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Last Friday I spoke at the 2007 Thai Update hosted by the National Thai Studies Centre at the ANU (update-program.pdf). Over the next few days I will post some notes about some of the key presentations. But for now, you will have to make do with the text of my presentation! Regular readers should find a lot of it familiar, as New Mandala has been a useful forum for developing and testing out my ideas over the past year. But I hope there is something new in the way the various issues are combined. As usual, comment are very welcome!
Seven Threats to Thailand’s Democracy
Andrew Walker
Thailand Update Conference
31 August 2007
University House
The Australian National University
Today I will be talking to you about what I see as seven key threats to Thailand’s democracy. Don’t ask me why I chose seven, it just seemed a good number when I nominated the topic and it gave me room to explore some of the complexity of the current situation. And, in fact, I’ve decided to talk about 6 threats and one opportunity.
My aim in doing this is not to provide a detailed analysis of the recent politics of military rule in Thailand. There are others far better qualified than I am to provide that sort of analysis. Instead I will take a more cultural direction – I am an anthropologist after all – and explore some of the more general attitudes, beliefs and social processes that I think pose key threats to the future development of Thai democracy. I should say that I appreciate that some of you may find some of my comments provocative. Some Thai commentators have expressed outrage at Western media and academic commentary on Thaksin, the coup, the monarchy and the recent referendum. In one recent case here at the ANU these complaints took the form of a rhetorical nationalist rejection of what was portrayed as neoliberal western bullying.
Well, if I fall into the camp of neoliberal bullies then so be it. But I do feel that this crude nationalist stance does little justice to the vigour and sophistication of debate that is going on within Thailand about its future political directions. This is a real debate that is carrying on despite significant restrictions on freedom of expression and the continued application of martial law in many parts of the country. The attempt to construct a dichotomy between Thai insiders and western outsiders is an attempt to paper over the very real political divisions that exist within Thailand. [I then very briefly reviewed the key political milestones over the past year.]
Rejecting the ballot box
So, lets move on to the key threats. The first is the rejection of the legitimacy of the ballot box.
The Thai coup of 19 September 2006 derived ideological legitimacy from the view that the Thaksin government’s electoral mandate was illegitimate because it had been “bought” from an unsophisticated and easily manipulated electorate. This was not the only rationale, but the denial of electoral legitimacy was fundamental in justifying the removal of a government that had been elected three times. And, with a further election scheduled for late 2006, those seeking to defend the coup relied heavily on the argument that the electorate was in no position to make a reasonable judgement about the Thaksin government’s well-publicised faults. Faced with the likelihood that Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party would win yet another election, the coup-makers argued that the army’s intervention was the only way to resolve the political standoff.
This rejection of the legitimacy of voter’s decision has taken some interesting twists during and after the referendum campaign. Remember, less than a year ago anti-Thaksin and pro-coup advocates were very keen to discredit the validity of the electoral process. Electoral politics was condemned and electors were slandered as uninformed, parochial and self-interested pawns of party canvassers. But in the lead up to the recent constitutional referendum electors were urged to return to the voting booths and to cast their votes in a process that, according to Prime Minister Surayud, would help secure Thailand’s democratic development.
So what changed? Why this new found enthusiasm for electoral politics. In fact, as we know in the referendum voters were given no meaningful choice. The referendum was a take-it-or-leave-it offer: if you want elections and a semblance of stability then vote yes. For those considering a no vote there was only the option of handing power to the military government to nominate a constitution of their choosing. Unlike the referendums that most of us are used to, in this case there was no clearly defined constitutional status quo that would be the outcome of a successful no vote. So, here we have some indication of the shape that sufficiency democracy is taking in Thailand. The advocates of sufficiency democracy, or guided democracy, are very happy to urge electoral participation when the electorate really has no choice. When voters do exercise choices, their electoral judgements are slandered as being the result of money politics.
Resort to the power of the gun
The second key threat is the ease with which resort is made to the power of the gun. One of the most unsavoury aspects of the Thaksin’s government’s term in office was the so called “war on drugs” which is said to have claimed the lives of thousands in a spate of extra-judicial killings. And one of the most unsavoury aspects of Thai political culture is that this brutal campaign (which turned a blind, and sometimes even approving, eye to official abuse and the violent settling of numerous local scores) proved to be a substantial electoral asset. Respect for people’s electoral wishes does amount to an endorsement of specific electoral motivations. People make electoral decisions for all sorts of reasons, some of them repugnant. That’s how a warts and all democratic system works. And it’s important to remember that support for the hardline action taken during the war on drugs extended to the highest levels of Thai society.
Of course, as we know it was resort to the gun of quite a different type (this time with a yellow ribbon tied around its barrel) that bought about Thaksin’s demise. Some commentators have argued that the coup was justified given Thaksin’s record of human rights abuse. Of course this is very much a retrospective justification. It is fanciful to suggest that the coup was motivated by Thaksin’s human rights abuses and that it represented some sort of turning point towards greater recognition of human rights.
My preference is to see a continuity between the extra-judicial gun culture that Thaksin endorsed and the extra-judicial, extra-constitutional and extra-electoral military intervention staged in September last year. In both cases the political assertion is made that force can resolve complex and seemingly intractable problems. Engendering respect for human rights and the rule of law is hardly served by using military force to tear up a constitution.
The constitution
So let’s consider this new constitution.
First let me make one empirical point. In the referendum held on the 19th August the constitution was endorsed. But not endorsed very strongly. 14.7 million out of 45 million voters voted yes. About 10 million voted no and about 20 million didn’t vote. But I don’t want to dwell on the referendum as I don’t think we yet have enough good quality data to make more than the most general speculation.
In relation to the provisions of the constitution there are clearly mixed opinions. On the one hand the constitution has been praised for its provisions in relation to human rights and the participation of civil society in the political process. On the other hand it is clear that one of the key aims of the constitution is to limit the power of elected representatives and to minimise the chance of single party dominance. But others are much better placed to talk about these specific provisions than I am.
The point I would like to put today is that, in a sense, the specific provisions of the constitution don’t matter. Rather than providing a general framework for government this constitution is a tool for achieving specific political objectives. What Thai voters were asked to endorse was a process whereby constitutions are only as good as the limit of military tolerance. In the wake of the September 2006 coup, the promise of a future election was undoubtedly attractive but it was also hollow, precisely because the reinvigorated threat of a coup strips legitimacy and moral force from the electoral process. The explicit request of the military government was that Thai voters endorse a constitution; but the implicit request was that they endorse the future abrogation of that very document if it delivers a government unpalatable to those who wield the power to overthrow it.
We can see the ideological groundwork for this being laid already with the usual tired claims about vote buying in relation to the substantial no vote in the northeast and the north. And this claims come from a government that spared little in terms of incentives and expenses for villagers mobilised as part of the yes vote campaign.
Sufficiency Economy
The fourth key threat may take some of you by surprise given its benign public face.
Let me introduce sufficiency economy by reading a short extract from a fairy story produced in Thailand. It is the story of a little kingdom and its good king, who triumphs over a series of dark forces. One of the king’s triumphs occurred during his many travels around the kingdom.
In a far off place, the king came across a village that had almost no one living there. “Where has everyone gone” the king asked the small group of remaining villagers. The villagers answered their king: “A demon of the dark called “GREED” came and visited and asked the people to leave the village. Most of the villagers abandoned the village and went to live in the “City of Extravagance”. The king thought for a moment and then gave the villagers a radiant seed. The villagers took the seed and planted it and it grew into the “radiant tree” that grew large branches and spread its radiance in all directions. The king told the villagers that the “radiant tree” is called “SUFFICIENCY.” The radiance of the tree shone to far off places, as far as the City of Extravagance. And many of those who saw it travelled back to return to their village.
This should give you some idea about the sufficiency economy philosophy. I don’t have time to go into it in detail today. Suffice to say that it is a theory proposed by the Thai king that places a strong emphasis on a “firm foundation in self reliance” as a basis for human development. The concept has been embraced with a passion by the current regime to help discredit Thaksin’s market driven model of economic development. Much of this adoption of sufficiency is rhetorical with local development projects funded by Thaksin quite literally re-badged as sufficiency economy or sufficiency agriculture projects. This is amusing and relatively trivial.
But there is a more fundamental issue. Sufficiency economy has become an ideological tool that seeks to moderate rising rural expectations for economic and political inclusion. Whatever sufficiency economy thinkers may have to say about urban consumers or businessmen, it is towards rising rural expectations for economic and political inclusion that the sufficiency economy urgings of moderation, reasonableness and immunity are most clearly directed. Not only are rural people to be shielded (or excluded) from full and active participation in the national economy but their full and active participation in electoral democracy is also delegitimised and the power of their elected representatives constrained. In this elite vision of electoral participation the problem lies in money politics – the demon of greed. The solution lies in the royally bestowed tree of local sufficiency.
