Discarding Dependent Origination, Returning to the Primary Source of the 12-Links (十二因缘) in Theravada Buddhism.
Eisel Mazard (大影), 2011.
This article broaches the Theravada Buddhist doctrine of “Dependent Origination”, also known by the Sanskrit moniker Pratītyasamutpāda and as the “12 links” or teaching of the “Twelve Nidānas”. The author deals with competing interpretations of the most ancient primary source texts in this tradition (i.e., as extant in the Pali canon) that have formed the basis for an array of religious traditions, both ancient and modern, throughout Buddhist Asia. The author’s conclusion is that many later sources have digressed from the basic theme and subject-matter of the original text, knowingly or unknowingly, and he here sets out some unpopular facts about one of Buddhist philosophy’s most popular doctrines.
§1.
Although commonly praised for its profundity, it is rare to find a clear answer to the question of what this famous tract of text supposed to be about: what is the thesis that the 12-links formula was meant to explain or support? I find the answer in the text itself (i.e., the passages of the Theravāda canon discussing the 12-links formula, variously called, “dependent origination”, “causal genesis”, etc., in English) and then find corollary support in comparing different contexts that present the formula within the Pali canon (i.e., passages making use of the same terms in different ways).
In the first few pages of the Mahānidāna-sutta, we have a prototypical version of the formula, in that the Buddha is explaining the way a monk ought to explain it.
Atthi idappaccayā jarāmaraṇanti iti puṭṭhena satā ānanda, atthīti’ssa vacanīyaŋ. Kimpaccayā[1] jarāmaraṇanti iti ce vadeyya, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇanti iccassa vacanīyaŋ. [Mahānidāna-sutta, Cambodian canon vol. 16, p. 118, cf. PTS DN vol. 2, p. 55]
This is slightly more verbose than the most frequently found version of the 12-links formula (in list form), but the meaning does not differ from it: the sufferings of growing old and dying are predicated upon birth. The word for “birth” here (jāti) really does mean physical birth,[2] in the most obvious sense of the term; this can be affirmed both by comparing the use of the terms to other canonical contexts, and also (blatantly enough) within the Mahānidāna-sutta itself.
There are two suttas named Avijjāpaccaya[3] that specifically address an important misconception that could (and apparently did) arise from this mode of teaching about birth: evidently, ancient Buddhists were concerned that some might believe that the birth of the body was something separate from the birth of the living spirit. This is yet another facet of the orthodox defense against any doctrine of a “supernal self” or soul of any kind, found throughout the canon; the controversy (contrasting jīva to sarīra) makes it abundantly obvious that the subject-matter being born is a physical body (sarīra) —and that there was doctrinal concern that this would be misunderstood as excluding an un-mentioned life-force (jīva) that followers could presumed to be additional to the birth of the body, the arising of consciousness, and the other aspects mentioned in the 12-links formula. The mere existence of the controversy demonstrates that the subject being debated is indeed physical birth.
Within the Mahānidāna, we also have a brief gloss on the meaning of the word “birth”, making it clear that the term applies to any living thing in Buddhist cosmology (the text gives a range of examples: snakes, birds, four-footed animals, humans, and various gods and demi-gods) but this does affirm, once again, that the term for birth is meant in the obvious sense (even if birds are hatched from eggs, and even if the mode of birth pertaining to gods is unknown to us, there can hardly be any ambiguity about the meaning of the term in this context). Without birth, we are explicitly told, there would be no old age unto death, and the lesson is here left implicit that everything that is born must grow old and die (i.e., the gods and the snakes alike).
Given that the 12-links formula concludes with birth (and then various terms describing the suffering of life, growing old, and dying) the necessary conclusion is that the subject being described is a sequence of stages prior to birth. Contrary to the great bulk of English language interpretations (cf. §3, below) my thesis is simply that the 12-links formula concerns the development of the embryo, i.e., including the arising of consciousness in the womb. Conversely, the text is expressly not about the arising of consciousness is any other sense of the term(s). The consciousness described in this text indicates a stage of development that transpires inside the womb; this, too, may is stated (blatantly enough) within the Mahānidāna and may be affirmed from other contexts presenting the doctrine (if the terse wording of the formula itself leaves any doubt).
In the Mahānidāna’s brief gloss on the term nāmarūpa (discussed further below), we have a very explicit reminder that the subject-matter being described in this sequence of stages is the development of the embryo.
Viññāṇappaccayā[4] nāmarūpanti iti kho panetaŋ vuttaŋ. Tadānanda imināpetaŋ pariyāyena veditabbaŋ yathā viññāṇappaccayā nāmarūpaŋ. Viññāṇañca[5] hi ānanda mātukucchismiŋ na okkamissatha api nu kho nāmarūpaŋ mātukucchismiŋ samuccissathā[6]-ti. [Mahānidāna-sutta, Cambodian canon vol. 16 p. 133–134, cf. PTS DN vol. 2, p. 61–2.]
In the quotation, above, it is indisputably clear that we are reading about something that may (or may not) enter into (okkamissatha) the mother’s womb (mātukucchismiŋ). In my interpretation, this is consistent with the subject-matter of the paragraphs before and after, and is a natural (and unsurprising) part of the topic discussed in the text as a whole; however, the passage is wildly incongruent with attempts of many other interpreters to render the whole doctrine in more abstract terms (variously psychological or metaphysical).[7] In the last sentence of our quotation, above, we are told that once it is in the mother’s womb, it may (or may not) “consolidate” properly —according to the somewhat speculative translation of samuccissathā offered by Rhys-Davids & Stede (1925, s.v. samucchati, an entry that declares the “derivation and meaning uncertain”). I think it would not add much to digress into debating the meaning of samucchati in this context, but (given that the subject-matter is sexual reproduction) there could be an element of euphemism here that would be difficult to pin down with certainty. The rendering “consolidate” interprets the word as a composed of a prefix added onto a form of the verb mucchati (and, I note, the difference between cca and ccha is normally of etymological significance in Pali, obliging us to raise an eyebrow, even if this turns out to be correct); the latter can mean “to stiffen up”, perhaps in the sense of congealing, but perhaps in some other sense instead (Davids & Stede, 1925, s.v., mucchati, and cf. the usage of mucchatithroughout DN 25, the Udumbarika-sutta).
