran vicious local militias in Timor and Papua, wasn’t that what he’d been trained to do in US Army counter-insurgency schools, and applied by the US Army itself in Iraq?”
That certainly doesn’t make it acceptable, just because the US did it.
Kopassus’ Chain of Command can be different because of the overtly political nature of their tasking. What they do can be signed off by the most senior political leader, not necessarily informing others. Prabowo might argue he had such authorisation from Suharto, if only verbal.
Santa Cruz is a spaghetti bowl. TNI, POLRI, the Governor, Resistance leaders, all bear some responsibility. All knew what was going to happen well before it happened. Only Belo tried to prevent it. There are plenty in TNI who would be only too happy to encourage suspicion of Prabowo and divert it from themselves.
Sulak had this to say (in Seeds of Peace, January 2014, p. 28):
“In conclusion, Siam is at a historical turning point that is fraught with risk and uncertainty. However, this may also be an excellent time to stimulate the unrealized potentials of the 1932 Revolution. The best way to be faithful to the 1932 Revolution is to repeat it.”
PDIP’s legislative fraksi framed the BBM issue as evidence of the SBY govt’s poor economic management (their ‘logic’ being that with better economic management, the subsidy would be affordable). Possibly any further reduction in the subsidy will be portrayed as a result of the economic ‘failures’ of the current govt. Blaming unpopular decisions on the previous incumbents = politics 101.
Modi ? And you think, under the Congress Party in New Delhi, no internecine conflict took place in India ? I would be most surprised if you said, “Yes”. The only Indian parties that haven’t killed Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Jains, are the Indian Communists, who merely kill entrepreneurship. Now back to Prabowo. You ask would a Prabowo Presidency be all that bad ? You presume him to be less of a fence-sitter than former President Yudhoyono ? I would like the name and address please of any Indonesian President, who was not at one time or another, a fence-sitter, if not a fence hopper. I would ask you, Mr McDonald, would an Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Presidency be all that bad ? After all, he also has blood on his hands, doesn’t he ? There are many Indonesians quite prepared to “cast the first stone”, just very few prepared to catch it. One of the lessons learned from the massacres that led to Suharto’s coup may have been that killing is all too easy, when one believes they have no stake in doing the opposite. The role of the Indonesian President is to convince Indonesians that they have a stake in the opposite. That, in fact, may require a Leader, who’s hands, in the past, were not so clean.
Modi ? And you think, under then Congress Party in New Delhi, no internecine conflict took place in India ? I would be most surprised if you said, “Yes”. The only Indian parties that haven’t killed Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Jains, are the Indian Communists, who merely kill entrepreneurship. Now back to Prabowo. You ask would a Prabowo Presidency be all that bad ? You presume him to be less of a fence-sitter than former President Yudhoyono ? I would like the name and address please of any Indonesian President, who was not at one time or another, a fence-sitter, if not a fence hopper. I would ask you, Mr McDonald, would an Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Presidency be all that bad ? After all, he also has blood on his hands, doesn’t he ? There are many Indonesians quite prepared to “cast the first stone”, just very few prepared to catch it. One of the lessons learned from the massacres that led to Suharto’s coup may have been that killing is all too easy, when one believes they have no stake in doing the opposite. The role of the Indonesian President is to convince Indonesians that they have a stake in the opposite. That, in fact, may require a Leader, who’s hands, in the past, were not so clean.
Chai-anan Samudavanija recently proposed that there should be only 77 elected MPs in the House, one for each province. This was to undermine the influence of political parties, and prevent the politicians from “meddling” in the affairs of the bureaucracy.
There’s another example in today’s Star Newspaper (BN owned paper)
“Islamic authorities barged in and stopped a Chinese (Malaysian) Funeral”
with claims that the dead ethnic Chinese had converted to Islam in 1987 (?)- ignoring the fact that she had lived for 30+ years since that claim of conversion as a Buddhist with friends and relatives!
If I recall my world history lessons correctly, the French Revolution was triggerred by the then French monarchy’s support of the American Revolution (waging war against the British) which exhausted the French treasury … then all sorts of economic problems including onerous taxes and farmers starving.
Considering Thailand’s economic outlook, Tocharian wish for a similar revolution (to restore Thaksin’s version of dubious very corrupt ‘democracy’) is just that … a foolish wish.
