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At a dinner table in a common Isaan household, a spirit appears, asking, “What’s wrong with my eyes? They are open, but I can’t see a thing.” The spirit’s appearance initially renders it a menacing threat, but it soon becomes clear that the spirit is the family’s guardian. This scene takes place in Apichatpong Weerasethakul’s 2010 film, Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives, alongside many other images of superstition and banal rural life in Thailand’s Northeast. The film was produced at a moment of immense change in Thailand, as the military continually interfered in civilian political processes between 2006 and 2010, sometimes causing violence in the suppression of street protests. The film, aware of its context, notes the country’s history of military interventions when the eponymous protagonist laments his past murder of communists under the false and exaggerated premise of nationalism.
The more recent military action that removed elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power in 2006 occurred along a polarized divide between the urban and the rural, between business and agriculture, and between the bourgeoisie and the poor. The film’s threatening spirit guardian represents this rural working poor, who simultaneously form a foundation of Thai identity but stoke fear among urban elites through their electoral power. Although 2006 saw the successful removal of Thaksin, the resumption of new street protests in recent months demonstrates the anxieties over rural power that still exist in Thailand. Key elements within a “deep state” of military, royal and business elites have unsuccessfully offset the interests of rural peasants, even as they have utilized and managed support from civil society movements opposed to government corruption. To shift the polarization in Thai society and politics, greater understanding of the historical experiences of the Thai subaltern – the rural and working poor – can bridge the divide.
Although the Shinawatra-associated parties of Pheu Thai [PTP] and previously Thai Rak Thai [TRT] won four elections between 2001 and 2011, the deeper powers of the Thai state have not necessarily shifted with the changes in government. Rather, as McCargo has suggested in his work on the Thai network monarchy, the entrenched military, royalist and business elements have continued to operate the state at a deeper level than any superficial electoral shift. Yet in the face of PTP’s continued electoral mandates for programs of healthcare provision and rural development loans, this deep state may no longer feel so empowered.
Through studies of bourgeois hegemony in his Prison Notebooks, the Italian communist leader, Antonio Gramsci, noted society’s role when a state lost control over politics. As he noted, “When the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed…[as] a powerful system of fortresses and earthenworks.” Thaksin’s mutation into a populist force outside the Bangkok establishment encouraged support among those that the leading Democrat Party had long ignored, including the geographically marginalized North and Northeast as well as the socioeconomically marginalized rural poor and migrant workers. It was assumed Thaksin held ulterior motives, but corruption and cronyism were not new features of Thai democracy; what unnerved the urban elite to a greater extent was his ability to consolidate such wide support from the voting public, for this had the capacity to threaten future policymaking and their deeper interests. This elite struggle resulted in and revealed the real forces within civil society taking part in street movements and fighting over sociopolitical hegemony: the urban bourgeoisie and the rural poor. As the dominant bloc of political elites lost control over the government, bourgeois elites now fear losing hegemony over the rural and working poor.
Recent events in Bangkok have amplified the anti-rural noise, referring to potential PTP voters as either ignorant or susceptible to bribes. Thongchai Winichakul has noted the discrepancy in criticizing vote-buying among rural populations but ignoring similar strategies of localized spending within the urban context. The cynical discourse surrounding development in rural areas does not exist concerning commonly used tax breaks or transit improvements in Bangkok. Andrew Walker has also argued that urban elites wrongly presume that money dispensed during elections will directly determine voting outcomes, an assumption that indicates not only urban bias but also urban ignorance of the realities and rational choices of rural populations.
Herein lies the paradox at the crux of the divide: the deep state of military, royalist and urban business interests view populist efforts as a threat to their wider support, but what truly threatens their grasp on power is their own mischaracterization of that wider public as threatening. Instead, these elements should view the rural populations as a foundational spirit of their power. The king once achieved his prominence and earned his wide appeal through years of concerted public engagement with rural farmers, for example. However, the monarchy and its networks have presently come to fear the rural population’s intractable power and related support for the Shinawatras.