Even if we began from no other data but this short quotation, above, there would be a limited range of possible meanings for the term nāmarūpa: it is something that must properly “consolidate” in the mother’s womb in the next stage of development after the arrival of consciousness (viññāṇa) there. Within this range of possibilities, it seems obvious to me that we must accept some guidance from Jurewicz’s (2000) findings that the pre-Buddhist (Vedic) tradition already used terms like nāmarūpa in describing the (supernatural) origins of human life in the womb; this may have been an analogy that the authors of the Buddhist texts were aware of, or (at least) it is one that provides a useful precedent (and parallel) demonstration of much of the terminology (even if the early Buddhist authors worked in ignorance of the Vedas). In both of these traditions, there may be an aspect of euphemism (that would be difficult for a translator to fully disclose), but, even if so, the Pali text does not leave very much up to the imagination.
Conversely, if we were to disregard the fact that the development of consciousness transpires inside the womb, and is part of the description of an embryo, the whole purpose of the passage of text would disappear into abstract generalizations, regardless of the precise meaning assigned to nāmarūpa or samucchati.
§2.
In the context of ancient Indian literature, it is not surprising that some would ascribe a supernatural agency to the origin of consciousness in the womb, and we have evidence of this within the Pali canon. The Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta (MN #38, PTS MN vol. 1, p. 256 et seq.) provides a list of three factors that are pre-requisite for a woman’s fertility and conception of offspring (ibid. p. 265-6) —and one of them is the attendance or assistance of a type of demi-god. The Pali word is gandhabba, and this is a sort of “heavenly musician” that could be described as the masculine counterpart to a nymph: a sensuous and somewhat insouciant sort of sprite, often depicted as part of the entourage of the more powerful gods. There is no direct equivalent in the Greco-Roman pantheon; a gandhabba is not quite a satyr, nor quite a cupid.
The significance of this passage is controversial. A recent work kindly sent to me by the author, Richard Gombrich (2009, p. 73), simply stated that he has no explanation for it —i.e., because it is incompatible with the rest of our knowledge of the cycle of birth and rebirth in Buddhist cosmology and ethics.
This passage illuminates both the early Buddhist understanding of conception, and at least one misunderstanding that arose within the period of the canon’s composition and revision. I would explain it with comparative reference to a dialogue found elsewhere, in the Assalāyana-sutta (MN #93, PTS MN vol. 2, p. 147–8).[8] In the latter source, we find the same snippet of text concerning this type of demi-god being pre-requisite for a woman’s conception of a child, but here (instead of being a principle the Buddha himself is preaching) the gandhabba‘s role is one of the beliefs of (non-Buddhist) Brahmins that the Buddha is ridiculing in the context of a debate about caste purity and heredity. In addressing caste prejudice, the Buddha asks how the Brahmins know the caste of these demi-gods that they believe participate in the conception of their own children. The Brahmin proponent admits that he does not know the caste of these intercessory demi-gods (and it is interesting that the Brahmin implicitly presumes the caste system to extend up to the heavens). This is not the only sutta wherein the Buddha repudiates Brahmin notions of their own divine ancestry and special birthright with sexually explicit terms (cf. AN Soṇavaggo, Soṇa-sutta, PTS AN vol. 3, p. 221–222).
In the dialogue of the Assalāyana-sutta, the Brahmin replies that he does not know the caste status of these demi-gods that are supposed to be pre-requisite to conception, and we gain a useful contrast between pre-Buddhist and Buddhist assumptions about incarnation. In this context, it seems impossible that the demi-god could itself symbolize the looming spirit of an unborn person waiting to be reincarnated, though some modern Buddhists insist on this interpretation.[9] If this were the implied or symbolic meaning of the term, how could the Brahmin possibly be in doubt as to the caste-identity of a member of his own clan being re-born? Apart from the fact that the meaning of the word as a demi-god is attested throughout the Pali canon, and has cognates throughout ancient Indian literature in other languages (and in statuary, etc., generally), in this specific context we may insist that the word gandhabba cannot mean the spirit of one of the Brahmin’s own ancestors (awaiting rebirth as one of their descendants) because, if that were the meaning of the term, the Brahmin would be sure of the spirit’s case identity. Instead, the entire scenario provides us with a glimpse of a pre-Buddhist model of incarnation that can be contrasted to the 12-links formula, wherein the role of the gandhabba would seem to be exactly what the text describes: a demi-god that enables fertility. As with many forms of mythology, I cannot deny that there may be an element of poetic allusion or euphemism here; conversely, there is no reason to preclude the possibility that this myth indicates a traditional belief in a form of divine agency in conception, with no innuendo.
This type of myth would hardly be surprising in any cultural context (ancient India least of all). Whereas the Assalāyana-sutta contrasts the Brahmin belief to the Buddhist teaching, the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta seems to conflate the two. In finding this Brahmin belief that divine intercession is a precondition for a successful pregnancy re-stated (without the context of the debate with the Brahmin) in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta, we are observing the cultural assumptions from one context “seeping into” the interpretation 12-links formula in the other. Even so, this misunderstanding still affirms that the early redactors of the text regarded the 12-links as an account of the arising of consciousness in the womb (and thus they did not regard the statement of this demigod’s role in fertility as “out of place” in an explanation of the 12-links formula). Conversely, for modern interpreters who seek to re-invent the meaning of the 12-links formula (as a sort of metaphysics) it must be difficult to account for such explicit references to a woman’s physical fertility that occur both within the formula, and in the canonical explanations surrounding it, in the most ancient canonical texts.
§3.
