If they were to spend the same amount of time, effort, and money to train the English teachers in an effective method of teaching English and ensured they did it they would have much better results
Martin Stuart-Fox often highlights the role of the military in controlling the Lao logging trade. This was certainly the case in the 1990s, but there is not much in the way of real evidence of their involvement in more recent times.
First, it is important to recall that in the 1980s, Lao forestry was managed through 9 State Forest Enterprises. Each of the Lao SFE’s was matched with a donor agency.
The SFE-donor cooperation matches were: as follows. SFE 1: Borikhamxai (Sweden); SFE 2: Savannakhet (Vietnam); SFE 3: Vientiane-Borikhamxai (Hungary in 1979, with Sweden taking over in 1981); SFE 4: Khammouane (Soviet Union); SFE 5: Khammouane (Bulgaria, who did not arrive, then transferred to Soviet Union); SFE 6: Xayaboury (2 visits by Czechoslovakia, later logged out by the HIPA-Lan Xang Forest Resource Development concession after 1993); SFE 7: Savannakhet (Soviet Union); SFE 8 Champassak (Poland, although the Polish delegation did not arrive); SFE 9: Vientiane (Asian Development Bank, parts of SFE 3 were also included) (anonymous, personal communication).
The rise of the 3 main military companies in the 1990s (AFD, in the north, BPKP in central Laos, and DAFI in the south) was the outcome of donor pressures to dismantle the original 9 State Forestry Enterprises. Anonymous (2000: 17) wrote: “The power of the military companies in the logging sector was cemented in 1994, by a Prime Ministerial Order which effectively gave them control over the logging quotas within their areas of interest… This marginalized the Department of Forestry…” Some argue this was a mistake, that Laos should have retained their SFE system, as Vietnam has.
The 3 military companies, which also held other commercial interests including sub-national monopolies in mining and fuel imports, were the amongst the strongest development actors on the ground in Laos in the 1990s. They seem to have been operating outside of the control of the MAF (Anonymous, 2000).
For instance, BPKP was initially established in 1984 as a business interest of the Lao People’s Army (specifically, General Cheng Sayavong). BPKP also entered into joint venture partnerships with external industrial partners, in establishing a plywood factory in Lak Xao, Bolikhamxai (Anonymous, 2000: 18). As aid from the Soviet Union fell at the end of the Cold War, and as military budgets were reduced, BPKP expanded into other resource sectors including mining, construction, tourism, import-export and shipping. At its height, Stuart-Fox reports that BPKP managed up to 60 companies under its umbrella, many of which had monopoly control over particular sectors of the Lao economy, although its logging empire accounted for the majority of its revenue. “By 1995, MADC reportedly had an income approaching US$40 million a year (Stuart-Fox, 2008), however there were major financial irregularities within the company, and financial losses and non-performing loans mounted. In 2002 it was removed from the control of the Ministry of Defense and placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The restructuring and splitting of the company was supported by a World Bank International Development Association (IDA) structural adjustment and macro-economic reform credit program, that focused on the reform of deeply indebted/non-performing State Owned Enterprises.
One consultant at the time wrote: “Given the complicated structure of the business portfolio, the origination or cause for non-performance [of BPKP] was not clear. However, it is widely believed that several of the companies within the business portfolio had been under-performing and substantially subsidized by the some of the core firms for extensive periods.” (Anonymous, 2002)
It would appear that by the late 1990s, central and provincial agencies began to re-assert control over logging, away from the military. Trade with Vietnam also began to play an increasingly important role in the southern Lao logging industry at this time. Cornford (2006: 15) writes:
“Allocations for logging quotas were shifted back to the provinces, theoretically under much closer direction from the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry in Vientiane…From 2000, the southern provinces, particularly the eastern provinces of Xekong and Attapeu, turned increasingly towards closer economic ties with Vietnam, and as part of this strategy, granted extensive concessions to Vietnamese logging companies.”
The restructuring of the insolvent BPKP in the early 2000’s also seemed to signal the decline of direct military control over logging and wood enterprises in the key timber producing province of Khammouane, and increasing control over the forestry sector by central and provincial administrations.
Based on interviews with forestry officials, FAO (2008: 7): “Though over the past five years, military companies have become less powerful than they were in the 1990s, the Army still controls all logging and forestry related activities in the border zones, often in joint operations with the Vietnamese military.”