There is a distinct possibility — even probability — that Thaksin capitalized on the subaltern of rural farmers and urban poor in a clever attempt to assuage populist sentiment without true action. Recent protests among Northern farmers still awaiting their promised subsidies reinforce this notion. However, the opposition’s emphasis of this claim only aims to manipulate the subaltern for purposes of its own. As such, Thai political and civil society regularly engage in debates that reinforce the status quo and protect the hegemony of the dominant bloc of the ruling class and the state. The selective removal of Thaksin Shinawatra as a singular example of corrupt politics denotes not only the level of unease among elites in response to his continued support among the rural population and the working poor, but also the continued entrenchment of an elite class on either side of the political divide. The monarchy’s Privy Council, the military and the courts – the structural tools of the deep state – only began to pursue Thaksin’s removal from office after his resounding 2005 re-election, after ignoring his and others’ corruption as a banal normalcy within Thai politics.
Thongchai Winichakul labels the events of 2006 “a royalist coup,” with the military and the courts as accomplices and with the support of an electoral minority but crucial element called “the people’s sector,” made up of activists, intellectuals, media outlets, and the business elite. This sector, weighted towards the attitudes and interests of the urban bourgeoisie, has failed to appreciate those of rural citizens. The lengthy movements of 2006 and 2008, the violence of 2010 and the renewal of action in recent months indicate the deep intractability of the divide that continues to separate the country. The invention of “the people’s sector” has resurfaced in the past few months, as protestors have rallied against elections and called for the instatement of a “people’s council.” The current protest leader, Suthep Thaugsuban, speaks of moral opposition to Thaksin’s corruption and his sister Yingluck’s leadership failings, even as he minimizes his own alleged involvement as the deputy Prime Minister who ordered the deadly military crackdown that killed 93 red-shirt supporters of Thaksin in 2010. Such a selective memory extrapolates beyond Suthep’s personal evasion: his circle of elite and urban-based support has consistently justified the previous acts of violence perpetrated on the social movements that first caused the state to tremble (to use Gramsci’s phrasing).
What truly needs to change in Thailand is a shift in civil society; street protests evoke the vestiges of civil action, but they merely actualise the political gamesmanship on both sides of a purely political debate. Understood as such, a Gramscian framework is more illuminating with regards to ongoing events in Thailand than the conventional analysis of democratization, which focuses too much on political power and policy. The opposition is correct that Thailand needs more than new elections, but Suthep and other yellow-shirt elites have ideologically manipulated the discontent of their supporters for their own political entrenchment. The series of trembles to the Thai state over the past eight years have revealed the cracked earthenworks of division and misunderstanding that lay between the key interests of society. A Gramscian framework provides greater agency to the subaltern: “If yesterday it [the subaltern element] was not responsible, because ‘resisting’ a will external to itself, now it feels itself to be responsible because it is no longer resisting but an agent, necessarily active and taking the initiative.”
For subaltern elements to entrench their own sense of agency, they must resist the hegemony within their own ranks – red or yellow. The alternative Gramscian framework has suggested they can accomplish this through direct emphasis on their own cultural strengths, ideological dominance, and incumbent moral superiority. Modern Thailand faces the task of reconciling an increasingly polarized populace, divided by political ideology as much as geographic and industrial background. Yet the battle is taking place and must continue to take place not within political society but within civil society. Until urban elites interpret the incentives and interests of the rural poor not as a threat but instead as a foundational spirit, the hegemonic Thai system will continue to move forward blindly, as with open eyes that cannot see.
Daniel Mattes is a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science
Suthep’s role in the 2010 so called ‘military crackdown’ should not be referred here as an ‘alleged involvement’. He was not simply involved – he was the head of CMPO so he was at the crux of it. Just wanna highlight this so that people unfamiliar with Thai politics could understand how outlandish Suthep’s claim to be ‘moral person’ to rescue Thailand is. This is not to mention all corruption cases in the past.