This essay has for its purpose the simple but fundamental task of establishing what the 12-links formula is about (i.e., the subject matter broached in the canonical primary source texts). I would now contrast a few of the popular opinions on this matter, taking my motto from Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man: “False facts are highly injurious … for they often endure long; but false views… do little harm, for every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness…”.
Many of the leading interpretations are pointedly vague. The influential translator Bhikkhu Bodhi remarks: “In its abstract form the principle of dependent arising is equivalent to the law of the conditioned genesis of phenomena.” (Bodhi, 1980, q.v. exposition, 2nd paragraph) As anodyne as this may sound, I must repudiate it as a “false fact”: the subject of the doctrine is simply incarnation (inclusive of conception, the development of the embryo, and birth). While this may extend to include the hatching of snakes and the births of gods and demi-gods (as shown above, §1), the primary concern of the text is human life in its tangible form. The text is not about the origin of “phenomena” (neither in its dictionary denotation, nor in any other sense of the term I can construe here); I would reject any attempt to broaden the meaning of this particular set of source texts into an abstract statement on epistemology or metaphysics. The Pali canon contains many discourses concerning the function of the mind and perception, but this isn’t one of them. A huge bulk of pseudo-philosophical hyperbole written by modern authors must collapse on this simple point: the original text does not broach the subject of the “structural relatedness of phenomena” (as Bodhi puts it, idem. 7th paragraph).
Although it would be ironic to look for a first cause on this subject, I would draw attention to Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys-Davids (1922, p. xiv) who confessed that her own interpretation of the 12-Links Formula (that has now inspired an amazing array of European theories) came from a spiritual experience that she had when reading the earlier work of Eugene Burnouf (ca. 1826) —and the latter theory was not even based on the Pali text.[10] Mrs. Rhys-Davids was among the first to set to work on the primary source concerned, but she did not approach the evidence with an open mind; instead, she sought to validate an earlier assumption. Having formed this expectation, she was very disappointed, she tells us openly, with what she found when she finally came to translate the original Buddhist text; however, despite what she saw as the deficiency of the primary source, she says that she did her best to emulate the earlier interpretation of Eugene Burnouf (ibid.). As is typical of her writing, she also directs insults, in passing, to the Buddhist monks whom she assumes have corrupted the texts —based on her own notions of what the Buddha’s teaching was originally supposed to be, with all evidence to the contrary dismissed as a later accretion.
These same attitudes are written into the PTS dictionary itself. In the entry forsaṅkhāra we are told:
None of the “links” in the [“dependent origination” formula] meant to the people that which it meant or was supposed to mean in the subtle and schematic philosophy (dhammā duddasā nipuṇā!) of the dogmatists. [Rhys-Davids & Stede, 1925, s.v., saṅkhāra]
Apart from the fact that this “definition” is openly contemptuous of its sources, and actually contains an insult directed to the texts’ authors, the combined effect of these PTS editions creates a loop of self-justifying references with no independent referent. If you doubt the interpretation of the translator, you can look it up in the dictionary (where you will find coeval justifications, with correlating attitudes of contempt for the primary sources they have selectively consulted).
The PTS-derived interpretations were excoriated by Nyanatiloka (1957, p. 157 & 161 et seq.); the latter correctly identifies Burnouf among the sources of these theories, and also vaguely blames “Theosophists” without naming C.A.F. Rhys-Davids (i.e., herself a Theosophist, and probably one of the intended targets of the criticism).
Nyanatiloka, for his part in this controversy, sets himself up as the defender of the commentarial tradition that extends the 12-links from a description of a single incarnation into a description of the causes and effects of reincarnation in three separate lifetimes. As such, the commentaries preserve what I would call a traditional misinterpretation of the 12-links formula, and it is one of much later origin than any of the evidence in the canonical accounts (with no resemblance to the diversity amongst the sources reviewed in §1 and §2, above).
In the context of Buddhist doctrine, the three-incarnations interpretation may seem like a very anodyne assertion, and yet I must disagree with it as another false fact. There are numerous texts dealing with the themes Nyanatiloka describes under this heading (i.e., of actions in a past life having effects at present, or of present deeds having effects in future incarnations) but the 12-links formula simply is not one of them. The original text describes a single birth only.
There is an interesting affirmation that the 12-links formula was originally understood as a single human incarnation in the Upanisa-sutta (PTS SN vol. 2, p. 29 et seq.; cf. Bodhi, 1980). The Upanisa-sutta is unusual in providing a bridge from the 12th link to the Buddhist practice leading to emancipation (thus, offering us a more upbeat sermon than the usual pattern, concluding with growing old and suffering unto death). This provides the reader with an obverse set of 12 stages leading from suffering (dukkha) to salvation (nibbāna). It makes sense (blatantly enough) that the Upanisa-suttapresents the formation of the embryo, then birth, followed by a life of suffering, in the middle of its expanded sequence of 24 (with salvation at the end); it would be impossible to make sense of the sequence if the first 12 links were (implicitly) divided into three separate lifetimes. It is completely consistent with Theravada orthodoxy in that nibbāna is here presented at the end of a series of stages that can be accomplished within a single lifetime; however, the text absolutely requires that its authors understood the original 12-links formula as the stages of a single incarnation for the two halves of this formula to fit together in this context.
While I regard the three-lifetimes interpretation (supported by Nyanatiloka) as incorrect, it deserves some credit for remaining thematically related to the original meaning of the primary source text (whereas many modern interpretations have digressed wildly from it). In a lecture on this subject, Nyanatiloka repeatedly refers to the subject-matter of the 12-links discussed as something transpiring inside the womb, also using the term “prenatal”. (Nyanatiloka, 1994, 3rd lecture) Apparently this has been less influential than the same author’s schematic overview of the terms in Nyanatiloka, 1957 (s.v. paṭicca-samuppāda) —a source cited in many of the more nebulous glosses on the issue, as if it adequately encompassed Nyanatiloka’s conclusions on the subject.
