This is a fabulous review and interview. Most academics write mediocre book reviews, and the reader is left to wonder: why didn’t the reviewer grapple with the ideas that animated the author? This review addresses the ideas.
But I would argue that the digression onto Popkin and the Popkin-Scott debate takes away from the review. In truth, the Popkin-Scott “debate” it is not really a debate. A debate should involve two or more scholars joining combat over a common problem and its interpretation. Scott and Popkin look at different areas, different data, come to different conclusions. Popkin actually uses some Vietnamese sources, so score one for him there. Scott does not. Scott is more persuasive in the end, as Popkin’s argument seems so simplistic. In the end, I tend to think that both authors talked about radically different places over different times, so why do people think this is a debate?
Back to Race. One thing in the accompanying interview that doesn’t quite ring true is how Race came up with concepts. From the interview, it seems as if the author, cut off from academia, had ideas like “‘contingent incentives” come to him in the field. Well, obviously, the notion of incentives was not new to him or social science. “Contingent incentives” is indeed a cool idea, though I would argue that if you think through the notion of “incentives,” they have to be contingent to work!
More importantly, though, the interview probably does not convey how much “social science” was in communist documents. I have read Viet Minh documents that are VERY pragmatic. Far from trying to impose a communist worldview willy-nilly on peasants, the communists tried to figure out HOW to get peasants to their side. They also figured out how the right calculus of terror/ violence combined with attraction would work. They were masterful at realizing that the aim of their movement was not necessarily to win or even make friends. It was to neutralize potential enemies, and deny their opponents governance of the countryside. in the long run, the erosion of state power in the countryside would help them win.
It is interesting, when you read in captured documents, to see how the communists planned (for example) to relate to the Cao Dai. Some Cao Dai hated them, but they figured out ways to make areas of common interest. They knew that these Cao Dai may still dislike them, but if they didn’t oppose the communists strongly, that’s progress.
Now, this all happened after serious trial and error. Lots of error. For example, in 1945-47, the Viet Minh used too much killing in the south, and realized pot 1950 that killing would have to be more selective to succeed. THEY LEARNED. And, I think, they applied this knowledge successfully much of the time. By “success,” I do not mean to make a normative statement of approval.
Now, I don’t remember seeing terms like “power ratios” in communist documents. But they were clearly masters of what we now call asymmetrical warfare. They said to themselves: well, how can we maximize our advantages while minimizing our disadvantages? This led them AWAY from purely military approaches, so favored in the early years of the First Indochina War, to more reasonable ones. But I am convinced: yes, they did think in terms of calculating how to succeed. In this, they were very rational choice! But they also realized that choice was not all. Coercion, intimidation, threats all had a role too, and if used well, would be a key to success.
Mind boggling assumption Les. Suggestive of a sneering disrespect for those who do respond to your baiting. Oops, just did it. I agree with others on up this list. It is a very interesting report, with some new information based on interviews. My guess is that both sides will be able to use it. It got considerable TV coverage last evening on one cable news channel, and the reporting was pretty unbiased.
Stuart 6
” One would hope that’s enough time for the free air to disinfect at least some of the poppycock, bullshit and enforced melodrama that’s been shoved down their throats since childhood.”
In the interests of balance I feel compelled to quote Nietzche (do I lose the argument?)
“If you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you”
One of the fascinations of “Thai gazing” is to be amazed at the crudeness of social manipulation, the ignorance of the masses and exposures of hypocrisy.”
Lest we forget, no nation is immune from this, it is just more refined and developed in first world nations. As a visitor to Australia I have seen much the same phenomena albeit more sophisticated.
There is also a tendency in mankind to avoid self-reflection or “deep-thinking” as I believe it’s referred to in the SE corner of Her Majesties commonwealth 🙂
I guess Human Rights Watch will join the ‘enemies list’ along with AI and The Nation but if anyone wants to read an independent report on last year’s troubles the link is below.
Thank you for your support! If you would like to submit your paper for the conference, please send it to me directly. I really hope that the conference will be (one of ) a good meeting place(s) for academics in Thai Studies.
“The present US charge d’affaires, Larry Dinger, in a cable in April last year, proposed various ways of improving ties with Burma, including aid, which he cynically suggested could undermine the regime.
“If properly designed, such assistance builds the basic capacity of people at the grassroots to survive and to think beyond mere subsistence to political goals. Such aid is subversive more directly as well: recipients understand who helps them (international donors) and who doesn’t (the regime),” Dinger said.”
