Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to be here. The Southeast Asian Human Rights Network is an incredibly important initiative that brings together both advocates and scholars to discuss pressing issues in the region. I think it can set an agenda for future research in terms of the key human rights concerns that affect the region.
In setting this agenda, one of the most important choices that we face is the topics that we choose for scholarship and advocacy. I want to make an argument today for why we need more scholars to choose to study Islam in Myanmar, the gaps that they need to fill and the broader contribution this could make to discussions on the human rights of Muslims in Myanmar.
One reason that the Muslim communities of Myanmar now need to be understood by both the West and by countries in Asia is due to the large scale migration that has taken place. There has been significant irregular migration of Muslims, especially the Rohingya, to parts of South Asia including Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and even as far as parts of the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, and to Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.
Some have made their way as asylum seekers, or as recognised refugees through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, to Western countries including the United States and Australia. My own experience since 2007 has been with the Burmese community in Melbourne, where there are a handful of Anglo-Burman and Muslim families, who fled Burma in the 1960s and 1970s; 8888 generation activists and their families who came to Australia in the 1990s; Burmese Muslims and other refugees from Karen State who have arrived since 2005; and since 2013, Rohingya asylum seekers who were detained at one of Australia’s off-shore processing centres until their claims for asylum were recognised.
We need to see this diversity inherent in Myanmar’s population, and this includes within the Muslim communities. How do we begin to capture the diversity and richness of Myanmar’s Muslim mosaic? Central to the politics of belonging is how Muslims define themselves. Let me take the 2014 census as an example of how Muslims are seeking to redefine their identity.
International commentary on the census primarily focused on the categories the government would use to mark religion and ethnicity, and specifically whether it would allow individuals to identify as ‘Rohingya’. But there was an absence of coverage of broader Muslim responses to the census. Observers failed to see the fierce discussion and debate within Muslim communities about what categories they wanted to use to define their religious and ethnic status in the census.
Many in the Burmese Muslim community were confused: they did not want to list their ethnicity as ‘Burman’, even if they identified as part Burman. This was because they felt that the ethnic category ‘Burman’ may be conflated by the government with ‘Buddhists’, and therefore overestimated the numbers of Buddhists. On the other hand, as Muslims who take pride in their ‘Burmeseness’ – both in terms of their ancestry as well as the use of Burmese language, clothing and culture – wanted recognition that they belong to Myanmar too.
As a compromise, some leaders from the Burmese Muslim community were advocating for the use of the term ‘Pathi’ Muslim. Here is where history is crucial: this is a term that was used during the period of the kings, and revived in the 1960s, in order to carve out specific recognition for this group. The term Pathi is today used in a broad sense to encompass Muslims of many different ethnic backgrounds in Myanmar, but particularly those with part-Burman ancestry.
From another perspective, some religious leaders from the Indian Muslim community issued a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) to their community members to instruct them on how to list their identity in the census. They emphasised that Muslims should not be afraid to list their religious identity on the census. Some Indian Muslim leaders even argued that it was haram (forbidden) for a Muslim to fail to list their religion on the census.
Different debates again were held within the minority Shiite community, with some Islamic religious leaders from Yangon advising that they should list themselves as ‘Mogul Shia’ on the census, although some Muslim Shiite leaders from Mandalay disagreed. Like the Burmese Muslim resurrection of the term ‘Pathi’, the use of ‘Mogul Shiite’ was also an attempt to revert back to past categories – in this case the reference to Muslims who had migrated from the Mogul empire – in order to recreate and redefine their future as a community in Myanmar.
This brief insight into broader debates surrounding the 2014 census suggests that scholarship needs to go beyond debates about whether the term ‘Rohingya’ was used (not to diminish the importance of this issue), and recognise the broader discussions around how Muslims want to be identified by the state.
Let me turn now to identify several key themes in academic literature where glaring gaps need to be filled, and misconceptions and bias need to be addressed.The first theme is the history of Muslims in Myanmar.