Cultural Elitism
This issue leads us more fully into the cultural domain. Here, when I refer to cultural elitism I am using a rather crude term to describe a complex process. And in discussing this I want to get even more speculative.
One of the interesting characters to emerge from the puppet government established after the coup is the Culture Ministry’s Mrs Ladda Thungsupachai who is said to be the director of the Cultural Surveillence Centre. She’s not a big political player but she’s been involved in some interesting public discussions which, I think, are relevant to the current directions of Thai democracy. Let’s have a look at a couple of these.
The first relates to the so-called Coyote Girls. After Loi Kratong in 2006 the queen raised concerns after seeing television footage of a temple fair in Nong Khai at which Coyote dancers performed. The Culture Ministry stepped in and Ladda was quoted as saying that “Coyote Girls have to be in the right place, like an animal has to be in the zoo.” Eventually a ban was put in place on such performances in the proximity of temples and the Education Ministry was encouraged to provide the girls with training for alternative livelihoods.
Mrs Ladda reappeared in the press in May this year when she condemmed Thailand’s Miss Universe contestant, Fahroong Yutitam, for appearing at the competition in Mexico in a costume that clearly had strong ethnic minority elements. Ladda condemned her for not appearing in Thai national dress. Thai National dress, Ladda said, must be Thai. “It also must be in line with the official, royal designs and it must be used for proper occasions. Miss Fahroong has failed in her duty as Miss Thailand. She should show the outside world an authentic national Thai dress. Wearing an ethnic dress but calling it Thai could confuse young Thai minds and set a bad example for the youngsters to emulate.”
Of course, these are relatively trivial incidents. But as with the re-badgeing we saw in relation to sufficiency economy there is something rather more important going on. Of course there is nothing new or particularly Thai about this sort cultural elitism. But I would suggest that in the current political context it both draws some strength from, and helps to reinforce the view, that the “masses” are not completely legitimate participants in shaping the country’s future. As with sufficiency economy we have the notion that large segments of the population, and especially the rural population, have become detached from appropriate cultural values. And once again the solution is expressed in terms of the need to return to relatively narrowly, and sometimes royally, defined sense of morality.
But I also think there is something more specific going on. And here I admit to being quite speculative. One of the anxieties produced by the Thaksin government is that he had derived influence from cultural forces that lay outside the domain of the centre. Of course, part of this anxiety lies in his clear electoral power in the north and northeast. But it’s not just about electoral power. There was also concern, I think, that Thaksin tapped into and perhaps even created or energised aspirations and forms of social and cultural expression that were seen as in some way inappropriate. One example of this is the regular condemnation of Thaksin’s village fund as enabling farmers to purchase motor bikes and mobile phones. A more extreme expression of this elite anxiety and outrage were the common references to Thaksin’s dealings with hazardous spiritual forces which were often defined in explicitly non-Thai terms – the Burmese astrologer and the khmer voodoo. Efforts since the coup to define appropriate forms of cultural expression – including the semi-obligatory wearing of yellow shirts on certain occasions – can be party seen as an attempt to re-establish the royal centre as the primary source of cultural inspiration.
Silence
Which leads us back to the key silence that lies at the heart of Thai political debate. This is, of course, the legally enforced silence about the monarchy.
As we all know open discussion, let alone criticism, of the role of the king in Thai political matters is exceptionally difficult. One illustration of this is the fact that Paul Handley’s scholarly biography of the king is banned in Thailand, though scans of the book circulate widely on the internet. In the absence of open public discussion there is, of course, a proliferation of rumour, gossip and even the occasional video. There is also some vigorous debate about the role of the monarchy on some Thai web boards. This may represent some opening up of discussion but there is a lack of serious and concerted public discussion about the role of the monarch in the Thai political system.
It is not necessary to take a strong anti-royalist position to recognise that the king’s contribution to political events, to rural development and to human rights has been uneven. This uneven record is natural and normal for any leader. But this natural and normal situation is silenced.
This silence has an important implication for the development of Thai democracy. What it allows is the persistence of a largely uncontested image of virtuous and disinterested leadership. This becomes an ideologically potent standard of leadership against which elected politicians are assessed. And it is an ideologically convenient standard that can be readily drawn upon by those seeking to overthrow elected governments. The ideological potency of this unrealistic image of leadership would be diluted via more open public debate and discussion.
An opportunity
I thought it would be good to end on a positive note. So I would like to discuss what I see as one of the key, and often unrecognised, opportunities for the development of Thai democracy.
In a recent paper I have written about what I call a “rural constitution”. The rural constitution is made up of the various values that inform peoples’ electoral decisions about political leaders. Based on my research in the north of Thailand these values relate to things like effective and accessible local representation, support for economic development, sound administration, strong leadership and an appropriate balance between private and public interests.
I am certainly not trying to romanticise rural political culture – as in any political system there is plenty that is ugly and unpleasant about it. But what I am suggesting is that there is a rich store of sound democratic sense within the Thai electorate. The notion that Thaksin’s electoral support was rock solid and readily mobilised through patronage networks is highly misleading. The 2006 election was sabotaged by the Democrat Party, who were too scared to contest it, but the result did show that the Thai Rak Thai vote was soft, even in its electoral heartland. It is very likely that Thaksin would have won the election scheduled for late 2006 but in all likelihood his parliamentary dominance would have been diminished.
We are often told that the democratic checks and balances failed during the Thaksin era and that the military had to intervene to put things right. But I’m not convinced. The fundamental check and balance of electoral judgement was in place. Thaksin’s faults were well known and they were having an electoral impact. Just because a party is elected two, three or even four times in a row does not mean that this judgement has failed. The rural constitution is alive and well.
Political elites in Thailand often like to pontificate about the need for democratic education. After the coup General Sonthi declared:
Many Thais still lack a proper understanding of democracy. The people have to understand their rights and their duties. Some have yet to learn about discipline. I think it is important to educate the people about true democratic rule.
But perhaps the most pressing need for political education is at this elite level. Some concerted exposure to the rural constitution may be a good place to start.
Excellent article, but I am still rather confused by what you mean by the “Rural Constitution”. The idea seems to be almost as abstruse as that of the Sufficiency Economy. You have deconstructed the latter concept masterfully.
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Thanks Tim. For my previous posts that relate to the “rural constitution” go here.
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“Rural constitution” merely is more catchy than referring to “rural political culture.” Look out for the first 2008 issue of the Journal of Contemporary Asia.
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Andrew-
Thanks for this.
I think that you brought up many important points that I think need to be elucidated by academia.
The frame of the political discussion. Who controls the tools of mass media/propaganda? Why? And to what end?
And I think your breakdown of what constitutes cultural authenticity, morality and political space dictated by the elites is quite revealing.
The things that you brought up are not trivial issues!
The Thai elites would have us think what they think about culture, morality and politics is right, good and authentic, but if the 20th century has proven anything, what they think has been fabricated to sustain their power. What they think and what they practice are not authentic at all, because there is plenty of evidence to contradict what they propagate official Thai culture to be. And there is certainly a lot of evidence that proves that the guardians of the authenticity of Thai culture don’t practice what they preach.
They have hijacked the words culture, morality and democracy and have re-interpreted them to suit their own political agenda whenever they feel like it, and they continue to use this language even though what they say, do and believe actually contradict the evidence that exists concerning their own actions.
The very notion that the King of Thailand, whose estimated wealth is $40 billion and most of that earned through crony capitalistic means, is lecturing the poor, who have no material wealth to speak of, about sufficiency economics is ludicrous. It is absurd. It is tragic and comical.
When you have the head of a military junta lecturing the poor people about their ignorance of democracy, it makes me want to pull my hair out in frustration.
It is truly Orwellian.
And then you have the entire Thai propaganda infrastructure configured to fit a circle into a square peg- the press and Thai academy actually get on board to justify all the lies, contradictions and blatant hypocrisy. For them, it is more important to protect the elite’s mythology more than it is to tell the truth. Why? How does it serve the press and the academy to keep lying?
All of us are children of the 20th century. We are the survivors of fascism, communism, Cold War politics, War on Terrorism propaganda etc. Yet, Thailand continues to go down the totalitarian path with the totalitarian mindset. And, for what reason? Who does it serve?
