[The Buddha:] “What now, R─Бhula, is the element of air? The element of air may be internal, may be external.
“And what, R─Бhula, is the internal gaseous element? Whatever pertains to oneself as an individual, is gaseous, of an airy nature, and a product of grasping–as for example: ascending and descending flatus [i.e., the Latin term for flatulence, etc.], the vapours in the abdomen and bowels, the air passing through the various parts of the body, such as inhalation and exhalation, or anything else whatsoever pertaining to oneself as an individual, that is gaseous, of an airy nature, and a product of grasping: this, R─Бhula, is called ‘the internal element of air.’ But even this internal gaseous element, as well as the external gaseous element, is merely the element of air. This, in accordance with fact and with perfect knowledge, should be regarded thus: ‘This is not mine; this am I not; this is soulless.,’ Having seen with perfect knowledge that such is the case one becomes disgusted with the gaseous element, and one’s mind is detached from the element of air.
[Translation of Nyanaponika Thera, Buddhist Publication Society,
Kandy, Sri Lanka, The Wheel No. 33, 1st ed. 1961]
P.S. I should add that, altogether, Joe had applied for bail eight times; all were rejected.
I also heard – but this is still a bit uncertain – that a number of Thais currently in jail on LM charge, in various stages of their cases (trial in lower courts, appeals, etc) have been seriously considering this option as well, since it now becomes obvious that, the newly installed “pro-democracy” government and its “pro-democracy” UDD ally, would not try to intervene, even just to secure their temporary release on bail. (The UDD, of course, had secured bail for several of their own top leaders and activists who are being charged with LM.)
When I wrote the above update #157, I actually already knew that Joe and his lawyer had decided to take the “confession” option after the latest attempt to secure bail was rejected by the Court, but I wanted to wait until it’s absolutely certain.
Now I can report that, on Friday afternoon (7 October), Joe’s lawyer has filed application with the Court changing Joe’s plea from “not guilty” to “guilty”.
So, the upcoming, scheduled trial tomorrow, Monday 10 October at 9.00 am, will turn into a sentencing hearing.
It is expected that Joe will get around 3 to 5 years jail term (reduced from 6 to 10 for confession).
I hope that the US embassy and anyone who can, would now help Joe in his quest for pardon.
…Javanese labour migration to Malaya and Sabah represented the third largest migratory movement…It is also important to place Javanese migration in the wider context of the long tradition of geographical mobility that was facilitated by network-creating and networkdependent relationships. Through their pilgrimages to Mecca, Javanese had established contacts with networks of pilgrim brokers (Haji sheikhs), who organised work and travel arrangements for their employment in Malaya and North Borneo (Sabah) via Singapore. These networks, which subsequently expanded to include Javanese settled in the latter two areas, have contributed, and continue to contribute to, the perpetuation of Javanese migration within the region (Bahrin 1965).
“…The truth is Malay leaders, particularly the Sultans, were happy to maintain the colonial status quo until Commonwealth troops had succeeded in quashing the Communist insurgency and the pre-ordained Malay leaders could take control of a fledgling independent country.
Independence was gifted in 1957, and a vote of thanks for the 70,000 British, Australian, New Zealand, Gurkhas and Fijian soldiers who fought here and subdued the Malay enemy is unlikely. However, several attempts have been made to venerate Malaysia’s first leaders as those who fought and won independence for a grateful nation…”
Amateur: interesting post. What you’re talking about reminds me a lot of the movement of populations into the British Isles. Haplotype frequency testing shows the majority of the UK to be of a type which the researchers believe to originate in the neolithic peoples. The Anglo-Danish and Norwegian contigent shows up in the north to a lesser extent, but the Celtic – not at all. This shows how a small over-class can impose its language and customs upon an under-class without really contributing very much to the gene pool.
If the grim visage of PM Yingluck in last night’s (Oct 7) televised addressed to the nation is any indication of what awaits Bangkok in the coming days, it seems almost inevitable that Bangkok will be flooded when the torrents of water arrive from the north and meet with high tides in the gulf of Thailand. Although the government has made every effort to inform the public in the inimitable style of photo ops that it is working hard to find a solution to the widespread upstream flooding, the Prime Minister’s candid statements reported by the Nation (Sept 27, 2011) that “her government did not know how to drain all the flood water, given that it was now literally almost everywhere” was perhaps already a veiled warning to downstream Bangkokians who seemed oblivious to the immensity of the flooding situation as they continued to live in dry conditions in the capital.
Yet in the days that followed, it appeared that no amount of money thrown at the problem or much “rear guard” action by unorganized agencies fighting a battle against the floods could stop its relentless spread of destruction. The ministers running these agencies are “the same Cabinet members who have been found lacking in their efforts to cope with this still-unfolding crisis. Agencies coming under this mechanism are the ones already fighting the floods in desperation. It seems the success of the plan announced by Yingluck yesterday will rely more on nature’s mercy than human efficiency.”