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What a splendid and insightful piece of writing this is! Most illuminating. I just wonder how a brainwashed nation exposed to fairy tales and propaganda, instead of proper education, can ever untie the Gordian knot, and achieve reconciliation. My sincere feelings of sympathy for Concerned but helpless Thai.
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Alexander’s answer to The Gordian knot was not tountie it but hack through it with his sword.
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Daniel Mattes forgot to mention that Uncle Boonmee won the Palm D┬┤Or at the Cannes film festival in 2010, and according to Wikipedia was passed uncut by the Thai film censorship board, though similar scenes had been cut from the director┬┤s two previous feature films.
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I cannot think of a phrase that is a better exemplar of the utter intellectual bankruptcy of modern inquiry in the humanities and social sciences.
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Although on the surface of this article, it seems to give an insight to the political turmoil in Thailand. The author seems to write with amnesia. To say ‘a Gramscian framework provides great agency to the sublatern’ is to pose the idea of the class struggle. And this seems to be attractive as the ‘other’ seems to give a voice to ‘the Other’, appealing to reader to feel sympathetic towards the ‘oppressed’ ( the rural?, the farmers, the new middle-class?).
The author wanted to say that Suthep is no angel and manipulate on the moral ground. I agree that he is no angle, however, I am not sure the word ‘manipulate’ is the right word.
Precisely, it is because we need to be moral; and sadly it seems archaic these days. Don’t we think for a start about what is just, what is right rather than looking at it in terms of political ‘subalternity’?
It would have given the author more insight, If he has understood the talks by people from different professions, giving information to protestors on the ‘huge’ problems of corruption – from academics, civil servants e.g. FCO (Thai). Education, Health, Labour and Tax revenue dept., and not to mention regional administrative staff. Besides, people (from different strata) have been giving donations all over Thailand. They are defying the emergency decree and DSI.
They have come out not because of Suthep, not because of the Democrat party – but simply they feel something – ‘morality’. And precisely, because they feel this – they think of the ‘Other’.
Now that, the farmers, who have not had money paid due to the huge failure of the rice pledge programme, have come out for the protest. Some in Chiangrai province could not come out for fear of the threats from their local (Phue Thai) PT representatives.
The rice pledge scheme is scandalous – simply because we have never known how much the rice stock in the silos. There is a huge corruption that the money has lost out to the PT politicians. And there is a lie saying from their side that the Thai government negotiated to sell rice to the Chinese government – and the Chinese government had to come out to deny it.
There are many issues that we need to take into account – e.g. water resources management, energy and health issue etc.
This protest has been peaceful (physically) from the protestors’ side. Has the author ever seen shootings and blasting in a broad daylight, and shooting sprees to threaten people who voice differently. Would one say this is an ugly situation? So far, Thailand has lost 10 lives and hundreds injured – without a single case arrested by the Centre of Maintaining Peace and Order (CMPO)
The case in 2010 – the lost of lives of the red demonstrators – one needs to look at the evidence – it is horrendously violence. However, if one has a chance to look at the evidence – you will see that the red core organisers incited them and intimidated the soldiers – not to mention ‘men in black’ that shot to kill. There is a report fromTRC ( Truth for Reconciliation Commission), an independent agency appointed by the Democrat and PT. governments.
People all over to Thailand have first come out because of the controversial Amnesty Bill (technically for Thaksin- although it is meant for all including the Red and yellow protestors and also, Suthep and Aphisit on the charge of 2010 crackdown), but they would rather face the trials.
For anybody sensible will think – how could one forgive Thaksin who has, during his administration, – corrupted and infringed human rights – thousands of people downsouth have been killed (and it is still going), not to mentioned his draconian rules on drugs.
Our (flawed) democracy gave rise for PT party to treat Thailand as a cooperate, rather than as a government.
