Thank you for this illuminating piece. I always suspected as much that the Democrats are political thieves and that once the Yellow Shirt army is in power they will appropriate policies from the Pheu Thai party to make themselves popular with the rural class. Now they can also line their pockets. How convenient.
The democrats have for months delayed payment to farmers and put a break on important infrastructure developments. Now the army can proceed and further enrich themselves.
I know the employees of Post Publishing, I have a nephew that is married to one of the long time employees of Post today. They are the netizens, who are the educated, meaning mindless followers of the Yellows. They know who I am and will rarely post one of my comments when I reply to one of their favorite agitators.
Khun Khemthong makes a number of good points, particularly about the failure of Suthep and followers to provide significant details on what they mean by reform. His emphasis on better enforcement of anti-corruption laws rather than passage of additional laws is well-taken along with his point that additional laws may further encumber government. Hopefully “reform” will mean more than legislative tinkering and can begin a process of change in organizations such as the police and the justice ministry so that corruption can be dealt with more effectively.
However, some of his other points seem to be based more on his imagination than fact. He says that Suthep got his wish for “a full fledge (sic) coup d’état,” but I don’t recall that Suthep ever said this. It might be so, but Khun Khemthong would have to be a mind-reader to be sure. If he can cite Suthep saying this, it would be good to do so.
Since the coup, Khun Khemthong says, “the use of deadly force against political opponents is encouraged.” However, he offers no evidence of this. In fact, the only evidence seems to suggest that the military, despite its many other faults, genuinely wants to see an end to political violence between opposing groups. The seizure of weapons from political groups and the night curfew seem to be evidence of this.
Khun Khemthong quotes the anti-government demonstrators as shouting “We don’t want democracy. We just want transparency and accountability,” but in all the demonstrations I attended and in all the news coverage, I never heard this quote. Is it imaginary or can a source be cited? The demand of many demonstrators that I spoke to seemed to be reform leading to a “better democrocy” that would result in a government acting with transparency and accountability.
Khun Khemthong writes that the courts prosecute “their political opponents.” While there is much about court decisions and the whole legal system that can be questioned, there are ongoing prosecutions of people from all sides in the conflict. Are all of them political opponents of the courts? The charge of murder against Abhisit for a shooting during the 2010 unrest seems to indicate that political leaders are not “selectively prosecuted.”
Khun Khemthong makes generalizations about civil servants, ie that “most of them are old conservative elites who are unwilling to tackle economic inequality and social injustice.” However, he offers no evidence for this. My experience with the Thai civil service is that there are many who genuinely work for the benefit of the Thai people, many who just go along with whatever the orders of the day may be from their bosses and some who work to use the system solely for their personal benefit. I doubt that research would show that “most” of the hundreds of thousands of civil servants are “old elites.”
Khun Khemthong’s question on how a corrupt military can end corruption is a good one. While it might seem beneficial for the period of military control to go smoothly and end quickly, it actually might be better in the long run for lots to go wrong under the military. A really bad personal experience from the coup might make the civilian politicians whose stubborn refusal to compromise and whose disruptive protest tactics opened the way for military intervention think twice before dragging the country down once again.
The implication of this comment is that Bangkok is unfairly awarded far more of public expenditure than it deserves. The distribution of expenditures in the world bank report actually reflects the significant centralization of government rather than an obvious bias towards expenditures that benefit the people of Bangkok (which include a large number of people from the northeast seekeing income in the capital). Most of that government expenditure in Bangkok goes towards payments for ministries that, in theory at least, serve the entire country, not just Bangkok. So, a much deeper analysis is needed to determine whether the pattern of government expenditure is unfair. It might also be interesting to include in that analysis the percentage of government revenue that comes from Bangkok.