There is also the controversial issue of dams nearing full capacity that release water in the most inopportune time to aggravate the already dire situation in the rivers and flooded areas, and at a time in the month of October that when the massive volume arrives in Bangkok will be met by high tides. Is there any room for accountability here by whoever is responsible for these dams since this was also the same type of blame during the 1983 floods?
Why wait until the “Bhumibol Dam is 94.3% full and the Sirikit Dam 99.19% full” instead of releasing the water in these dams gradually (as a reserve) before the onset of heavy rains? Surely the engineers receive weather forecast data? What is the science behind this?
Despite all of these efforts to create a semblance of control (“flood war room” in Don Mueang Airport), provision of free parking at Don Mueang’s Airport carpark for use “by people who are worried that their vehicles could be submerged”(no mention of where people can stay if they are flooded since obviously Thais value their cars more than their persons), provide relief (through mobilization of Thai Red Cross, Army and Navy) and prioritize to save economic assets as in the case of “the government choosing to sacrifice part of the Asian Highway in Ayutthaya to save around a hundred factories in the 7,275-rai Rojana Industrial Park in the province”
there appears to be little or no reference in the public consciousness on how to share the flood burden. We only get an inkling of this important issue as we read of conflict arising between flooded communities as a result of prioritized areas, with anger and frustration erupting into into civil disobedience as was reported in residents destroying the sandbag embankments in Nakhon Nayok (that privileged the Pathum Thani economic zone) and Chainat (that privileged neighboring Suphan Buri province).
Although this “worst flood” in 50 years is a likely result of a combination of unusual climate patterns (heavy rains probably caused by higher evaporation from the Pacific and moisture blown westward to the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand) and the usual suspects (deforestation for state-promoted tree farming, resort building; poor land use controls, urbanization) we fail to remember an additional significant factor: the presence of a metropolis on the mouth of the flood plain of Chao Phraya River. In the past, such 50 year cycle floods would have been accommodated simply by flooding the entire flood plain, making this one giant “kaem ling” or monkey cheeks (water retention pond) as subsequently popularized by HM the King as a flood mitigation strategy. This is one reason why the central Plain is fertile as a result of sediment being distributed during the natural cycle of flooding.
Bangkok so far has remained spared of the floods because of its comparatively advanced infrastructure in the form of a system of dikes, water gates to prevent entry of overflowing river water to its system of khlongs, one drainage tunnel, and massive pumping stations that had been installed after the massive flooding of Bangkok in 1983. However, as a result of this protection, the river flow capacity of Chao Phraya River is therefore constrained by its physical dimensions regardless of how many boats are pressed into service to churn the water with their propellers to push the waters outwards to the sea. The effect of Bangkok’s flood protection, as the dramatic flood photo (indicative not accurate) from the GISTDA shows is that Bangkok, besieged by a wall of water surrounding it, looks like one giant cork preventing all the water from draining into the sea. (you need Google Earth to view the file) Needless to say, any similar attempt to protect any large urban area upstream by dikes would also have the same effect of displacing the flood waters to unprotected areas.
Therefore, the success of any urban area in keeping the flood waters at bay would appear to depend on its level of infrastructure and its downright refusal to flood it as a “kaem ling” (a retention pond) so that water from upstream can drain faster. This is the case of Bangkok where Governor Suhumbhand reports that BMA “has already opened 90% of its water sluice gate”, and in the case of Suphanburi, where the political strongman of Suphanburi (Mr. Banharn) is reported to have kept “the keys of all watergates in Suphan Buri and does not allow anyone to open a single one to allow run-offs from the upper North”.
What is therefore the political economy of sharing the flood water burden i.e., who should bear the burden of the floods? If the whole Bangkok area was made into a water retention pond, the water from upstream can drain faster, and therefore ease the burden of those who have been inundated for more than a month. Bangkok is part of the flood plain. My proposal (that would of course be considered bababobo (BBBB) by many) is that to help ease the urban-rural divide (remember that? Or have the floods made you forget?)(and should this unusual climate patterns most likely continue to be a yearly event from now on in varying degrees of severity), I submit that Bangkokians share the burden of the flooding. Since after all this is the term break for students, let Bangkok be flooded in a controlled manner for at least one week, even two (then close the water gates and pump the water out). This may perhaps help mollify the sense of frustration, discontent and feelings of neglect by people in the rural areas may now find yet another source of aggrievement in the form of this suffering from flood damage and loss of life that upstream folks have to bear almost singlehandedly. The economic damage will be great, but that is a small price for returning the country into some semblance of unity again.