The three-lifetimes analysis is taken much further into the realm of abstraction and hyperbole by Mahāsī Sayadaw, a 20th century monastic innovator whose influence has already been institutionalized in an international group of meditation centers. However, Mahāsī’s interpretation does intermittently (if inconsistently) confess that the subject-matter being dealt with in the primary source text is the development of the embryo (2008, p. 39-41). In opening his discussion, he makes an important admission that is subsequently obscured:
…the Bodhisatta’s reflection was confined to the interdependence of mind and matter. In other words, he reflected on the correlation between consciousness [viññāṇa] and mind and matter [nāmarūpa], leaving out of account the former’s relationship to past existence. [Mahāsī, 2008, p. 2]
This is, in fact, a confession that the three-lifetimes interpretation is not supported by the primary source texts: there is no discussion of a past (nor future) existence internal to the 12-links formula, and Mahāsī was evidently aware of this (in examining the same text about consciousness and nāmarūpa within the womb, etc., ibid. p. 39-41); he is nevertheless willing to pretend that information to the contrary (based on later commentarial traditions) was implicitly intended by the Buddha but “left out” of the text. He proceeds to author an entire book on the premise that material the Buddha had “left out” (i.e., did not say) could be discussed as if were present where it is (in fact) absent. The result of this tactic is that a coherent account of a single incarnation (from conception through birth and death) becomes an incoherent account of three lives, omitting the significant stages of birth and death for all except the third, set in the future (ibid., p. 149-50).
§4.
As the argument, so far, has traded in certainties, there is hardly any need to draw conclusions. I would instead fill up a little bit of paper with some speculations of my own. In the course of the foregoing discussion, some may have wanted to know why the term nāmarūpa appears in the context of the 12-links formula at all, or, in effect, some may question how my interpretation can be reconciled with the denotation ofnāma and rūpa where they appear as two separate words in canonical usage.
In the study of any language, we must read usage in context: etymology can be misleading and, not infrequently, the two components of a word cannot tell us the meaning of the sum. In English, we can hardly construe any link between the meaning of the verb “hypostatize” and “hypo-stasis”; if regarded as two parts, the latter would seem to mean “under-standing”. The same principle can be illustrated by our English verb “understand”: it certainly does not mean “to stand under”, and cannot be analyzed into two halves. Complaints that this compound word, nāmarūpa, should have a meaning that is self-evident from the addition of one half to the other are founded on an assumption that is false, even if it may be appealing to the imagination.
Whatever nāmarūpa may be, it appears at one of the earliest stages of the conception and development of the embryo, and it is immediately subsequent to consciousness “entering into the mother’s womb”. Whereas the womb that consciousness “enters into” is specified as the mother’s, we have no indication of whose nāmarūpa it is that we’re discussing, and the two appear in mutual contrast, suggesting to my mind that the father’s role in reproduction must be accounted for somewhere in the equation. If we reject the possibility that nāmarūpa is imparted by the father, there would be remarkably little role for the male of the species in this traditional account of reproduction, and no clear “link” to the father’s hereditary characteristics.
The (empirically obvious) inheritance of a father’s traits in the next generation (of humans or any other creatures) is something that Buddhist orthodoxy needed to account for carefully, because the father’s own consciousness or spirit could not be construed to continue in his offspring. In other words, because “reincarnation” itself is never hereditary in the Theravada paradigm (and because it is of doctrinal importance that there is no soul that passes from father to son, and no continuity of consciousness between the generations) the description of other hereditary characteristics (such as physical appearances) becomes problematic and needs to be precise.
It is possible that the “name” suggested by nāma in this context had only a non-specific sense (related to personal identity) but the terminology could reflect an ancient belief in the patronym as something imparted to the embryo prior to birth. As a cultural assumption, the name, like the appearance, could be inherited from the father; or, of course, it could be presumed to be a gift from the gods. India has a diverse culture of magical naming practices, but the only evidence that is (without dispute) historically antecedent to the Pali canon would be found in the Vedas (already compared to the 12-links formula by Jurewicz, 2000).
It is not surprising that the canon preserves fragments of further debate concerning exactly whose consciousness shows up in the womb, and about the mechanics of incarnation and heredity in general. The debate of the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta (MN #38) is consistent with the interpretation I’ve offered throughout this essay, and also reflects uncertainty (amongst ancient Buddhists) about the same issues that here seem to remain ambiguous in the original source text. In this debate, significantly, the problem of the continuity of consciousness between incarnations is explained with reference to the Buddhist theory of “the four foods”, a subject that has attracted much less scholarly interest than the 12-links formula.
As has been explained (§1, above) the inclusion of a special role for a demi-god (gandhabba) facilitating conception further “fills in the blanks”, but it seems to have been a pre-Buddhist notion that (in at least one context) the Buddha refuted in debate with a Brahmin; however, the inclusion of this notion in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta‘s account shows that the redactors of the texts were trying to provide a full and coherent account of fertility, conception, and the development of the embryo unto birth (with old age and suffering-unto-death being the next, and final, link thereafter).
In the more ancient context of the Vedas, there were other concepts of divine and magical agency involved in a comparable process of fertility, conception, and reincarnation, with comparable terminology, but I leave the discussion of that to Vedic scholars, such as Jurewicz (op. cit.).
The paragraphs above (§4) are somewhat speculative; I hope that the concrete argument presented in earlier sections of this essay will not be disregarded on this account.
My conclusion is, simply, that the 12-links formula is unambiguously an ancient tract that was originally written on the subject of the conception and development of the embryo, as a sequence of stages prior to birth; in examining the primary source text, this is as blatant today as it was over two thousand years ago, despite some very interesting misinterpretations that have arisen in the centuries in-between.
A Note on the Pali Text Used in this Article.