Of course, we are not even allowed to ponder these questions. To even ask the questions, makes you a criminal under Thai law eg lese majeste, Cyber Crime Bill, Printing Act of 1941, and if you are to ponder these questions within the law, you are labeled un-Thai and western minded, which is the equivalent of calling you a racist or anti-Semite. In any event, the crimes and the de facto restrictions against free thought are meant to shut down debate, because the truth is that anybody who challenges the official superstructure in Thailand is seen as a threat.
This is disgusting and it is evil.
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I am interested in comments on what people see as the future of Thailand after the Thai King, who is 80 years old and has serious health problems, passes from the scene in the next few years. Will there be a period of instability and social upheavel? Economic collapse?
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Re: Mitchell>
As for the future of Thailand, what will happen is whatever China will want to happen. As the Westphalian system of nation-states is slowly becoming irrelevant, Chinese forgein policy is returning to a tianxia, “Mandate of Heaven” Sinocentric system of tribute-trade relationships with the “barbarians”. (Updated for a post-industrial world.)
While the United States currently has the potential to combat Chinese hegemony of S.E. Asia, if the U.S. is recluctant to challenge the Chinese over Taiwan, they sure as hell aren’t going to do battle over Thailand.
So, you want to know the future of Thailand? Search for it in the face of Hu Jintao.
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What Taksin showed was that the old constitution could give rise to political figures with a power and authority which rivaled that of the generals. A new constitution was therefore called for, and one which would ensure this could never happen again. It’s sickening to see Thailand slip back to the age of ‘supervised democracy.’ Damn it! Just when I thought the days of coups had passed for ever we get the sickening spectacle of tinpot generals asserting their divine right to rule.
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I read Andrew Walker and I am still convinced that without some kind of extra-constitutional intervention, Thaksin would have increased his constitutional and criminal abuses every year and win every election still. Or, if Thaksin started feeling his ‘popularity’ started diminishing to an unacceptable degree, Thaksin himself would have staged the coup, a-la Marcos, to entrenched himself as Thailand’s ruler for life.
Every behavior of Thaksin including his disregard for rule of law, flaunting constitutional ethiquette and quick trigger to bribe any one or everyone (or intimidate when bribery will not work) supports my thesis, whatever silly things Andrew Walker says about ‘threats’.
The only threat to Thai democracy was Thaksin and Thaksin had been removed and that’s it!
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Jeru a la mor doo: “The only threat to Thai democracy was Thaksin and Thaksin had been removed and that’s it!” Ah, yes… Thaksin was the only threat to democracy. Not the military of course. They have not been a threat to democracy and are not been now. Oh, sorry, I forgot, since the coup, Thailand is not a democracy, so the military can’t possibly threaten it. They are composing a Thai-style authoritarianism, so no need to worry about any threat to democracy for the immediate future. The military is unlikely to threaten a constitutional order that they created. And, the military has, of course, been scrupulous in following the law, especially in the South. Don’t you ever feel that your military-centred view of Thailand just a little uncomfortable?
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Andrew,
I am not quite sure what you are implying with regards to HMK. I know for a fact the majority of the Thai populace respect the HMK unconditionally. This is easy to understand when you think that the only check on a corrupt and inefficient government would be a higher power.
The three main players in Thai politics are: HMK, The Army, Parliament.
I am not sure who comes higher in terms of political power, but I know elected parliament is last.
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Thaksin was/is the threat to Thai democracy just as Marcos was the poison to the Philippines democratic aspirations Both were removed extra-constitutionally which allowed a reset . . of their democracy. For Thailand the reset came much sooner and that was godsend.
It was dangerous . . . these extra-constitutional resets because these resets could have been violent and bloody. And that is why both Marcos and Thaksin deserve every puke directed at them for putting their countries in such danger just because their greed and corruption were boundless and their lust to cling on to power border on the criminal.
Thailand will move on to its peculiar manner of achieving political and democratic maturity because Thailand is cursed with political leaders whose ideology orbit mainly in self-enrichment and power for its own sake. Foreigners can observe and criticize but they cannot impose their own standards or guidelines on how Thailand should behave to remove dangerous threatening flawed leaders like Thaksin.
If is a truism that a country deserve the leader(s) they get, then it must also be true that a country should be able to remove dangerous leaders they don’t deserve by the means demanded by the degree of the danger.
Now you cannot make me believe all these nonsense Andrew Walker is writing about that some semblance of maturity had already been achieved! That is stupid and dangerous thinking. When Thailand can continue to have a dominant political party like Thai Rak Thai party, with clearly no ideology beyond assisting the Shinawatras enrich themselves and shield the Shinawatras from scrutiny or investigation into their criminal abuses, Thailand clearly is vulnerable to the manipulative and the corrupt and the criminal . . . like Thaksin.
I can’t predict what Thailand’s political future will be after the junta leaves. But I can clearly predict, that Thailand’s political future WITHOUT THAKSIN would be less traumatic, less corrupt, and less susceptible to disregard of the rule of law and basic spirit of democracy.
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Dear Col. Jeru can only bark on about Thaksin being bad. What about the military? Now, in power? Can’t there be any critical word about them from you? Or are you the appointed protector of their assaults on democracy? Can’t both be bad? Can’t both be criticised?
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Jeru,
Just speculation, but I think Thaksin is a lot poorer now than when he entered politics. I did think he should have put a check on some of his wife’s dealings as being inappropriate considering the position he held and he was short-sighted in seeing that there would be no repurcussions in future from the purchase of the land plot. In fact his wife had made many purchases of land plots during his time in office. If this is what you mean by corrupt practice, then I would agree that this was inappropriate by western standards at least.
I can’t understand the rest of your points.
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Military Advisor,
As Republican has tirelessly pointed out, of course they both can’t be bad and criticized, as that is falling into a strategic trap of political dupe. Despite their deep ideological differences, jeru and Republican share the same strategic sensibilities, they are just positioned on different sides of the political spectrum. I fully agree with you that both Thaksin and the military must be criticized for a better future (along with numerous other actors like the media, academics, public intellectuals, etc), but it is a bit pointless trying to get either jeru or Republican to agree to that position.
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Why not just say in the constitution that only Jeru and his likes have the right to cast their vote in elections? This would also be much cheaper, because they could perform this exercise in Challenger Hall in Mueng Thong Thani, or even in the ball room of any good hotel. Be honest and call for the abolition of universal suffrage! But you won’t dare, right? Rather amazing, this shift of Thai politics to a right-wing world view. Or is it just the extension of the old elitism?
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Just speculation, but I think Thaksin is a lot poorer now than when he entered politics.
If that’s true then the rest of his family (and his maid) must be a lot richer!
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Western standards of democracy would not have tolerated, must lest voted a Thai Rak Thai party, into power. Western starndards of democracy would have locked up a criminally inclined Thaksin Shinawatra, his wife and his gang of TRT crooks.
But Andrew Walker and the rest of the bloggers at New Mandala would make a reader believe that Thailand’s democracy was working, and working well, when Thasin Shinawatra was so disgracefully booted out.
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“Western standards…” >> It is the other way round: In Thailand, people such as Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl (Pasuk’s “president for life”), Silvio Berlusconi, and George W. Bush would have been putsched out of office by the countries’ militaries, in conjunction with their bureaucratic-academic elites. What does it tell us that all of these people actually stayed in office, and that nobody even remotely considered a military coup against them?
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By Western standards of democracy, a Thai Rak Thai party continuing to shield their criminal leader from many criminal allegations would have been an abomination.
By Western standards of democracy, any elected leader enriching himself (or his family) by more than 20% of his declared during office would have to answer to public or parliamentary scrutiny at the first hint of impropriety.
By Western standards of democracy, any elected leader whose family was seen as evading taxes or complicit to concealing assets, et al would have been subjected to public or parliamentary scrutiny.
By Western standards of democracy, any elected leader seen as publicly directing or prodding the police to commit extrajudicial killings would have been immediately criminally prosecuted for each and every extrajudicial killing committed, then locked up.
By Western standards of democracy, any elected leader seen as concealing assets through offshore vehicles or possessing offshore Swiss bank accounts (hinted later denied) would have been toast and criminally prosecuted.
Had Western standards of democracy been immediately in effect to punish Thaksin Shinawatra for his ‘first’ honest mistakes, even more Godzilan mistakes later on would not have been possible . . . and the generals would have not been provoked to extra-constitutional remedies.
By Western standards of democracy etc. etc. etc.