However, this BBBB proposal has already been overtaken by events. We are now moving into the high tide season, plus there are increasing rains (due to “low pressure system”) expected and those damn dams have to continue releasing water. I hope I am proven wrong and that Bangkok will not be flooded contrary to the dire fact that the PM Yingluck has already admitted on Thursday, Oct 6 that the flooding situation in the country has reached the crisis level (read, out of control)
Be that as it may, it is instructive to reflect on what should be done after the worst of this flood season is over. Are there going to be any long term solutions? When PM Yingluck asked for 40 Billion Baht for “integrated water management, that supposedly should prevent extensive flooding in the future”, no details were given, except for “early warning systems”. “Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra yesterday (Sept 28) instructed all governors to implement the “2Ps 2Rs” in fighting off disasters in their provinces. “Make the checklist and see if you’ve followed them,” she said, referring to preparation and prevention, and response and recovery.”
However, in a search in google, there is already one proposal for flood mitigation called “The second master plan of flood mitigation for Chao Phraya Delta after 1995 flood which has been initially developed by AIT , DHI and ACRES Int.Ltd. for the World Bank, further developed in details by JICA and finally reported in Thai by the Crown Property Bureau.” (Vongvisessomjai, 2007).
There is even a phasing of implementation of flood mitigation measures by short, medium and long term by the Crown Property Bureau (p. 4). Why this has not been implemented or whether even this proposal has come to the attention of PM Yingluck remains an unanswered question. If this great Megalopolis called Bangkok has to be protected by all means (as it contributes at least 60% to the GDP), the construction of the diversion channel to the eastern part of Bangkok would serve to mitigate severe flood damage. The report acknowledges that this is going “to be very costly”. Regardless, as we irreversibly enter the era of severe climate patterns, priorities must be reoriented to reduce the costs of spatial inequalities that seem for certain to intensify as more and more people realize the unfair sharing of climate impacts leave many worse off than a select few. In doing so we save the country not only economically, politically, but more importantly, psychologically, as it realizes a modicum of social equity.
I think the the discussions are not subject driven, but panel driven. Whoever is in town on the day of the panel discussion determines the turns taken in the ensuing discussion.
…. And another thing to add to my largely incoherent observation above, I wonder what sort of influence the Myitsone cancellation will have over the Xayaburi project decision. Vientiane will look damn foolish if they proceed with a project in spite of protests, from local to regional, when Naypidaw have cancelled a big dam to apparently appease popular protest. Well that’s how I imagine some types to play it: Naypidaw more reasonable than Vientiane!
The people won a battle but not the war, so I agree with Sabai Sabai. Shwe Gas pipeline project appears to be the next arena, and I believe it is the right one. These two are the heads of the dragon as it were.
The govt might have calculated it’s a trade off between the dam and the pipeline. By depriving the Rakhine of their offshore gas, to be siphoned off to China as Rakhine State blinks in the dark, the regime has failed to split between the people of the Rakhine coastland and those of the Burman heartlands plus Shan uplands, vast areas of which stand to suffer from environmental devastation, something that can unite people to stand up and fight together.
If the Chinese think the generals are content to leave the Wa alone for the foreseeable future, they’ve got another think coming. If the Wa think they had better keep their powder dry, it won’t be for long and they’ll find out breaking the alliance with the KIA and listening to China was a mistake. None of them expected a BGF fate earmarked for them and all of them seemed to believe the promise of political solutions once a new civilian govt was in power. No use repeating, “Burmese talk in forked tongue” like the native American complaining about the white man.
The effusive language that both countries use in their relations is a time honoured tradition. Whilst the Chinese are arguably the only race the Burmese hold in high esteem for their ancient civilisation, intellect and skills, this great alien empire along the long eastern border has always been regarded as a powerful threat since the days of the Burmese empires of yore. When in the 18th C the Burmese invaded Thailand twice, the Chinese invaded Burma four times all repulsed at the border. The generals kn0w their country’s military history inside out, and realize it won’t be that easy this time.
The farmers have never been a source of flooding, even if illiterate they are to intelligent to destroy their own resources; deforestation was always and still is the result of the corrupt Tha├п elite causing damage to large areas in the North, using cheap labor coming from outside of the concerned areas. Its fashion among Tha├п generals to have their own resort in the mountains, even in theoretically blocked Natural Parks. They also engage labor to deforest now the top of the mountains, so that it cannot be seen from below and resulting in huge mud-slides in areas where there have never been such disasters.
As to Bangkok, the city will soon also get its share of flood, the hastily constructed dams will probably not resist for long to the force of water. But don’t worry, the king has taken all necessary measures to avoid disaster: he ordered ships been lined up with their engines running to speed up the water flow (I think he merits an IG Nobel in applied physics), he also wanted start in pure Buddhist tradition prayers to the some Hindu Rain god but it seems he was dissuaded to go on with such a stupid action. In the meantime and in order to allow training for the rowers of the royal barges for the December festival, he has closed some water-doors on the Chaophraya River. He thinks that the remaining channels should be able to absorb the coming floods.
I just want to refer back to the comments Ricardo and I made in Comments 9 and 11 about whether vimeo is or is not banned.