The text quoted here is based on a comparative reading of the Cambodian edition (wherein the DN was first published in B.E. 2501-2503, with succeeding volumes of the suttas in successive years) and the Sri Lanka Triptiaka Project’s e-text (SLTP). The latter is based on a comparative reading of the bilingual Sinhalese edition (BJT) and the Pali Text Society (PTS) editions. The Cambodian edition is itself based on a comparative reading of Cambodian and Thai manuscript sources with the earlier PTS editions. Variations from the PTS are footnoted throughout the Cambodian edition. My thanks are owed to the volunteers at the SLTP, and also to the Japanese charity (now known as the Shanti Volunteer Association) that supported the (post-war) reprinting of the Cambodian edition. The latter volumes do not have conventional publication data, and are normally cited as published by the Buddhist Institute, Phnom Penh.
Bibliography
Anālayo (Bhikkhu Anālayo), n.d., “Rebirth and the Gandhabbha”. Source unknown (unpublished essay or lecture?).
Bodhi (Bhikkhu Bodhi). 1980. Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta. The Wheel [Series] No. 277, Buddhist Publication Society, Sri Lanka.
Gombrich, Richard. 2009. What the Buddha Thought. Equinox Press: London.
Jurewicz, Johanna. 2000. “Playing with Fire”, JPTS XXVI, 2000, p, 77-103.
Jurewicz, Johanna. 2007. “The Fiery Self. The Rgvedic Roots of the Upaniṣadic Concept of Ātman”, in: Teaching on India in Central and Eastern Europe, Danuta Stasik & Anna Trynkowska (editors), p. 123-137.
Jurewicz, Johanna. No date (circa 2008?). “The R̥gveda, ‘small scale’ societies and rebirth eschatology”. A lecture delivered at the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studes, archived online at: www.ocbs.org/content/view/63/121
Mahāsī (Mahāsī Sayādaw) & U Aye Maung, translator. 2008 (1st ed. 1982). A Discourse on Dependent Origination. Association for Insight Meditation: Middlesex, England. [Available as an e-text, via www.aimwell.com]
Nyanatiloka. 1956. Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines. Frewin & Co., Columbo, Sri Lanka. (This book has been through numerous subsequent editions, including widely-distributed reprints financed by the Taiwanese Corporate Body of the Buddha Foundation.)
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Rhys Davids, C.A.F.. 1922. The Book of the Kindred Sayings, vol. 2. Pali Text Society: Oxford.
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Yuyama, Akira. 2000. Eugene Burnouf: The Background to his Research into the Lotus Sutra. The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology. Soka University: Tokyo.
[1]. The Khmer edition has kiŋpaccayā throughout (កិំបច្ចយា vs. កិម្បច្ចយា).
[2]. I am here omitting to mention that there are interpretations that presume (and preach) the very opposite, most famously the 20th century Thai monk Buddhadasa.
[3]. SN, Abhisamaya Saŋyutta, Kaḷārakhattiyavaggo; PTS SN vol. 2, p. 60-63.
[4]. A variation of no significance: I am retaining the Khmer edition’s double-p spelling (vs. viññāṇapaccayā).
[5]. Again, a variant of no significance, I’m opting to retain the euphonic ñ of the Khmer version (vs. viññāṇaŋ ca).
[6]. The Khmer version has samuccijjissathā (សមុច្ចិជ្ជិស្សថា), footnoting the spelling above from the PTS edition.
[7]. In the interpretation of Piyadassi, 2008, glossing this particular “link” seems to interrupt his (exceedingly abstract) sermon as a non-sequitor, as he admits that the subject matter being discussed is (or at least includes), “…the conascent material body in its first embryonic stage…”. There is an obvious problem for an interpreter to admit that this is the subject-matter in the transition between two of the twelve links (viññāṇa& nāmarūpa) but not to confess it in the others, or to omit to mention that is the subject of the text as a whole. Piyadassi, 2008, q.v. section IV, second paragraph & section XI, first paragraph.
[8]. All of my observations on the gandhabba originate in a discussion (by e-mail) with Dr. Ole Pind, and to him my thanks are owed, for his patience and encouragement. I gathered my thoughts on the matter together and sent them off in reply to Gombrich (2009, p. 73, as aforementioned). I then received a reply from the Reverend Nyanatusita (of Kandy, Sri Lanka) who drew my attention to an undated (and apparently unpublished) article by a monk named Anālayo, titled “Rebirth and theGandhabbha“. This affirms that I am not the first person to notice the comparison between these two sources, nor am I the first to propose the Assalāyana-sutta as an explanatory origin for the role of the gandhabba. However, Anālayo seems to state his conclusion with some ambivalence, and his interest in pursuing the issue may be perpendicular to my own: “It may be from this original intent of the discussion of the three conditions for conception in the Assalāyana-sutta references to this presentation in other discourses and later works originated.” (Anālayo, n.d., p. 98)
[9]. This misinterpretation is foisted onto the source text in the translation of the MN by Sister Upalavanna, n.d., distributed on the internet by the Sri Lanka Tripitaka Project (metta.lk); her hermeneutic ploy is simply to provide the English phrase “the one to be born” as if it were a synonym for the gandhabba, described above, with no explanation.
[10]. For a study that includes some detailed discussion of the manuscripts that Burnouf had in hand, along with other sources and influences, see Yuyama, 2000.
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To my limited knowledge, the interpretation of n─Бmar┼лpa as “one of the earliest stages of the conception and development of the embryo, and it is immediately subsequent to consciousness “entering into the mother’s womb” and might be influenced by the father may not be the true understanding of what the Buddhist teaching is. For Buddhist teaching although whatever effect that we experience must have a certain cause, Buddhist teaching never ackowledges any causes that is beyond human experience. Although in scientific term, one can explain some physical characteristic of a human through genetic, one is hardly predict his/her behavior. Therefore, nothing of specific consciousness can be pre-determined. Therefore, neitgher mother nor father (or even previous life if we believe in reincarnation) has a role in determining n─Бmar┼лpa. It is the environemnt where a human was born and live in that define what his or her consciousness is.
Un Leang
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Thanks for this excellent article. Surprisingly, the study of ancient dead languages seems to provide constant fuel for controversy!