There are three major phases in scholarship on the history of Islam in Myanmar: Muslims during the time of the Burmese kings; Muslims under colonial rule in Burma; and Muslims during the period of parliament democracy (1948-1962). We catch glimpses in scholarly literature of the important role some Muslim communities played during the time of the kings.Historians have referred in passing to Muslims who served the kings, and the mosques that were established during this period. Yet some historians have effectively written Muslims out of the history of Myanmar. As a scholar recently noted to me, a historian would not be taken seriously today if they wrote a history of the United States that excluded the Jews or the African American community. In the same way, we need to be critical of histories of Burma that have excluded Muslim communities.
The second theme is Muslim political engagement in Myanmar. Some Muslims have been active in the political arena and have made a vital contribution to national politics, yet this has not received sustained attention. Little has been written on the role of Muslims in public life since the 1960s, yet Muslims were politically active in key political moments, such as in 1988 when the Muslim community in Mandalay organised collective demonstrations and protests against the socialist regime. Studies on the positive contribution key Muslims have made to political life could contribute to shifting the current negative discourse that effectively excludes Muslims from national politics.
The third theme is Muslims in times of crisis. The key example here is research on the Rohingya that raises crucial issues of citizenship, statelessness, and irregular migration, although there is a need for rigorous academic engagement to inform advocacy efforts (such as the work of Nausheen Anwar).
Another example is the perceived sense of crisis in relation to inter-religious marriage and the position of Burmese Buddhist women. The literature on ‘women’ in Myanmar is narrow as it has generally focused on Burman and/or Buddhist women, or at least ‘non-Muslim’ women. It has been assumed that inter-religious marriage primarily takes place between a Burmese woman and a Muslim man, which even if this was the case in the past is not necessarily the case today. We need scholars who can contextualise today’s debate on inter-religious marriage. For example, the 1954 law the allowed women to divorce their Muslim husband was actually introduced by Minister for Justice U Khin Maung Latt, who was Muslim, in response to the social need to allow Burmese women (who had been married to Indian Muslim men who were forced to flee Burma) to dissolve their marriage because of the difficulties women face obtaining a divorce under Islamic law. Yet there is no evidence of such a social crisis today, and such perspectives need to challenge the stereotypes that dominate contemporary debates.
The fourth theme is the practise of Islam among the Muslim communities of Myanmar. Most Muslims in Myanmar are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school of law, although some follow the Shafi school of law. Muslims therefore have more in common with communities in South Asia, compared to Muslim communities in Southeast Asia. There are almost no studies to date on the beliefs and practises of these Muslim groups. This is despite the fact that Islamic personal law is recognised by the state and that Muslims can go to the court to have family matters decided in accordance with this law. We must not dismiss Islamic law in Myanmar as ‘artificial’, but rather seriously consider what it means for Muslims today.
To conclude, the Muslims of Myanmar clearly constitute an understudied area of research for Burma Studies, Islamic Studies and Asian Studies more broadly. I want to suggest that future scholarship in this area must do two things in particular.
First, we need to displace Buddhism from its privileged place in the field of Burma Studies. There is a clear disconnect between the way we view Islam and Buddhism. Buddhism, I would suggest, has been protected, idealised and shielded from scholarly criticism for too long. I am not suggesting that Buddhism is not an important part of the study of Myanmar. On the contrary, just as Islam is critical to understanding the Indonesian local context, or Catholicism is vital to the study of the Philippines, Buddhism is clearly a central part of the study of Myanmar.
Yet we must be willing to reject the rose-tinted glasses with which the West often views Buddhism, in contrast to the perception of Islam as a violent religion. We must reject perpetuating the stereotype that Islam is inherently ‘bad’ and ‘violent’ and that in contrast Buddhism is ‘peaceful’, ‘non-violent’, and ‘good’. We must recognise that the tendency for violence can arise in any religion, including among those who identify with Buddhism or who seek to use Buddhism as a convenient rallying point. The evidence we have suggests that it is Buddhists who are the main cause of violence against Muslims in Myanmar.