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By Western standards of democracy, any elected leader enriching himself (or his family) by more than 20% of his declared assets during office would have made to answer to public or parliamentary scrutiny at the first hint of impropriety
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As usual, Jeru judges everyone else as either black or white. “Western standards of democracy” is used by Jeru as an ideal type that simply does not match reality. There are plenty of examples of “Western” leaders who got away with all kinds of alleged and real crimes. Srithanonchai gives some appropriate examples. One could add to them. And jeru also says “But Andrew Walker and the rest of the bloggers at New Mandala would make a reader believe that Thailand’s democracy was working, and working well, when Thaksin Shinawatra was so disgracefully booted out.” That is plainly untrue. But it is a black/white world that jeru inhabits. Even jeru’s beloved military leaders do a better job of seeing shades of grey. David W. says that jeru (and Republican) will never understand or change. I agree, however jeru’s posts need responses for their narrowness of their perspective alone. On Western democracy, jeru’s views are quaint but wrong. Western democracy’s are not perfect, and any reading of the history of the development of Western democracies shows struggle, compromise, corruption, crime, money politics, pork-barrel politics, political murder, regression into authoritarianism, and so on. Real democratic development is not easy, but supporting a military dictatorship because they got rid of someone you personally dislike is probably not the most productive of strategies.
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Jeru: So, should we then blame Prem for everything that has happened since the Constitution Court ruling after the election in 2001?
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Imperfect democracies are common and imperfect leaders are even more common. Countries adjust to such imperfections, and carry on with their democratic aspirations, FOR SO LONG as constitutional mechanisms to correct, remove and punish imperfect leaders are not only in place but are also seen to be observed fairly and with due regard to rule of law and the country welfare.
But when a country’s constitutional system have been completely broken with its highest elected leader seen as disrespecting the spirit of the very constitution he was elected to protect and upheld, to perpetuate his rule and to protect himself and his family from having to answer to serious criminal allegations of abuse of power and conflict of interest, and rending the country apart in the process, that is a sure formula for some extra-constitutional remedy of sort.
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This is further to my No. 23 posts when I said that under Thaksin, Thailand was headed to some ‘extra-constitutional’ remedy, a coup to be blunt, and it could NOT be avoided gentlemen.
Review what you all know about Thaksin Shinawatra gentlemen and you will see the light. Thaksin Shinawatra we all know was is the man of non-stop ‘honest mistakes’ of ever expanding and more outrageous proportions. Thaksin would NOT stop at murder (extrajudicials remember?) or disregarding the constitutional rule of law. And Thaksin would raise the ante, Thaksin being the high-stakes high-risk high-return gambler he is, to protect himself, his ill-gottens and perpetuate his deeply flawed rule.
That means, a-la Marcos, Thaksin would have executed the military coup himself (as was alleged by Nation News editor Thanong) because he was already in too deep with all his criminal corruption and extrajudicial crimes.
The military coup was unavoidable gentlemen and it was in Thailand’s flawed Thaksin’s democracy’s path. That the military coup was pre-empted by anti-Thaksin forces, instead of pro-Thaksin, was a godsend.
Now I invite your rebuttal gentlemen.
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Of course the military coup was unavoidable. The palace and the royalist military decided to do this some time before. Plenty of evidence for that. jeru keeps saying the same things again and again. We all know that. Many of us have reviewed it again and again. Some of us have written about it at length. So this is a broken record, stuck in the same groove. But what about your military heroes? Are they right, correct and good on everything simply because they took their orders and threw Thaksin out?
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By the way, using Thanong for “evidence” is about as secure as using Thaksin or Sonthi. Thanong has produced absolutely no evidence to back the claim he made, apart from Sonthi using the same claim immediately after the coup. Thanong has also been the military’s mouthpiece.
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jeru invites a rebuttal of a series of unsubstantiated assertions and opinions.
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Rebuttal of what, Sir?
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Thaksin Shinawatra clearly brought Thailand’s democracy to a dead-end and to the brink gentlemen, and that is FACT. Thaksin usurped powers firstly by massive vote buying (arguably his version of democracy) and suborning institutions . . . and once facing street protests had all the intentions to remain in power by hook or by crook . . . with his own military coup.
Perhaps it was speculations and perhaps it was not speculation. But knowing now what we know of Thaksin Shinawatra gentlemen, I am inclined to believe Thaksin Shinawatra capable of every crime in the book . . . so why NOT the coup?
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What a yawn jeru. You simply go back to your assertions and views that have been discussed ad nauseum since the coup. I know this is a waste of time and effort because it is preaching to one who has no ability to hear, but here goes, as briefly as I can. No, Thaksin had not brought democracy to an end. The courts had intervened, perhaps not altogether legally, and had made decisions that set a course to a new election. Thaksin was not facing street protests when he was overthrown. Those protests stopped after Prem took leadership of the anti-Thaksin strategy. And what, exactly, do we know about Thaksin that we didn’t know before? That Thaksin was capable of nasty things is well-known (“crimes” in jeru’s view: I note there have been no convictions so far, except in jeru’s mind). So why not a coup. That’s a rhetorical question, and not deserving of a response on NM given all the discussion that has already taken place here.
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Well . . Andrew Walker’s ‘six threats’ were also rhetorical and speculative, including Andrew Walker’s continuing spin that there exist a (1) Thai ‘rural constitution’ capable of rational choices untainted by Thaksin’s handouts and (2) rurals whose eyes not shut to Thaksins crimes and (3) the rurals would have eventually seen the light that would have resulted in Thaksin eventually (not my lifetime surely!) being democratically eased out of power.
I believe my version is more down to earth and carries more foundation than Andrew Walker’s ‘rural constitution’. Thaksin would have resorted to his own ‘coup’, because Thaksin’s corrupt dead-end democracy was NOT working and was facing non-stop street protests up to the very moment General Sonthi carried out his pre-emptive coup. (Historicus was of course lying when he posted his otherwise version of Thaksin’s last moments in power).
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Andrew,
To help you fine tune some local sentiment. HMK is held in the highest regard in Thailand by almost everyone I have ever met. This is unconditional. He helps the poor, is incorruptible, and seen as holding the peoples interest at heart.
The palace and the PC doesn’t have the same level of regard from the public.
The government is seen as slow and inefficient. It is also seen as very corrupt. This I can vouch for if you ever have to process government documents.
The police force is corrupt. Bribery is more the norm than the exception.
Elected government never delivers on the promises it makes. The usual platform is to wipe out corruption, deal with drugs and alcoholism, increase the livelihood of the masses.
The army is not a big player in politics, unless that is when it decides to stage a coup. The first reaction from the public is to welcome the army as saviour.
This time is slightly different. The needs of the rural voters are different than that of the urban rich. Thaksin did deliver on many of his platform promises he made to the rural voters. The urban rich felt excluded and at odds with policy being dictated from the poorer regions.
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“To help you fine tune some local sentiment. HMK is held in the highest regard in Thailand by almost everyone I have ever met. This is unconditional. He helps the poor, is incorruptible, and seen as holding the peoples interest at heart.”
I can’t comment on the people you have met. But I don’t think the high regard is as universal or unconditional as you suggest. But let’s put that issue to one side for the moment. The point I was making in my speech was that more open public commentary on the king would encourage a more realistic appraisal of his leadership. In the absence of this public commentary the image of disinterested and virtuous leadership that you present can readily persist without serious challenge. And it is an ideologically potent image that serves the interests of coup makers.
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So what you have is 2 very dynamic figures in peoples lives.
One who has always been held in extremely high regard by the entire country, the other rising from the filth of politics and business.
The rural poor I think never had any issue amalgamating the 2 figures into their lives. One as their spiritual guardian, the other as their champion for equality in sharing of the countries riches.
The urban rich are still struggling with the issue. What the PAD did when they demonstrated was to take advantage of this and drive a wedge between Thaksin and HMK that didn’t exist previously. They demonstrated with loyalty to HMK, and drove the idea that Thaksin was against HMK. So in order to stop the demonstrations, the urban rich had to make a choice between HMK and Thaksin.
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Andrew,
When you are referring to HMK, are you referring to the Palace as a whole, including the PC, and all the other royalists, or just HMK himself?
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Banyaoonjingjing.
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I am not using any code here. I am referring to the king.
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Andrew,
HMK has come out and said he is not above criticism. He has stressed this on a few occassions. I believe his words were “…even the King is not perfect” when addressing the nation.
But true, the lese majeste law still exists and the way it is being casually thrown around to stifle criticism is worrying. The latest episode being a website owner who allowed criticsm of the monarchy on his discussion board jailed for a couple of weeks.