For instance, Lao President Choummaly Sayasone is said to hold an interest in a large sawmilling operation in Attapeu province.
Yet, in their recent studies of the southern Laos timber trade, To Xuan (2009) and Baird (2010) do not emphasize the role of Lao or Vietnamese military units in logging operations. To Xuan (2009) instead focuses upon new of Vietnamese industrial capital, and an imported Vietnamese labour force, in spearheading the ‘joint venture’ logging and wood processing industries of southern Laos.
It seems we need a closer analysis of the actual involvement of the Lao military in commercial resource extraction in Laos, although this is admittedly a very difficult topic for outsiders to study.
Citations:
Anonymous (2000). Aspects of Forest Management in the Lao PDR. Amsterdam: Tropical Rainforest Programme.
Baird, Ian (2010). Quotas, Powers, Patronage and Illegal Rent Seeking: The Political Economy of Logging and the Timber Trade in Southern Laos. Washington DC: Forest Trends.
FAO (2008). Country Outlook Paper: Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Asia Pacific Forestry Outlook Study II. September, 2008.
Stuart-Fox, Martin (2008). Historical Dictionary of Laos. Third Edition. Scarecrow Press.
To Xuan Phuc (2009). Timber Markets and Trade Between Laos and Vietnam: A Commodity Chain Analysis of Vietnamese Driven Timber Flows. Washington DC: Forest Trends.
It does seem ironic that this group is getting so worked up about the temple again, at the very moment that Burma Army troops are making incursions into Thai territory, and Burma Army shells are falling on Thai soil.
Abhisit being trashed by two ‘fringe’ groups on the opposite ends actually legitimizes him as being a worthy leader. Hope he hangs on. Hope the silent majority speaks out in his favor.
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Bangkok Times Online, New Mandala. New Mandala said: New Mandala readership to boom!: BANGKOK, Jan 26 (Bernama) – Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva says that his… http://bit.ly/hSLYgN […]
It does seem that with no Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand and no pro-Thaksin government trying to change the constitution or grant an amnesty to bring him back, the role of, and support for the PAD seriously diminishes.
Let’s see what happens if Pheua Thai form a coalition later this year.;-)
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by ahyangyang, New Mandala. New Mandala said: Doing their best to discredit the nation: Having played a key role in undermining the legitimacy of Thailand’s m… http://bit.ly/f8lrTf […]
This time the yellows have dug themselves a hole they can’t climb back out and I’m sure they know well enough in advance of it. Let’s see when they will start going violent which I suspect is well within their plans…..
As for the Abhisit, with 2 colors now going against him….how much more credit can he get, as the lunatic Sondhi said ” People are being fooled by his good looks” and not by his ability….
As Steve says, excellent analysis. Needing an issue to build a campaign around is exactly right. The Red Shirts have double standards as their rallying cry. PAD, having removed a democratically elected government, can’t really take that line. What else is there but nationalism? The problem is, as countries around the world have found, when this genie comes out of the bottle it’s *really* hard to put back.
The madness of the current situation is not just that we see a rather small-sized crowd (n=2500) of little old ladies and their assorted loony leadership frothing at the mouth saying stupid things, but that the Thai military is playing along with them. They are now planning to conduct military maneuvers including a live artillery fire exercise (a la North Korea) on a mountainside not far from Preah Vihar. Watching the Bangkok Post’s Morning Edition TV broadcast this morning, I was struck by how much Thai politics in this situation is being driven by a mob of people acting like idiots.
Steve –
Is there ANY difference between the Reds and the Yellows? They both want to take over the airport, etc. etc… hasn’t the latest government already sprinkled enough new benefits, to be paid for in the future, to make this work out ok?
As far as I concern the red never attempt the take the air port. Furthermore, the red never use the Phra Viharn for their political agenda, and the very core of their demand is totally on the other side of the PAD. On the last note, this governing didn’t sprinkled anything but the increase the budget deficit from 175 Billion to 380Billion with no obvious major project in sight. Some of the “Dustless Road” project was to demolished a perfectly fine side walk in front of the criminal court and rebuilt it, how is that going to pay out in the future??