The second aspect is related more broadly to the study of Islam in Asia. For too long Muslims in Myanmar have been overlooked, ignored and forgotten in discussions and debates on Islam in both South Asia and Southeast Asia. We must stop acting as if Islam in Myanmar is peripheral and irrelevant, or an anomaly that does not really fit. Rather, we must begin to see the potential for the study of Muslim communities in Myanmar to offer fresh insights and generate new knowledge, as something of a ‘crossroads’ for Islam between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
The opportunity is there for scholars from a wide range of disciplines to begin undertaking this task. There is a need for historians who are willing to do the hard work of reconsidering historical sources and where possible discovering new ones. There is a need for ethnographers and anthropologists to spend time in the field to get to know these Muslim communities in order to construct rich ethnographies of contemporary community dynamics. There is a need for religious studies and Islamic studies scholars to take the study of Islam in Myanmar seriously.
I could go on. The point I want to make is this: there is a need for an informed and scholarly response to contemporary issues facing the Muslim communities of Myanmar. Scholars can play a vital role in informing these human rights issues by addressing some of the obvious bias and gaps in existing literature. I hope some of you make take up this challenge.
Melissa Crouch is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Asian Legal Studies, NUS. In December 2014 she is moving to the Law Faculty, the University of New South Wales, Sydney. This speech is adapted from an edited book on Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging (forthcoming 2015).
Note: This talk was given at the Southeast Asian Human Rights Network Conference on 15-16 October 2014 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. One of the co-panelists, Pak Ulil Abshar Abdullah who is well-known as a proponent of liberal Islam, was banned from entering Malaysia, but was able to give his presentation via skype. On the same day, the Malaysian Bar Council conducted a peaceful protest in support of law professor Azmi Sharom (one of the organisers of the conference), to protest against the sedition charges he faces. A video recording of the session will appear on Libertv shortly.
Brilliant Melissa!
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Thanks Sean, I hope it challenges a few of the stereotypes out there
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I agree with your piece and Sean! Let’s hope this inspires research on Muslims in Myanmar.
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The “Rohingya” are Bangladeshi Muslims who have migrated into Burma. They are indistinguishable from Bangladeshi Muslims in Dhaka or Chittagong. “Rohingya” practice the same Hanafi School of Sunni Islam as their colleagues in Dhaka. Allelic markers on their mtDNA (mitochondrial DNA) will show the exact allelic patterns as any Bangladeshi Muslim, for the obvious reason that “Rohingya” originate from Bangladesh, and have no indigenous origins in Burma, anymore than my British PhD Supervisor, born in Rangoon, resident in Canada, and with a father was with the British Rifles in British India.
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Simplistic view with the same rhetoric. The article wasn’t even talking about the Muslims from the Western Burma. Gee!
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Hi Melissa, would that book be available at book shops?
Thanks!
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While I entirely agree with the main thrust of your presentation, which is as you say “to recognise the broader discussions around how Muslims want to be identified by the state”, I would myself be cautious when making even the most basic of assumptions. There is for example no internationally accepted definition of who the ‘Rohingya’ are. In an article published in 2006, attributed to Moshe Yegar and entitled “The Crescent in Arakan”, I read that the main adherents of the movement to siphon off Northern Arakan to Pakistan “were Muslims of Chittagong origin, the native Rohinga (sic) being less inclined to it”.
In 2014 it would seem that the roles have been completely reversed. The Muslims of Chittagong origin have become the ‘Rohinga’, while the Arakan Mohamedans, whom the British recognised as indigenous – the native Rohinga of Moshe Yegar – have seemingly disappeared without trace, as have the Myedu and other minor Muslim communities in Arakan. What started as an indigenous ‘Rwangya’ community of less than 100,000 souls in 1948 has gone through various ‘R’ designations to become in 2014 the monolith juggernaut of some 3 million or more, in Myanmar and overseas, with the maximalist interpretation including all those post-1870 Chittagonian and Bengali migrants who ventured beyond Arakan into other divisions and states of Myanmar.
There is, in short, a political dimension to the discussion which we ignore at our peril. I get a (no doubt unreasonable) shiver down my spine when I hear the word “fatwa” and when I read in the latest ICG report about the influence of camp leaders. The holy principle of “self-identification” then takes on a completely new meaning.