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The attempts to disentangle the king from what happens inside his palace and the privy council are disingenuous. If one looks at the case of the declaration by the judiciary on the April 2006 election, there was a direct, daily line from the senior judges to Prem (providing him with a briefing) and then to the king. The attempt to delink the king from politics and to blame underlings just doesn’t work.
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Historicus,
I don’t totally disagree with you. I am trying to build a picture of how things are on the ground here. I am not totally sure of everything I say either.
You will find those who voted TRT also happen to adore HMK. Thaksin is the reason why TRT is so popular. Those who voted NO in the referendum mostly came from Thaksin’s stronghold.
You can not easily draw a line and say the NO voters mean they have stopped adoring HMK. But they did vote NO against the military led government.
Let me put it another way->
Thaksin had a horrid time balancing all the interests of the country. He did believe that elements from the monarchy were destabilising to his policies. But I don’t think he even considered taking a political stand against the monarchy because that would alienate his voter base, not because he worried of a military coup, although that did happen.
Whoever the next elected PM will be must navigate the minefield of old powers, them being the usual suspects, party politics which will be back to the old pork barrel dealings with this new constitution, the military, and then trying to deliver the election promises to the public.
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Correction. I meant to say Thaksin would alienate himself from his voter base.
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I generally agree with you Paul L. There is no doubt that the palace’s views can only be ignored at an elected government’s peril. The old duffers in the palace (all of them) have ensured this by having their military lads to take control.
You might be interested in this. There’s not a lot new in it, but the perspective and terms used are interesting:
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20070906TDY05005.htm
ANALYSIS / Why Thaksin is favored over king in Isan
Tetsuya Tsuruhara / Yomiuri Shimbun Asian General Bureau Chief
Thailand is divided into northern, northeastern, central and southern administrative regions. The northeastern region, called Isan in the Thai language, is the least developed area among them. As farming–the only industry in the region–is slack, the region’s per capita household income is two-thirds of the national average, and a mere one-third of Bangkok’s. Many young people, both men and women, leave for the capital and physical labor-related jobs, sending money back home if they can manage.
The people of Isan are Laotians of Thai origin and speak Isan, which is extremely close to the standard language of Laos, located across the Mekong River. Until the mid-20th century, the Isan people felt they belonged to the Lao ethnic group. Isan writer Kamsingh Srinok says, “We have been looked down upon and controlled by the central government throughout our history.” They have had to get used to poverty and the fate of being ruled, trying to find temporary pleasures to distract them from their pain.
This changed in 2001, when the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra came to power.
Thaksin launched unprecedented measures to aid the poverty-stricken Isan people, including the introduction of an inexpensive medical service system that requires patients to pay only 30 baht (about 92 cents), an easy-to-borrow system of agricultural funds and promotion of a “one village, one product” campaign.
Thaksin declared in 2004 that an Isan household with a monthly income of 3,000 to 4,000 baht would see its income increase to 10,000 baht within five years.
These initiatives were motivated by populist politics to gather votes with minimal fiscal outlay. But the Isan people found “hope” instead of “fate [in the face of poverty].”
In the country’s first ever national referendum held Aug. 19 on a new Thai Constitution that shapes a post-Thaksin Thailand, 57.8 percent of voters nationwide supported the new Constitution, while 62.8 percent of the people of Isan were against it. Paijit Sriworakan, a former House of Representatives member of Thaksin’s party elected from Nakhon Phanom Province, which recorded the highest percentage of negative votes among a total of 76 provinces, said, “Such a high percentage of negative votes represents a denial of the military coup that ousted Thaksin last September and loyalty toward him.”
One leading intellectual was shocked when a farmer he met in Isan said, “I revere Thaksin more than [Thai] King Bhumibol [Adulyadej]. Thaksin gave us money.”
Even King Bhumibol, who has reigned for more than 60 years and is revered like a god, is no match for Thaksin in terms of popularity among the Isan people.
The military-led Thai interim government has taken various measures to prevent the former prime minister returning to favor, including dissolving Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) party, freezing his and his family’s bank accounts, and filing criminal complaints against Thaksin and his wife. However, the national referendum that was intended as the final round of such efforts unexpectedly served to give momentum to a Thaksin resurgence.
The mainstream faction of the former Thai Rak Thai party regards the more than 10 million negative votes registered in the national referendum as the number of votes it will be able to garner in a general election scheduled for December. It calculates its candidates will be able to capture 110 seats in Isan and at least 200 seats across the country in the 480-seat lower house. If this calculation proves correct, the People Power Party–taken over by the faction–will become the largest party in the lower house. If an agreement is reached on a coalition government, the former members of the Thai Rak Thai might come back to power.
Former Bangkok Gov. Samak Sundaravej, who became leader of the People Power Party, said, “I don’t mind being called a nominee of Mr. Thaksin,” indicating his intention to use Thaksin’s name as a political magnet to strengthen his leadership.
The anti-Thaksin democratic forces in Bangkok that prompted last year’s military coup may well have thought no one could oust Thaksin through elections.
Referring to personnel changes within the Royal Thai Army scheduled for late September, Suriyasai Katasila, the leader of one of such democratic force, said it is necessary to appoint a commander who would not allow Thaksin to regain power.
A situation similar to that which prevailed before the 2006 military coup is emerging.
Democracy will not develop in Thailand unless the fundamental issue of poverty, as symbolized by the Isan region, is tackled in earnest.
(Sep. 6, 2007)
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Historicus and others always amuse when they attempt to portray Thaksin Shinawatra (the skedaddler with billions stowed in luggages in flight, the multi-billion offshore asset concealer, the head of the clan of tax cheaters, and the arguably biggest Thai mafia chieftain directing the corruption spree as head of that outlawed TRT party) as Thailand’s defender of the poor Isans.
That is what I meant by Thaksin’s dead-end democracy. The leader steals and cheats on taxes, and definitely maintains Swiss and other offshore numbered accounts, while promising to the guillible that He is the Saviour, and here is the Baht 500 installment handout with more to come . . .
Historicus as usual is preposterous.
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Historicus,
An election campaign could not be run on a promise of more riches to the poor and a political stand against the monarchy. Somehow the new PM must combine the wishes of the palace with delivering his election promises to be succesful. Pity the next PM.
Let me posit another point. I don’t think the 1993 coups had palace backing, not from the exalted one anyway. I am not prepared to debate the latest one for reasons of having lese majeste thrown at me. But I tend to believe the name of HMK is hijacked in the name of restoring democracy through the gun too easily. Should he speak out more in times of crisis, yes.
Local sentiment here is post HMK, the Thais believe the military will be more adventurous, not less.
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Historicus,
Also if I am reading you correctly, your first paragraph does not reflect local sentiment. HMK is permanent in the hearts of the Thais. The PM will lose if he competes for that place in their hearts. N,E,S,W it is the same across the country.
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Undoubtedly, Thai democracy was not working as intended under Thaksin.
Whether he was eroding vested interests influence or not, he was definitely undermining the concept of democracy. Whether he should have been removed militarily is a moot point since it happened. He was in a position where the democratic process was being removed so that he could not ever be removed from office or face realistic checks and balances. This in itself was very dangerous for the future of Thailand.
However, what we have today is to me even more dangerous and verges on an Orwellian control of the people. I am very scared for what may become of Thailand in the next few years. I spend a lot of time in China, and I for one do not want Thai people to become a politically mindless, toothless collective.
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I am very scared for what may become of Thailand in the next few years. I spend a lot of time in China, and I for one do not want Thai people to become a politically mindless, toothless collective.
But isn’t that the way Thaksin wanted Thailand to head – remember who said this: “Democracy is a good and beautiful thing, but it’s not [my] ultimate goal. Democracy is just a tool, not our goal. We can’t drive a Rolls-Royce to a rural village and fix people’s problems; sometimes a pickup or good off-road vehicle will do”.
It’s a well known strategy – Spread a few crumbs and people will forget about loss of human rights & freedoms.
Paul L: How do you reconcile Thaksin’s greed (tax avoidance, use of nominees & tax havens, policy corruption) with his supposed role as a champion of the poor?
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Yes Paul L I think our King should be speaking out against the coup and the actions against freedom of this military coup. Why do you think our great and wise King is not? But then our King has not in the past spoken against military juntas – usually he supports them.
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Yes nganadaleeg, how do academics like Andrew Walker and the many ‘democracy’ bloggers at NM reconcile Thaksin as the champion of the poor while Thaksin himself was leading the corruption and the looting and the tax cheating?
Explain Andrew Walker how Thaksin (the extrajudicial killer) can be the embodiment of Thai democracy when he so publicly announced that he embraces a ‘one-party political system’ and was on his way to doing just that, until he was deposed?