Well, apropos of something completely unrelated to Thai politics, I followed a link to vimeo tonight and it did not go through the MICT. This is good.
All I can think is that the MICT having banned so many thousands of websites, have forgotten precisely why they banned them in the first place and may be attempting to make amends.
Perhaps they read New Mandala for information on these matters.
This number is disingenuous. That’s the “official” exchange rate, which only junta cronies benefit from when outsiders bring money into Myanmar. The real exchange rate once the money has been brought into Myanmar means that each resettled person (ie person told s/he must move against his or her will) will receive, if he or she is lucky, about 86 USD.
I know this because when I paid the fee for a young Myanmar person’s English course in Yangon last month, 190,000 kyat equaled about 450 USD if exchanged “on the street”, but the same number of kyat required 45000 USD (!!!) at a government-sanctioned exchange site.
Must agree with what many others have noticed: Other than an initial discussion of religion, the topic soon turned to politics, insurgency, and security. This panel wasn’t really about religion in the context of the violence in the Deep South. As others have noted, there are various topics that could have been discussed regarding these three issues while retaining a focus on religion: the increasingly intimate collusion of Buddhist temples and Army encampments (ala Jerryson’s new book); the increasing polarization between the Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslims communities in general or religious authorities in particular; the declining population of Thai Buddhists in the Deep South due to outward migration; the continuing but challenged salience of religious tourism by Chinese Malay Buddhists to pilgrimage locations in the Deep South; the role of Southern Thai Buddhist monastics and elites in championing a more nationalistic Thai Buddhist persona (ala their support for the effort to make Buddhism the state religion in the more recent past); the relation of Malay Muslims in the Deep South to other ethnic and regional Muslim communities in Thailand and the official, centralized Muslim religious hierarchy; the divisions and fragmentation within and among Muslim communities and networks in the Deep South.
In other words, there were a lot of relevant topics regarding the place and salience of religion in the insurgency, violence and political turmoil of the Deep South that could have been explored. Why these issues weren’t discussed in a panel on “religion” focused on the Deep South is a mystery to me.
referring to Fadhli’s comments, it seems like many Malaysians feel uncomfortable with existing contradictions among the Pakatan Rakyat component parties, particularly with regard to racial and religious issues.
In the history of social and political chane, exceptionally, a charismatic leader or dictator may be able to impose his will for a period of time and effect the changes he requires onto his nation’s citizens through persuasion or force, respectively. But in Malaysia for the past 13 years, UMNO has been tirelessly tarnishing Anwar’s reputation to prevent him from carrying out reformasi through his charisma.
Apart from the above exception, in real life, political parties with any measure of support mostly reflect the mentality and aspirations of their own supporters. It is up to the leaders of these political parties to slowly work together and tackle the various issues without alienating their supporters. It is premature to expect all the outstanding problems to be resolved immediately merely by amalgamating all the 3 Pakatan Rakyat component parties.
Fadhli’s yearning for one leader, one party, one manifesto, one vision, one voice, etc can only be realistically accomplished if the various groups, communities and races have resolved their differences to such an extent (through their own efforts as well as through the hard and sincere work of their party leaders) that finally a true one Malaysia comes into existence.
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Flatulence and breathing meditation
[The Buddha:] “What now, R─Бhula, is the element of air? The element of air may be internal, may be external.
“And what, R─Бhula, is the internal gaseous element? Whatever pertains to oneself as an individual, is gaseous, of an airy nature, and a product of grasping–as for example: ascending and descending flatus [i.e., the Latin term for flatulence, etc.], the vapours in the abdomen and bowels, the air passing through the various parts of the body, such as inhalation and exhalation, or anything else whatsoever pertaining to oneself as an individual, that is gaseous, of an airy nature, and a product of grasping: this, R─Бhula, is called ‘the internal element of air.’ But even this internal gaseous element, as well as the external gaseous element, is merely the element of air. This, in accordance with fact and with perfect knowledge, should be regarded thus: ‘This is not mine; this am I not; this is soulless.,’ Having seen with perfect knowledge that such is the case one becomes disgusted with the gaseous element, and one’s mind is detached from the element of air.
[Translation of Nyanaponika Thera, Buddhist Publication Society,
Kandy, Sri Lanka, The Wheel No. 33, 1st ed. 1961]
FACT’s plea for Joe Gordon
P.S. I should add that, altogether, Joe had applied for bail eight times; all were rejected.
I also heard – but this is still a bit uncertain – that a number of Thais currently in jail on LM charge, in various stages of their cases (trial in lower courts, appeals, etc) have been seriously considering this option as well, since it now becomes obvious that, the newly installed “pro-democracy” government and its “pro-democracy” UDD ally, would not try to intervene, even just to secure their temporary release on bail. (The UDD, of course, had secured bail for several of their own top leaders and activists who are being charged with LM.)