A very simple fact might makes us think – when the rulers are not good – people have the right to overthrow. This is Locke’s social contract and it seem that Thailand needs it so long that the military does not stage a coup.
Gramsci’s idea, then, perhaps is not suitable to provide the framework for civic discourse to Thai society as this is not about class struggle as a lot of academics and journalists seem to claim – it is simply about justice, which is the basis for democracy. Or am I wrong?
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Yep, you’re wrong. There’s nothing in Mattes’ piece above that claims that moral considerations are irrelevant; rather, the emphasis is on a class-based analysis because taking the side of the oppressed is assumed to be a key element of political morality. That you clearly disagree with this assumption doesn’t mean that you are offering a “morality-based” riposte to an amoral position, but rather that your own ethical worldview does not see class-based oppression as a relevant moral issue.
There’s nothing special about your claims regarding the morality of your cause — every social movement in history has claimed to have morality on its side. This is especially true of some of the most destructive and oppressive movements in history. In the end, being clear-eyed about facts and principles is worth much more than moral posturing.
Indeed, mere moral posturing (e.g. “it is because we need to be moral; and sadly it seems archaic these days” — as if people were really so much more moral in the past!) is dangerous. A group of people who are misty-eyed about their own moral goodness and full of red-faced rage about their demonised opponents is capable of anything; in particular, it is capable of supporting just the kind of unprincipled and undemocratic politics that Suthep and his cronies have engaged in since the beginning of this crisis. And of course, such people are capable of developing the laughably one-sided and distorted understanding of recent history that you’ve demonstrated in your post.
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Yes you are wrong.
Stupethy is as Stupety does.
When you break it all down, the horrible thing is that we need to have a situation in which we can be overtly against the likes of Thaksin and his sister or the various other populist Red Shirt people. But because of the way the Democratic party and the others on the other side have reacted and conducted themselves politically, it is clear that the Red Shirt side is the best way to maintain Democracy or at least continue on a path to Democracy.
Once the likes of Suthep and all that he represents have been faced down and clearly defeated- and they must be seen to have failed. Then the task of building and then being part of real reform can begin in earnest.
The preoccupation with Thaksin and the Shinawatra clan is a total red herring and out of all proportion to the real significance they have in the future of Thai politics.
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I agree entirely. I have never been particularly attracted to Thaksin as a politician though I must admit to having a soft spot for Yingluck – it was just such a delight to see the faces of Abhisit, Chuan, Korn and others after she had so roundly defeated them! What has actually motivated me has been the reaction of the “Democrats” and their elite supporters ever since Thaksin’s comprehensive election win in 2005. They tried every single underhand, anti-democratic ruse, first to unseat him and then to try to obliterate him completely. It has been just such wonderful fun to see them put on the back foot time and time again. He has made fools of them all and it has been thoroughly deserved.
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Dear Daniel,
as a fellow Gramscian I was excited to see your piece, as I truly believe a shift in discourse hegemony is a decisive factor in Thailand’s transformation struggle.
After reading it I feel a bit short hanged. Why you leave us high and dry with two or three scarce sentences? Please elaborate your good ideas more!
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Thanks for your perceptive analysis. However the writing was on the wall even before the “resounding 2005 re-election” of Thaksin after the Democrat Party overlooked Abhisit for the leadership in favor of Banyat Bantadan – a senior Democrat party hack seriously lacking in the charisma necessary to all successful political leaders.
Moreover, the Xmas 2014 tsunami gifted Thaksin the 2/3 majority he craved in order to make himself immune to parliamentary censure. The proof of this is that academics and other writers had been attacking Thaksin’s record and landing heavy blows which had him on the ropes until the Tsunami – after which they realized that Thaksin would become the ‘600 pound gorilla’ they had all been trying to head off.