I was familiar with Tibetan interpretations of “(Co-)Dependent Origination / Arising” as a key Buddhist doctrine, through (e.g.) Tsongkhapa’s 14th-century poem. Therefore it’s fascinating to discover just how far those interpretations have strayed from the primary source text, and ultimately how little they are related to the actual words of the Buddha.
It seems there are a lot of misinterpretations of Buddhism (in the Tibetan / Mahayana context) as being somehow uninterested in whether there is a soul, whereas this article reveals that in fact the Buddha categorically asserts that there is no soul! And this makes sense in the broader context of caste relations, and the Buddha’s opposition to caste (since soul is intimately related to caste in ancient India).
I liked the fact that the author was very clear about his sources — a lot of religious / philosophical texts supposedly translating Buddhist materials are very vague, and seem to base their far-fetched interpretations in the “philosophy” they learned in their Santa Cruz yoga class… (Am I being too harsh?)
I would love to see more from the same author!
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Perhaps the several comment evaluators who hit the “thumbs down “button can elaborate on why they reacted negatively to those comments, and/or to the article by Mr. Mazard itself?
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This is a very interesting article. But I fail to see how knowing the physical birth process reduces suffering now or in the future.
The only way this would make sense is if Gotama was trying to dissolve the human race. Which, of course, would end human suffering. But is the termination of reproduction really what Buddhism is all about?
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In response to earlier comments, it is important to note that Mahayana interpretations of Prat─лtyasamutp─Бda are more often based upon Mahayana sutras, which are held to supercede the earlier sutras in instances where they appear to contradict them.
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Alan Potkin // Jan 30, 2011 at 1:31 pm
Perhaps the several comment evaluators who hit the “thumbs down “button can elaborate on why they reacted negatively to those comments, and/or to the article by Mr. Mazard itself?
I pressed the thumbs down button because it’s red 🙂
I think this is a result of my environment rather than a genetic trait. But I could be wrong….
Please press the green button if you did also.
If your genes made you do it please press red
If your mother made you do it, get her to press it. It’s really not your fault.
If no one pressed it, can it press itself?
What would the Lord Buddha have said if he were alive today?
“God made me do it?”
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Dear Larren
I think the Buddhist philosophy never advocate for the termination of reproduction. Although there might be individual who decide to stay in the monkhood for the whole life. The fact is that Buddha himself, at least, produced one child in his life. The idea of ending suffering in Buddhism is to end craving and attachment. The only cause to this desire is a kinship and network system. That is why Buddhist morality never advocate for kinship system, but care, equality and reciprocity. Even after his enlightenment, we hardly hear that Buddha treat his family and freind above other beings. The problem today is how to get away from the kinship and network system. In Western country, to some extent due to its betterment of social security system, the kinship and network system was weakened, but actually never disappear. There are so many example if we look carefully on how the system work in Western countries. It is a bit complicated and hidden compared to most of the developing countries where kinship and network system can be seen in its quite primitive way.
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This discussion here is sliding slowly towards denigrating a major Buddhism.
Every New Mandala subscriber must realize that the same or anything as described here can be construed from any other existing texts on any existing religion.
Even if no existing texts are found, there are numerous, Reverends, mullahs, abbots, Rabbis, Gurus or plain old academics as in this article and out there willing to revise anything to make hay for themselves for or against other religions.
The truth is:
All major religions enshrine a set of principles to better all its followers.
Buddhism, Christianity and Islam being the major 3.
Those who interpret or translate to otherwise are not followers nor expert.
We have seen more Christians justifying the crusade
A few Islamic fanatics justifying terrorism.
But NEVER any Buddhist justifying any interpretation above.
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I’m not sure if by “above”, what is meant here is “above” in the comment regarding religious justifications for violent aggression, or “above” in Eisel Mazard’s article, which has nothing to do with violent aggression. However (recognising that this is moving away from the topic of Eisel Mazard’s post), there are numerous examples of Buddhist Kings attempting to justify aggressive violence by appealing to the defence and propagation of the Dhamma. See, here for an example, taken from the life of Sri Lanka’s King Dottagamani, as celebrated in a well know Burmese publication.
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Thanks for a terrific article on DO. I particularly agree with the quest to ground DO more firmly in Indic culture, a process that is in its infancy. Have you read Wijesekera’s article on the gandhabba in his Buddhist and Vedic Studies? – along with several of his others, a must read.
A couple of points I would question, however. I can’t understand why you reject the three life interpretation: the Upanisa Sutta simply doesn’t bear the burden you place on it, as it doesn’t refer to rebirth in any way different to any other DO teaching. On the other hand, the Balapandita Sutta (SN12.19), for example, clearly requires three lifetimes.
I think your criticism of Mahasi’s comment is inaccurate. From what I can see, he is commenting on the abbreviated form of DO as found in the Mahapadana Sutta, and explaining that in this case the Buddha didn’t follow his normal course of continuing to the avijja and sankhara in previous lives. As is well known, DO is presented in multiple variations, and the ‘three lives’ only refers to the full 12 links, not the 10 found in the Mahapadana Sutta.
I find your suggestion about nama representing paternity to be a fascinating one. Since paternity is always uncertain (without a DNA test), it is common for patriarchs to seek immortality through their ‘name’. It could well be the case that this has contributed to the use of nama in the context of rebirth. Of course, the connection is an abstract one.
In reply to the earlier comment about the relevance of this interpretation in practice: I think it means that the Buddha’s teaching is at root an existential one, not merely a psychological one. There are plenty of places where the Buddha dealt with the way we give rise to suffering in our mind, but as this article points out, the twelve links of DO is not one of those places. It is about the basic existential fact that birth and its consequences are suffering, and to overcome suffering we have to not get reborn.
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Bhikkhu Sujato 11
“and to overcome suffering we have to not get reborn”
If one accepts the lack of empiric scientific evidence for rebirth or any form of supernatural afterlife ( which I suspect the Buddha hinted at as much as Richard Dawkins before the snake oil salesmen put their spin on things) then it is very unlikely that anyone need fear suffering the agonies of life more than once.