A scholar? You could have fooled me. In your piece you made several controversial claims with serious implications and offered not a scintilla of evidence to support those claims. That’s the issue here. You extrapolate from something you heard from an anonymous source to state that many of the demonstrators at Red Shirt rallies were of Lao nationality. Beyond the lack of documentation or facts, your stating that there were ‘many’ demonstrators holding Lao nationality at the rallies just doesn’t pass the smell test. Why? Because, as Mr.Nostitz points out, the xenophobic anti-government forces would have touted that far and wide if it were true. In any case, even if we accept as true your informants’ statement that hundreds of Lao nationals from their village attended a rally it is a huge and totally unjustified leap to state as you do that “The most recent demonstrations held by the Thai Red Shirts in Bangkok included many Lao nationals. Were the words ‘some’ or ‘a few’ missing from your Thesaurus?I would not have dared submit something like this to one of my professors when I was doing my graduate degrees.
Interesting speculation, but it is way too early to determine whether the military will pursue policies similar to those of the Thaksin government and its successors. As of now, the military has only said it would review the various economic projects and approve those that offer benefits without incurring large debts. That would seem to rule out at least some of the projects under the Pheua Thai infrastructure and water management schemes. The fact that the military moved quickly to pay farmers does not mean approval of the Pheua Thai rice scheme. Farmers were legally owed the payments and had to be paid once the government was able to secure the funds to pay them. It was also politically wise to offer something to rural people, many of whom did not welcome the coup. We will have to wait as see whether the rice program will continue as before, just as we will have to wait and see what elements of Thaksin’s policies are continued and which are discarded. More important than short-term economic policies, however, will be moves to return to elected government and what kind of government with what kind of policies emerge from the process.
Some westerners have this bee in their bonnet about the differences between Thai and Lao ethnicity and culture: the difference between the two is no more than the variation you might find in people living in different regions of France, say. The fact that most Lao Lum can understand Central Thai, and vice versa, indicates that the speakers of the two “languages” split up recently, say within the last 1,000 years or so.
Lao people used to call themselves Thai, as attested to by the fact that a 15th century king of Lan Xang adopted the name Sam Sen Thai (“300 000 Thai”), acknowledging the inhabitants he ruled. A 19th century European traveler to those parts, whose name escapes me now, wrote that the people called themselves Thai, and, if my memory serves, Lao was a name encouraged by the French. La Loubère, a French envoy to King Narai of Ayutthaya, wrote in his book that the people called themselves Tai, and the country Meuang Tai.
AMSELLEM#15 claims that some people dream to see Isan attached to Laos in a democratic country. Isan was never a part of Laos. On the other hand, to emulate Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., I have a dream that one day Thailand and Laos will be united as one country, which would have been inevitable had the French not intervened. In the former case you would still have a landlocked country whose people watch Thai TV and movies and read Thai newspapers; in the latter case you would have the largest country in Southeast Asia. But then we can all dream, can’t we?
I was wondering whether perhaps NM might consider an advice section where we could offer gratuitous suggestions to our respective camps (red and yellow) as to how the leadership might heal the nation:
At the current time, for example, Khun Pravuth, I am sure, would appreciate advice on how to deflect the charge of hypocrisy -see the excellent Thaksin thinks, Pravuth acts.”
He also desperately needs advice on how to amend the constitution to ensure the electorate returns the correct results next time round. So, What do we suggest? (my own idea is a property ownership or educational qualification).
Then again, how should one deal with all those Falangs who just don’t understand the situation because they are not Thais?
I’ll kick off:
policy suggestions to Pravuth:
Regarding constitutional amendment
1. No one should have the right to vote unless that have completed an undergraduate degree.
It is somewhat preposterous to suggest that by paying the farmers, pursuing infrastructure development and appointing Pridyathorn, Somkid and Narongchai as advisors the junta is engaging in Thaksinomics.
Since the government has already taken delivery of the rice, what else could Prayuth have done other than pay for it? Would you have had him return it to the farmers and import rice from overseas to replace the stocks that will turn out to be missing? Before the PDRC protests had commenced the Yingluck government had already intentionally defaulted on payments to farmers amounting to 10% of annual output of the agricultural sector, which in the case of the poorest Isaan farmers, was their entire cash crop for 2013. Then Yingluck dissolved parliament without bothering to make a cabinet resolution to authorize borrowings in excess of the budget which would have avoided the problem faced by the caretaker government. Any fully empowered government (or junta) would have no choice but to pay up as soon as possible, rather than causing further hardship to the most vulnerable members of society by continuing to withhold the outstanding amount which is equivalent to 0.6% of the total amount of banknotes and coins in circulation. Is that populism or just clearing up the mess caused by the incompetence and deceit of the Yingluck government? What was the rationale in Thaksinomics for the intentional default on payments to farmers?