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Mr. Tonkin is absolutely correct. The Arakhan Muslims, who are indigenous to Burma, are not politically expedient for “Pro-Rohingya” groups, who range in motive from Burma bashing to Mahathirian global Islamic liberation. The Rohingya, I will repeat, as I am also a scientist,
are 100 % DNA allelic frequency comparisons with Bangladeshis from Dhaka or Chittagong.
There is no cultural, ethnic or even genetic difference between “Rohingya” and Bangladeshi Muslims, and we must distinguish between neo-Asiatic hill tribes in NW Bangladesh, who are Sino-Tibetan in ethnic origins, and are not Indo-Aryan like Bengalis. The politicization of the Rohingya as a Cause de Jour, for those who need cathartic release, is not going to solve the problem of refuges in Burma. I do NOT claim that Thein Sein’s policies are necessarily wise, fair or in the best interests of all Burmese, more likely in his own (Bamar) best interests. But the non-Burmese latching on to the Rohingya issue for political purposes will not help them. As even Bangladesh does not want them back, from whence they came, it is Bangladesh’s lack of birth control and overpopulation, that has led, over many, many years, to this burgeoning population. Despite the inaccurate claims of some Rohingya “fanatics” that they are all apolitical, that is true only in part. Most are, but the ambitious among them have established “Rohingya” political movements, which are closely watched and aided by Bangladesh, and even more so, by Malaysia, for whom the Rohingya have become a cause celebre, as if Malaysia did not have enough problems with increasing Malay stridency. The UN and outside relief agencies may mean well, but despite Thein Sein’s own machinations, I can’t say that these foreign agencies haven’t antagonized Burma either. I suspect soon, we will all see the likely inevitable “Palestinisation” of the Rohingya issue, if we haven’t already, and that is not a recipe for equitable adjudication of the Rohingya’s fate, nor entirely fair to Burma, either.
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Peter,
Ain’t that true, your words?
There is the perception that that tribe in Burma may have some “ideological” difference with the Bangladeshi in that whereas Bangladeshi couldn’t stand the Pakistani and for that they died in millions, this crowd wants to be with Greater Pakistani country which is like Burmese saying “dog longing for the elephant’s organ” as Pakistani do not want them either and will not take them. The so much Wahabi-ish Saudi put them in jails in thousands.
And they are simply pawns for people who want to use them for their own ends. These Uddin, Sadiqque, etc. are not interested in their welfare but simply to use them to beat up the Bamar and hope to get a bridgehead of Muslim enclave under their own name.
Meanwhile, it would be so, so naive to assume UN is anything but a brothel. This guy Ban is worse than any Hollywood extra reading his lines.
Regardless, those Sri Lanka associated Nazi Buddhist practitioners, naive but ruthless public and internationally pampered rabidly racist- racism is the cheapest of human quality- one simply needs to be borne-, Sit-tut guys do put most ugly and despicable situation out of all these.
And there is no end. Who are the good guys here? No one.
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Ohn,
The Malays arm them, the Malays aid them, the Malays defend them at the UN, and the Malays even give them rickety boats. But how many Rohingya are actually given asylum in Malaysia, their greatest defenders ? And when it comes to victims, the Rohingya have no sole claim on merit; the Malaysian government does a fine job of abusing their own citizens. I never said the Rohingya were bad people; I never said they were all extremists; and I never said all ethnic Bamar are Buddha’s gift to the Earth. I DID say that the Rohingya are Bangladeshis; they are not indigenous to Burma (or Myanmar, if you prefer); and I said that they have been manipulated politically by their own leaders, by Bangladesh and by Malaysia. It seems on New Mandala, only Burma manipulates them, as if the Rohingya live in a Burmese vacuum, totally devoid of any role for the OIC and the Ummah (global Muslims). This is rarely mentioned, lest one find that Muslim hands outside Burma, are bloodier than Bamar hands in Burma (Buddha forbid !).
To quote Michael Stipe of REM:
“The crime of good men who can’t wrestle with change, or are too afraid to face this life’s misjudged unknowns..”