So it seems to me that many or most Red Shirts are, and Red Shirt friends from the north and from Esarn have said as much, just along for the ride rather than having ‘welded on’ support for Thaksin.
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For people who keep claiming every Thai is against Thaksin, and still too chicken to go for an election….
See what’s wrong with the picture?
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Now just where are those sturdy structures that are being revealed?
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Until the factionalized elite (both rural and urban, singular)ceases to interpretthe incentives and interests of the poor and financially-tenuous(both rural and urban)as either a threat to the ancient(moribund)status quo or as lucrative leverage to create a nouveau status quo (slightly more proactive, but hopelessly compromised right from the start), the hegemonic Thai system will continue to reel drunkenly and disastrously from one complete foul-up to the next.Added to which, I’m not at all sure that a grand theorist is really quite practical enough to fully understand a system in which the only apparent way of ever ejecting a criminally-irresponsible government is to engage in equally irresponsible criminal acts. And the great populist of Thai politics was never exactly going to be quite subtle or intelligent enough to execute a complete and clean break from the bad old good old days.
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One wishes that Young Mattes had devoted a bit of space to outlining his understanding of Thai society and its history before launching into his entirely predictable Gramscian analysis. Neither contemporary Bangkok nor contemporary Kalasin is Interwar Torino, after all . . .
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Notwithstanding the merits of this worthy article and various other theories, I am mindful of the cautionary saying from Zen:
‘He who speaks does not know. He who knows does not speak.’ Indeed I have often quoted this to Thais re politics here in the Kingdom of Illusions, while adding that one such widely respected commentator, Dr. Chaianand Samutvanich, once despairingly commented that he would in future refrain from making political predictions because when they proved accurate (as his tended to be) it was said that because he knew how events would pan out he must be involved in politics behind the scenes.
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Or “it is better to be silent and be taken for a fool, than to open one’s mouth and remove all doubt.” Mark Twain, I think
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Are you really talking about Chai-anand Samudavanija, the well connected, staunchly royalist yellow-shirted nutcase, the inventor of “sufficiency democracy”? Well, I hope he (and you maybe too) will follow his own advice.
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From NM Guest Contributor:
‘Chai-anan’s point is not complicated when compared to his seminal Three-Dimensional State Model. His view may reflect three dimensions of ideas that are present in a large group of Thai intellectuals today. First, it is part of a reaction to capitalist economic development at least since the late 1980s when Thailand experienced its economic boom. This anti-capitalist thinking peaked in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. Second, Chai-anan is reflecting a bottom-up approach to democracy and, apparently, a reaction to the rise of the Thai Rak Thai party under Thaksin. Lastly, a nationalist rationale – Thailand’s uniqueness – is the key to negating ‘external’ elements in Thailand’s political economy.’
Sven, unfortunately it seems that you consider use of the descriptors ‘well-connected’, ‘staunchly royalist’ and/or ‘yellow-shirted’ as sufficient reason to demean someone as a ‘nutcase’. While I am none of these things myself, I do take exception to such lazy, if not crazy, comments – which indicate that you, rather than Dr. Chai-anand, are part of the problem.
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First let me apologize for attacking a bit too much on an ad-hominem basis, I never would want you to get quiet here – What would be the fun of a discussion without differing views? I still think though that my primary impression of his “sufficiency democracy” is still valid.
Chai-anand may have been a really brilliant thinker in the nineties, but he definitely is lost it with ideas like this.
There is really no-one buying into this “por piang”-anything stuff. His “botton-up approach” means nothing else than giving the majority of the population some community projects to decide and on the top the important decisions will be made by unelected technocrats.
Economically “por piang” never was meant to be anti-capitalistic, it was always (well, at least after it’s revival after the 2006 coup) used as a tool to keep the poor in place.
