Are you really posting your self serving tripe on a 8 year old thread, too? If your derisive posts are being removed, it’s because it’s obvious to everyone they are made solely to get publicity for your self-published book. Who else in Thailand uses their real name on such as site as this, in these times? You may just find yourself caught in dragnet, no matter the intensity of your ass-kissing.
Thank you Trirat for substantiating your argument with written sources. Thai people, especially many from the Central plain, often look down on their brethren from the north/northeast/Lao. I believe it is misinformation from the Thai history books-designed to brainwash its populace.
Because criticism has just been criminalized and under martial law, with no right to a lawyer even. Even the discussion forums and regional online English tourism based publications are towing the coup line, NO DISSENT.
Quite scary actually. I would not be so convinced Prayuth’s power grab will prove a lesson in malevolent military fascism if this were not so.
Martin – you’ve completely misunderstood what I wrote. My point was that Lao teachers/ intellectuals view Isan as their “Vichy”. They don’t need to read endless waffle by well-paid Western academics to be taught about this. It is in their national consciousness. And this is not only the old people – 1954. It is modern day Lao PDR.
Talk about bees in their bonnets; I seem to have stirred up a hornet’s nest, judging by the agitated buzzes. For example, Martin#20 says, “Tai and Thai are totally different terms – all good scholars of the region know this.”
I wonder if he considers Martin Stuart-Fox, “The Lao Kingdom of L─Бn X─Бng: Rise and Decline,” a good scholar? This is from an endnote to Chapter 1: In accordance with what has become common usage, the term “Tai”, even though more correctly written “Thai”, will be used as a linguistic and cultural prefix to refer to all those related ethnic groups speaking Tai languages, while “Thai” will be reserved for the citizens and language of the present-day state of Thailand. Thus in Thailand, one can differentiate the central Thai (Tai-Say─Бm) from the northern (Tai-Yuan) or northeastern Thai (Tai-Is─Бn). Similarly, lowland or ethnic Lao will be referred to as Tai-Lao to differentiate them from other constituent groups comprising the Lao Lum.
So the difference between Thai and Tai is just a scholarly distinction; as far as the people themselves, they are Thai or Tai, whichever way you want to spell it; the names Siam and Lao are relatively recent and, at least in one case, foreign. The 19th century traveler I mentioned in #16 was none other than James McCarthy, “Surveying and Exploring in Siam With Descriptions of Lao Dependencies and of Battles against the Chinese Haw.” He was an adviser to the Siamese government and spent 12 years surveying Siam and its dependencies and published the first scaled maps of Siam.
In his book he makes these observations; talking about the people of northern Siam, page 100: “It is curious how the name Lao is disliked by the whole of the northern country of Siam, yet it still lingers among inhabitants.” He would be pleased to know that northern Thais are now not often called Lao.
And, talking about people in Laos, page 218: “Whence the name Lao? The people called Lao resent having the name applied to them, and call themselves Thai. On the old Chinese maps the south-east of the Empire is marked Lao Chua. It is curious that most of the Yao that are now crossing into the valley of the Me Kawng are of the clan “Lao,” and in the old histories the chiefs have the prefix “Lao.” In the upper reaches of the Salwin and Me Nam Kawng the Shans call themselves “Tai Yai,” or the great Siamese.” The name Lao, probably encouraged by the French to drive a wedge between Lao and Thai, has won out.
It does matter whether or not 50 or 500 Lao attended, because you wrote that ‘many’ attended the red rallies and if true that could have serious political ramifications. Let’s do the numbers. Mr. Nostitz estimates from 40,000 to 60,000 people attended the most recent rally, and you write of villagers telling you that hundreds of Lao nationals attended rallies. For our calculation here, let’s be generous and assume that 2,000 Lao nationals attended the most recent rally, and let’s be conservative and take the lower estimate for rally attendence by Mr.Nostitz, or 40,000 people. Using those figures, at best 5% of the recent rally participants were Lao nationals. So, then, how do you arrive at the qualifier ‘many’ when writing about Lao nationals attending Red rallies? This is not a minor distinction, it is the difference between something important with serious political implications and something perhaps worth noting but not very important in the scheme of things. Words matter–this is more than infelicitous phrasing. We have a right to expect scholars to be more precise in their language.