“You’re not hurting anybody else’s chances,
but you’re disfiguring your own…”
“Give me a minute and I’ll tell you the setup for The worst joke ever, I never..”
“I’ll tell you my version of the greatest life story. Don’t bore me, I NEVER..
Give me a minute and I’ll tell you the
setup…”
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This article is so wrongly presumptuous as so manly levels.
Historic, political, religious and even HR.
Historic and Political: Well summarized by Mr Derek Tonkin above.
Religious: Not realizing Myanmar is the known center of ‘Purified Buddhism’ next to historical Sri Lanka make the author’s call for any diminishing of Buddhism and any discussion of any subject rather wanting.
The politics of belonging in Myanmar has long being set by the Muslim and others in Maulamyanin.
SO why reinvent the wheel of getting along?
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Adding fuel to the fire is what it is. Bad enough these people have been let down by their wrongheaded and ambitious leaders, egged on by their brethren outside like many of those expatriate leaders.
Living in harmony, impossible alas with the Chittagonians, to communal strife has an historic trajectory conveniently ignored by certain scholars and analysts. Backlashes happen for a reason. The Arakan is not Texas, nor Burma Mexico.
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That’s right Moe Aung, in Mexico thy behead tourists in Acapulco; I do not recall when the last Burmese beheading took place, perhaps by a crazed British Rifleman, but not by a Bamar Buddhist monk. I know you would just love to blame every White person, on the planet, and U Wirathu, for ALL of Burma’s problems, but I am sorry to inform you that you cannot. It doesn’t work that way. Instead focus on why U Thant, as UN Chief, allowed six Arab nations to illegally attack sovereign UN member Israel, and did absolutely nothing to try and stop it, typical of U Thant’s “dynamism”. Rather disappointing relative to U Nu, another of your “favourites”.
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With respect you seem to know very little, Hang Tuah. The last beheadings in Burma took place in August 1988. Also your wild accusations when you know as little about me is rather unedifying.
U Thant and U Nu were great friends, but why are you comparing apples and oranges, a civil servant and a PM? And what’s that gotta do with the price of fish?!
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The other fact that that author gloss over but play significant role, without any more needed academic exposure is:
1) The unmitigated migration of mostly Muslim (because of the proximity and ease) and Hindus into Myanmar.
Significantly this period, the colonial period, was ‘the 2nd longest’, if compared to previous Dynastic eras.
The Hindus religion believes are incorporated readily into the then existing Buddhism in Yakihine, thus avoiding any future conflicts. The architecture of the Pagoda every where attested to that facts clearly.
2) The Muslim intolerance of anything Buddhist is shamefully legendary. Recorded well resulting in riots, the very first one started during the colonial period, not before, therefore speak loudly to the present continuation.
Truly the Muslim in Yakhine are getting the worst among a deprive citizenry.
Reviving through an academic hope of exalting a minority while diminishing the majority respective religion seem unwise and might just make the politicians more intransigent thus prolonging the present HR related issues.
Too many atrocities against each side is well documented.
If one is concern about the abhorrent state of HR of the Kala in Yakihine, one must seek practical historic example of minority getting along with majority, as in Maulayain and promote those aspects.
A truly instructive scenario to present period, academic or otherwise, knowing this is the original capital of the colonial power, that started the process yet have no recorded discord by the existence of opulent Mosques and sacred Pagodas up to this day that make this city by the mouth of Salween River uniquely irresistible.
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The fundamentals of getting along are:
1) Knowing more to gain
2) Knowing more to loose
In Maulmyain: Res ipsa loquitur.
AS for the more deprived Yakhine citizenry
This adage “Freedom is another word for noting left to loose” is particularly applicable.
If the Muslim Kala insisted on their often manufactured ID Rohingyas as base for “freedom”, egged on by the west and other Islamic countries and OAS, will surly free to loose it or rather loose it to be free.
As for the contribution of Muslim during the post war independent era, Abdul Razak the only Mulsim brought on board by Bogyoke Aung San was as much as a political move to force the British to see a unified face for independence from the longest subjugation by a western power. Bogyoke Aung san “Knowing more to gain” here is evident.