Explain Andrew Walker how a deeply flawed Thai Rak Thai party, who will shield its corrupt and criminally abusive leader from public or parliamentary scrutiny, represent Thai democracy at work?
And educate us Andrew Walker how you thought Thailand would have been better served had we allowed ‘nature’ to follow its course and allowed the ‘rural constitution’ to mature and be enlightened to democratically vote out Thai Rak Thai party and Thaksin?
That is all garbage. Thaksin’s democracy was a dead-end. Thaksin’s dead-end democracy was leading the Thai Kingdom to a sure disaster. Thaksin’s only option was a pro-Thaksin coup (a-la Marcos), to accelerate his one-party political ideology.
Ergo. Thaksin’s dead-end democracy was ineluctably headed towards a military coup. Either a pro-Thaksin or a pro-Thai (General Sonthi’s) coup.
General Sonthi’s coup was pro-Thai and anti-Thaksin and was therefore a godsend.
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Nganadeeleg,
You have said Thaksin is greedy. I don’t think he was so I don’t need to reconcile it. I think a lot of issues with Thaksin was party politics. I tend to look beyond party politics and look at what he delivered to the poor, which I feel he delivered a lot of good. If he achieved his election promises by merging a lot of his renegade parties into his TRT, then so be it. As long as the people benefited from it, which they did.
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jeru : Please point out where, in any post to this blog, you have evidence for this outrageous statement of my contributions: “Historicus and others always amuse when they attempt to portray Thaksin Shinawatra (the skedaddler with billions stowed in luggages in flight, the multi-billion offshore asset concealer, the head of the clan of tax cheaters, and the arguably biggest Thai mafia chieftain directing the corruption spree as head of that outlawed TRT party) as Thailand’s defender of the poor Isans.”
Facts, please, not assertion and interpretation. You seldom answer questions, so let’s see.
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Like the military junta and its puppet government, jeru and nganadeeleg have suddenly become worried that their views are not as widely held as they imagined. So they become bellicose in making claims that are not based on any analysis but on their perspectives built through a hatred of Thaksin rather than any analysis of his failings and Thaksin’s location in broader political events and structures.
jeru says my views are preposterous and that I have lied: “Historicus was of course lying when he posted his otherwise version of Thaksin’s last moments in power.” I take it that jeru is responding to: “No, Thaksin had not brought democracy to an end. The courts had intervened, perhaps not altogether legally, and had made decisions that set a course to a new election. Thaksin was not facing street protests when he was overthrown. Those protests stopped after Prem took leadership of the anti-Thaksin strategy. And what, exactly, do we know about Thaksin that we didn’t know before? That Thaksin was capable of nasty things is well-known.” So you think that a coup was necessary and a good thing because it got rid of Thaksin and you are a stalwart supporter the military, but this does not make my comments lies.
I take it that jeru agrees that Thaksin was nasty. That the street protests had stopped is a fact shown in the newspapers and other reports of the time. So it seems that the disagreement (or the lie) is in whether there were continuing constitutional processes. Given that the king set some of them in process, it seems difficult to see how they could not have been there. The point of disagreement seems to be that jeru wanted that constitutional process crushed and damaged because jeru thinks that Thaksin would have manipulated them.
That’s exactly the junta’s position. But every reader of NM has known that since September 2006. What’s new is that Thaksin support base remains, and Col jeru and his masters are deeply worried.
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Col. jeru states: “Yes nganadaleeg, how do academics like Andrew Walker and the many ‘democracy’ bloggers at NM reconcile Thaksin as the champion of the poor while Thaksin himself was leading the corruption and the looting and the tax cheating?”
I suggest that you actually read some academic articles written during and since Thaksin was in power. Pasuk and Baker, McCargo, Hewison, Nelson, Ukrist, Kasian are just a few that come to mind, all of who were highly critical of the TRT and Thaksin. But, hey, you ideologues aren’t interested in this work because they are also mostly critical of the coup. Your task is to blog for the military.
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Was not the point of your #42 Historicus poster to portray Thaksin as poor Isan’s champion? What else the point of that poster if I may ask?
But you were deliberately lying Historicus (#30) when you said “Thaksin was not facing street protests when he was overthrown.”
But then again Historicus would horrified by my allegation that Thaksin would commit a coup a-la Marcos, sooner rather later, to protect himself from public scrutiny and judicial prosecution for his many abuses and corruption plus extrajudicial crimes, during his rule.
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If only one academic or blogger can explain to me in a language a sixth or seventh grader can understand how Thaksin and his crooked gang of TRT crooks were good for Thailand’s democracy (and no bloviating and convoluted language please), I will be obliged.
Until then I will remain steadfast that Thailand’s version of democracy was headed inevitably to an extra-constitutional resolution with Thaksin himself ready and prepared to commit the coup himself (with his last flight from Bangkok loaded with scores of luggages stuffed with billions of Baht just in case), for self-preservation, but was thwarted by the pre-emptive General Sonthi’s coup.
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One should quote the right things. To some people, the sentence “Democracy is just a tool, not our goal” might sound scandalous. However, it has been the core issue of democracy theory since Aristotle. Democracy is conceptualized as a tool for good government. By the way, that’s the reason Aristotle rejected it as mob rule, and Plato played with the idea of rule by philosophers.
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Ngana,
It may well have been the way that Thaksin wanted to move. I am in no way defending what he did in terms of extrajudical shootings, probable massive corruption and whatever else we can and will find out about.
My issue is with the current situation. We cannot turn the clock back to the day before Thaksin left and the army took power. What I was probably naively hoping was that the army would take power for a while, and so to say re-boot Thai democracy. If they had added a few and I mean a few small caveats to strengthen the system of checks and balances Thailand could have restarted democratic life in a stronger position.
However, what we have today is a major rethink in the constituition effecting political parties, the senate and laws being railroaded thru parliament effecting free speech. I fear very much what will be the outcome in Isaan after the election. I cannot help feeling (I have worked and lived in Isaan for a considerable time) that the people of Isaan will be very disatisfied with the outcome of the next election. Many people are correct when they say that these people feel very disenfranchised. Some would say it is their fault for selling their votes, however, I believe it is more to do with a complete feeling of helplessness that is only going to get worse with the new constitution. They will sell their vote to whoever they believe may help them.
These rural areas of Thailand desperately need economic and social development. There is already an exodus from the countryside to the cities. They are at the bottom of society already, and there is a real possiblity that in 20 years or so they will become the lost underclass of Thailand. Thailand is basically undereducating millions of rural children, and giving them little more hope than remaining farmers or becoming labour in Bangkok at barely above minimum wage.
I worry that there is a real chance that rural Thailand will cease to exist in 30 years. I know of companies in Isaan who cannot get labour, cannot find farmers, villages where the men have all left, whilst Bangkok is choking under a mass of humanity many of whom are living subsistence existences in hovels.
I am not in anyway advocating sufficiency economy, rather structured proper education and rural development, infrastructure and business to give these people a reason to stay and develop their region. Meanwhile, we have laws coming from everywhere making it harder for foreign businesses to open and an infrastructure that makes it impractical to hope to move further north than Korat.
What hope is there for the next generation coming from these regions. When I look at it like that, I would vote for someone like Thaksin every day over anyone else in the political system.
When one considers HMK in this equation, the issue I fear lies more seriously with his successor. Will he be able to hold this country together?
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Col. jeru the mind reader: if you read the post it was a response to something on the king. They were not my words, and there are things I’d disagree with in the article, but only you seem to be able to determine intention. But your blinkered, black/white view cannot let you see anything other than pro- or anti-Thaksin.
I apologise that I misinterpreted your call – “how do academics” – as a call for an academic analysis. I now realise that you are uninterested in real academic work and want statements at the primary school student. You are clearly asking for this in the wrong place. You might try: http://primaryblogs.suprglu.com/
Col jeru says: “But you were deliberately lying Historicus (#30) when you said “Thaksin was not facing street protests when he was overthrown.”” The word “facing” refers to street demonstrations at the time up to the coup. Your words, that I responded to, said: “and once facing street protests had all the intentions to remain in power by hook or by crook . . . with his own military coup.” This appears to me to be a statement referring to demonstrations that ceased well before the coup. There was a PAD threat of renewed demonstrations, but from early May there had been no major street demonstration. This is clear in the press. The military used the threat of a PAD demonstration and the unsubstantiated claim that Thaksin was to organise a violent response as one pretense for the coup.