Is it time for old stooges like you and your ilk to rethink helping the citizenry first instead of, punishing more to change an already repeatedly proven uncaring government?
The “K”-word has been craftily redefined, politicized and exploited by the very people who now decree it to be apolitical.
It is, of course, not really about HM.
Can any reader with genealogist knowledge provide a vague number of how many individuals are considered “Royal” in Thailand and enjoy de facto feudal privileges? The Chakri Dynasty comprises of 21 families according to Wikipedia…
The “Request for interpretation” is pretty much as expected – but the other “Request for the indication of provisional measures” is potentially more significant in the short term. I’m no lawyer, but it virtually looks like a request for the court to put a restraining order on Thailand….. as well as bringing in consideration of border conflict well away from Preah Vihear.
I don’t suppose it’ll make much difference to Thailand – their accustomed approach to court rulings seems to be to keep going for new ones until you get one you like…..
[…] several days of growing discussion and outrage over the Amnesty International statement, published by Southeast Asia researcher Benjamin Zawacki of Amnesty’s International Secretariat, […]
Les: I think the buying episode you refer to was Matichon.
You could be right Ralph, but I sort of remember there was a move on the stock exchange in buying the Nation Group’s shares by Thaksin allies sometime after he kicked them off the ITV channel. He took a lot of lessons from Harry Lee in Singapore of course.
Oh dear.As an admirer of Andrew Spooner’s work on Thailand, it’s regrettable he slips into the standard Guardanista mode when discussing the British monarchy.It’s a common position of the bien pensant left in the UK, and one can usually rely on Polly Toynbee to articulate it.And yet it’s so misguided as events have shown time and time again, most notably the huge crowds that turned out at the death of the Queen Mother – to the dismay and frustration of the Guardianistas.It is relevant to Thailand because many of us are dismayed at the way the monarchy has been mobilised for political purposes, but I at least am not hostile to the Thai monarchy – far from it.Andrew needs to understand that in both the UK and Thailand there are millions – almost certainly a majority – who provide the monarchy with overwhelming public support.If Andrew doesn’t understand his own country (he implies the monarchical system has minority support) what hope has he of understanding the aspirations and loyalties of most Thais.
It should be noted that gilded, roadside portraits of the CP, his consort and son have been popping up all over Bangkok and environs over the past month. It seems this new display of “voluntary affection” towards the heir apparent is being shoved down everyone’s throat, and I wonder about the hidden agenda. Why now? What does it imply, if anything, about the current health of HMK? Who benefits politically from this public display of support for the CP? For that matter, why choose him alone and not put up portraits of Princess S or the other Princesses at the same time? Is this an effort to cement his succession to the throne?
IMHO, it would go further toward restoring some respect if he would emulate his closest sister in age and actually bother to engage in a modicum more philanthropy, but I am informed by my reading of the Wikileaks memos that he really doesn’t care what the people think of him.
Les: I think the buying episode you refer to was Matichon. The Nation’s hate of Thaksin was most firmly set when he sent AMLO after some of them on probably trumped-up allegations.
Also, I think it depends when you are saying the the Nation was one of the few that stood up to Thaksin. If you go back to the initial case against Thaksin on assets, you’ll see plenty of critical press coverage. That continued on and off, with Matichon being another. Prachatai was formed out of a feeling that Thaksin was brow-beating the media….
By early 2006, almost all mainstream media were anti-Thaksin.
The Nation does have Pravit, who does some great reporting in amongst a bunch of opinionated nonsense sprouted on its opinion pages. Whatever happened to Thaksin’s impending financial collapse and death that regularly gained a place on those pages as plagiarisms from the madder PAD types?
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Review of War Comes to Long An
This is a fabulous review and interview. Most academics write mediocre book reviews, and the reader is left to wonder: why didn’t the reviewer grapple with the ideas that animated the author? This review addresses the ideas.
But I would argue that the digression onto Popkin and the Popkin-Scott debate takes away from the review. In truth, the Popkin-Scott “debate” it is not really a debate. A debate should involve two or more scholars joining combat over a common problem and its interpretation. Scott and Popkin look at different areas, different data, come to different conclusions. Popkin actually uses some Vietnamese sources, so score one for him there. Scott does not. Scott is more persuasive in the end, as Popkin’s argument seems so simplistic. In the end, I tend to think that both authors talked about radically different places over different times, so why do people think this is a debate?