Apart from the largest project, the ill conceived B783bn hi-speed train budget accounting for 34% of the infrastructure borrowing bill, the rest of the projects are “no-brainers”, rather than proprietary projects that could only ever have come from the brilliant mind of Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin’s unique touch was to try to take the projects off-budget based on a simplistic legal argument that government borrowings could not be regarded as government appropriations and would therefore be exempt from the constitutional requirement for such spending to be authorized by annual budget acts. It was clear from the start that his borrowing bill had never a snowball’s chance in hell of ever getting past the Constitutional Court. Thus Thaksinomics in this case meant that necessary infrastructure projects that would have broken ground by now, if they had been included in annual budget acts, are now delayed. What is the junta expected to do, other than put them into the 2014-15 budget and start work on them as soon as possible?
As far as the advisors are concerned, I think you will find they are all very much their own men, despite the fact that they may have served Thaksin or Thaksin governments in the past. In the case of Somkid it is a chicken and egg question. Which came first Somkid or Thaksinomics?
Finally, if you genuinely believe that the junta is adopting Thaksinomics as its key economic philosophy, why would you not want to embrace the junta wholeheartedly, if you believe in Thaksinomics? The Yingluck government was not able to apply these brilliant economic theories effectively for the benefit of the people and there is now likelihood of any successor Thaksin nominee government for the foreseeable future. Nevertheles, we should now rejoice that pure Thaksinomics can be be put into effect without let or hindrance.
great piece. clear and precise. indeed, hypocrisy, “thickness”, and fraudalent behaviour of the amaat-military-DP alliances has no limits. There is no ideology behind this; it is all about self-interests of the few and power at the ritual centre…There is an ominous tone to the current scenario, well sketched by Anders.
Anders,
You fail to mention that the rice scheme has been scrapped. That the junta makes outstanding payments to farmers is only making good what was promised to them. It does not approve the rice pledging scheme which was plagued and open to gross corruption. Khun Gorn’s approval of the payments must be seen in the same light.
That core ideas of Thaksin’s economics policies are good and helped the country is not denied. It is also not the problem, the problem is to run politics like a business, resulting in extreme high kickback payments (30-50%).
So it does not means all things are bad just because the people around Thaksin thought about it or introduced it. Good things should stay bad things need to go. Thaksin is not a man of compromise, that is bad and incompatible for and with democracy. Military rule is also not good for democracy.
Take a more balance stand.
Don’t know so much than you, just interest about what’s happen here.
I lived some months in Isan, I heard from some experts that Thailand will be cut in 2 parts like Korea,….
But I know that in Isan many people feel really the Lao culture in the blood and the soul.
1- Don’t you think some them help Lao to go out from the “Communism” they are ?
2- The border was place by the French, isn’t it ? Don’t you think that some people dream to see Isan attach again in Lao in a democratic country ?
Isaan is predominantly of Laotian lineage and if a few Lao friends from the borders felt the itch to join the Red Shirts march, wouldn’t the Red leadership be delighted?
Suddenly some fools in NM are felt inclined to argue vehemently that the Red Shirts are ‘pure Isaan-Thai bloods’ in rage.
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Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
Thank you for this illuminating piece. I always suspected as much that the Democrats are political thieves and that once the Yellow Shirt army is in power they will appropriate policies from the Pheu Thai party to make themselves popular with the rural class. Now they can also line their pockets. How convenient.
The democrats have for months delayed payment to farmers and put a break on important infrastructure developments. Now the army can proceed and further enrich themselves.
After the coup
I know the employees of Post Publishing, I have a nephew that is married to one of the long time employees of Post today. They are the netizens, who are the educated, meaning mindless followers of the Yellows. They know who I am and will rarely post one of my comments when I reply to one of their favorite agitators.