GL is correct, the term failed-state initially belonged to Chomsky before it was hi-jacked by the Washington-Axis. Umm.. the term Washington Axis may be a little bit unfair.. let’s put it this way> the only state Chomsky the leftie linguist had in mind was actually the United States (Ideology 1). Somehow the term was picked up conveniently by a few vulgar journalists and technocrats (disguised as academics) at one or two daddy-know-best institutions of the “first” world. Now it has become a label for low performing or “decelerating” economies, which, with little surprise, tend to be the young democracies of the “third” world (Ideology 2).
The “Prime”, not first, not third nations should not pay too much intention to it. Try again, fail again, fail better > Samuel Beckette. If Malaysia’s going to fail I’m sure she’ll land in style. Have faith in your nation ladies & gents. Oh my, this keyboard….. I give up>.
As per this piece from January 25, 1942, the rightwing in Thailand has a long history of generating territorial claims against its neighbors…and in fact, during a brief period of its alliance with Japan in WW II, Thailand occupied large areas of Cambodia and parts of Laos….only to be told to leave once the war was over…..
==============================
Jan 25, 1942 – Thailand joins Axis, declares war on U.S. & UK, claims right to swaths of Cambodia, Laos & China…..
Excellent analysis! What is so valuable about the disputed temple? Ah politics! What will be tremendously encouraging is if the next election goes off just fine. Wouldn’t that be outstanding! That most Thais have their feet on the ground; not wandering around up in the clouds somewhere or telling everyone they are ready to jump off a cliff, then doing it while their leaders sneak off to claim the political rewards. Is there ANY difference between the Reds and the Yellows? They both want to take over the airport, etc. etc… hasn’t the latest government already sprinkled enough new benefits, to be paid for in the future, to make this work out ok?
Naypyidaw is where the multi-billion dollars of natural gas revenue has been wasted and the process is continuing. It’s been nicely enriching the generals and also many a Burmese businessmen like Tay Za and Htay Myint.
Unlike in the photos the grass there is extremely green though, especially after a heavy rain, according to my first cousin who is a lowly subbie to a big- subbie who got the sub-contract to fence the low rise buildings from another big-subbie.
“It’s not the average wisdom of household members pulled together,” says Townsend. Rather, he notes, “It’s suggestive that it is the ability or talent of one individual” that can change a family’s entire economic trajectory.
As a university lecturer, I can tell you that if we look at who is going on for higher education in Thailand, it has got to be at least 80-90 percent female. Once again, it is the women of Thailand who are pulling their families up by their bootstraps.
I totally agree with Les Abbey that the odds are that the house belongs to a “mia farang” who is married to some guy in Austria, Switzerland, or Germany. Take for example a particularly typical poor village in northern Roi Et province, where I happen to know from first hand experience that 60% of the village women are married to foreigners, and more than half of them are living abroad. There are two dozen new homes in the village all valued at between 1 million and 3 million baht. That’s why I am skeptical that such a small percentage of the reported net increase in wealth comes from remittances. I am also very skeptical that 81 percent of the wealth accumulation has been due to accumulated savings of income, unless that income happened to have been denominated in euros, dollars, or pounds.
In 2007, I attended the house warming ceremony in a rural district. The quite impressive concrete house belonged to a policeman from the district police station (his wife was a low-level official in the district branch of a bank). My contact, a school director, had to attend, because he was in the same MA course. He related to me that he actually did not want to go, because people suspected (with reason) that the house was built from money the policeman had corrupted. However, he had to attend. Otherwise, he would have shown his disapproval. That is, sometimes, yes, an explanation, and some more legal and social control would be nice.
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New Mandala readership to boom!
If they were to spend the same amount of time, effort, and money to train the English teachers in an effective method of teaching English and ensured they did it they would have much better results
Family problems in the Lao PDR
Martin Stuart-Fox often highlights the role of the military in controlling the Lao logging trade. This was certainly the case in the 1990s, but there is not much in the way of real evidence of their involvement in more recent times.
First, it is important to recall that in the 1980s, Lao forestry was managed through 9 State Forest Enterprises. Each of the Lao SFE’s was matched with a donor agency.