Back to Race. One thing in the accompanying interview that doesn’t quite ring true is how Race came up with concepts. From the interview, it seems as if the author, cut off from academia, had ideas like “‘contingent incentives” come to him in the field. Well, obviously, the notion of incentives was not new to him or social science. “Contingent incentives” is indeed a cool idea, though I would argue that if you think through the notion of “incentives,” they have to be contingent to work!
More importantly, though, the interview probably does not convey how much “social science” was in communist documents. I have read Viet Minh documents that are VERY pragmatic. Far from trying to impose a communist worldview willy-nilly on peasants, the communists tried to figure out HOW to get peasants to their side. They also figured out how the right calculus of terror/ violence combined with attraction would work. They were masterful at realizing that the aim of their movement was not necessarily to win or even make friends. It was to neutralize potential enemies, and deny their opponents governance of the countryside. in the long run, the erosion of state power in the countryside would help them win.
It is interesting, when you read in captured documents, to see how the communists planned (for example) to relate to the Cao Dai. Some Cao Dai hated them, but they figured out ways to make areas of common interest. They knew that these Cao Dai may still dislike them, but if they didn’t oppose the communists strongly, that’s progress.
Now, this all happened after serious trial and error. Lots of error. For example, in 1945-47, the Viet Minh used too much killing in the south, and realized pot 1950 that killing would have to be more selective to succeed. THEY LEARNED. And, I think, they applied this knowledge successfully much of the time. By “success,” I do not mean to make a normative statement of approval.
Now, I don’t remember seeing terms like “power ratios” in communist documents. But they were clearly masters of what we now call asymmetrical warfare. They said to themselves: well, how can we maximize our advantages while minimizing our disadvantages? This led them AWAY from purely military approaches, so favored in the early years of the First Indochina War, to more reasonable ones. But I am convinced: yes, they did think in terms of calculating how to succeed. In this, they were very rational choice! But they also realized that choice was not all. Coercion, intimidation, threats all had a role too, and if used well, would be a key to success.
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
Mind boggling assumption Les. Suggestive of a sneering disrespect for those who do respond to your baiting. Oops, just did it. I agree with others on up this list. It is a very interesting report, with some new information based on interviews. My guess is that both sides will be able to use it. It got considerable TV coverage last evening on one cable news channel, and the reporting was pretty unbiased.
Monarchy and “voluntary affection”
Stuart 6
” One would hope that’s enough time for the free air to disinfect at least some of the poppycock, bullshit and enforced melodrama that’s been shoved down their throats since childhood.”
In the interests of balance I feel compelled to quote Nietzche (do I lose the argument?)
“If you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you”
One of the fascinations of “Thai gazing” is to be amazed at the crudeness of social manipulation, the ignorance of the masses and exposures of hypocrisy.”
Lest we forget, no nation is immune from this, it is just more refined and developed in first world nations. As a visitor to Australia I have seen much the same phenomena albeit more sophisticated.
There is also a tendency in mankind to avoid self-reflection or “deep-thinking” as I believe it’s referred to in the SE corner of Her Majesties commonwealth 🙂
Thailand before the poll
Simon – 4
Abhsit has just issued a denial – no decree submitted. Should have known better, sorry.
Today’s (Wednesday’s) papers are saying it was submitted yesterday.
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
I guess Human Rights Watch will join the ‘enemies list’ along with AI and The Nation but if anyone wants to read an independent report on last year’s troubles the link is below.
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2011/05/03/descent-chaos-0
The Nation vs WSJ
SteveCM – 13
It’s been “The Notion” for quite some time…..
Sorry Steve, for people a bit slow like myself, could you explain?
Thai Studies conference in Melbourne
Thank you for your support! If you would like to submit your paper for the conference, please send it to me directly. I really hope that the conference will be (one of ) a good meeting place(s) for academics in Thai Studies.
Thailand’s benevolent army
Probably in preparation of things to come
The king never campaigns
The king’s current location might be fairly described as “being under hospital arrest”
New war in Kachin State?
“The present US charge d’affaires, Larry Dinger, in a cable in April last year, proposed various ways of improving ties with Burma, including aid, which he cynically suggested could undermine the regime.