Thailand, what next?
Khun Khemthong makes a number of good points, particularly about the failure of Suthep and followers to provide significant details on what they mean by reform. His emphasis on better enforcement of anti-corruption laws rather than passage of additional laws is well-taken along with his point that additional laws may further encumber government. Hopefully “reform” will mean more than legislative tinkering and can begin a process of change in organizations such as the police and the justice ministry so that corruption can be dealt with more effectively.
However, some of his other points seem to be based more on his imagination than fact. He says that Suthep got his wish for “a full fledge (sic) coup d’état,” but I don’t recall that Suthep ever said this. It might be so, but Khun Khemthong would have to be a mind-reader to be sure. If he can cite Suthep saying this, it would be good to do so.
Since the coup, Khun Khemthong says, “the use of deadly force against political opponents is encouraged.” However, he offers no evidence of this. In fact, the only evidence seems to suggest that the military, despite its many other faults, genuinely wants to see an end to political violence between opposing groups. The seizure of weapons from political groups and the night curfew seem to be evidence of this.
Khun Khemthong quotes the anti-government demonstrators as shouting “We don’t want democracy. We just want transparency and accountability,” but in all the demonstrations I attended and in all the news coverage, I never heard this quote. Is it imaginary or can a source be cited? The demand of many demonstrators that I spoke to seemed to be reform leading to a “better democrocy” that would result in a government acting with transparency and accountability.
Khun Khemthong writes that the courts prosecute “their political opponents.” While there is much about court decisions and the whole legal system that can be questioned, there are ongoing prosecutions of people from all sides in the conflict. Are all of them political opponents of the courts? The charge of murder against Abhisit for a shooting during the 2010 unrest seems to indicate that political leaders are not “selectively prosecuted.”
Khun Khemthong makes generalizations about civil servants, ie that “most of them are old conservative elites who are unwilling to tackle economic inequality and social injustice.” However, he offers no evidence for this. My experience with the Thai civil service is that there are many who genuinely work for the benefit of the Thai people, many who just go along with whatever the orders of the day may be from their bosses and some who work to use the system solely for their personal benefit. I doubt that research would show that “most” of the hundreds of thousands of civil servants are “old elites.”
Khun Khemthong’s question on how a corrupt military can end corruption is a good one. While it might seem beneficial for the period of military control to go smoothly and end quickly, it actually might be better in the long run for lots to go wrong under the military. A really bad personal experience from the coup might make the civilian politicians whose stubborn refusal to compromise and whose disruptive protest tactics opened the way for military intervention think twice before dragging the country down once again.
Thailand, what next?
The implication of this comment is that Bangkok is unfairly awarded far more of public expenditure than it deserves. The distribution of expenditures in the world bank report actually reflects the significant centralization of government rather than an obvious bias towards expenditures that benefit the people of Bangkok (which include a large number of people from the northeast seekeing income in the capital). Most of that government expenditure in Bangkok goes towards payments for ministries that, in theory at least, serve the entire country, not just Bangkok. So, a much deeper analysis is needed to determine whether the pattern of government expenditure is unfair. It might also be interesting to include in that analysis the percentage of government revenue that comes from Bangkok.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
A scholar? You could have fooled me. In your piece you made several controversial claims with serious implications and offered not a scintilla of evidence to support those claims. That’s the issue here. You extrapolate from something you heard from an anonymous source to state that many of the demonstrators at Red Shirt rallies were of Lao nationality. Beyond the lack of documentation or facts, your stating that there were ‘many’ demonstrators holding Lao nationality at the rallies just doesn’t pass the smell test. Why? Because, as Mr.Nostitz points out, the xenophobic anti-government forces would have touted that far and wide if it were true. In any case, even if we accept as true your informants’ statement that hundreds of Lao nationals from their village attended a rally it is a huge and totally unjustified leap to state as you do that “The most recent demonstrations held by the Thai Red Shirts in Bangkok included many Lao nationals. Were the words ‘some’ or ‘a few’ missing from your Thesaurus?I would not have dared submit something like this to one of my professors when I was doing my graduate degrees.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
Interesting speculation, but it is way too early to determine whether the military will pursue policies similar to those of the Thaksin government and its successors. As of now, the military has only said it would review the various economic projects and approve those that offer benefits without incurring large debts. That would seem to rule out at least some of the projects under the Pheua Thai infrastructure and water management schemes. The fact that the military moved quickly to pay farmers does not mean approval of the Pheua Thai rice scheme. Farmers were legally owed the payments and had to be paid once the government was able to secure the funds to pay them. It was also politically wise to offer something to rural people, many of whom did not welcome the coup. We will have to wait as see whether the rice program will continue as before, just as we will have to wait and see what elements of Thaksin’s policies are continued and which are discarded. More important than short-term economic policies, however, will be moves to return to elected government and what kind of government with what kind of policies emerge from the process.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Some westerners have this bee in their bonnet about the differences between Thai and Lao ethnicity and culture: the difference between the two is no more than the variation you might find in people living in different regions of France, say. The fact that most Lao Lum can understand Central Thai, and vice versa, indicates that the speakers of the two “languages” split up recently, say within the last 1,000 years or so.