FACT’s plea for Joe Gordon
sad UPDATE:
When I wrote the above update #157, I actually already knew that Joe and his lawyer had decided to take the “confession” option after the latest attempt to secure bail was rejected by the Court, but I wanted to wait until it’s absolutely certain.
Now I can report that, on Friday afternoon (7 October), Joe’s lawyer has filed application with the Court changing Joe’s plea from “not guilty” to “guilty”.
So, the upcoming, scheduled trial tomorrow, Monday 10 October at 9.00 am, will turn into a sentencing hearing.
It is expected that Joe will get around 3 to 5 years jail term (reduced from 6 to 10 for confession).
I hope that the US embassy and anyone who can, would now help Joe in his quest for pardon.
Moving forward from racial tensions in Malaysia
@ KY #3: An example:
Extracted from, “International Migration and Governance in Malaysia: Policy and performance“,Amarjit Kaur, UNEAC Asia Papers No. 22 , 2008.
Migration from Indonesia to Malaysia is discussed further here by the same author.
Reclaiming Malaysian history
Extracted from, “Malaysia’s twisted past“, Luke Hunt, The Diplomat, 7 October 2011.
Nationalism and genetics: Thai obsession with race
Amateur: interesting post. What you’re talking about reminds me a lot of the movement of populations into the British Isles. Haplotype frequency testing shows the majority of the UK to be of a type which the researchers believe to originate in the neolithic peoples. The Anglo-Danish and Norwegian contigent shows up in the north to a lesser extent, but the Celtic – not at all. This shows how a small over-class can impose its language and customs upon an under-class without really contributing very much to the gene pool.
Nation, Religion, King – Episode 2
Empirical data make matters more complicated. This is probably the reason why a lot of discussions on the south tend to be led by “armchair” academics with a rather limited knowledge of what happens. There are a few exceptions like Marc Askey or Sascha Helbardt (see his report in new madala: http://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Anatomy-of-Southern-Thailand%E2%80%99s-Insurgency.pdf).
Floods, hacks and the Nitirat effect
The BBBB Proposal
If the grim visage of PM Yingluck in last night’s (Oct 7) televised addressed to the nation is any indication of what awaits Bangkok in the coming days, it seems almost inevitable that Bangkok will be flooded when the torrents of water arrive from the north and meet with high tides in the gulf of Thailand. Although the government has made every effort to inform the public in the inimitable style of photo ops that it is working hard to find a solution to the widespread upstream flooding, the Prime Minister’s candid statements reported by the Nation (Sept 27, 2011) that “her government did not know how to drain all the flood water, given that it was now literally almost everywhere” was perhaps already a veiled warning to downstream Bangkokians who seemed oblivious to the immensity of the flooding situation as they continued to live in dry conditions in the capital.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Bt40-bn-needed-for-longterm-solution-PM-says-as-mo-30166223.html
Yet in the days that followed, it appeared that no amount of money thrown at the problem or much “rear guard” action by unorganized agencies fighting a battle against the floods could stop its relentless spread of destruction. The ministers running these agencies are “the same Cabinet members who have been found lacking in their efforts to cope with this still-unfolding crisis. Agencies coming under this mechanism are the ones already fighting the floods in desperation. It seems the success of the plan announced by Yingluck yesterday will rely more on nature’s mercy than human efficiency.”
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Sense-of-urgency-must-turn-into-action-30167153.html
There is also the controversial issue of dams nearing full capacity that release water in the most inopportune time to aggravate the already dire situation in the rivers and flooded areas, and at a time in the month of October that when the massive volume arrives in Bangkok will be met by high tides. Is there any room for accountability here by whoever is responsible for these dams since this was also the same type of blame during the 1983 floods?
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/259742/more-dam-water-to-be-released
Why wait until the “Bhumibol Dam is 94.3% full and the Sirikit Dam 99.19% full” instead of releasing the water in these dams gradually (as a reserve) before the onset of heavy rains? Surely the engineers receive weather forecast data? What is the science behind this?
Despite all of these efforts to create a semblance of control (“flood war room” in Don Mueang Airport), provision of free parking at Don Mueang’s Airport carpark for use “by people who are worried that their vehicles could be submerged”(no mention of where people can stay if they are flooded since obviously Thais value their cars more than their persons), provide relief (through mobilization of Thai Red Cross, Army and Navy) and prioritize to save economic assets as in the case of “the government choosing to sacrifice part of the Asian Highway in Ayutthaya to save around a hundred factories in the 7,275-rai Rojana Industrial Park in the province”
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/260280/highway-sacrificed-to-protect-industry
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Sense-of-urgency-must-turn-into-action-30167153.html
there appears to be little or no reference in the public consciousness on how to share the flood burden. We only get an inkling of this important issue as we read of conflict arising between flooded communities as a result of prioritized areas, with anger and frustration erupting into into civil disobedience as was reported in residents destroying the sandbag embankments in Nakhon Nayok (that privileged the Pathum Thani economic zone) and Chainat (that privileged neighboring Suphan Buri province).