Thanks for assigning me such a challenging task. I am not qualified to propose specific compromises that government should have offered. My point was that in a proper functioning democratic system, competing politicians are able to work together, often not easily, sometimes too slowly and usually not without controversy, to deal with problems through discussion and compromise. It would have been best if the civilian politicians could have a working relationship soon after the elections. Some Democrat criticisms of Pheua Thai policies were valid and could have led to compromise — particularly on the rice pledging program and the big infrastructure development loan. If Pheua Thai had addressed early on some of the spending and corruption issues that generated support for Suthep, that would have been good. It would have been good for Prime Minister Yingluck to have met with Abhisit to find ways to compromise before she dissolved Parliament. Perhaps such compromises could have encouraged Democrat Party to participate in the election. Once Parliament was dissolved and Democrats decided to boycott, everything became much more difficult. Still, discussions among the civilian politicians on ways to address concerns about unsustainable spending policies, perceptions of corruption and perceptions (warranted or not) of vote buying. That might have undermined Suthep and shifted attention back to the political parties leaders (and away from demonstrations and the military) as the way forward.
Once elections could not be completed and lives were lost to political violence, compromise became still more difficult, but maybe not impossible. If Prime Minister Yingluck had stepped down and the party elected someone less closely connected to Thaksin to the PM post that would have deprived protests of some emotion. Someone like Chaturon or Chadchart might have been able to work with the opposition more effectively. Reducing the role of outspoken ministers like Surapong and Chalerm might have helped create a better atmosphere for compromise.
I suspect political leaders really intent on averting a coup and reducing conflict could have found compromise actions better than what I can suggest, but by April they probably would have needed something quasi extra constitutional and would have required buy-in from the constitutional court and maybe the election commission so Pheua Thai could not be blamed for going outside normal constitutional procedures. Maybe not strictly constitutional but better than coup.
I am sure others know better than me, but I suspect compromise talks would have had to include some of the following points in government moves on compromise:
— a period of interim administration, as short as possible and with the caretaker government as the appointing authority, perhaps headed by a more neutral Pheua Thai figure like Chadchat or someone from an allied party
— a public referendum on the timing (before or after elections) and nature of a reform process (list of reform objectives)
— measures to depoliticize the police, especially DSI
— measures to reduce violence and confiscate weapons (why did the military have to wait until after a coup to seize weapons?)
— tightened rules and strengthened enforcement of those rules to reduce distortion of voting by use of money and administrative power
— adjustments to the rice pledging system to make it less costly, more sustainable and less subject to corruption
— strengthening of anti-corruption commission and the state auditor to investigate corruption
— commitment to reform process that includes using the “blind trust” system to reduce the ability of politicians to pursue policies favorable to companies in which they have a share
— agreement to make more details of government financial dealings available to the public to increase transparency
— commitment to existing regulations on public hearings on major projects — not just going through the motions
— commitment to more even-handed reporting on government-controlled television
— pledges to reduce hate speech on media controlled by Pheua Thai and its allies, along with publicly denounce such hate speech by Pheua Thai and Red Shirt leaders
On the opposition side, reasonable compromise actions could have included:
— commitment to participate in elections whenever they are held
— commitment not to interfere with elections (such as preventing distribution of ballot papers or blocking registration of candidates)
— removal of protesters from government offices
— commitment to a set of rules on what constitutes legal protest so that the public and the government are not harmed
— pledges to reduce hate speech and distortion of facts in speeches by opposition
— pledges to reduce hate speech on opposition-linked media and to publicly denounce such hate speech by Abhisit, Suthep and other opposition leaders
— statement opposing a military coup
— surrender to court by protesters charged with crimes
— removing all hired guards suspected of violence
— giving up all weapons held by those guards
— agreement to a reform process that also includes legal changes that put an end to court powers to dissolve political parties and ban politicians who are not individually convicted of crimes
— agreement to reforms that increase the power and taxation rights of locally elected officials – including provincial governors
— reforms to asset reporting system that would require senior police and military officials to report their assets and acceptance of a blind trust system
— acceptance of a more transparent system of political donations to protest movements
— an end to appeals to civil servants to stop doing their jobs
I realize this is a laundry list and some things might be acceptable and others not. My point is that there is a lot that could have been and should have been discussed by the civilian politicians. By the time martial law was declared and politicians were compelled to meet, it was already too late. By failing to do this, short-sighted politicians, have again damaged democracy and helped the military seize power.
Good article, well-balanced and pretty objective. The take-away from this is that the junta must correct the past abuses if it hopes to get the red shirts onside for the future.
To start with, Prem has to go, the man has done more damage to Thailand than can be imagined. Then abolish the Constitution Court and NCCC and remove the pensions of all on the bench. Make them unemployable for what little time they have left before retirement.