By the way, there is no substantiated evidence that Thaksin was planning a coup, and as stated above, using Thanong as a source for this is unreliable. He simply state’s the military’s view. I’m sure that if this was a real event the military junta would have come up with some evidence. I am unaware of any.
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Jeru wrote:
“General Sonthi’s coup was pro-Thai and anti-Thaksin and was therefore a godsend.”
The coup was not pro-Thai but pro-Bangkok-Thai, that amalgamation of convenience between the Sino-Thai business community, the old high Sakdina families (including the extended palace), and their hired Samurai in the military and police. Please do not think the military moves without the approval of this elite.
It was anti-Thaksin, but only on a personal level; Thaksin was really no different than his predecessors or those who kicked him out. The only big difference was that Thaksin used some “populist” policies to garner the popular vote, but he was certainly no populist. That being said, by happenstance or by design, he did allow the rural people to get a glimpse of their combined electoral power at the national level. He showed that if you threw the rural people some bones, distributed some of the national wealth in their direction, that they might vote for you.
(And although I clearly have no proof, I don’t think that the violent anti-drug campaign was solely a Thaksin plan. I think it was an inevitable outcome, regardless of who was in office, as the meth problem in the rural areas had gotten well out of hand, too many police and too many bankers implicated, and thus something had to be done. A nation can not allow a meth epidemic in its secondary schools go unchecked. Those of you who were not living in rural communities in Thailand at the time have no idea how bad the violence and the crime had become as a result of the meth epidemic. Although many felt that it was a Thaksin “populist” policy, and the rural populations were indeed all in favor of the campaign, I am not sure it was a campaign originated solely by Thaksin, although he is surely a convenient scapegoat for the western “human rights” critics of the policy.)
The Thai rural communities do have long histories voting democratically, perhaps more so than do the urban communities. They vote democratically for the village headman, they vote democratically for the kamnaan, and more recently they vote democratically for the head of the tambon administration office, a government office that has greatly increased its importance over the last few decades in many areas and taken away many of the former bureaucratic responsibilities of the kamnaan . That is not to say that there are no corrupting influences in the countryside, but contrary to the borderline racist views of Sonthi Limthongkul and his Bangkok brothers, they are not uneducated masses. I am clearly in full agreement with Andrew that rejection of the ballot box by the re-instated old guard is indeed one of the great threats to democratic trends in Thailand.
This coup was certainly no godsend except to those in the Bangkok elite who are now back to getting what they perceive as their fair share of the pie.
Meanwhile, who knows what is going on behind the scenes. His Majesty is looking very feeble in body. The Crown Prince is lagging not far behind in overall health. The Princesses are keeping quiet. And as the power of the Schwartz suggested in a previous post, the Chinese delegation, as well as the US delegation (don’t think these coups occur without their approval also) are also jockeying for future influence, with Bejing almost assured of taking over the number one son position at the Thai court from the US. I daresay there are interesting times a coming.
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ThaiBloke: Thanks for your response. I agree with much of what you say, however I cannot see any evidence that people of Isaan have had their right to vote taken away (only their right to vote for Thaksin and the cheating TRT executives has been removed).
What are you worried about?
Is it that now that Thaksin is gone, no one in Thailand cares about the rural poor, or is it that you are worried that the rural masses cannot distinguish good people from bad, or worse that they simply don’t care?
Historicus: I have read many articles about Thaksin, and observed his actions, and that is why I have come to the conclusion that Thaksin did not really care about the rural poor – IMO they were just a means to an end, pawns in his greedy game.
Paul L: I think perhaps you are the one who needs to do a little more reading. So you don’t think Thaksin was greedy? What rock have you been living under? I would be surprised if even Republican or Andrew Walker would be prepared to back you up on that statement.
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We can wonder if they were pawns in a game, we can wonder if they were just a means to an end. Since we will never know the answer you have the right to your opinion.
All I can think is that after the next election, it is likely that incomes in the rural areas will go down which when you are living hand to mouth hurts very hard.
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I think the apart on Sufficiency Economy that the write wrote reflects how ignorant and shallow the writer is on Thailand. He was not deserved any right to speak on Thailand.
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“Thaksin did not really care about the rural poor” >> Politicians, certainly not those in the West, are not supposed to “really care” for anything in particular. Democracy is a mechanism to produce responsiveness in relation to existing restrictions. It is not about political decisions based on “care.” Thus, one cannot criticize Thaksin on this count.
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Jopha said I am not sure it was a campaign originated solely by Thaksin,
I hope you are not suggesting the Border Patrol Police had anything to do with it particularly given their link to certain entities.
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Srithanonchai: I’m not sure which definition of ‘care’ you are referring to.
It’s probably besides the point anyway, because my statement was not so much a criticism of Thaksin, but rather a counter to some recent posts to this site which seemed to indicate that Thaksin’s main motivating factor was a regard for the poor (rather than personal greed & ego)
Since you brought up what politicians are supposed or not supposed to do, I wonder whether politicians should treat all constituents the same irrespective of whether they voted for the politician or not?
(who was it who said: “Provinces that give us their trust deserve our special care. We have to take care of the whole country, but our limited time has to be allocated to provinces where we receive the most trust. Provinces that trust us less will have to wait.”)
I am also wondering whether politicians are supposed to authorize extra-judicial killing, use tax havens and nominees, or push policies that favor and enrich ones own family and friends?
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“which seemed to indicate that Thaksin’s main motivating factor was a regard for the poor (rather than personal greed & ego)” >> My point is that both the positive and the negative views are besides the point of democratic mass politics. One cannot criticize Thaksin for not “really caring” for the “poor,” nor can one say that he was a good politician because he cared for them.
The rest of your post is, as far as I am concerned, irrelevant.
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Srithanonchai: So does morality have any place in ‘democratic mass politics’ ?
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Nganadeeleg,
I’ll give you my bottomline assertion and then I will leave this forum for good because I think the guys in brown are coming for me.
I am surprised by the pro-coup group about their optimism for democracy in Thailand. I would assert in fact that Thailand is in a worse situation then ever in its entire history of democracy. I am worried because it now seems that the Thai Bangkok public can get their way through street demonstrations, and even so far as to ask the army to hold a coup in the name of good democracy.
I agree with Andrew Walker entirely except he needs to update himself on HMK and the fact that 99.9% of the population love HMK without conditions.
Gotta run.
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In modern society, morality has as much space in politics as it has in journalism, law, medicine, education, research, or in the economy, I guess.
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In post 51 I asked jeru, the accuser, to substantiate his claim that “Historicus and others always amuse when they attempt to portray Thaksin Shinawatra (the skedaddler with billions stowed in luggages in flight, the multi-billion offshore asset concealer, the head of the clan of tax cheaters, and the arguably biggest Thai mafia chieftain directing the corruption spree as head of that outlawed TRT party) as Thailand’s defender of the poor Isans.”
jeru hasn’t been able to show any evidence for this outrageous statement of my contributions to this blog.
He came up with a lame claim based on my posting of a piece of journalism. Worse, he claims I have lied on this blog and again came up with conjecture, not fact. So come on jeru, where is the evidence?
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Paul L: Ask yourself which manifestation of ‘democracy’ is better:
(1) a dominant party with an authoritarian/autocratic leader
or
(2) a choice of 2 or 3 major political groups
IMO neither is perfect, but there is reason to be optimistic that there will be less chance for the checks and balances to be subverted under scenario (2) above, especially when the leader under scenario (1) had no regard for the rule of law, authorized extra-judicial killings, pursued policies that enriched his family and friends, and avoided taxes by using tax havens, nominees and coercion of tax officials.
There is no need to run away and avoid the question (again).
IMO, it’s not people in brown uniforms you should fear, but rather people wearing white coats, if you still have the following opinion:
“You have said Thaksin is greedy. I don’t think he was so I don’t need to reconcile it. ”
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Reply to David W (comment #14):
“… I fully agree with you that both Thaksin and the military must be criticized for a better future (along with numerous other actors like the media, academics, public intellectuals, etc), but it is a bit pointless trying to get either jeru or Republican to agree to that position…”
What a noble gesture. Your criticisms are not just academically motivated, but you actually aim to create a “better future” for Thailand. What a fearless, noble person you are. You are happy to criticize a former democratically-elected Prime Minister under attack by the royalists who are protected from criticism by lese majeste and a 50 year propaganda cult surrounding the king, but you omit to include the monarchy in the list of “numerous other actors” that should be criticized in order to bring about your “better future”.
What you and the other song mai ao academics can not seem to understand is that under the current censorship regime and propaganda surrounding the monarchy in Thailand today, your criticism of Thaksin automatically translates into rhetorical support for the royalists and the undemocratic political status quo they seek to achieve. And yet you posture as democrats wanting a “better future” for Thailand.