Lao people used to call themselves Thai, as attested to by the fact that a 15th century king of Lan Xang adopted the name Sam Sen Thai (“300 000 Thai”), acknowledging the inhabitants he ruled. A 19th century European traveler to those parts, whose name escapes me now, wrote that the people called themselves Thai, and, if my memory serves, Lao was a name encouraged by the French. La Loubère, a French envoy to King Narai of Ayutthaya, wrote in his book that the people called themselves Tai, and the country Meuang Tai.
AMSELLEM#15 claims that some people dream to see Isan attached to Laos in a democratic country. Isan was never a part of Laos. On the other hand, to emulate Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., I have a dream that one day Thailand and Laos will be united as one country, which would have been inevitable had the French not intervened. In the former case you would still have a landlocked country whose people watch Thai TV and movies and read Thai newspapers; in the latter case you would have the largest country in Southeast Asia. But then we can all dream, can’t we?
After the coup
I was wondering whether perhaps NM might consider an advice section where we could offer gratuitous suggestions to our respective camps (red and yellow) as to how the leadership might heal the nation:
At the current time, for example, Khun Pravuth, I am sure, would appreciate advice on how to deflect the charge of hypocrisy -see the excellent Thaksin thinks, Pravuth acts.”
He also desperately needs advice on how to amend the constitution to ensure the electorate returns the correct results next time round. So, What do we suggest? (my own idea is a property ownership or educational qualification).
Then again, how should one deal with all those Falangs who just don’t understand the situation because they are not Thais?
I’ll kick off:
policy suggestions to Pravuth:
Regarding constitutional amendment
1. No one should have the right to vote unless that have completed an undergraduate degree.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
It is somewhat preposterous to suggest that by paying the farmers, pursuing infrastructure development and appointing Pridyathorn, Somkid and Narongchai as advisors the junta is engaging in Thaksinomics.
Since the government has already taken delivery of the rice, what else could Prayuth have done other than pay for it? Would you have had him return it to the farmers and import rice from overseas to replace the stocks that will turn out to be missing? Before the PDRC protests had commenced the Yingluck government had already intentionally defaulted on payments to farmers amounting to 10% of annual output of the agricultural sector, which in the case of the poorest Isaan farmers, was their entire cash crop for 2013. Then Yingluck dissolved parliament without bothering to make a cabinet resolution to authorize borrowings in excess of the budget which would have avoided the problem faced by the caretaker government. Any fully empowered government (or junta) would have no choice but to pay up as soon as possible, rather than causing further hardship to the most vulnerable members of society by continuing to withhold the outstanding amount which is equivalent to 0.6% of the total amount of banknotes and coins in circulation. Is that populism or just clearing up the mess caused by the incompetence and deceit of the Yingluck government? What was the rationale in Thaksinomics for the intentional default on payments to farmers?