Suthep and Abhisit must see some serious prison time, and the prosecutuions of the PAD etc for the 2008 bunfights must be expedited and those responsible for delaying them must be sacked. 6 years is long enough and reflects badly on Thai jurisprudence. Prem guaranteed them impunity but this must be disavowed and they must see prison time.
Then repeal the outrageous retrospective immunity legislation, sack and remove the pensions of all treasonous army personnel. Prem, Paochinda. Prawit, Boonyaratgalin, and yes, Prayuth. I think that will be harder.
It is baffling that Jokowi says nothing has been done to cut fuel subsidy when PDIP has been the staunch opponent to SBY’s repeated proposal to cut fuel subsidy.
Excellent article by prof. Dayley. As a 69 year old Thai I’d like to add that Thai people is deep-rooted in the “rule by law” mentality. In games there is a saying “lose ball game but people don’t lose”. That is Thai mentality. If they lose an argument they are quick to respond with a “that is Thai way or Thai-Thai style.” We need to change that mentality to become a respectable democratic society.
Prof. Dayley’s article will be useful guidelines for an independent military dictatorship, however brutal, but I suspect that Thai military junta is only serving the interest of the elite and themselves.
Sven – the greater the Bangkok Reshuffle – greater the prospect of Isarn separatists launching a Patani-style campaign – though it is not the right time – yet.
yet, Yingluck was thrown out of office on a rather trivial offense. let me anticipate your reply: “it was a violation of the law”. that may be true (though Abhisit was charged with the same offense, the court never took the case, double standard?), but it undercuts the notion that TS & company are so bad that they will make us forget Hitler.
If any translation into Thai is done could No.8 be added with the permission of Dr Robert Dayley?
Will the military be subserviant to a civilian govt in the next constitution?
Facebook 
Twitter 
Soundcloud 
Youtube 
Rss
Persona non grata no more?
“Santa Cruz or even the earlier reprisal executions at Kraras have not been conclusively pinned on him. If he ran vicious local militias in Timor and Papua, wasn’t that what he’d been trained to do in US Army counter-insurgency schools, and applied by the US Army itself in Iraq?”
That certainly doesn’t make it acceptable, just because the US did it.
Persona non grata no more?
Kopassus’ Chain of Command can be different because of the overtly political nature of their tasking. What they do can be signed off by the most senior political leader, not necessarily informing others. Prabowo might argue he had such authorisation from Suharto, if only verbal.
Santa Cruz is a spaghetti bowl. TNI, POLRI, the Governor, Resistance leaders, all bear some responsibility. All knew what was going to happen well before it happened. Only Belo tried to prevent it. There are plenty in TNI who would be only too happy to encourage suspicion of Prabowo and divert it from themselves.
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Sulak had this to say (in Seeds of Peace, January 2014, p. 28):
“In conclusion, Siam is at a historical turning point that is fraught with risk and uncertainty. However, this may also be an excellent time to stimulate the unrealized potentials of the 1932 Revolution. The best way to be faithful to the 1932 Revolution is to repeat it.”
So what is Jokowi’s message?
PDIP’s legislative fraksi framed the BBM issue as evidence of the SBY govt’s poor economic management (their ‘logic’ being that with better economic management, the subsidy would be affordable). Possibly any further reduction in the subsidy will be portrayed as a result of the economic ‘failures’ of the current govt. Blaming unpopular decisions on the previous incumbents = politics 101.
Persona non grata no more?
Modi ? And you think, under the Congress Party in New Delhi, no internecine conflict took place in India ? I would be most surprised if you said, “Yes”. The only Indian parties that haven’t killed Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Jains, are the Indian Communists, who merely kill entrepreneurship. Now back to Prabowo. You ask would a Prabowo Presidency be all that bad ? You presume him to be less of a fence-sitter than former President Yudhoyono ? I would like the name and address please of any Indonesian President, who was not at one time or another, a fence-sitter, if not a fence hopper. I would ask you, Mr McDonald, would an Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Presidency be all that bad ? After all, he also has blood on his hands, doesn’t he ? There are many Indonesians quite prepared to “cast the first stone”, just very few prepared to catch it. One of the lessons learned from the massacres that led to Suharto’s coup may have been that killing is all too easy, when one believes they have no stake in doing the opposite. The role of the Indonesian President is to convince Indonesians that they have a stake in the opposite. That, in fact, may require a Leader, who’s hands, in the past, were not so clean.
Persona non grata no more?