The outcome: the academics appear morally pure and high-minded, independent and above the dirty business of politics.
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Historicus: I gave up a long time ago expecting such commentators to provide any evidence. I just ignore them.
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I thought I replied to Historicus already but Andrew Walker must have been on his deleting-censorious mood.
But OK Historicus if you say you did not mean to say or imply, by your poster, that Thaksin was Poor Isan’s champion, I believe you and I apologize for misreading your intent.
But I still maintain you deliberately lied when you tried to misrepresent the impending massive street protests in Sept-2006 when Thaksin was deposed by a coup.
I can see that Bangkok Pundit still looks for evidence – – on extrajudicial killings directed by Thaksin Bangkok Pundit?
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jeru: Apology accepted on point 1.
But where is your evidence that Thaksin or the Thaksin government was actually facing (and here I mean that these were current at the time) demonstrations? Maybe this is pedantic, but “impending” is not the same as currently facing demonstrations.
As pointed out previously, from early May until the coup, there was no major/massive street demonstration. My point made in the original post was: “Thaksin was not facing street protests when he was overthrown. Those protests stopped after Prem took leadership of the anti-Thaksin strategy.” There might have been a a threat of renewal of street demonstrations (see below), but big/massive demonstrations had ceased in early May.
Even the threat of a PAD demonstration leading to the coup is not entirely compelling. One reason is because Sonthi Lim was regularly threating this (e.g. on 22 Aug and again on 5 Sept). In August, there were little events-cum-demonstrations in Bangkok (like the Paragon scuffle) and there were reports of a 5,000-10,000 person anti-Thaksin demonstration in Phitsanulok and a very small demonstration in Pranburi.
On the 5 Sept. statement of future threat, PAD leaders said they would announce a resumption date for their protests on 15 Sept. When they did announce, they said that Sonthi’s talk show would be at Sanam Luang on 22 Sept. PAD also threatened a Sept demonstrations in Chiangmai and Buriram.
This date of the 22nd was very quickly changed to a Royal Plaza rally on the 20th, with PAD leaders saying they wanted prevent Thaksin returning to Thailand. Even so, it remained unclear why this new strategy emerged within a couple of hours of the first announcement. Maybe one could infer that they had been told to change the date by their military friends like Saprang? Given the well-known links between Sonthi Lim and Saprang, it is possible, but is is conjecture.
On the day before the coup, PAD announced that it would hold rallies until Thaksin resigned. Of course, PAD never did have to remobilise because the military coup took place.
Sorry to go over old ground for NM readers, but jeru continually makes allegations and seldom provides any facts, so in this case, where jeru has sunk to name-calling, I feel that jeru needs some facts to deal with. Of course, I include some conjecture that jeru will find distasteful in his/her role as defender of the military coup, but at least that conjecture is embedded in some facts, at least as they are portrayed in Bangkok’s newspapers.
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Historicus: Can you please clarify your post #52.
It seems you agree that Thaksin was nasty and capable of nasty things.
You also state that Thaksin’s support base remains, and therefore Jeru and his masters are deeply worried.
Can you please explain why a sensible person should not worry about continued support for a person capable of nasty things?
(I presume that by ‘support’ you mean support for his return to power, rather than support in a helping way, such as support for rehabilitation of his nasty ways)
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Had there been no coup in Sept-2006, those street protests to demand the Thaksin resignation would have resumed with the big one slated for Sept-22/06 and pro-Thaksins led by Newin/Yongyuth were also planning a confrontation. That much is fact.
Even when Thaksin was at London then at NY, the Thai protesters would let him off the hook – – so where did Historicus get his conclusion that anti-Thaksin prostesters have quieted down?
The only reason Historicus wishes to rewrite events during Thaksin’s last moments in power was to rebut my thesis that Thai democracy had reached dead-end by Sept-2006 with only the extra-constitutional option (military coup whether by pro-Thaksin or anti-Thaksin) left to resolve the political gridlock and near anarchy at that time.
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“Even when Thaksin was at London then at NY, the Thai protesters would NOT let him off the hook – – so where did Historicus get his conclusion that anti-Thaksin prostesters had quieted down?” – Correction
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jeru: I gave you the facts, you give none. “so where did Historicus get his conclusion that anti-Thaksin prostesters have quieted down?” – from tha Bangkok press. I cited all of the events. You now scratch around for protests in NYC and London. Do these equal the “massive street protests” that you wrote of above? You are doing a fine job of avoiding facts. I am not rewriting that’s your job for the boys in khaki and green. That should be absolutely clear to all on NM. You are not serious but a (self-appointed?) blogger for the junta.
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Like the military junta and its puppet government, jeru and nganadeeleg have suddenly become worried that their views are not as widely held as they imagined.
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Historicus: Why would I be ‘suddenly’ worried?
I admit I do worry, but there is nothing sudden about it, as I have consistently stated that the electoral masses need to be more discerning before things can get better.
I note you have avoided my question in post #76 above.
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Historicus you should ask Andrew Walker who worries. I think thrice already Andrew Walker’s blocking-deleting-censorious fingers were attentively active with my posts.
Thaksin’s democracy had to end extra-constitutionally Historicus, there was no other way, either Thaksin’s coup or the pre-emptive General Sonthi coup that was successful. So far none of the NM bloggers can show me how Thaksin’s democracy, with the divisions and non-stop protests, was supposed to culminate.
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Off topic I suspect, but today I got my first real glimpse into just how popular and highly regarded is his majesty king Bhumipol. Looking through You tube (now accessible) I could not find one single derogatory video of the esteemed king _And I mean NOT ONE! A truly beloved leader, indeed.
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[…] is the paper presented by Chairat Charoensin-o-larn of Thammasat University at the Thailand Update held at the ANU late last month [chairat-2007.pdf]. I think it is a balanced and nuanced account […]
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Thank you, Andrew Walker, for the seven threats to Thailand. I agree with you entirely. Actually, my friends of the like mind and I have talked about these for many years, and hope to effect some changes where we can. And now comes this demonstration at Makhawan Bridge. Let us hope that those five iguanas who lead the demonstration will see light. They are not an alliance for democracy, but rather an alliance for secret money. We can see Iguana Suriyasai, for example, acts quite hilariously because the fund is ample for him, whose motto seems to be “Fund and fight”. His conduct confirms completely Walker’s remarks.
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High regard et. al…
I would venture to say that most of it is high regard, but not out of any purely metaphysical origin. More impregnated and orchestrated, although some arising from observation of the many positive contributions made to society.
That taboos are far and wide on discussing role, possible faulty acts, or succession and so on is a clear reflection on this country’s basic ruling elite coalition, none of whose membership wants to lose privileges or be responsible to public agencies.
That a senior PC member was taken out of the PC made PM and then brought back into the PC clearly indicates highest levels of inside involvement in 19 September 2006. There was a top-level power struggle going on, which by the way, is not over. That Thaksin’s brother-in-law is in at the moment says mountains about what’s in store unless things are forced to change. Thus the PAD and hopefully students, state enterprise unions and others need to get involved, and all of these need to stop kidding themselves and us about how deeply committed to HMK they are, or say they are. Using such a high element to coalesce favorable opinion is working in the short term but will have socially damaging effects later on, I fear.
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Talking about making changes…
A few years ago, a long time ago, in fact,
(972-73) I was teaching at NIDA in Bangkok, and one of my favorite activities was criticizing the then Thai government. A colleague I shared an office with would from time to time mention, “My father-in-law is doing all he can about fighting corruption.” It finally got to me and I said, “Listen, you tell me this all the time. But just who is your father-in-law anyhow?”
My friend wrote down on a piece of paper, “”PM.”
I was slow!
“Who?” I asked.
“Prime Minister.”
Whoa! Did I lay an egg! My friend was Dr. Suvit Yodmani, who had married Thanom Kittikajorn’s youngest daughter. That was my lesson in not just personal ignorance, but also in seeing that the guys at the top themselves sometimes think they are doing the right thing – even when they are not. The next year we had already taken off for my new job in Iran, and Thanom and the other two dictators were ousted.
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Andrew – I found your comments quite compelling. What seems to be missing from those comments and the long list of responses to them is a systematic focus on the Democrat Party. This party is arguably one if not the major force, given its relatively solid electoral base in the South, that could help promote some degree of reconciliation. Could you or others provide some sense of 1) the degree of coherence or unity within this party, and 2) the party’s overall political calculus (if there is one).
Many thanks for your excellent work!
Rick
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