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Suffering-Nakhon-Nayok-locals-tear-down-sandbag-em-30166319.html
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/Angry-Chai-Nat-flood-victims-destroy-sandbag-barri-30166084.html
Although this “worst flood” in 50 years is a likely result of a combination of unusual climate patterns (heavy rains probably caused by higher evaporation from the Pacific and moisture blown westward to the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand) and the usual suspects (deforestation for state-promoted tree farming, resort building; poor land use controls, urbanization) we fail to remember an additional significant factor: the presence of a metropolis on the mouth of the flood plain of Chao Phraya River. In the past, such 50 year cycle floods would have been accommodated simply by flooding the entire flood plain, making this one giant “kaem ling” or monkey cheeks (water retention pond) as subsequently popularized by HM the King as a flood mitigation strategy. This is one reason why the central Plain is fertile as a result of sediment being distributed during the natural cycle of flooding.
Bangkok so far has remained spared of the floods because of its comparatively advanced infrastructure in the form of a system of dikes, water gates to prevent entry of overflowing river water to its system of khlongs, one drainage tunnel, and massive pumping stations that had been installed after the massive flooding of Bangkok in 1983. However, as a result of this protection, the river flow capacity of Chao Phraya River is therefore constrained by its physical dimensions regardless of how many boats are pressed into service to churn the water with their propellers to push the waters outwards to the sea. The effect of Bangkok’s flood protection, as the dramatic flood photo (indicative not accurate) from the GISTDA shows is that Bangkok, besieged by a wall of water surrounding it, looks like one giant cork preventing all the water from draining into the sea. (you need Google Earth to view the file) Needless to say, any similar attempt to protect any large urban area upstream by dikes would also have the same effect of displacing the flood waters to unprotected areas.
http://tile.gistda.or.th/geoserver/gwc/service/kml/flood:flood_2011_geo.png.kml
Therefore, the success of any urban area in keeping the flood waters at bay would appear to depend on its level of infrastructure and its downright refusal to flood it as a “kaem ling” (a retention pond) so that water from upstream can drain faster. This is the case of Bangkok where Governor Suhumbhand reports that BMA “has already opened 90% of its water sluice gate”, and in the case of Suphanburi, where the political strongman of Suphanburi (Mr. Banharn) is reported to have kept “the keys of all watergates in Suphan Buri and does not allow anyone to open a single one to allow run-offs from the upper North”.
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/260279/flood-waters-bear-down-on-capital
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/politics/The-suffering-continues-as-politicians-play-game-30166957.html
What is therefore the political economy of sharing the flood water burden i.e., who should bear the burden of the floods? If the whole Bangkok area was made into a water retention pond, the water from upstream can drain faster, and therefore ease the burden of those who have been inundated for more than a month. Bangkok is part of the flood plain. My proposal (that would of course be considered bababobo (BBBB) by many) is that to help ease the urban-rural divide (remember that? Or have the floods made you forget?)(and should this unusual climate patterns most likely continue to be a yearly event from now on in varying degrees of severity), I submit that Bangkokians share the burden of the flooding. Since after all this is the term break for students, let Bangkok be flooded in a controlled manner for at least one week, even two (then close the water gates and pump the water out). This may perhaps help mollify the sense of frustration, discontent and feelings of neglect by people in the rural areas may now find yet another source of aggrievement in the form of this suffering from flood damage and loss of life that upstream folks have to bear almost singlehandedly. The economic damage will be great, but that is a small price for returning the country into some semblance of unity again.
However, this BBBB proposal has already been overtaken by events. We are now moving into the high tide season, plus there are increasing rains (due to “low pressure system”) expected and those damn dams have to continue releasing water. I hope I am proven wrong and that Bangkok will not be flooded contrary to the dire fact that the PM Yingluck has already admitted on Thursday, Oct 6 that the flooding situation in the country has reached the crisis level (read, out of control)
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/breakingnews/Yingluck-admits-floods-reach-crisis-level-30166980.html
Be that as it may, it is instructive to reflect on what should be done after the worst of this flood season is over. Are there going to be any long term solutions? When PM Yingluck asked for 40 Billion Baht for “integrated water management, that supposedly should prevent extensive flooding in the future”, no details were given, except for “early warning systems”. “Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra yesterday (Sept 28) instructed all governors to implement the “2Ps 2Rs” in fighting off disasters in their provinces. “Make the checklist and see if you’ve followed them,” she said, referring to preparation and prevention, and response and recovery.”