The SFE-donor cooperation matches were: as follows. SFE 1: Borikhamxai (Sweden); SFE 2: Savannakhet (Vietnam); SFE 3: Vientiane-Borikhamxai (Hungary in 1979, with Sweden taking over in 1981); SFE 4: Khammouane (Soviet Union); SFE 5: Khammouane (Bulgaria, who did not arrive, then transferred to Soviet Union); SFE 6: Xayaboury (2 visits by Czechoslovakia, later logged out by the HIPA-Lan Xang Forest Resource Development concession after 1993); SFE 7: Savannakhet (Soviet Union); SFE 8 Champassak (Poland, although the Polish delegation did not arrive); SFE 9: Vientiane (Asian Development Bank, parts of SFE 3 were also included) (anonymous, personal communication).
The rise of the 3 main military companies in the 1990s (AFD, in the north, BPKP in central Laos, and DAFI in the south) was the outcome of donor pressures to dismantle the original 9 State Forestry Enterprises. Anonymous (2000: 17) wrote: “The power of the military companies in the logging sector was cemented in 1994, by a Prime Ministerial Order which effectively gave them control over the logging quotas within their areas of interest… This marginalized the Department of Forestry…” Some argue this was a mistake, that Laos should have retained their SFE system, as Vietnam has.
The 3 military companies, which also held other commercial interests including sub-national monopolies in mining and fuel imports, were the amongst the strongest development actors on the ground in Laos in the 1990s. They seem to have been operating outside of the control of the MAF (Anonymous, 2000).
For instance, BPKP was initially established in 1984 as a business interest of the Lao People’s Army (specifically, General Cheng Sayavong). BPKP also entered into joint venture partnerships with external industrial partners, in establishing a plywood factory in Lak Xao, Bolikhamxai (Anonymous, 2000: 18). As aid from the Soviet Union fell at the end of the Cold War, and as military budgets were reduced, BPKP expanded into other resource sectors including mining, construction, tourism, import-export and shipping. At its height, Stuart-Fox reports that BPKP managed up to 60 companies under its umbrella, many of which had monopoly control over particular sectors of the Lao economy, although its logging empire accounted for the majority of its revenue. “By 1995, MADC reportedly had an income approaching US$40 million a year (Stuart-Fox, 2008), however there were major financial irregularities within the company, and financial losses and non-performing loans mounted. In 2002 it was removed from the control of the Ministry of Defense and placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The restructuring and splitting of the company was supported by a World Bank International Development Association (IDA) structural adjustment and macro-economic reform credit program, that focused on the reform of deeply indebted/non-performing State Owned Enterprises.
One consultant at the time wrote: “Given the complicated structure of the business portfolio, the origination or cause for non-performance [of BPKP] was not clear. However, it is widely believed that several of the companies within the business portfolio had been under-performing and substantially subsidized by the some of the core firms for extensive periods.” (Anonymous, 2002)
It would appear that by the late 1990s, central and provincial agencies began to re-assert control over logging, away from the military. Trade with Vietnam also began to play an increasingly important role in the southern Lao logging industry at this time. Cornford (2006: 15) writes:
“Allocations for logging quotas were shifted back to the provinces, theoretically under much closer direction from the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry in Vientiane…From 2000, the southern provinces, particularly the eastern provinces of Xekong and Attapeu, turned increasingly towards closer economic ties with Vietnam, and as part of this strategy, granted extensive concessions to Vietnamese logging companies.”
The restructuring of the insolvent BPKP in the early 2000’s also seemed to signal the decline of direct military control over logging and wood enterprises in the key timber producing province of Khammouane, and increasing control over the forestry sector by central and provincial administrations.
Based on interviews with forestry officials, FAO (2008: 7): “Though over the past five years, military companies have become less powerful than they were in the 1990s, the Army still controls all logging and forestry related activities in the border zones, often in joint operations with the Vietnamese military.”
For instance, Lao President Choummaly Sayasone is said to hold an interest in a large sawmilling operation in Attapeu province.
Yet, in their recent studies of the southern Laos timber trade, To Xuan (2009) and Baird (2010) do not emphasize the role of Lao or Vietnamese military units in logging operations. To Xuan (2009) instead focuses upon new of Vietnamese industrial capital, and an imported Vietnamese labour force, in spearheading the ‘joint venture’ logging and wood processing industries of southern Laos.
It seems we need a closer analysis of the actual involvement of the Lao military in commercial resource extraction in Laos, although this is admittedly a very difficult topic for outsiders to study.