This fact will be forever overshadowed by subsequent conflict during short U NU era as well as BSPP era where the Muslim Kala agitations are well documented and full of worthy HR notes.
As for the Muslim contribution to the 8888 period the less said the better during present “umteened steps to democracy era”.
“Knowing more to loose” one might not wish for what one asking, even and especially academically.
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Wow, first of all, ever heard U Rashid? Have you seen a picture of him with Bogyoke Aun San? Obviously not.
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And the point is ?
Beyond contribution to independence as a Muslim representing Kala:
1) The citizenry of Muslim kala even though migrated during colonial era are accepted as part of a citizenry.
2) Numerous sources of Muslim Kala or part Kala contribution speak for itself.
Questions to MandySwe:
Does U Rashid or any Muslim leaders of that era insist on being ID as a Pashtun or Pakistani?
Is a Muslim Kala in Yakhine be allowed to ID themselves as Rohingyas?
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U Rashid or any Muslims of that era were not living in Arakan and were in need of an identity as the Rohingyas.
The fact that you keep calling the Muslims in Burma s Kala shows your disposition which obviously stems out of complex inferority.
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At your service, a Tayoke,Yakhine,Mon and Bamar with an Inferiority Complex rather than complex inferiority.
SO little time so much left to do. By the way Tayoke is a derogatory term as well, a bastard advocating for a beleaguered Citizenry does that make one faux c├┤mplex supér├оor?
How about the question:
“Did U Rashid ever insist on being Classified as a Pashtun or Pakistani ?”.
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U Razak, U Rashid, U Khin Maung Latt, Hajima Daw Pu, Saya Chair and Colonel Tin Soe were all Muslims, Plan B, so what is your point ? None of them were Rohingya either. So, ethnic Chinese also fought for Malayan independence, so both Malays and Chinese could be free, and I can tell you Chinese in Malaysia are now treated far worse than Muslims in Burma. You want your cake and eat it too. On the one hand, you chafe at the mere hint that Burmese Muslims, from the very start of British India, were anything but loyal to Burma, but you have no issue, apparently, when Rohingya activists visit Malaysia, complain to the Malaysian Foreign Minister that they are discriminated against because they are Muslims. NO. General Thein Sein rightly objects (as do many Burmese) to Bangladeshis pawning themselves off as indigenous to Burma, which they are not.
I am sure you are also fine with Malaysia importing Muslims from Indonesia and the Philippines to increase the Muslim ratio in East Malaysia. Something Burma does not interfere with as an ASEAN member, even though every Burmese knows Malaysia is hypocritical, on this issue. You let Malaysia interfere in Burmese affairs (even while it covets Burma’s natural gas fields), arm and aid the Rohingya, who demand to be identified
as BURMESE MUSLIMS (not just Burmese) when they are only Muslims, but are not Burmese. Perhaps Burma should take a cue from Malaysia, and start importing other Buddhists from Chittagong, Assam, Bhutan,
Sikkim, even Thailand, and increase the Buddhist ratio domestically. Those who so piously cry discrimination when a Rohingya starts complaining, have no issue when Bangladesh persecutes non-Bengali hill tribes. And by the way, U Nu’s government recognized Muslims as having equal status with Buddhists and Christians. I have seen many sarcastic comments here on New Mandala, questioning Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s loyalties, just because her husband was British and she was educated in England, but these same cynics, insist with no evidence, that Rohingya loyalties
are somehow provided by Allah, and no Burmese, least of all the Government, has a right to question them. And enough of this pseudo-nationalism and tiresome rants against the West. You allowed Ne Win to ruin your nation, and not the West. If you feel the Rohingya are so deserving of special dispensations, go to the Malaysian Representative on the U.N. Security Council and complain. The problem is you have a conundrum. You say the Rohingya are Burmese first, but the Malaysian Rep won’t give you the time of day, unless you say the Rohingya are Muslims first and Burmese second. So which is it ?
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There were not enough Pashtun for him to insist. Besides, these Pasthun had intermarried with Bamar and were no longer maintained Pashtun culture. Rohingyas have a distinct culture.