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/PM-calls-for-more-early-warning-systems-30166405.html
However, in a search in google, there is already one proposal for flood mitigation called “The second master plan of flood mitigation for Chao Phraya Delta after 1995 flood which has been initially developed by AIT , DHI and ACRES Int.Ltd. for the World Bank, further developed in details by JICA and finally reported in Thai by the Crown Property Bureau.” (Vongvisessomjai, 2007).
http://web.rid.go.th/ffd/papers/Paper-Session%201/p1-04%20Flood%20Mitigation%20Master%20Plan.pdf
There is even a phasing of implementation of flood mitigation measures by short, medium and long term by the Crown Property Bureau (p. 4). Why this has not been implemented or whether even this proposal has come to the attention of PM Yingluck remains an unanswered question. If this great Megalopolis called Bangkok has to be protected by all means (as it contributes at least 60% to the GDP), the construction of the diversion channel to the eastern part of Bangkok would serve to mitigate severe flood damage. The report acknowledges that this is going “to be very costly”. Regardless, as we irreversibly enter the era of severe climate patterns, priorities must be reoriented to reduce the costs of spatial inequalities that seem for certain to intensify as more and more people realize the unfair sharing of climate impacts leave many worse off than a select few. In doing so we save the country not only economically, politically, but more importantly, psychologically, as it realizes a modicum of social equity.
Nation, Religion, King – Episode 2
I think the the discussions are not subject driven, but panel driven. Whoever is in town on the day of the panel discussion determines the turns taken in the ensuing discussion.
Infinite feeling: Sino-Burmese relations
…. And another thing to add to my largely incoherent observation above, I wonder what sort of influence the Myitsone cancellation will have over the Xayaburi project decision. Vientiane will look damn foolish if they proceed with a project in spite of protests, from local to regional, when Naypidaw have cancelled a big dam to apparently appease popular protest. Well that’s how I imagine some types to play it: Naypidaw more reasonable than Vientiane!
Sabai sabai
Nation, Religion, King – Episode 2
Thanks The Insider,
That’s some handy speculation. All will be revealed on Tuesday.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
Nation, Religion, King – Episode 2
The first one, nation, digressed into economic issues.
The second episode, religion, turned out to be southern violence discussion.
The last one, King, has yet to be broadcasted.
I speculate that…
A. If it is to be on-topic, Nick will have the panel focused on succession.
B. Otherwise, there are two possibilities that it may digress into:
1. Freedom of speech
2. Constitution
On Burmese Army combat losses
Well, it’s not for nothing that they say in war truth is the first casualty.
Infinite feeling: Sino-Burmese relations
The people won a battle but not the war, so I agree with Sabai Sabai. Shwe Gas pipeline project appears to be the next arena, and I believe it is the right one. These two are the heads of the dragon as it were.
The govt might have calculated it’s a trade off between the dam and the pipeline. By depriving the Rakhine of their offshore gas, to be siphoned off to China as Rakhine State blinks in the dark, the regime has failed to split between the people of the Rakhine coastland and those of the Burman heartlands plus Shan uplands, vast areas of which stand to suffer from environmental devastation, something that can unite people to stand up and fight together.
If the Chinese think the generals are content to leave the Wa alone for the foreseeable future, they’ve got another think coming. If the Wa think they had better keep their powder dry, it won’t be for long and they’ll find out breaking the alliance with the KIA and listening to China was a mistake. None of them expected a BGF fate earmarked for them and all of them seemed to believe the promise of political solutions once a new civilian govt was in power. No use repeating, “Burmese talk in forked tongue” like the native American complaining about the white man.
The effusive language that both countries use in their relations is a time honoured tradition. Whilst the Chinese are arguably the only race the Burmese hold in high esteem for their ancient civilisation, intellect and skills, this great alien empire along the long eastern border has always been regarded as a powerful threat since the days of the Burmese empires of yore. When in the 18th C the Burmese invaded Thailand twice, the Chinese invaded Burma four times all repulsed at the border. The generals kn0w their country’s military history inside out, and realize it won’t be that easy this time.
Floods, hacks and the Nitirat effect
The farmers have never been a source of flooding, even if illiterate they are to intelligent to destroy their own resources; deforestation was always and still is the result of the corrupt Tha├п elite causing damage to large areas in the North, using cheap labor coming from outside of the concerned areas. Its fashion among Tha├п generals to have their own resort in the mountains, even in theoretically blocked Natural Parks. They also engage labor to deforest now the top of the mountains, so that it cannot be seen from below and resulting in huge mud-slides in areas where there have never been such disasters.
As to Bangkok, the city will soon also get its share of flood, the hastily constructed dams will probably not resist for long to the force of water. But don’t worry, the king has taken all necessary measures to avoid disaster: he ordered ships been lined up with their engines running to speed up the water flow (I think he merits an IG Nobel in applied physics), he also wanted start in pure Buddhist tradition prayers to the some Hindu Rain god but it seems he was dissuaded to go on with such a stupid action. In the meantime and in order to allow training for the rowers of the royal barges for the December festival, he has closed some water-doors on the Chaophraya River. He thinks that the remaining channels should be able to absorb the coming floods.