Therefore we can all look forward to a just reward of eternal rest after, hopefully; a life well lived.
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Billy Budd, you suspect wrong. And you’re speaking to someone who is actually familiar with the suttas, so you might not want to embarrass yourself by regurgitating Buddhist Modernism propaganda.
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Greg 14
I’m not a buddhist modernist I’m an individual leaning toward atheism based on my life experience and learning. I accept that my world view is a little cynical because of this, however I have no belief system to promulgate or wage jihad for. You are therefore free to accept or dispute my personal point of view with no strings attached.
For further elucidation I would refer you to Emo Philips parable of the Northern Conservative Baptist, which sadly has yet to be translated into Pali, or I suspect Arabic.
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I did not say you were a Buddhist Modernist, but you are espousing a Buddhist Modernist opinion when you say you “suspect” that the Buddha was actually a proto-Dawkins scientific materialist who did not believe in an afterlife. There are no legitimate grounds for believing that about him. He was a 4th century BC Indian man who believed all sorts of things you would not find palatable.
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This article has nothing whatsoever to do with Southeast Asia. Why is it on the New Mandala website? Isn’t the more important question how texts related to theories of dependent origination were interpreted by Thai, Lao, Khmer, et al. Buddhists, rather than simply dismissing these, as the author does in his conclusion, as “misinterpretations”? An unfortunate return to the bad old days of paternalistic orientalist scholarship: the stupid Buddhists have their tradition all wrong, and can’t even recognize the “unambiguous” and “blatant” truths before their eyes!
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I quite agree that after all this time any hypothesis about Christ, Moses, Muhammed, Gautama Buddha is a mix of hypothesis and unreliable sources.
Still we all like something to debate about.
Apart from those who believe that doubt and debate threaten the security of their personal space in infinity or their earthly regimes.
May we all continue to express our personal views in a spirit of peace and developing “the better angels of our nature” as a Pre-Darwininian Abraham Lincoln referred to it.
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@charlesincharge Whether or not that is “more important” is highly subjective. For many of us, ancient and modern, Southeast Asian and not, establishing the most convincing interpretation of the texts though rigorous scholarship is quite important and something we have a vested interest in. In many regards the highest compliment one can pay to the tradition is to take it seriously by engaging it critically beyond disinterested reportage. Further, Mazard takes issue with the interpretations of his peers as much as with anyone else, so playing the Orientalism card I think is not justified at all.
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Greg
Would you care to give us some examples of how the Buddha was a 4th century BC Indian man who believed all sorts of things you would not find palatable? I’m intrigued.
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@Moe Aung I have no idea what you would find unplatable. For someone like Billy Budd who would like to see the Buddha as someone who “hinted” at a “lack of empiric scientific evidence for rebirth,” then obviously the countless sutras describing rebirth and continuity across multiple lifetimes, other planes of existence such as hells and so forth, or anything really not in conformity with scientific empiricism, would not be palatable.
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Greg, the simple observation I have tried to highlight is that the thoughts and beliefs of the great free thinkers are viewed through the imperfect lens of history and interpretation. Which is the basic point of Eisel Mazards article I think.
This will continue to be so in future – I hope.
I find myself frustrated by the all too human tendency to abandon critical thought for blind faith simply because it makes such people victims of those who would manipulate their otherworldly beliefs for all too worldly benefits.
Full marks to the Buddha’s teachings on selflessness, impermanance, non-attachment, introspection and self-examination. I accept and admire this greatly. I get lost in alternate theories of afterlife though. (and suspect, in the case of buddhism that these are supplanted polytheistic leftovers from older religion beliefs).
As a product of “the age of enlightenment” I await more evidence before making an informed decision. So yes, modernist if you will and I hope, all the healthier for it. If there is internet in the afterlife I’ll get back to you and eat my hat.
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Billy Budd,
As far as we can discern, since we ultimately have only a hazy idea of what the historical Buddha actually taught, his teachings about practice, meditation, and virtue are all aimed at moksa, or liberation, also know as nirvana. But all the evidence indicates that this is quite clearly and specifically conceived as liberation from the cycle of samsara, from the ultimately unsatisfying cycle of birth, death, rebirth within the multiple planes of existence, whether heavenly, wordly or hellish. Quite simply, Indian Buddhist teachings, thought and practices make no sense without reference to the cosmology of multiple realms of existence and birth/rebirth that was seemingly presumed by him as the frame of his instruction, the foundation upon which it developed and to which it responded.
And these cosmological presumptions were clearly not “polytheistic leftovers from older religious beliefs”. In fact, the historical evidence indicates that this vision of samsara, rebirth and moksa (as broadly understood across the Indian religious landscape at that time) was a relatively new development in Indian religiosity, perhaps initially developed among the broad community of mendicants and renunciants among which the Buddha was just one example.
Unfortunately, Western Buddhists are typically quite uninformed about actual Indian religious history (vs. simplified and outdated Orientalist imaginings). I have no problem with Western Buddhists adapting and modifying Buddhist notions to fit their own cultural and historical moment and needs. I do object, however, to them claiming justification for their innovations by claiming that all they assert is in accordance with what the historical Buddha taught – before that is the superstitions and ignorance of the Indian masses and the deceptions of opportunistic religious elites obscured such surprisingly modern wisdom. Such claims are typically unpersuasive when closely examined.
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Billy Budd,
You mention belief in an afterlife/rebirth in connection with a Buddhist tradition about which you are dubious. In this regard, I understand the Buddha to have taught that seeing past and future lives was an empirical fact for those who had developed a level of consciousness which permitted such vision.
The Buddha does not ask one to believe in this cycle of births and continuing existences. He says that he developed the ability to see them. He says that you can, too. If you can’t see them, don’t worry about them.