Citations:
Anonymous (2000). Aspects of Forest Management in the Lao PDR. Amsterdam: Tropical Rainforest Programme.
Baird, Ian (2010). Quotas, Powers, Patronage and Illegal Rent Seeking: The Political Economy of Logging and the Timber Trade in Southern Laos. Washington DC: Forest Trends.
Cornford, Jonathan (2006). Globalisation and Change in Southern Laos. Occasional Paper No. 1. Bangkok: Focus on the Global South. http://www.focusweb.org/content/view/860/30/
FAO (2008). Country Outlook Paper: Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Asia Pacific Forestry Outlook Study II. September, 2008.
Stuart-Fox, Martin (2008). Historical Dictionary of Laos. Third Edition. Scarecrow Press.
To Xuan Phuc (2009). Timber Markets and Trade Between Laos and Vietnam: A Commodity Chain Analysis of Vietnamese Driven Timber Flows. Washington DC: Forest Trends.
Doing their best to discredit the nation
It does seem ironic that this group is getting so worked up about the temple again, at the very moment that Burma Army troops are making incursions into Thai territory, and Burma Army shells are falling on Thai soil.
Doing their best to discredit the nation
Abhisit being trashed by two ‘fringe’ groups on the opposite ends actually legitimizes him as being a worthy leader. Hope he hangs on. Hope the silent majority speaks out in his favor.
New Mandala readership to boom!
“Abhisit 3.5m web pages into Thai for local youths”
special translation supporting rule by elites/military,
blocking how many other webpages anti the elites/military rule?
New Mandala readership to boom!
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Bangkok Times Online, New Mandala. New Mandala said: New Mandala readership to boom!: BANGKOK, Jan 26 (Bernama) – Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva says that his… http://bit.ly/hSLYgN […]
Doing their best to discredit the nation
It does seem that with no Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand and no pro-Thaksin government trying to change the constitution or grant an amnesty to bring him back, the role of, and support for the PAD seriously diminishes.
Let’s see what happens if Pheua Thai form a coalition later this year.;-)
Doing their best to discredit the nation
[…] This post was mentioned on Twitter by ahyangyang, New Mandala. New Mandala said: Doing their best to discredit the nation: Having played a key role in undermining the legitimacy of Thailand’s m… http://bit.ly/f8lrTf […]
Doing their best to discredit the nation
This time the yellows have dug themselves a hole they can’t climb back out and I’m sure they know well enough in advance of it. Let’s see when they will start going violent which I suspect is well within their plans…..
As for the Abhisit, with 2 colors now going against him….how much more credit can he get, as the lunatic Sondhi said ” People are being fooled by his good looks” and not by his ability….
Doing their best to discredit the nation
As Steve says, excellent analysis. Needing an issue to build a campaign around is exactly right. The Red Shirts have double standards as their rallying cry. PAD, having removed a democratically elected government, can’t really take that line. What else is there but nationalism? The problem is, as countries around the world have found, when this genie comes out of the bottle it’s *really* hard to put back.
Doing their best to discredit the nation
The madness of the current situation is not just that we see a rather small-sized crowd (n=2500) of little old ladies and their assorted loony leadership frothing at the mouth saying stupid things, but that the Thai military is playing along with them. They are now planning to conduct military maneuvers including a live artillery fire exercise (a la North Korea) on a mountainside not far from Preah Vihar. Watching the Bangkok Post’s Morning Edition TV broadcast this morning, I was struck by how much Thai politics in this situation is being driven by a mob of people acting like idiots.
Doing their best to discredit the nation
Steve –
Is there ANY difference between the Reds and the Yellows? They both want to take over the airport, etc. etc… hasn’t the latest government already sprinkled enough new benefits, to be paid for in the future, to make this work out ok?
As far as I concern the red never attempt the take the air port. Furthermore, the red never use the Phra Viharn for their political agenda, and the very core of their demand is totally on the other side of the PAD. On the last note, this governing didn’t sprinkled anything but the increase the budget deficit from 175 Billion to 380Billion with no obvious major project in sight. Some of the “Dustless Road” project was to demolished a perfectly fine side walk in front of the criminal court and rebuilt it, how is that going to pay out in the future??