Lastly I want to cite from a comment of the article you referred to which I thing sums it up quite well: “All this talk of “Sufficiency” is just a load of cod’s wallop, total nonsense, sheltered desperate coddled Bangkok hi-so royalist elites desperately trying to comfort each other as their privileged fantasy world collapses all around them in a constant state of change…”
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Excellent article. Why has Thailand come to this impasse after the great days of the Assembly of the Poor and which had s many rich lessons for others in Asia? Have the middle classes always have to be the arbitrator between the poor and the elites and cannot the poor have their say? The article has great relevance for us in India also as we fight off a fearful rightwing fascist challenge to an entrenched elite and a middle class upsurge possibly threatening the apple cart of both right and Centre. The left? It is for now “left out”. So is “civil society” as you point in the Thai case.
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It’s amusing to see how the western, intellectual elite on these forums denounces what they call the Thai elite. Have any of you actually lived in rural Isan or do you find your truths solely from long gone Italian politicians?
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So do you care to define the term ‘Thai elite’ yourself or do you try to avoid using it altogether?
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That’s actually a valid question.
– In current Thailand, there is a tiny economic elite, the families that own the businesses, land in Bangkok and surroundings etc. While they used to have a lot of political power, that power is fast eroding if there’s much left at all.
– Until recently, you could also talk about a royalist elite, but the development the last few years have changed that dramatically. Many are still loyal to the King, but that is probably much stronger upcountry than in Bangkok. The strongest exponent for the royalist elite are fading out for natural reasons and in Bangkok, “traditional Thai values” are disappearing at a speed few thought was possible only five years ago.
– Then there is the Bangkok middle class. They can hardly be called an elite. Most of them have an education, many of them are ambitious, but although they earn much better than farmers, cost of living and the commercial pressure makes them run fast to survive. So fast that few of them get children. The fertility rate in Thailand is 1.6, but most of those children are born in rural communities. These are the ones that have been on the streets in Bangkok the last few months. Many of them come from Isan and other upcountry provinces and many have farmer parents.
Thaksin himself is a typical representative of the traditional elite. He comes from a relatively rich family and has expanded the family fortune by using connections within the business world, political life, the police and the military. The biggest difference between him and other successful business people in Thailand is that he chose to follow a political path while still maintaining his business interests.
So if you ask me, if there is a Thai elite, it’s people like Thaksin; extremely rich, able to make money on everything he does, politically influential even from his exile, and totally ruthless.
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Not really gramscian, but related to hegemony: Because foreign western media provide only biased information, I went to Bangkok to see for myself. My visits were limited to Asoke and Siam. In the local media and several comments it had been written that the educated Bangkok middle class is the main supporter of the protests. If those I saw at the spots during the day time and in the evening are the educated Bangkok middle class, the educational system of Thailand certainly has very serious problems. The Thai used on the stage and when I spoke with some members of the middle class, was quite distinct from what I learned as “polite” middle class Thai.
Definitely the strong nationalist orientation of the middle class was visible with the many flags, the “tri-colore” bands, gloves etc. that were used to cover the bodies and keep the hair together. The strong believe in Buddhism was shown by the men in numerous amulets around their necks. However, in Europe we would describe those middle class people rather as hooligans, thugs or something like that. Is this the new dress-code of the Bangkok middle class? I do appreciate this change to informality, as I found the middle class dress-code quite formal.
I was strongly impressed by the hardship the middle class is willing to take, like living in a very noisy encironment, sleeping in small tents, having only very limited hygienic facilities etc. I interpret this that they want to show how “sufficiency economy” can become reality.
Probably the description as “thugs” or rough criminals fits most of those I encountered to some degree. The vendors at the stalls and those at the shops told me that “protection money”, or donations are asked for. The news presented the case that a hotel manager was asked to pay 120.000 (plus if I remember right 4.200) Baht to some visitors lead by a monk. Again some surprise for me. My travel guide explained that monks are living a life of meditation and wisdom. They are not even allowed to touch money! Thus, I did not expect them to be involved in extortion rackets. But, this closeness between at least this monk and the hooligans might explain the prominence of the Buddhist amulets among them. It was explained to me that this extortion was justified, as the hotel was owned by Thaksin. I was slightly worried. May be tomorrow such a justification may be that the property is owned by a foreigner or so. This does not really assure investment.