The Vichy spectre died out in 1954, French pride obviously continues. However, it is certainly not as pervasive as Luang Wichit’s legacy which remains a cornerstone in the Thai kharatchakarn mindset. I’d like to see names of scholars that Mr. Beale has met from this period given the fact a handful of Lao were schooled in the Vichy system – a period of barely 5 years. They are all octogenarians suffering deafness or dementia. Teachers that I met years ago such as General Singkapo found the pre-Vichy years much worse and of course post-Geneva the American-RVN-RTG influence was classed as the greatest exploiter and abuser of the Lao. As an Isan-niyom or Lao Nyai renaissance man, Mr. Beale, I think you really need to read up more and talk to the people who lived through those turning points in Lao history. Dr. Evans knows Laos quite well thank you. He just didn’t anticipate the hypersensitivity to his passing observation.
I have to concede that my opening ‘hook’ has completely eclipsed the main nine paragraphs of the article, about which almost nothing has been said. Perhaps more felicitous phrasing may have helped.
Leaving aside pious statements by some readers about ‘methodology’, one should point out that researching this issue inside Laos is very difficult. One needs a permit carry out any research in Laos, and one can be certain a permit would not be issued for this topic. It is worth mentioning that for the survey with the Institute of Social Sciences I mention in the article, I did suggest a question on the impact of the Red channel on Lao viewers. It was rejected out of hand as ‘inappropriate’ (politically).
I have, however, been able to make further probes and and it is clear to me that one needs to place Lao movements in the context of circular labour migration to Bangkok. Lao who have been working in Bangkok have been attending red rallies since at least 2010. In order to receive remuneration they show their work permits, or passports. The small spike in movements to Bangkok recently (that led to local gossip) was part of normal movements in search of work, but in this case taking advantage of the small remuneration from the rallies to help them while they get settled.
What I wasn’t expecting is that some Lao have also been attending Suthep’s ‘yellow shirt’ rallies. But it seems to be for the money only; 1000 baht for those who ‘go up front’ and 500 baht for those ‘who come behind.’ The difference presumably counting as danger money.
For my critics what is important here is that some organisers on both sides obviously know that Lao have joined in.
From my point of view, the fact that people are remunerated to attend drawn out rallies is neither here nor there. The rich backers of both sides know that some incentive was required to keep substantial numbers on the street. That there were ‘free-loaders’ is hardly surprising.
As for my original argument, it doesn’t matter whether 50 or 500 Lao attended rallies; their motivations, mixed in most cases, are what are of interest.
The rice scheme has not been scrapped. Due to the dissolution of Parliament, it was not extended to cover the 2014 dry season rice crop being harvested. It will be up the junta to decide if there will be any subsidies to farmers for the main 2014 wet season harvest. My prediction is that the military government will pay farmers above market prices, under a rebranded scheme.
We can all agree that corruption is bad, but do you have any comparative empirical evidence on levels of kickbacks during recent Thai administrations? Looking at the notoriously corrupt transport ministry, I doubt that Sophon Saram ran a cleaner shop than Chadchart Sittipunt. As hinted in the text, my expectation is that corruption will be even more rampant during military rule than during elected governments.
Lao PDR teachers and intellectuals I’ve met – especially those going to study in France – understand the term “Vichy” very, very well. Though perhaps Professor Evans, given his current French employer, would not feel it was “diplomatique” to comment ?
Well, as several have pointed out, Engvall’s piece is just a puff without any substance before we have any idea exactly what policies the junta or the forthcoming military appointed government will pursue in respect of agriculture or infrastructure development.