“If properly designed, such assistance builds the basic capacity of people at the grassroots to survive and to think beyond mere subsistence to political goals. Such aid is subversive more directly as well: recipients understand who helps them (international donors) and who doesn’t (the regime),” Dinger said.”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/09/wikileaks-china-impatience-with-burma?intcmp=239
@#27
Is it time for old stooges like you and your ilk to rethink helping the citizenry first instead of, punishing more to change an already repeatedly proven uncaring government?
ICJ press release on Cambodia
[…] ICJ press release on Cambodia […]
The king never campaigns
The “K”-word has been craftily redefined, politicized and exploited by the very people who now decree it to be apolitical.
It is, of course, not really about HM.
Can any reader with genealogist knowledge provide a vague number of how many individuals are considered “Royal” in Thailand and enjoy de facto feudal privileges? The Chakri Dynasty comprises of 21 families according to Wikipedia…
The Nation vs WSJ
Oh – let’s call a spade a spade, shall we? It’s been “The Notion” for quite some time…..
ICJ press release on Cambodia
The “Request for interpretation” is pretty much as expected – but the other “Request for the indication of provisional measures” is potentially more significant in the short term. I’m no lawyer, but it virtually looks like a request for the court to put a restraining order on Thailand….. as well as bringing in consideration of border conflict well away from Preah Vihear.
I don’t suppose it’ll make much difference to Thailand – their accustomed approach to court rulings seems to be to keep going for new ones until you get one you like…..
Amnesty International and Robert Amsterdam
[…] several days of growing discussion and outrage over the Amnesty International statement, published by Southeast Asia researcher Benjamin Zawacki of Amnesty’s International Secretariat, […]
The Nation vs WSJ
Ralph Kramden – 11
Les: I think the buying episode you refer to was Matichon.
You could be right Ralph, but I sort of remember there was a move on the stock exchange in buying the Nation Group’s shares by Thaksin allies sometime after he kicked them off the ITV channel. He took a lot of lessons from Harry Lee in Singapore of course.
Monarchy and “voluntary affection”
Oh dear.As an admirer of Andrew Spooner’s work on Thailand, it’s regrettable he slips into the standard Guardanista mode when discussing the British monarchy.It’s a common position of the bien pensant left in the UK, and one can usually rely on Polly Toynbee to articulate it.And yet it’s so misguided as events have shown time and time again, most notably the huge crowds that turned out at the death of the Queen Mother – to the dismay and frustration of the Guardianistas.It is relevant to Thailand because many of us are dismayed at the way the monarchy has been mobilised for political purposes, but I at least am not hostile to the Thai monarchy – far from it.Andrew needs to understand that in both the UK and Thailand there are millions – almost certainly a majority – who provide the monarchy with overwhelming public support.If Andrew doesn’t understand his own country (he implies the monarchical system has minority support) what hope has he of understanding the aspirations and loyalties of most Thais.
Monarchy and “voluntary affection”
It should be noted that gilded, roadside portraits of the CP, his consort and son have been popping up all over Bangkok and environs over the past month. It seems this new display of “voluntary affection” towards the heir apparent is being shoved down everyone’s throat, and I wonder about the hidden agenda. Why now? What does it imply, if anything, about the current health of HMK? Who benefits politically from this public display of support for the CP? For that matter, why choose him alone and not put up portraits of Princess S or the other Princesses at the same time? Is this an effort to cement his succession to the throne?
IMHO, it would go further toward restoring some respect if he would emulate his closest sister in age and actually bother to engage in a modicum more philanthropy, but I am informed by my reading of the Wikileaks memos that he really doesn’t care what the people think of him.
New war in Kachin State?
Sorry, it was Shari Villarosa, not Leslie Hayden, who filed the report from the US Emabassy in Rangoon:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/161881
The Nation vs WSJ
Les: I think the buying episode you refer to was Matichon. The Nation’s hate of Thaksin was most firmly set when he sent AMLO after some of them on probably trumped-up allegations.
Also, I think it depends when you are saying the the Nation was one of the few that stood up to Thaksin. If you go back to the initial case against Thaksin on assets, you’ll see plenty of critical press coverage. That continued on and off, with Matichon being another. Prachatai was formed out of a feeling that Thaksin was brow-beating the media….
By early 2006, almost all mainstream media were anti-Thaksin.
The Nation does have Pravit, who does some great reporting in amongst a bunch of opinionated nonsense sprouted on its opinion pages. Whatever happened to Thaksin’s impending financial collapse and death that regularly gained a place on those pages as plagiarisms from the madder PAD types?