Modi ? And you think, under then Congress Party in New Delhi, no internecine conflict took place in India ? I would be most surprised if you said, “Yes”. The only Indian parties that haven’t killed Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Jains, are the Indian Communists, who merely kill entrepreneurship. Now back to Prabowo. You ask would a Prabowo Presidency be all that bad ? You presume him to be less of a fence-sitter than former President Yudhoyono ? I would like the name and address please of any Indonesian President, who was not at one time or another, a fence-sitter, if not a fence hopper. I would ask you, Mr McDonald, would an Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Presidency be all that bad ? After all, he also has blood on his hands, doesn’t he ? There are many Indonesians quite prepared to “cast the first stone”, just very few prepared to catch it. One of the lessons learned from the massacres that led to Suharto’s coup may have been that killing is all too easy, when one believes they have no stake in doing the opposite. The role of the Indonesian President is to convince Indonesians that they have a stake in the opposite. That, in fact, may require a Leader, who’s hands, in the past, were not so clean.
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Chai-anan Samudavanija recently proposed that there should be only 77 elected MPs in the House, one for each province. This was to undermine the influence of political parties, and prevent the politicians from “meddling” in the affairs of the bureaucracy.
Dissonance in Malaysia-Japan relations
There’s another example in today’s Star Newspaper (BN owned paper)
“Islamic authorities barged in and stopped a Chinese (Malaysian) Funeral”
with claims that the dead ethnic Chinese had converted to Islam in 1987 (?)- ignoring the fact that she had lived for 30+ years since that claim of conversion as a Buddhist with friends and relatives!
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
If I recall my world history lessons correctly, the French Revolution was triggerred by the then French monarchy’s support of the American Revolution (waging war against the British) which exhausted the French treasury … then all sorts of economic problems including onerous taxes and farmers starving.
Considering Thailand’s economic outlook, Tocharian wish for a similar revolution (to restore Thaksin’s version of dubious very corrupt ‘democracy’) is just that … a foolish wish.
Who’s who in the Thai coup?
Khun Nganadeeleg,
Thanks for assigning me such a challenging task. I am not qualified to propose specific compromises that government should have offered. My point was that in a proper functioning democratic system, competing politicians are able to work together, often not easily, sometimes too slowly and usually not without controversy, to deal with problems through discussion and compromise. It would have been best if the civilian politicians could have a working relationship soon after the elections. Some Democrat criticisms of Pheua Thai policies were valid and could have led to compromise — particularly on the rice pledging program and the big infrastructure development loan. If Pheua Thai had addressed early on some of the spending and corruption issues that generated support for Suthep, that would have been good. It would have been good for Prime Minister Yingluck to have met with Abhisit to find ways to compromise before she dissolved Parliament. Perhaps such compromises could have encouraged Democrat Party to participate in the election. Once Parliament was dissolved and Democrats decided to boycott, everything became much more difficult. Still, discussions among the civilian politicians on ways to address concerns about unsustainable spending policies, perceptions of corruption and perceptions (warranted or not) of vote buying. That might have undermined Suthep and shifted attention back to the political parties leaders (and away from demonstrations and the military) as the way forward.
Once elections could not be completed and lives were lost to political violence, compromise became still more difficult, but maybe not impossible. If Prime Minister Yingluck had stepped down and the party elected someone less closely connected to Thaksin to the PM post that would have deprived protests of some emotion. Someone like Chaturon or Chadchart might have been able to work with the opposition more effectively. Reducing the role of outspoken ministers like Surapong and Chalerm might have helped create a better atmosphere for compromise.
I suspect political leaders really intent on averting a coup and reducing conflict could have found compromise actions better than what I can suggest, but by April they probably would have needed something quasi extra constitutional and would have required buy-in from the constitutional court and maybe the election commission so Pheua Thai could not be blamed for going outside normal constitutional procedures. Maybe not strictly constitutional but better than coup.
I am sure others know better than me, but I suspect compromise talks would have had to include some of the following points in government moves on compromise:
— a period of interim administration, as short as possible and with the caretaker government as the appointing authority, perhaps headed by a more neutral Pheua Thai figure like Chadchat or someone from an allied party
— a public referendum on the timing (before or after elections) and nature of a reform process (list of reform objectives)
— measures to depoliticize the police, especially DSI
— measures to reduce violence and confiscate weapons (why did the military have to wait until after a coup to seize weapons?)