Rice farmers are in deep trouble as a result of the payment defaults and most of the cash will go to paying off debts that are mainly interest, leaving them with little to invest in the next planting season. They also face widespread drought this year and rice prices have plummeted following the collapse of the rice pledging fiasco. There will doubtless be some policy that involves either price subsidy or subsidy of inputs or both. Engvall would do better to comment on the policy once when we know what it is. Same applies to infrastructure. We don’t know what projects are going to be approved and which will be dumped yet, except the hi-speed train, the fate of which is a certainty.
“Remember the transport minister who had a stash of money stolen during his daughters wedding…”
No, I don’t – not least because the person you’re misremembering (Supoj Saplom) was not a minister but actually a high-placed career (read “survivor”) civil servant with longstanding Chart Thai/BJT connections (rather than Pheu Thai); that’s “high” as in permanent secretary at the highly lucrative transport ministry, chairman of SRT etc.
Here is some evidence that farmers do indeed see this in the way that I suggested, although I am not sure about the term “Isaanis”.
Several Isaanis said they felt patronised rather than grateful over what they see as a crude effort at bribery by the junta, which has pledged to pay almost $3bn of unpaid rice subsidies owed to farmers in the region and elsewhere.
“I know very well that the government tried to pay the money before, but the opposition blocked it,” said Sai, a farmer. “So I don’t feel great about this.”
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After the coup
ASEAN didn’t protest either, as far as I am aware of. What’s the whole point of that organisation?
The King Never Smiles?
Are you really posting your self serving tripe on a 8 year old thread, too? If your derisive posts are being removed, it’s because it’s obvious to everyone they are made solely to get publicity for your self-published book. Who else in Thailand uses their real name on such as site as this, in these times? You may just find yourself caught in dragnet, no matter the intensity of your ass-kissing.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Thank you Trirat for substantiating your argument with written sources. Thai people, especially many from the Central plain, often look down on their brethren from the north/northeast/Lao. I believe it is misinformation from the Thai history books-designed to brainwash its populace.
Time to change a name.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
So, what is the characteristics that make a Lao person differs from a Thai person?
After the coup
Because criticism has just been criminalized and under martial law, with no right to a lawyer even. Even the discussion forums and regional online English tourism based publications are towing the coup line, NO DISSENT.
Quite scary actually. I would not be so convinced Prayuth’s power grab will prove a lesson in malevolent military fascism if this were not so.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
It is when these coup-masters try moving into the well-armed Red Shirt tambons, that we will see the birth of Patani-style insurrection.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
There’s a distinct note of panic among Thailand’s coup-makers, that this coup may not work out as they plan – i.e. it could be defeated in a matter of months, with shattering consequences for the military : http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Winthai-warns-public-against-rallying-using-social-30234555.html
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
By the way the Battle of Thakhek does not come under the Vichy umbrella. Vichy were done for in Laos in March 1945.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Martin – you’ve completely misunderstood what I wrote. My point was that Lao teachers/ intellectuals view Isan as their “Vichy”. They don’t need to read endless waffle by well-paid Western academics to be taught about this. It is in their national consciousness. And this is not only the old people – 1954. It is modern day Lao PDR.
Jokowi the party man
We will find the truth on July 9, 2014
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Talk about bees in their bonnets; I seem to have stirred up a hornet’s nest, judging by the agitated buzzes. For example, Martin#20 says, “Tai and Thai are totally different terms – all good scholars of the region know this.”
I wonder if he considers Martin Stuart-Fox, “The Lao Kingdom of L─Бn X─Бng: Rise and Decline,” a good scholar? This is from an endnote to Chapter 1: In accordance with what has become common usage, the term “Tai”, even though more correctly written “Thai”, will be used as a linguistic and cultural prefix to refer to all those related ethnic groups speaking Tai languages, while “Thai” will be reserved for the citizens and language of the present-day state of Thailand. Thus in Thailand, one can differentiate the central Thai (Tai-Say─Бm) from the northern (Tai-Yuan) or northeastern Thai (Tai-Is─Бn). Similarly, lowland or ethnic Lao will be referred to as Tai-Lao to differentiate them from other constituent groups comprising the Lao Lum.