I went again to the places at about 22:00. Although it was Friday, not many people were around. I was asked to show some kind of ID. I was surprise and asked whether the person is a policeman. He did not look like it, but you never know. He was not, but assumed that he has the same authority as policemen have. May be this kind of blurredness between police as state organ and hooligan explains that public places can be occupied and regular persons be assaulted. However, I found it very polite when I read at their banners that they asked for understanding and excuse for the in-convenience caused by paralysing Bangkok.
Usually it can be assumed that the police and military have the responsible to protect the state administration, public spaces and private property (f.e. against extortion). I was surprised that hardly any attempt has been made. Of course, I find it highly appropriate that the state tries to avoid escalation, but does this allow that a city of a few million can be terrorized by a few gangsters? Somebody explained to me that they are afraid of the military, and that military and police are on different sides. Aren’t both supposed to fulfil their functions as state organs to protect the state and provide security for the people?
An article in a newspaper provide some answers. They reported that the courts had decided that it is not allowed to push those occupying the crossroads and the state buildings (the thugs and hooligans) from their places. Obviously, the legal system in Thailand does not have any laws protecting property (private as well as public), public peace, the working of the state, and personal security. Naively I though f.e. traffic law would prohibit the occupation of roads for an extended time. I remembered that a few years ago, the occupation of the airports was as well regarded as protected under the constitution as freedom to express once opinion. Obviously, this article of the constitution is held in very high esteem and is even ranked higher than international law. (Because I am not well versed in legal issues, I am not sure, whether this might imply that the airports in Thailand will loose their IATA certification). At least so far nobody has been tried for it as far as I know. Today I read that farmers are heading to the airport again. They probably learned the lesson of how the freedom of expression can be applied.
I read and heard that all Thai highly respect and love their king, and that the king is the head of the state. As such, the state organs are in a special relationship to the king, and, as a consequence, they should be respected as well. I interpret this that one shows respect to the king as head of state by respecting his executive organs, or vice versa by respecting the state organs one shows respect to the king. Is the occupation of state organs and making their work impossible such a show of respect?
When I asked some people why they were at Asoke and Siam, they explained to me that Thaksin is very bad and corrupt. In some older articles I had read that corruption was or perhaps still is quite wide spread in Thailand. There was a funny saying about the government headed by Chatchai as “buffet-government”. Coruption was cited as reason for the coup by Suchinda. Neverthless his government was called “fast food” and one former prime minister was not allowed entry into the US. Thus, is corruption specific and limited to Thaksin? And, if he is such a bad person, and much of the arguments indicated that he in fact is, why were these not used as political arguments to convince people? When I spoke with several other persons, they were not very fond of the “paralysing Bangkok” action, even though they were certainly no friends of Thaksin.
Perhaps someone might explain some of these issues to a farang who faces a difficulties to understand Thailand.
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To take the last question first:
Thailand was never meant to be understood by foreigners, and in Thai culture, the importance of understanding people or their actions is minimal. In spite of being totally dependent on other nationalities for its industrial development, Thailand may well be the industrialised country in the world that is the least influenced by western thinking. Yes, they do it hamburgers, but they don’t see it as fast food, they see it as exotic, international cuisine.
Many think Thaksin is bad because they are disappointed. They had high hopes for him, but he has come out to be at least as corrupt and greedy as any other Thai prime minister. Many hate him because he challenges the traditional (and diminishing) Bangkok elite. Many dislike him because he is Chinese and they suspect he will allow increased Chinese influence in Thailand.
There are many more reasons why people dislike him, and therein lies one of the biggest problems for his opposition: They dislike him for different reasons and they are not united other for not liking Thaksin.
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