— tightened rules and strengthened enforcement of those rules to reduce distortion of voting by use of money and administrative power
— adjustments to the rice pledging system to make it less costly, more sustainable and less subject to corruption
— strengthening of anti-corruption commission and the state auditor to investigate corruption
— commitment to reform process that includes using the “blind trust” system to reduce the ability of politicians to pursue policies favorable to companies in which they have a share
— agreement to make more details of government financial dealings available to the public to increase transparency
— commitment to existing regulations on public hearings on major projects — not just going through the motions
— commitment to more even-handed reporting on government-controlled television
— pledges to reduce hate speech on media controlled by Pheua Thai and its allies, along with publicly denounce such hate speech by Pheua Thai and Red Shirt leaders
On the opposition side, reasonable compromise actions could have included:
— commitment to participate in elections whenever they are held
— commitment not to interfere with elections (such as preventing distribution of ballot papers or blocking registration of candidates)
— removal of protesters from government offices
— commitment to a set of rules on what constitutes legal protest so that the public and the government are not harmed
— pledges to reduce hate speech and distortion of facts in speeches by opposition
— pledges to reduce hate speech on opposition-linked media and to publicly denounce such hate speech by Abhisit, Suthep and other opposition leaders
— statement opposing a military coup
— surrender to court by protesters charged with crimes
— removing all hired guards suspected of violence
— giving up all weapons held by those guards
— agreement to a reform process that also includes legal changes that put an end to court powers to dissolve political parties and ban politicians who are not individually convicted of crimes
— agreement to reforms that increase the power and taxation rights of locally elected officials – including provincial governors
— reforms to asset reporting system that would require senior police and military officials to report their assets and acceptance of a blind trust system
— acceptance of a more transparent system of political donations to protest movements
— an end to appeals to civil servants to stop doing their jobs
I realize this is a laundry list and some things might be acceptable and others not. My point is that there is a lot that could have been and should have been discussed by the civilian politicians. By the time martial law was declared and politicians were compelled to meet, it was already too late. By failing to do this, short-sighted politicians, have again damaged democracy and helped the military seize power.
Thailand’s forgotten key
Good article, well-balanced and pretty objective. The take-away from this is that the junta must correct the past abuses if it hopes to get the red shirts onside for the future.
To start with, Prem has to go, the man has done more damage to Thailand than can be imagined. Then abolish the Constitution Court and NCCC and remove the pensions of all on the bench. Make them unemployable for what little time they have left before retirement.
Suthep and Abhisit must see some serious prison time, and the prosecutuions of the PAD etc for the 2008 bunfights must be expedited and those responsible for delaying them must be sacked. 6 years is long enough and reflects badly on Thai jurisprudence. Prem guaranteed them impunity but this must be disavowed and they must see prison time.
Then repeal the outrageous retrospective immunity legislation, sack and remove the pensions of all treasonous army personnel. Prem, Paochinda. Prawit, Boonyaratgalin, and yes, Prayuth. I think that will be harder.
So what is Jokowi’s message?
It is baffling that Jokowi says nothing has been done to cut fuel subsidy when PDIP has been the staunch opponent to SBY’s repeated proposal to cut fuel subsidy.
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Excellent article by prof. Dayley. As a 69 year old Thai I’d like to add that Thai people is deep-rooted in the “rule by law” mentality. In games there is a saying “lose ball game but people don’t lose”. That is Thai mentality. If they lose an argument they are quick to respond with a “that is Thai way or Thai-Thai style.” We need to change that mentality to become a respectable democratic society.
Prof. Dayley’s article will be useful guidelines for an independent military dictatorship, however brutal, but I suspect that Thai military junta is only serving the interest of the elite and themselves.
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
Sven – the greater the Bangkok Reshuffle – greater the prospect of Isarn separatists launching a Patani-style campaign – though it is not the right time – yet.
So what is Jokowi’s message?
I guess that puts you in the not knowing category now that you’ve spoken?
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
And let’s not forget that the generals are doing the “Bangkok Reshuffle” now on a scale that might have brought Yingluck a 20 year jail sentence.
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Thailand needs a French Revolution of sorts. There can be no democracy in a feudal oligarchy.
Interview with Joe Gordon: Lèse majesté and democracy
yet, Yingluck was thrown out of office on a rather trivial offense. let me anticipate your reply: “it was a violation of the law”. that may be true (though Abhisit was charged with the same offense, the court never took the case, double standard?), but it undercuts the notion that TS & company are so bad that they will make us forget Hitler.
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
Re. Profressor Dayley’s comment “civil war” remains unlikely because only one side is fully armed”. Try telling that to Patani !
Seven questions for Thailand’s military
If any translation into Thai is done could No.8 be added with the permission of Dr Robert Dayley?
Will the military be subserviant to a civilian govt in the next constitution?