It is difficult to reject the Buddha’s claim. I have met individuals who claimed to have developed the same power. They were quite convincing. However, it would be pushing the point to call this evidence irrefutable. If you have not developed this ability in yourself, and you have not met anyone who seemed to you to have this ability, then perhaps you are best off leaving the subject alone. One can’t know everything, or develop every possible ability. Perhaps some day you may develop it? Who knows. In the meantime, it does not pay to completely discount the claims, either. They may be true. The point, I guess, is that this version of Buddhism which I am presenting here does not require a belief in reincarnation. It does seem to require an open mind on the subject, something which an ‘There Is Absolutely No Such Thing As Reincarnation’-Atheist might not be able to abide.
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Billy Budd,
You mention belief in an afterlife/rebirth in connection with a Buddhist tradition about which you are dubious
Perhaps you should learn to do “intense meditation” This may provide an insight to the issue. Intense meditation is different from the general meditation taught at meditation centres.
Doing “intense meditation” causes one to have “visions” and experience detachment of consciousness. (OBE – Out of Body experience) This may only be a state of mind, but makes for a very interesting experience. Generally one can expect to experience that with about 2-3 months of deligent practice – good luck
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What does the author think of other suttas in the Nid─Бnavaggo which refer to Dependent Origination/Dependent Cessation in a more practical sense? Like 1:52 (Up─Бd─Бnasuttaс╣Г): up─Бd─Бniyesu, bhikkhave, dhammesu ass─Бd─Бnupassino viharato taс╣Зh─Б pavaс╕Нс╕Нhati / up─Бd─Бniyesu, bhikkhave, dhammesu ─Бd─лnav─Бnupassino viharato taс╣Зh─Б nirujjhati. To me this series of suttas seem to have a fairly straightforward meaning, that by dwelling on the ‘ass─Бd─Б’ of things, taс╣Зh─Б increases; by dwelling on the ‘─Бd─лnav─Б’ of things, taс╣Зh─Б ceases. This is obviously not referring to the birth process of an infant, for such cognitive processes do not occur then. These suttas begin from the middle of DO, avijja etc already in place, and they concern the increase or decrease in craving.
Feeling>craving>clinging>becoming have a straightforward application, observable in one’s own life. The question is of course, what then is “birth” referring to after becoming? In the three lives model, becoming>birth means death and rebirth, continuity like the “great fire” in 1:52 which burns so long as it is given fuel to burn. In the reverse order, cessation of craving brings the rest of the cycle to a stop, after death there is no rebirth. In a one life interpretation, I think we would have to interpret birth and death symbolically, as per Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, but then other suttas like Vibhaс╣Еgasuttaс╣Г contradict this giving straight definitions of the terms.
Mahayana scholar Hajime Nakamura wrote in his biography Gotama Buddha that the entire 12 links series is merely a later innovation, that the Buddha himself never taught or thought it. I find this view interesting but questionable due to the Mahayana bias.
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Rhetoric,
I think it is possible to see past lives but not future lives, for the simple reason that the future is determined by present khamma and thus, unknown. The past lives can be known through meditation because it is simply tracing back various causal connections to the point of birth and before that – into the previous life. Seeing into future lives would imply that actions are predestined. This contradicts notions of khamma and the practical living of the holy life, which relies on present moment thoughts and actions.
Not entirely related but might as well post it now – for anyone into Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, I would be very weary. He was obviously an accomplished monk but his deference to Western scientific thinking was naive and ultimately one must conclude that he was an annihilationist who believed that we are born spontaneously with no causal connection to the past and that death is total cessation. Some Buddhists do not see why it is important to believe in rebirth at all, but when examined closely, denial of rebirth means that every death is “nirvana” whether earned or not, whether it’s a 3 year old child dying or a wise old buddha. This noxious nihilism was the target of the Buddha’s criticism, along with its opposite extreme, eternalism of the likes found in theistic religion.
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mmnn… I’m not sure, but it seems to me that, while this interpretative thesis is plausible; even if it is true, it doesn’t actually rule out interpreting the 12 links as applicable to experience and samsara as a whole, since the process of rebirth is, to certain extent, occurring in every moment. Each of the 12 links is, I believe (in my limited understanding) a part of momentary experience, arising and passing away.
As such, the idea that we ought to limit our understanding to the formation of consciousness in the womb just seems to be inconsistent with other Buddhist doctrine.
I mean, I’m not sure, but it just seems like if we are too strict or narrow in our interpretation, and try too much to stick to the letter of the text, then we risk moving away from the spirit of the dhamma.
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Eisel Mazard seems to be something of a crackpot. Anyone familiar with the Samyutta Nikaya, which is regarding by some important scholars as preceding the other Nikayas, should be able to see the absurdity of Mazard’s claims here. I suspect this man, having now distanced himself from Buddhism, certainly no Buddhist himself, is using this “theory” as a last grasp at scholastic infamy. We are to believe his insight is so penetrating that he saw in the paticcasamuppada what no one else ever has seen, what the Buddha seems to have been unaware of himself! This baseless theory might – might – hold up if one had nothing but the bare bones 12 link formula to work with, but as soon as one considers the bulk of texts expounding on the sequence, it falls flat. Hopefully it will not mislead anyone in their practice.
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MN 38 unambiguously states dependent origination is something that can be realised or verified by each wise person. Therefore, if a version of dependent origination is not clearly visible in meditation, it cannot be dependent origination. DN 15 is obviously not the words of the Buddha because it defines certain nidanas differently than the other suttas and because it does not even include all 12 nidanas.
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Would be interesting what other interpretations have been given by others from within the traditions. One should’nt belittle new interpretations , one can look at the same equations in many ways and might see it in entirely new perspective.That is part of Human creation of knowledge, part of what makes knowledge a discovery and an invention. It makes better sense to note where that new perspective has come from instead. I am interested in knowing whether this has been the only interpretation or were there any other interpretations as well. And to take it forward how exactly does karma tally with our day to day interaction, our day to day behavior. In short, what was the understanding of human psyche and causality and how has it changed with time . In this case I would be grateful to the author if he can say whether there have been different interpretations from with the tradition before say 17th century AD and whether he can guide to material reagarding say buddhist understanding of psyche and causality (especially buddhist atomism) ? Thank you
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