Apart from the largest project, the ill conceived B783bn hi-speed train budget accounting for 34% of the infrastructure borrowing bill, the rest of the projects are “no-brainers”, rather than proprietary projects that could only ever have come from the brilliant mind of Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin’s unique touch was to try to take the projects off-budget based on a simplistic legal argument that government borrowings could not be regarded as government appropriations and would therefore be exempt from the constitutional requirement for such spending to be authorized by annual budget acts. It was clear from the start that his borrowing bill had never a snowball’s chance in hell of ever getting past the Constitutional Court. Thus Thaksinomics in this case meant that necessary infrastructure projects that would have broken ground by now, if they had been included in annual budget acts, are now delayed. What is the junta expected to do, other than put them into the 2014-15 budget and start work on them as soon as possible?
As far as the advisors are concerned, I think you will find they are all very much their own men, despite the fact that they may have served Thaksin or Thaksin governments in the past. In the case of Somkid it is a chicken and egg question. Which came first Somkid or Thaksinomics?
Finally, if you genuinely believe that the junta is adopting Thaksinomics as its key economic philosophy, why would you not want to embrace the junta wholeheartedly, if you believe in Thaksinomics? The Yingluck government was not able to apply these brilliant economic theories effectively for the benefit of the people and there is now likelihood of any successor Thaksin nominee government for the foreseeable future. Nevertheles, we should now rejoice that pure Thaksinomics can be be put into effect without let or hindrance.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
great piece. clear and precise. indeed, hypocrisy, “thickness”, and fraudalent behaviour of the amaat-military-DP alliances has no limits. There is no ideology behind this; it is all about self-interests of the few and power at the ritual centre…There is an ominous tone to the current scenario, well sketched by Anders.
After the coup
Dasa Book Cafe between Sukhumvit Soi 26 and 28 is the best second-hand bookshop in Bangers, but not many farangs see me there because I’m a ghost.
Thorns of the Thai rose
How can anyone vote down this even-tempered, insightful comment!?! It just shows how low-so the Monarchist trolls are.
Thaksin Thinks, Prayuth Acts
Anders,
You fail to mention that the rice scheme has been scrapped. That the junta makes outstanding payments to farmers is only making good what was promised to them. It does not approve the rice pledging scheme which was plagued and open to gross corruption. Khun Gorn’s approval of the payments must be seen in the same light.
That core ideas of Thaksin’s economics policies are good and helped the country is not denied. It is also not the problem, the problem is to run politics like a business, resulting in extreme high kickback payments (30-50%).
So it does not means all things are bad just because the people around Thaksin thought about it or introduced it. Good things should stay bad things need to go. Thaksin is not a man of compromise, that is bad and incompatible for and with democracy. Military rule is also not good for democracy.
Take a more balance stand.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Sorry for my english, it’s not my mother language.
Hope you understand all.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Hello,
Don’t know so much than you, just interest about what’s happen here.
I lived some months in Isan, I heard from some experts that Thailand will be cut in 2 parts like Korea,….
But I know that in Isan many people feel really the Lao culture in the blood and the soul.
1- Don’t you think some them help Lao to go out from the “Communism” they are ?
2- The border was place by the French, isn’t it ? Don’t you think that some people dream to see Isan attach again in Lao in a democratic country ?
After the coup
Gary – Are you telling me that Sukhumvit (and its associated soys) has redeeming features? If so, please enumerate. (Bumrungrad doesn’t count.)
After the coup
Oh dear, jim
It seems that your experience of Sukhumvit is limited to Nana and Cowboy. I wonder why that is?
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
What’s all the fuss about?
Isaan is predominantly of Laotian lineage and if a few Lao friends from the borders felt the itch to join the Red Shirts march, wouldn’t the Red leadership be delighted?
Suddenly some fools in NM are felt inclined to argue vehemently that the Red Shirts are ‘pure Isaan-Thai bloods’ in rage.
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Now that there have been 2 coups and many funerals since Grant Evans reviewed Paul Handley’s TKNS, I’d like to know if he still stands by that review?
http://www.newmandala.org/2006/11/07/handley-responds-to-evans/
“Foreign influence” in Red Shirt demonstrations
Just to clarify post #10, by anti-government I meant anti the current government, i.e. anti-coup.