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The Pashtuns are from the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. They have nothing to do with Burma, nothing to do with Rohingya and the Pashtuns are not known for being tradesmen who migrated in great numbers to the East. The Pashtuns are deeply conservative and do not follow any of the schools of Sunni Islam as practiced by North Indian, Rohingya (Bangladeshis) or Rakhine Muslims.
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[…] West equates Muslims in Myanmar with the term “Rohingya”. There is little appreciation of the diversity within the Muslim communities in Myanmar, nor is there any acknowledgement that most Muslims in Myanmar are probably not (or do not […]
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During the cultural revolution, is not BSPP orchestrated anti Tayoke demonstration clear enough which should come first?
This sectarian violence is the same in every respect replacing Tayoke with Muslim Kala.
Malaysia OAS and beyond can promote what they wish with Rohingyas. In Myanmar when push come to shove history has shown to be very consistent.
Tayoke learn long ago being Bamar has advantages even if you don’t know a word of Burmese.
Will the Muslim Kala in Yakhine learn?
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Unlike the Tayoke, Rohingyas did not come from another country. It is the Burman who began to arrive Yakhine Pye in 10th century.
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The depth of your sense of reason need to be questioned here.
1) The difference b/t Baghali and Rohingyas
2) the reasonable degree of demand under present circumstances.
Instead of being a Muslim Kala in Yakhine, a part of Myanmar Citizenry where the sentiment is strong against anything else your chosen arguments will go no where even if they are absolutely correct or close.
There are areas of Yakhine near Bangladesh where Banghali cross over freely to further migrate (undocumented) into the interior. Be prepared for more sectarian violence now that ASEAN gavel is no longer in Thein Sein hand.
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Mohamed Akram Ali, writing in the (Rangoon) “Guardian Magazine” for August 1960, made the following perceptive comment in an article on Pages 31-32 which he entitled “Unity Among Ourselves”. He wrote: “I feel very sorry to mention that there is a lack of unity among the Arakanese Muslims themselves. The main causes of the disruption of unity among them are racial and sectional prejudices. Some of them style themselves as Roewengyas while other call themselves Kamans and Chittagonian descendants etc. and they take pride in being so called. Some of them have a deep-seated sense of localism and therefore take pride in their birth places such as Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Akyab, Mrohaung, Kyauktaw, Kyaukpyu, Sandoway etc. If we go on in this way, I can say with certainty that we will not be able to achieve any good work, nor will we be able to get unity among ourselves. This will indeed hamper the progress of our community in particular and of Arakan in general. I should therefore like to request my people that they should forget the past and make the future bright by sinking their racial differences. Then only, I hope, we can reach our goal without fail.”
At the time (1948-1962), four main designations for Arakanese Muslims were in vogue: Roewengya, especially favoured by the Muslim scholar U Ba Tha which U Kyaw Min also mentioned as recently as 11 August 2014 (as an alternative designation to Rohingya) ; Rwangya which had been promoted since 1948 by the indigenous ‘Yakhain Kala’ (and which Khin Maung Yin in ‘Salience of Ethnicity’ 2005 says is a term by which Rohingya are also known) ; Ruhangya which seems to have been favoured by Chittagonians resident outside Arakan; and Rohingya to which I find scattered references in the Guardian Daily for 1960, which appears to have emanated from Maungdaw and was also favoured by the Mujahid.
As we know, it was Rohingya which eventually captured the market to become the dominant political force, thus achieving perhaps the unity among Arakan Muslims which Mohamed Akram Ali had advocated over 50 years ago, although the Kamans, I understand, are today not at all happy with this and fear that they too may be engulfed by the Rohingya movement sooner or later.
Another article in The Guardian of 3 August 1960 quoted the Ruhangya Youth League in Rangoon as claiming that Ruhangyas “numbered about 400,000 in Arakan and altogether about 700,000 all over Burma.” It is intriguing then that, though there was chaos and controversy in Rakhine State at the time of the recent Census, the large number of Rohingyas reportedly living outside Rakhine State completed the Census without controversy or confrontation. We might ask how they did it.
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