So the difference between Thai and Tai is just a scholarly distinction; as far as the people themselves, they are Thai or Tai, whichever way you want to spell it; the names Siam and Lao are relatively recent and, at least in one case, foreign. The 19th century traveler I mentioned in #16 was none other than James McCarthy, “Surveying and Exploring in Siam With Descriptions of Lao Dependencies and of Battles against the Chinese Haw.” He was an adviser to the Siamese government and spent 12 years surveying Siam and its dependencies and published the first scaled maps of Siam.
In his book he makes these observations; talking about the people of northern Siam, page 100: “It is curious how the name Lao is disliked by the whole of the northern country of Siam, yet it still lingers among inhabitants.” He would be pleased to know that northern Thais are now not often called Lao.
And, talking about people in Laos, page 218: “Whence the name Lao? The people called Lao resent having the name applied to them, and call themselves Thai. On the old Chinese maps the south-east of the Empire is marked Lao Chua. It is curious that most of the Yao that are now crossing into the valley of the Me Kawng are of the clan “Lao,” and in the old histories the chiefs have the prefix “Lao.” In the upper reaches of the Salwin and Me Nam Kawng the Shans call themselves “Tai Yai,” or the great Siamese.” The name Lao, probably encouraged by the French to drive a wedge between Lao and Thai, has won out.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
It does matter whether or not 50 or 500 Lao attended, because you wrote that ‘many’ attended the red rallies and if true that could have serious political ramifications. Let’s do the numbers. Mr. Nostitz estimates from 40,000 to 60,000 people attended the most recent rally, and you write of villagers telling you that hundreds of Lao nationals attended rallies. For our calculation here, let’s be generous and assume that 2,000 Lao nationals attended the most recent rally, and let’s be conservative and take the lower estimate for rally attendence by Mr.Nostitz, or 40,000 people. Using those figures, at best 5% of the recent rally participants were Lao nationals. So, then, how do you arrive at the qualifier ‘many’ when writing about Lao nationals attending Red rallies? This is not a minor distinction, it is the difference between something important with serious political implications and something perhaps worth noting but not very important in the scheme of things. Words matter–this is more than infelicitous phrasing. We have a right to expect scholars to be more precise in their language.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
The Vichy spectre died out in 1954, French pride obviously continues. However, it is certainly not as pervasive as Luang Wichit’s legacy which remains a cornerstone in the Thai kharatchakarn mindset. I’d like to see names of scholars that Mr. Beale has met from this period given the fact a handful of Lao were schooled in the Vichy system – a period of barely 5 years. They are all octogenarians suffering deafness or dementia. Teachers that I met years ago such as General Singkapo found the pre-Vichy years much worse and of course post-Geneva the American-RVN-RTG influence was classed as the greatest exploiter and abuser of the Lao. As an Isan-niyom or Lao Nyai renaissance man, Mr. Beale, I think you really need to read up more and talk to the people who lived through those turning points in Lao history. Dr. Evans knows Laos quite well thank you. He just didn’t anticipate the hypersensitivity to his passing observation.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
I have to concede that my opening ‘hook’ has completely eclipsed the main nine paragraphs of the article, about which almost nothing has been said. Perhaps more felicitous phrasing may have helped.
Leaving aside pious statements by some readers about ‘methodology’, one should point out that researching this issue inside Laos is very difficult. One needs a permit carry out any research in Laos, and one can be certain a permit would not be issued for this topic. It is worth mentioning that for the survey with the Institute of Social Sciences I mention in the article, I did suggest a question on the impact of the Red channel on Lao viewers. It was rejected out of hand as ‘inappropriate’ (politically).