р╕Кр╕▓р╕Хр╕┤ р╕ир╕▓р╕кр╕Щр╕▓ р╕Юр╕гр╕░р╕бр╕лр╕▓р╕Бр╕йр╕▒р╕Хр╕гр╕┤р╕вр╣М: Nation, Religion, King
I just want to refer back to the comments Ricardo and I made in Comments 9 and 11 about whether vimeo is or is not banned.
Well, apropos of something completely unrelated to Thai politics, I followed a link to vimeo tonight and it did not go through the MICT. This is good.
All I can think is that the MICT having banned so many thousands of websites, have forgotten precisely why they banned them in the first place and may be attempting to make amends.
Perhaps they read New Mandala for information on these matters.
Infinite feeling: Sino-Burmese relations
“…resettling site, which is 8644 USD per person.”
This number is disingenuous. That’s the “official” exchange rate, which only junta cronies benefit from when outsiders bring money into Myanmar. The real exchange rate once the money has been brought into Myanmar means that each resettled person (ie person told s/he must move against his or her will) will receive, if he or she is lucky, about 86 USD.
I know this because when I paid the fee for a young Myanmar person’s English course in Yangon last month, 190,000 kyat equaled about 450 USD if exchanged “on the street”, but the same number of kyat required 45000 USD (!!!) at a government-sanctioned exchange site.
Nation, Religion, King – Episode 2
Must agree with what many others have noticed: Other than an initial discussion of religion, the topic soon turned to politics, insurgency, and security. This panel wasn’t really about religion in the context of the violence in the Deep South. As others have noted, there are various topics that could have been discussed regarding these three issues while retaining a focus on religion: the increasingly intimate collusion of Buddhist temples and Army encampments (ala Jerryson’s new book); the increasing polarization between the Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslims communities in general or religious authorities in particular; the declining population of Thai Buddhists in the Deep South due to outward migration; the continuing but challenged salience of religious tourism by Chinese Malay Buddhists to pilgrimage locations in the Deep South; the role of Southern Thai Buddhist monastics and elites in championing a more nationalistic Thai Buddhist persona (ala their support for the effort to make Buddhism the state religion in the more recent past); the relation of Malay Muslims in the Deep South to other ethnic and regional Muslim communities in Thailand and the official, centralized Muslim religious hierarchy; the divisions and fragmentation within and among Muslim communities and networks in the Deep South.
In other words, there were a lot of relevant topics regarding the place and salience of religion in the insurgency, violence and political turmoil of the Deep South that could have been explored. Why these issues weren’t discussed in a panel on “religion” focused on the Deep South is a mystery to me.
Nation, Religion, King – Episode 1
[…] р╕кр╕│р╕лр╕гр╕▒р╕Ър╕Ьр╕╣р╣Йр╕нр╣Ир╕▓р╕Щр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╕Кр╕бр╣Бр╕ер╣Йр╕зр╕нр╕вр╕▓р╕Бр╕Ир╕░р╕гр╣Ир╕зр╕бр╣Бр╕кр╕Фр╕Зр╕Др╕зр╕▓р╕бр╕Др╕┤р╕Фр╣Ар╕лр╣Зр╕Щр╕Бр╕▒р╕Ър╕Ьр╕╣р╣Йр╕Ир╕▒р╕Фр╕Чр╕│ р╕кр╕▓р╕бр╕▓р╕гр╕Цр╣Ар╕Вр╣Йр╕▓р╣Др╕Ыр╣Др╕Фр╣Йр╕Чр╕╡р╣Ир╣Ар╕зр╣Зр╕Ър╣Др╕Лр╕Хр╣Мр╕Щр╕┤р╕зр╣Бр╕бр╕Щр╕Фр╕▓р╕ер╕▓ […]
Moving forward from racial tensions in Malaysia
referring to Fadhli’s comments, it seems like many Malaysians feel uncomfortable with existing contradictions among the Pakatan Rakyat component parties, particularly with regard to racial and religious issues.
In the history of social and political chane, exceptionally, a charismatic leader or dictator may be able to impose his will for a period of time and effect the changes he requires onto his nation’s citizens through persuasion or force, respectively. But in Malaysia for the past 13 years, UMNO has been tirelessly tarnishing Anwar’s reputation to prevent him from carrying out reformasi through his charisma.
Apart from the above exception, in real life, political parties with any measure of support mostly reflect the mentality and aspirations of their own supporters. It is up to the leaders of these political parties to slowly work together and tackle the various issues without alienating their supporters. It is premature to expect all the outstanding problems to be resolved immediately merely by amalgamating all the 3 Pakatan Rakyat component parties.
Fadhli’s yearning for one leader, one party, one manifesto, one vision, one voice, etc can only be realistically accomplished if the various groups, communities and races have resolved their differences to such an extent (through their own efforts as well as through the hard and sincere work of their party leaders) that finally a true one Malaysia comes into existence.