Malaysia a failed state – The writings are on the wall?
GL is correct, the term failed-state initially belonged to Chomsky before it was hi-jacked by the Washington-Axis. Umm.. the term Washington Axis may be a little bit unfair.. let’s put it this way> the only state Chomsky the leftie linguist had in mind was actually the United States (Ideology 1). Somehow the term was picked up conveniently by a few vulgar journalists and technocrats (disguised as academics) at one or two daddy-know-best institutions of the “first” world. Now it has become a label for low performing or “decelerating” economies, which, with little surprise, tend to be the young democracies of the “third” world (Ideology 2).
The “Prime”, not first, not third nations should not pay too much intention to it. Try again, fail again, fail better > Samuel Beckette. If Malaysia’s going to fail I’m sure she’ll land in style. Have faith in your nation ladies & gents. Oh my, this keyboard….. I give up>.
Doing their best to discredit the nation
As per this piece from January 25, 1942, the rightwing in Thailand has a long history of generating territorial claims against its neighbors…and in fact, during a brief period of its alliance with Japan in WW II, Thailand occupied large areas of Cambodia and parts of Laos….only to be told to leave once the war was over…..
==============================
Jan 25, 1942 – Thailand joins Axis, declares war on U.S. & UK, claims right to swaths of Cambodia, Laos & China…..
http://goo.gl/XnhSR
Doing their best to discredit the nation
Excellent analysis! What is so valuable about the disputed temple? Ah politics! What will be tremendously encouraging is if the next election goes off just fine. Wouldn’t that be outstanding! That most Thais have their feet on the ground; not wandering around up in the clouds somewhere or telling everyone they are ready to jump off a cliff, then doing it while their leaders sneak off to claim the political rewards. Is there ANY difference between the Reds and the Yellows? They both want to take over the airport, etc. etc… hasn’t the latest government already sprinkled enough new benefits, to be paid for in the future, to make this work out ok?
Seeing like a state
Naypyidaw is where the multi-billion dollars of natural gas revenue has been wasted and the process is continuing. It’s been nicely enriching the generals and also many a Burmese businessmen like Tay Za and Htay Myint.
Unlike in the photos the grass there is extremely green though, especially after a heavy rain, according to my first cousin who is a lowly subbie to a big- subbie who got the sub-contract to fence the low rise buildings from another big-subbie.
The Devil’s Discus – in Thai
Frank, may be you found the fast to download small size preview file.
This download can be made from one of the time limited free download services:
https://www.yousendit.com/dl?phi_action=app/orchestrateDownload&rurl=http%253A%252F%252Fwww.yousendit.com%252Ftransfer.php%253Faction%253Dbatch_download%2526batch_id%253DbFlHak96TSs4aU94dnc9PQ
Moving out of poverty
“It’s not the average wisdom of household members pulled together,” says Townsend. Rather, he notes, “It’s suggestive that it is the ability or talent of one individual” that can change a family’s entire economic trajectory.
As a university lecturer, I can tell you that if we look at who is going on for higher education in Thailand, it has got to be at least 80-90 percent female. Once again, it is the women of Thailand who are pulling their families up by their bootstraps.
Moving out of poverty
I totally agree with Les Abbey that the odds are that the house belongs to a “mia farang” who is married to some guy in Austria, Switzerland, or Germany. Take for example a particularly typical poor village in northern Roi Et province, where I happen to know from first hand experience that 60% of the village women are married to foreigners, and more than half of them are living abroad. There are two dozen new homes in the village all valued at between 1 million and 3 million baht. That’s why I am skeptical that such a small percentage of the reported net increase in wealth comes from remittances. I am also very skeptical that 81 percent of the wealth accumulation has been due to accumulated savings of income, unless that income happened to have been denominated in euros, dollars, or pounds.
Moving out of poverty
Andrew #4
In 2007, I attended the house warming ceremony in a rural district. The quite impressive concrete house belonged to a policeman from the district police station (his wife was a low-level official in the district branch of a bank). My contact, a school director, had to attend, because he was in the same MA course. He related to me that he actually did not want to go, because people suspected (with reason) that the house was built from money the policeman had corrupted. However, he had to attend. Otherwise, he would have shown his disapproval. That is, sometimes, yes, an explanation, and some more legal and social control would be nice.