I have, however, been able to make further probes and and it is clear to me that one needs to place Lao movements in the context of circular labour migration to Bangkok. Lao who have been working in Bangkok have been attending red rallies since at least 2010. In order to receive remuneration they show their work permits, or passports. The small spike in movements to Bangkok recently (that led to local gossip) was part of normal movements in search of work, but in this case taking advantage of the small remuneration from the rallies to help them while they get settled.
What I wasn’t expecting is that some Lao have also been attending Suthep’s ‘yellow shirt’ rallies. But it seems to be for the money only; 1000 baht for those who ‘go up front’ and 500 baht for those ‘who come behind.’ The difference presumably counting as danger money.
For my critics what is important here is that some organisers on both sides obviously know that Lao have joined in.
From my point of view, the fact that people are remunerated to attend drawn out rallies is neither here nor there. The rich backers of both sides know that some incentive was required to keep substantial numbers on the street. That there were ‘free-loaders’ is hardly surprising.
As for my original argument, it doesn’t matter whether 50 or 500 Lao attended rallies; their motivations, mixed in most cases, are what are of interest.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
The rice scheme has not been scrapped. Due to the dissolution of Parliament, it was not extended to cover the 2014 dry season rice crop being harvested. It will be up the junta to decide if there will be any subsidies to farmers for the main 2014 wet season harvest. My prediction is that the military government will pay farmers above market prices, under a rebranded scheme.
We can all agree that corruption is bad, but do you have any comparative empirical evidence on levels of kickbacks during recent Thai administrations? Looking at the notoriously corrupt transport ministry, I doubt that Sophon Saram ran a cleaner shop than Chadchart Sittipunt. As hinted in the text, my expectation is that corruption will be even more rampant during military rule than during elected governments.
Jokowi the party man
We will see if jokowi only “Pencitraan” or not when he become the President. I believe in him to be the president for 2014-2019
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Lao PDR teachers and intellectuals I’ve met – especially those going to study in France – understand the term “Vichy” very, very well. Though perhaps Professor Evans, given his current French employer, would not feel it was “diplomatique” to comment ?
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
Well, as several have pointed out, Engvall’s piece is just a puff without any substance before we have any idea exactly what policies the junta or the forthcoming military appointed government will pursue in respect of agriculture or infrastructure development.
Rice farmers are in deep trouble as a result of the payment defaults and most of the cash will go to paying off debts that are mainly interest, leaving them with little to invest in the next planting season. They also face widespread drought this year and rice prices have plummeted following the collapse of the rice pledging fiasco. There will doubtless be some policy that involves either price subsidy or subsidy of inputs or both. Engvall would do better to comment on the policy once when we know what it is. Same applies to infrastructure. We don’t know what projects are going to be approved and which will be dumped yet, except the hi-speed train, the fate of which is a certainty.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
“Remember the transport minister who had a stash of money stolen during his daughters wedding…”
No, I don’t – not least because the person you’re misremembering (Supoj Saplom) was not a minister but actually a high-placed career (read “survivor”) civil servant with longstanding Chart Thai/BJT connections (rather than Pheu Thai); that’s “high” as in permanent secretary at the highly lucrative transport ministry, chairman of SRT etc.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/news/283816/once-a-shining-star-supoj-now-fights-for-survival
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
Here is some evidence that farmers do indeed see this in the way that I suggested, although I am not sure about the term “Isaanis”.
Several Isaanis said they felt patronised rather than grateful over what they see as a crude effort at bribery by the junta, which has pledged to pay almost $3bn of unpaid rice subsidies owed to farmers in the region and elsewhere.
“I know very well that the government tried to pay the money before, but the opposition blocked it,” said Sai, a farmer. “So I don’t feel great about this.”
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/264f2580-e7e5-11e3-9af8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33Lk3sbbX